

POLITICAL SCIENCE

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS book is written primarily for students of Indian universities. The course covered is substantially that prescribed by Calcutta University. To bring the subjects abreast of recent developments, in several instances additional material has been incorporated. Most of the qualities peculiar to the arrangement and scope of the book are to be ascribed to the primary end for which the book was undertaken. I venture to hope that the volume may be useful also to students outside India, and to any who wish to acquire a general knowledge of political theory and practice.

In the text of the book classical quotations and untranslated quotations from modern books the language of which is other than English have been studiously avoided. English is the medium of university instruction in India, and the Indian student, as a rule, is unacquainted with any other modern European language. Latin and Greek are likewise unknown to the Indian student, whose classics are Sanskrit and Arabic or Persian. Throughout the book a knowledge of Logic and History has been assumed. Students of Political Economy and Political Science in India normally are expected to have passed the Intermediate Examinations in these subjects.

As this book is meant to be a text-book for the earlier stages of political and economic studies, I have not elaborated what may be called abnormal theories. A fair impersonal presentation of modern political theory has been my endeavour. Originally I meant to include several chapters on the history of political theory, but the book ran the danger of being overcrowded ; so, wherever possible, I have incorporated historical sections in the individual subjects. The treatment of some subjects, e.g., the Government of Britain, and the Government of India, has been much more

detailed than a first course of political studies usually demands. Such detailed treatment is due to the nature of the course prescribed in India. Repetition of detail, e.g., under the Executive (Chapter XVI) and under the individual governments (Chapters XXI–XXVII) is also due to local exigencies. The chapter on the Government of Japan, though not essential according to our local syllabus, is added to enable Indian students to know in outline the system of government in an eastern empire which for many years has created the deepest interest in India.

The bibliography appended is intended as an initial guide to Indian colleges wishing to start Political and Economic studies. The list has been compiled with reference to the sums usually available for such purposes.

In the moulding of ideas which have led to the writing of this book, my obligations have been many. These are best summarized when I say that I owe much to most of the authors whose books I recommend in my library list, and whose theories or facts are specifically mentioned in the text. For more immediate help I am indebted to my late colleagues in Presidency College, Calcutta, the present Professors of Political Economy and Political Philosophy—Mr. J. C. Coyajee and Babu Panchanan Das Mukherji. To the latter in particular I am grateful for many suggestions and criticisms. To Mr. J. C. Kydd, Professor of Political Economy and Political Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College, Calcutta, I am also much obliged for valuable help. Throughout the whole book, from its earlier to its later stages, for criticism, for help in reading proofs and for the compilation of the index, I owe more than I can express to my wife.

R. N. GILCHRIST.

KRISHNAGAR, BENGAL,
February, 1921.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE demand for a second edition of this book has given the author an opportunity of revising the text and of recording many political changes that have taken place since 1920. The main features of the book remain unchanged, and, in some cases (e.g., the Government of Germany) it has been deemed advisable to leave the previous Chapters very much as they were, in spite of political fluctuations. The unsettled state of the post-war period makes it difficult to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary ; and there is less likelihood of confusion for the student if, at the present stage, the more settled facts of history are not mixed up with the fluctuations of present day politics. The revision and printing have been carried through at high pressure, but even so it has not been found possible to record all the changes that have occurred recently. An instance will be found at page 385, where the island Ascension is stated to be under the British Admiralty. It has recently been transferred to the administration of St. Helena. Such instances show the necessity of periodical reference to standard works such as the *Statesman's Year Book* in order to keep the descriptive parts up to date.

R. N. GILCHRIST.

CALCUTTA,
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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY

1. THE NAME AND SCOPE OF THE SCIENCE

POLITICAL SCIENCE deals with the state and government. Within its scope are included so many subjects that writers have found considerable difficulty in finding a name sufficiently wide to cover its content. **The Name of the Science** Political Science has now been widely accepted as the general designation for the science of the state and government, but several other names have been suggested. This is not without reason, for in a science which is older than Aristotle, the developments have naturally been very wide and far-reaching ; indeed, several of the subjects with which we deal in this book have really developed into independent sciences. Political Science is one of the many sciences of society, and, as we shall see presently, it is impossible to draw absolute lines of demarcation between one branch of social science and another. The term is now a generally accepted one, indicating certain definite lines of study, all of which revolve round one centre—the State.

Some writers, especially the earlier writers on the subject, use simply the word Politics as a title for the science. This word is derived from the Greek **Politics** word *polis*, meaning a city, with its derivatives *polites*, a citizen, and the adjective *politikos*, civic. Other writers, using the word Politics as a general designation, subdivide the science into two broad divisions, viz., Political, Philosophy, Theoretic or Deductive Politics, and Historical, Applied or Inductive Politics. Sir

Frederick Pollock, for example, the well-known English writer on the subject, divides the science thus :—

<i>Theoretical Politics</i>	<i>Applied Politics</i>
A. Theory of the State.	A The State (actual forms of Government).
B. Theory of Government.	B. Government (the working of Governments, Administration, etc.).
C. Theory of Legislation.	C. Laws and Legislation (Procedure, Courts, etc.).
D. Theory of the State as an artificial person.	D. The State personified (Diplomacy, Peace, War, International Dealings).

The first of these divisions, Theoretical Politics, is concerned with the fundamental characteristics of the state, without particular reference to the activities of government or the means by which the ends of the state are attained. The second division, Practical Politics, deals with the actual working of governments and the various institutions of political life. This division is both useful and exhaustive. It covers the whole field of Political Science, and, were the name Political Science substituted for Politics, the division would be universally acceptable. To the use of the word Politics, however, there is a well-grounded objection. Used in its original Greek sense, the word is unobjectionable, but modern usage has given it a new content which makes it useless as a designation for our Science. The term Politics nowadays refers to the current problems of government, which as often as not are more economic in character than political in the scientific sense. When we speak of a man as interested in politics, we mean that he is interested in the current problems of the day, in tariff questions, in labour questions, in the relations of the executive to the legislature, in any question, in fact, which requires, or is supposed to require, the attention of the law-makers of the country. Similarly a "politician" is not a student of Political Science but a member of this or that political party. The words politics and politician, therefore, are so wide in application and indiscriminate in use that once and for all they had better be rejected as names for our science and students of our science. The etymological meaning is not the current meaning, and it is better in this case to bow to current usage than to etymology, just as the sister science, Economics, has done.

The word Economics etymologically means household management, now known as Domestic Economy: the study of wealth is now definitely known as Political Economy or Economics.

Another name which is sometimes used is Political Philosophy. This term is a most useful one if used for a specific purpose, but it is too narrow to include the whole field covered by our subject.

Political Philosophy deals with the fundamental problems of the nature of the state, citizenship, questions of duty and right, and political ideals. This forms part of our subject. In the opinion of some English political thinkers, this is the main part of Political Science. Sidgwick, for example, declares that the study of Political Science, or, as he calls it Politics, "is concerned primarily with constructing, on the basis of certain psychological premises, the system of relations which ought to be established among the persons governing, and between them and the governed, in a society composed of civilized men, as we know them." Another considerable part of our subject is historical and descriptive—the Applied Politics of Sir Frederick Pollock's division. This latter section, though closely concerned with Political Philosophy, would be out of place in a pure Political Philosophy course. Political Philosophy is in a sense prior to Political Science, for the fundamental assumptions of the former are a basis to the latter. Political Philosophy, in its turn, has to use much of the material supplied by Political Science. No definite line can be drawn between them, but according to modern usage Political Science has a certain definiteness of meaning which Political Philosophy has not yet attained.

French writers sometimes use the plural form, the Political Sciences, which is correct inasmuch as the various phenomena of the state and government really may be studied separately. Thus Sociology, Political Economy, Constitutional Law and Public Administration, all deal with phenomena closely connected with the state. These are special sciences, dealing with distinct branches of enquiry. Political Science too, as we understand it, deals with a particular subject in a general way. All these sciences, Political Science included, are social sciences; they deal with the relations of men in society,

The
Political
Sciences

and as each man is essentially connected with the state, each social science is to some extent a political science. It is possible, however, to separate the various branches of enquiry. Political Economy deals with wealth; Sociology with the forms of social union, social laws and ideals; Political Science with the state and government. No absolute separation is possible. In Political Science we touch on problems which really belong to the domain of Sociology, Political Economy, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional law. Political Science deals with the general problems of the state and government; these others deal with special problems.

Both reason and usage, therefore, justify the name Political Science. Its central subject is the state, and the scope

Political Science : its Scope of the science is determined by the enquiries that arise in connection with the state. These enquiries may broadly be classed under the state as it is; the state as it has been; the state as it ought to be. To discuss the state as it is implies an analysis of the meaning of the state, its origin and its essential attributes. The various working manifestations of the state, that is, the principles and practice of existing governments naturally fall under this head. Under the state as it has been is included a historical survey of the working of governments, or the historical development of the state and of ideas concerning the state. The state as it ought to be includes the analysis of the functions of government, and a determination of the principles on which governments may best be conducted.

2. THE METHODS OF THE SCIENCE

Aristotle, the greatest writer on the subject the world has had, called Political Science the master or supreme science. Several modern critics, however, refuse to Political Science the right of even the name science. They say that the subject-matter of the science is so varied, and in many cases so inexact, that proper scientific methods cannot be applied to it. The arguments of such critics apply equally to all the social sciences. Social, political and economic problems deal with the complex actions and motives of men, for which it is often admittedly difficult to find general laws. The exactness of Physics and Chemistry

Is Political Science a Science ?

is absent from the social sciences. It is impossible to deal with problems of man in the clear-cut way by which we can deal with problems of matter. It is easy to analyse a chemical compound and to say exactly what it is. Experiments, too, in these natural sciences enable laws to be tested with accuracy and in various ways. While we may agree that the exactness of the natural sciences is impossible of attainment in the social sciences, nevertheless social problems can be treated with the same scientific methods as Chemistry or Physics. The results, indeed, may not be so accurate or so easily tested, but, as we shall see, the various subjects with which we deal present a systematized mass of material which is capable of being treated by ordinary scientific methods. We shall see that general laws can be deduced from given material, and that these laws are useful in actual problems of government. To say that the only real sciences are those which have exact results, with the dogmatic proof of experiment, is to deny the possibility of Ethics, Political Economy, Political Science, Sociology and Metaphysics being sciences. The chief disproof of the contention is that they are recognized as sciences by thinking men. They are rapidly expanding, and as time goes on, their suitability for the application of scientific methods is amply demonstrated.

It is true that in Political Science there are many difficulties which do not occur in, say, Chemistry or Physics. In the Natural Sciences it is possible by observation and experiment to obtain uniform and exact laws. One chemical element is exactly the same all the world over; any variations in its composition can be tested and explained. In Political Science it is difficult to find uniform and unvarying laws. The material is constantly varying. Actions and reactions take place in various and often unforeseen ways. A man is a member not only of a state, but of a host of other social groups—a municipality, a church, a trade-union, a stock-exchange, a university, a caste or a family. To understand his actions in one phase of his life often requires a knowledge of the social groups influencing him, or influenced by him. Social and political relations are constantly changing, and what may be true of them to-day may not be true a century hence. In all matters concerning man, too, there are unconscious

**Difficulties
in Political
Science**

assumptions in the mind, which, formed before the mind consciously reacts to them, often give a bias to our judgments. It not infrequently happens in social sciences, like Political Economy and Political Science, that at the outset of our study we cannot lay down the final limits of the subject-matter. The methods of enquiry are frequently best explained by using them, and observing their results when applied to concrete problems. Complete and final answers to questions in social science can be given only when the science is ended. Historically, we find that a body of systematic knowledge is built up before reflexion analyses its presuppositions. What is historically a late development of the science is logically the first and fundamental question, so that the methods are often best understood by an analysis of the actual scope of the science.

Though the experimental method as applied in Physics and Chemistry is inapplicable, nevertheless there is a wide field of experimentation of a definite kind in Political Science. The Political Scientist cannot select one community here and another there and experiment with democracy in the one and socialism in the other. Even if he could, his results would be influenced by various kinds of unpredictable causes such as wars, revolutions, strikes and religious movements. The source of the experiments of Political Science is history; they rest on observation and experience. Every change in the form of government, every new law passed, every war, is an experiment in Political Science. These are materials for political science just as, say, carbon is material for Chemistry. Most of these events do not take place as conscious experiments: they simply happen. In the modern world, however, political experiments *are* made, definitely based on reasoning provided by Political Science. Two notable examples may be quoted—one, the grant by the English Parliament of responsible government to Canada in accordance with the recommendations contained in Lord Durham's Report of 1839; the other, the grant by Parliament of constitutional reforms to India on the basis of the recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. In these cases the conclusions are definitely grounded on bases provided by Political Science, and, therefore, conscious political experiments are made or proposed.

Experimental Methods

The chief method of experimentation in Political Science is thus the Historical Method. Properly to understand political institutions, we must study them in their **The Historical Method** origin, their growth and development. History not only explains institutions, but it helps us to make certain deductions for future guidance. It is the pivot round which both the inductive and the deductive processes of Political Science work.

The historical method, of which the best modern English exponents are Seeley and Freeman, is mainly inductive. By it generalizations are made from the observation and study of historical facts. More than any other method, it gives positive results. **Sidgwick's View of the Historical Method** Philosophical political scientists do not give it the same importance as the Historical School. Sidgwick, for example, gives this method a secondary position, for two reasons. First, he holds that history cannot determine the ultimate standard of good and bad, or of right and wrong in political life. The goodness or badness of the political institutions which history shows us is determined on other grounds than historical, i.e., ethical or philosophical. Second, the study of history only in a very limited way can enable us to choose means for the attainment of the end of political life, for not only is it difficult to ascertain the complete bearing of past events with accuracy, but also each age has its own problems and difficulties, all of which are relative to the times in which they occur.

Sidgwick's objections are quite justifiable in the case of the indiscriminate use of historical material. But the Political Scientist must exercise careful judgment in his analysis and selection of material. History itself, moreover, is becoming more and more exact as time goes on, so that the objection regarding accuracy loses its meaning. History, too, enables us to judge the goodness or badness of actions, though it does not provide us with our actual ethical standards. As in all scientific methods, the greatest care must be used in the application of the historical method. Otherwise it may degenerate into what Bluntschli, the well-known German writer, calls "mere empiricism," which means too great adherence to historical facts, without due regard to causes and effects, and rigid conservatism, on the ground that what has been in the past must be now and for the future.

The Historical Method is supplemented by the Comparative Method, a method which is as old as Aristotle.

Comparative Method This method tells us that, in order to find out the laws which underlie them, we must compare the various events of the world's history. Similar events may occur under very different political conditions, or *vice versa*, similar political conditions may lead to very different political events. Revolutions, for example, have happened at all times and under various conditions. By the Comparative Method we sift out what is common, and try to find common causes and consequences. A modern example is the Russian Revolution. Political Scientists compare it with the English Great Rebellion and the French Revolution, trying not only to explain what has happened but to lay down rules for the future guidance of the Russians.

The Comparative Method must be used with great care. In trying to find general principles underlying historical events, many elements of difference have to be examined. The social system, the economic conditions, the temperament of the people concerned, the capacity for political life, their moral standard, their qualities of obedience or law-abidingness, all must be taken into account. A comparison of the United States and India, for example, as regards democracy would be useless, were not the fundamental difference of caste thoroughly analysed, with its bearings on political phenomena.

In the Comparative Method the ordinary processes of inductive logic must be followed. These are (a) the Method of Single Agreement, by which, among a number of instances of political phenomena, we find one element in common. This element, extracted by a process of elimination, whereby irrelevant antecedents are dispensed with, is the cause. The chief difficulty of this method is the possible existence of a plurality of causes. To cope with this we must vary the circumstances as much as possible by multiplying the instances. (b) The Method of Single Difference, in which, given a certain political phenomenon, if an instance in which this phenomenon occurs and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance in common save one, that one circumstance, in which the two differ, occurring in the first phenomenon, is the cause. (c) The

Double Method of Agreement, or, as John Stuart Mill calls it, the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. If various examples in which a political phenomenon occurs have only one element in common, while various similar instances in which it does not occur are marked by the absence of this element, then the element present in one and absent in the other is the cause or an integral part thereof, of the phenomenon. (d) The Method of Residues, according to which, after we have subtracted from the given political phenomena such parts as are already known to be cause and effect, the remnant may be judged to be the effect of the remaining causes. (e) The Method of Concomitant Variations, whereby if a phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in another manner, then they somehow are connected by cause and effect.

These methods, applicable in a natural science like Chemistry, are equally applicable in Political Science, though the results are not so accurate. Particular care
Analogy in Political Science is required in the case of one inductive method, viz., Analogy, where two things, because they resemble each other in certain points, may be regarded as resembling each other in all other points, though no definite cause can be found for such resemblance. Analogy is very useful in Political Science, but it must never be forgotten that analogy is not proof. It gives probability, not certainty, and the difficulty of its application in Political Science is all the more marked because of the vast number of circumstances surrounding any given instance.

These inductive methods are useful so far, but they must be used in conjunction with what Bluntschli calls the Philosophical Method. The truly Philosophical, Deductive or *a priori* method of which Rousseau, Mill and Sidgwick are exponents, starts from some abstract original idea about human nature and draws deductions from that idea as to the nature of the state, its aims, its functions and its future. It then attempts to harmonize its theories with the actual facts of history. The danger of this method is that the user, as Plato in his *Republic* or More in his *Utopia*, often allows his imagination to run riot and he forms theories which have little or no foundation in historical facts. The result is that the method degenerates into what Bluntschli calls mere Ideology, which pays little or

The Philosophical Method

no attention to facts. This is particularly dangerous in practice, as may be seen from the French Revolution, the leaders of which were the unreasoning followers of those who, like Rousseau, preached the doctrine of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. A modern example is the Russian Revolution, where abstractions preached by dreamers led to a collapse of the governmental system and to anarchy and mob-rule unparalleled in history.

The two methods, historical and philosophical, do not conflict: they rather supplement and correct one another.

The Right Method

The genuine historian as such is compelled to recognize the value of philosophy, and the true philosopher must equally take the counsel of history. The experiences and phenomena of history must be illumined with the light of ideas. The best method thus arises out of the blending of the Philosophical and the Historical Methods. Aristotle and Burke are notable exponents of this method.

These are the methods of Political Science. Difficulty sometimes arises in the methodology of Political Science

Methods and Points of View

from confusing with methods the points of view from which the science may be studied. Certain writers, chiefly French and German, give as methods the Sociological, Biological, Psychological and Juridical. These are not methods, but points of view. To study the state from the Sociological point of view means to apply the theory of evolution to political phenomena; the Biological Method tries to interpret the state and its organization by comparing it with the living body, with brain, nerves, muscles, etc.; the Psychological tries to explain political phenomena through psychological laws; and the Juridical regards political society as a collection of laws, rights, and duties, without reference to the many other social forces influencing man in his relations with others.

Not only, therefore, is Political Science a science with material as definite as that of Chemistry, Physics or

Conclusion Geology but it is a science where the recognized methods of these sciences can be regularly applied. Because slight shades of difference may vitiate a whole conclusion, as a science it is more difficult than the Natural Sciences. The difficulty in the application of these methods arises from the innumerable elements, undefined

and undefinable, which occur in any science of man. Much patience in comparing details, much care in applying inductive methods, much mental balance in making judgments, all these are necessary in Political Science. It is a science which taxes the scientific mind to the utmost ; and its conclusions, no less than the discoveries of Chemistry, vitally affect the daily lives of the inhabitants of the globe.

3. THE RELATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE TO ALLIED SCIENCES

Man is a social being, and his various social activities may be studied separately. His political life is only one part of his total social life, but as every human being lives within a state, the science of the state is necessarily connected with the other social sciences.

The various sciences dealing with man as a social entity are called the social sciences, and the most fundamental of them all is Sociology. Sociology is the general social science. It deals with the fundamental facts of social life, and, as political life is only a part of the sum-total of social life, Sociology is wider than Political Science. Sociology is the study of the elementary principles of social union. It is not the sum of the various social sciences but the fundamental science of which, to use the term of a well-known American writer, Professor Giddings, they are "differentiations". In Political Science we must assume the facts and laws of human association, which facts and laws it is the duty of Sociology to study and determine. The exact boundaries of the two sciences cannot be rigidly defined. They occasionally overlap ; but there is a clear general distinction. Sociology is the science of society : Political Science is the science of the state, or political society. Sociology studies man as a social being, and, as political organization is a special kind of social organization, Political Science is a more specialized science than Sociology.

Political Science, as we have already seen, is intimately connected with History. Sir John Seeley, a well-known English writer on History and Political Science, has expressed the relationship in a classic couplet :—

History without Political Science has no fruit,
Political Science without history has no root.

History is a record of events ; it tells the how and why of happenings. It is an account not only of events but of conditions and causes. History provides the raw material of Political Science. Not every type of history, however, is used by Political Science. The history of language, of customs, of battles, of art, of literature, for example, have no direct bearing on Political Science. Political Science is concerned mainly with political history and the history of the particular institutions which form the subject-matter of the science. These institutions can be properly understood only in their historical setting. History explains them by tracing their growth and explaining their changes in structure. Political Science, using this material, takes a wider view. It tries to find general causes and laws. Political Science, as we shall see, has a definitely historical section. In a treatise on Political Science we must trace the history of various institutions, not for the sake of history but to enable us to form the conclusions of our science. Inasmuch as history not merely records events but analyses causes and points out tendencies it overlaps Political Science. Political Science, however, goes further. It uses historical facts to discover general laws and principles ; it selects, analyses and systematizes the facts of history in order to extract the permanent principles of political life. Political Science, further, is teleological, that is to say, it deals with the state as it ought to be, whereas history deals with what has been.

The general line of demarcation between Political Science and Political Economy or Economics is clear. Political Science is the science of the state : Economics is the science of wealth. Economics deals with the production, consumption, distribution and exchange of wealth, subjects which form a body of material quite distinct from that of Political Science. Obviously, however, government is closely concerned with economic matters. A glance at the prevailing questions before modern legislatures will show that a very large number, such as disputes between labour and capital, and the imposition of tariffs, are concerned with industrial and commercial matters. All economic activities are carried on within the state on conditions laid down by the state in laws, and the prevailing theories of state or of government functions profoundly

affect the economic life of a country. It is a matter of first-rate importance to the producer of wealth, for example, to be able to judge whether the prevailing tendencies are individualistic or socialistic. Questions of individualism and socialism, indeed, illustrate better than any other the interaction of Political Science and Economics. As a rule they are treated fully in text-books on both Economics and Political Science, the political and economic arguments alike being set forth whether the book is meant as a text-book in Economics or Political Science. The two sciences, while each has its distinct subject-matter, are thus closely related. Political movements are profoundly influenced by economic causes : economic life is conditioned by political institutions and ideas. So close is the connexion that scientific writers of a century ago regarded Economics as a branch of Political Science. Nowadays we separate the sciences, regarding both as differentiations of the more general science of Sociology.

Political Science, the science of political order, is also closely connected with Ethics, the science of moral order.

Ethics On general grounds the line of division is clear.

Ethics is the science of conduct or morality. Ethics deals with the rightness and wrongness of man's conduct, and of the ideals towards which man is working. Each man must live in a state, therefore both rightness and wrongness of conduct, and the moral ideal, must be concerned with the state. The political ideal cannot be divorced from the ethical ideal. We cannot conceive a perfect state where wrong ethical ideals prevail. The ethical and the political must in this case coincide. The science of Ethics is therefore prior to Political Science. We must settle the basis of right and wrong before we discuss political institutions and ideals.* Ethics is a study of human motives, an analysis of intention, of desires and of the moral end, and this moral end is the ultimate justification of Political Science. Both sciences are teleological, and in their ideals they must be in agreement ; but the main body of material is distinct.


The close inter-relation of these various sciences with Political Science is shown by the place universities have given it in curricula. Sometimes it is established as a subject by itself, independent of other subjects ; sometimes it is given as a half-subject with Political Economy ;

sometimes it is included in the History course, sometimes in the Philosophy course, and as an optional or compulsory subject it is included as a rule in the Honours courses of all these subjects.

As time goes on, more and more subjects closely connected with the state tend to develop into independent sciences.

Other Sciences Public Administration, for example, which examines the principles and practice of governments, and Comparative Politics, which, by the comparative method, examines the various kinds of governments, trying to deduce general laws therefrom, both promise to become independent sciences. With other sciences already recognized as such, Political Science has more or less close relations. Jurisprudence, or the science of law, is intimately concerned with the state; Anthropology, the science which deals with the existence, development and interpretation of customs, dress, superstition, religious festivals, and social institutions generally; Ethnology, the science of races; and Religion, especially the comparative study of Religion, which shows the effect on political institutions of religious beliefs and observances—all these sciences in a greater or lesser degree are related to Political Science.

Diagrammatically the relation of Political Science to the other social sciences may be shown in a general way thus :—



CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

1. DEFINITION OF THE STATE

Before attempting to define the word "state" as used in Political Science, we must first dismiss a certain number of verbal ambiguities which arise chiefly from the inexactness of every-day language. The word is often used indiscriminately to express a general tendency or idea. Thus in phrases like state control, state railways, state education, it indicates the collective action of the community through government as contrasted with individual management. In "state regulation" and "state management" the word state is used where, strictly speaking, government should be used. In the phrase "church and state" the organization of civil power as distinguished from religious power is indicated. Again, we speak of the Indian States, the State of Prussia in Germany, the State of New York in the United States of America, the State of Victoria in the Australian Commonwealth. Not one of these uses is scientifically correct. One of the essential characteristics of a state is sovereignty, a characteristic lacking in every one of these so-called states. Unfortunately no general name has found acceptance even in Political Science for these "states", all of which are only units or parts of a state in the scientific sense of the term. The word "province" might be usefully employed, but as yet it has not found favour, and at present the double use of the word state continues in both scientific books and popular language. At the outset of his studies in

**Different
Meanings
of State**

Political Science, the student is warned to note this confusion. Finally, we have to bear in mind that there is the juristic meaning of state, in International and Constitutional Law, which regard the state as an artificial person with definite rights and duties, as distinguished from the natural person or ordinary citizen.

We have already seen that Political Science is a particular branch of the science of society, or sociology. Society is composed of a number of individuals living together and entering into relations with one another. The state is a type of society regarded from a definite point of view. Social relations vary, and of these political relations form one class: it is with these that we are concerned in Political Science. The political life of man lends colour to and borrows colour from his other social activities. The political relation, however, does not either sum up or control the other social relations of man. Political order is one of several orders—social, moral, religious—and its distinguishing characteristic is the state, with its visible human institutions of laws and government.

Definitions of the state are as numerous as are the books written on the subject. Quoted below are a number of modern definitions, given by writers from various points of view. The first two are by well-known English lawyers—Holland and Phillimore.

Holland defines the state thus:—

“A numerous assemblage of human beings, generally occupying a certain territory, amongst whom the will of the majority, or of an ascertainable class of persons, is by the strength of such a majority, or class, made to prevail against any of their number who oppose it.”

Phillimore says that the state is

“A people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by common laws, habits, and customs into one body politic, exercising through the medium of an organized government independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace and of entering into all international relations with the communities of the globe.”

Bluntschli, the German writer, says:—

“The state is a combination or association of men in the

form of government and governed, on a definite territory, united together into a moral organized masculine personality, or, more shortly, the state is the politically organized national person of a definite country."

Sidgwick, the well-known English writer on Philosophy, Political Economy and Political Science, says that the state is a "political society or community, i.e., a body of human beings deriving its corporate unity from the fact that its members acknowledge permanent obedience to the same government, which represents the society in any transactions that it may carry on as a body with other political societies." This government, he says, is independent, in the sense that it is not in habitual obedience to any foreign individual or body or the government of a larger whole.

Professor Burgess, of Columbia University, New York, one of the greatest modern authorities, says that the state is a "particular portion of mankind viewed as an organized unity." Dr. Willoughby, another recognized American authority, says that the state exists "wherever there can be discovered in any community of men a supreme authority exercising a control over the social actions of individuals and groups of individuals, and itself subject to no such regulation." Dr. Woodrow Wilson says simply that the state "is a people organized for law within a definite territory."

These definitions do not agree in all details. Some of them are given from particular standpoints, and are open to criticism on certain points. They contain, however, all the essential ideas necessary to the definition of the state. The state is a concept of Political Science and a moral reality which exists where a number of people, living on a definite territory, are unified under a government which in internal matters is the organ for expressing their sovereignty, and in external matters is independent of other governments.

2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE STATE

The essential elements of the state are thus: first, a number of people, or population; second, a definite place of residence, or territory; third, an organization unifying the people, or government; and, fourth, supremacy in internal matters and independence of external control, or sovereignty.

1. It is obvious that to have a state, which is a human institution, a population of some kind is necessary. No state can exist in an uninhabited land ; nor can there be any state if there is no population beyond a single family. The family may be a centre round which the state grows, but till there is a series of families there can be no state. It is impossible to fix a definite number of men for a state. In the modern world we are familiar with states in which the populations vary from five millions to three hundred millions. Huge states of the modern type were quite outside the range of the old Greek ideas, where the city-state was the working ideal. The city-state, in population, was about the size of a small modern municipality. The idea of Aristotle, the philosopher of the city-state, was that neither ten nor a hundred thousand could form a good state : they were both extremes. Many centuries after Aristotle, Rousseau, the French philosopher, who lived when vast states of many millions existed, thought ten thousand the ideal number. Both these writers considered small numbers essential to good government. In the modern world other principles, such as federalism, empire and nationality, are the determining factors in the size of the state, while the perfection of government which Aristotle and Rousseau thought attainable only with very limited numbers is now secured by what is known as local government. In the modern world the population of states varies greatly, from the few thousands of Monaco to the many millions of Russia and the United States. No limit, either theoretical or practical, can be laid down in this respect.

2. Without a fixed territory there can be no state. The Jews, for example, did not form a state till they definitely settled in Palestine. Conversely, the Huns of 2. **Territory** Attila, in spite of their prowess and their leaders, broke up because they had no real fixed territory. Nomadic tribes, which wander from one part of a country to another, cannot form a state.

As in population, so in territory, no limit can be laid down. States exist to-day with areas varying from eight square miles, as in Monaco, to about nine million square miles, as in Russia. Small states, though they benefit by being compact and easily governed, are at a

great disadvantage in matters of defence and resources as compared with larger states. Unless guaranteed by larger states, small states are liable to invasion and annihilation by greater and more powerful states, as shown by the fate of Belgium in the Great War. In very small states like Monaco and Guatemala, the resources are insufficient to give their citizens the fulness of life and development which larger states can afford. Their disadvantages are similar to those of small scale as compared with large scale production.

The older writers on Political Science almost universally condemned larger states because of their unwieldiness. To govern well a wide stretch of territory appeared quite impossible to them. Two things have completely altered that point of view—first, the rapid development in transit—trains, steamships, the telegraph and aeroplanes—and second, the development of local self-government—in the wider sense, as in the British Dominions with responsible government, and the “states” of a federal union, and in the narrower sense, as in municipalities, counties and districts. No principle can be laid down as to the size of a state. Size, moreover, is no index of greatness. Russia, a huge state in respect of size, is not so great as the smaller France. Great Britain is much more powerful than many states ten times her size. There are many other elements connected with territory which make for greatness: climate, the temperament of the people, geographical configuration, and natural resources are all important factors in deciding both the size and the greatness of a state.

That climate has an important effect on the development of states may be judged from the fact that the highest political development of the world has been reached in the temperate zones. Extremes of both heat and cold affect the physical and mental constitution of the individual and also the natural resources of a country. Extreme cold, as in the Arctic regions, makes the struggle for existence against nature so hard that political life is only a secondary consideration. Extreme heat, as in the tropics, leads to luxuriant vegetation, ample and easily obtainable food, and the enervation of the people. Climatic extremes, whether of heat or cold, tend to produce a fatalistic outlook on life which weakens the mainsprings of

personal effort. The most energetic political life in the world for these reasons has been led in the temperate zones, though, with the growth of education, and the advancing control of mind over matter, the peoples living in the areas of climatic extremes may develop as surely as, though more slowly than, those in temperate parts.

Geographical configuration is also important in fixing the areas of states, as well as giving a peculiar cast to the character of particular peoples. A glance at a map of the world will show how the areas of many states are fixed by boundaries provided by nature, such as the sea, mountain chains, and rivers. **Geographical Configuration** Geographic unity is an important predisposing cause to political unity, as shown by Great Britain, where neighbouring nations clearly marked off from the rest of the world joined to make one state. One of the chief bases of the unity of India is the complete self-containedness of the country, bounded as it is by the sea and the greatest mountain ranges in the world. In the past the many states or subdivisions contained in India were marked out by natural boundaries, such as mountain ranges, rivers and deserts.

Geographical conditions have also had much influence on the creation of states. In the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates, for example, the early Egyptians and Assyrians pitched their camps where nature provided the best conditions for a settled life. Geography also helps to determine the activities of peoples. Rome, for example, became the greatest empire in the old world largely because of her geographical position, which gave her access to other countries by sea. The maritime activity of Britain is explained by the very favourable geographical position she occupies in Europe. England, France, Spain and Portugal, from their natural positions, have been the greatest discoverers, colonizers and empire-builders of the modern world. The geographical position of states also largely determines the policy of their governments. England, the United States and Japan are at present the greatest mercantile nations of the world. They all have powerful navies, to protect not only their shores, but their mercantile fleets. The very existence of England depends on her sea trade; hence arises the necessity of the very powerful British navy.

Germany, on the other hand, used to be bounded on three sides by powerful states, with no natural defences. Germany therefore was a military state, and the necessity for defence compelled her neighbours also to support large armies. Germany also has a fairly large sea-board, and her ambitions were to dominate the world. She therefore built a powerful navy, but her geographical position, especially in relation to Britain, made that navy of little value in the Great War.

Where nature provides defences, the energies of the people can be turned into the channels of peace, not of war. The best defences are the sea and mountain ranges though, with the new aerial war, natural defences are becoming less important. With the advance of invention in transportation, irrigation and drainage, geographical configuration as a factor in development is becoming of less importance as compared to the ingenuity of man.

Resources, in cereals, minerals, etc., have frequently determined the size of states. National strength in the modern world rests on national wealth, and such **Resources** wealth depends on the character of the people and the produce of the land. Desire for national expansion often arises because of the lack of some important mineral, such as coal or iron. In modern warfare, the possession of these minerals is indispensable for both defence and attack. The resources of a country also determine its economic activity and economic activity reacts quickly on political life. Discoveries of new wealth lead to immigration, exhaustion of old wealth to emigration. Wealth excites covetousness, covetousness leads to wars of plunder by the stronger on the weaker.

Besides geography and natural resources, the chief influence* in deciding the size of states has been policy.

Policy Rulers, from personal ambition or a patriotic idea of aggrandizing their own nation, have, through conquest, treaties, or occupation, enlarged the boundaries of their own states, usually at the expense of other states. The many elements which enter into policy, such as empire, nationality, and desire for natural resources are matters for the student of history. The whole range of political history is a commentary on them.

3. For the existence of a state, government is necessary.

Government is the organization of the state, the machinery through which the state will is expressed. A people settled on a definite territory cannot constitute a state till some political organization has been formed. The organization may vary in kind and complexity. Government is the organization which shows that the essential relation of command and obedience has been established. Wherever that is confirmed, whether it is in a vast organization like that of the United States, or in the simple tribal government of the Australian aborigines, there government exists. The government is the organization of the state, the organ of unity, the organ whereby the common purposes which underlie that unity are definitely translated into practical reality. It is the focus of the common purposes of the people. As Professor Giddings says, the state is the "chief purposive organization of civil society." Government is the outward manifestation of the state, and as such is the organization of the common purposes of the people. It is the organ of the community.

4. The fourth characteristic of the state is sovereignty. This is the supreme element of statehood. It differentiates the state from all other social organizations. Other associations exist which can claim a number of people with separate territory and a governmental organization, but there is only one association which has all these elements *and* sovereignty. That association is the state. Sovereignty, in general terms, means supremacy. The state is supreme in both internal and external matters. This sovereignty is expressed through government, which is supreme in internal matters, and independent as regards external governments. The subject of sovereignty is discussed separately in a later chapter.

Population, territory, government, sovereignty are, thus, the essential characteristics of the state. Several other "essential" characteristics are given by writers, but most of them are implied in the above four. Professor Burgess, for example, gives all-comprehensiveness, exclusiveness and permanence as peculiar characteristics of the state, with "sovereignty as the most essential principle. All-comprehensiveness means that the state embraces all persons and associations of persons within the given territory. Exclusiveness means that

Other
Character-
istics

there can be one and only one organization of the state. Both these are essential to government and sovereignty, as we have explained. Permanence means that, whatever the form of government may be, the state always continues to exist. Governments change from time to time; at one period government may be monarchical in form, at another democratic. One government may be subdued by another or disappear by being absorbed by another; but mankind must continue to live within a state. The state is essential to the being and well-being alike of man. As Aristotle said, it arises from the mere necessities of man's existence and continues to exist for the sake of the good life, or for the well-being of man. Permanence therefore does not mean that this or that state continues for ever. So long as this or that state satisfies the above criteria, it does continue permanently. There is an English constitutional maxim which says "The king never dies." Though the king dies or the form of government changes, the state is continuous. Individual states do disappear, but their disappearance is only the disappearance of a type of government, not of the state as such. The state is permanent throughout, as permanent as the human minds the unity of which it is the fundamental expression.

Bluntschli, in common with many other writers of a similar cast of thought, says that the state is organic, that it is a moral and spiritual organism, and masculine. These are allegorical descriptions corresponding to particular points of view from which the state may be regarded. They are not of the essence of the conception of state: in fact, as we shall see in our analysis of the organic theory, they may be expressions of mistaken points of view and theories.

German writers distinguish two meanings of the word state—the idea and the concept of the state. The same is

true of the word society, which, as Professor Giddings points out, means both the individuals entering into social relations and the union which results. According to the Germans, the concept

of the state is the result of concrete thinking. It refers to the actual political types of history. Among these types there is one common element or essence, that is the state. All actual political types, present, past and future, have this

common essence, embodying the idea of the state. The distinction is that of the state as it is, as a matter of organization, and the state in general, differences of organization being left out of account. Some writers, as Bluntschli and Professor Burgess, regard the idea of the state as the state as it ought to be, i.e., its final completion, or perfection.

3. STATE, GOVERNMENT, NATION, NATIONALITY

In the English language certain terms of Political Science are very nearly related in meaning, and the student must be able to appreciate the scientific uses of the words. Much of the difficulty, as we have seen, arises from the carelessness or inexactness of every-day language. All science requires definition, and before we proceed we must distinguish, and define the words state, government, nation and nationality.

Between state and government we have already drawn the line of distinction. *State* is used to denote the sovereign unity of a number of people settled on a fixed territory and organized under one government. *Government* is the practical manifestation or organization of the state and essential to it. In ordinary language state and government are often used interchangeably, but for Political Science a definite distinction is necessary. Government is the machinery through which the ends or purposes of the state are realized. The state is largely an abstraction; government is concrete. Governments change or die; the state is permanent. Government has power in virtue of its relation to the state. It is not sovereign; it has power only because the state grants it power. It exercises sovereign power because it is the organization or practical medium of the sovereign state. It is not even necessarily identical with the form of state.

The student must familiarize himself with this distinction, as it is the solution of some of our most difficult problems, notably sovereignty. Much of the confusion in older writings on Political Science is due to the failure to separate state from government. Hobbes, for example, the upholder of the seventeenth century absolutist theories, declares, in his *Leviathan*, that, if a sovereign dies, the most minute arrangements must be made for the succession to the throne, otherwise the commonwealth, or state, will be dissolved.

But the commonwealth does not depend for its permanence on the adventitious succession of kings. The king is part of the government, but he is not the state. Kings come and go ; but the state continues to exist as long as the common mind on which it is founded is able to express itself.

The words nation and nationality have a common origin.

- They come from the root *natus*, the Latin word meaning *born*. Modern English usage, however, has given distinct meanings to the words. Yet here again language difficulties cause confusion. The ambiguity is due partly to our inexact every day speech, partly to dissension among Political Science writers and partly to the difficulties of translation.

Only in very recent years has a proper distinction been drawn between *nation* and *nationality* in the English language, and as yet this distinction, far from being observed in current speech, is not even universally accepted by writers on Political Science and History. Many writers still use "nation" in our sense of "nationality," and prefer to use "nation-state" for "nation," in the sense used in this chapter. This confusion in English is increased by the use of the word *nation* in the German language. In the German language there is a word *nation*, which does not express the meaning of the same English word. The English equivalent for the German *nation* is *nationality*. The English word *nation*, in spite of the old casual practice and the persistence of some writers (e.g., Dr. Willoughby in his *Nature of the State*), has definitely a political signification, which the Germans denote by the word *volk*, which is usually translated into English as *people*. The English word *people* (as also the French *peuple*) has its nearest German equivalent in *nation*, the English word *nation* having its parallel in the German word usually translated people. The Germans have etymology on their side in the ethnic sense of their word *nation* (from *natus*, born). But the English language has given *nation* and *nationality* distinct meanings, and there is no reason to confuse issues simply because of etymology. Science demands as exact definitions as possible, and if on the one hand popular usage is vague and often wrong, on the other hand there is no reason to divorce scientific from popular usage in words, except (as in the present case to a certain extent) when absolutely necessary.

Nation is very near in meaning to state : the former has a broader signification. It is the state *plus* something else :

the state looked at from a certain point of view

Nation : —viz., that of the unity of the people organized

State in one state. Thus we speak of the British

nation, meaning the British people organized in one state

and acting spontaneously as a unity. On the other hand

we should have hesitated to speak of the Austro-Hungarian

nation, though we could speak perfectly correctly of the pre-

war Austro-Hungarian *state*. There was not that requisite

unity of spirit in the old Austro-Hungarian Union to make

it a nation. This distinction of nation and nationality is of

paramount importance largely because it has not been

observed till quite recently in the literature on the subject.

John Stuart Mill, whose chapter on Nationality—in his

Representative Government—is a classic on this subject,

gives a good lead to thinkers by giving clear ideas on both

the subject and name of nationality; but even in Mill's

works the distinction between nation and nationality is not

brought out. Though T. H. Green, the profoundest of

modern English political thinkers, does not deal directly

with the subject of nationality, he gives, in his *Principles*

of Political Obligation, one or two very apposite passages

regarding the meaning of the word *nation*. "The Nation,"

he says, "underlies the state," and, again, he characterizes

the state as "the nation organized in a certain way." He

also points out that the members of a nation "in their

corporate or associated action are animated by certain

passions arising out of their organization." Till recently

nation and nationality have been used interchangeably; but,

it is far better to use them—indeed many present day scien-

tific writers do—as two separate terms. As yet the unfor-

tunate thing about their separation is that they have to

share the common adjectival form "national." The both

have the same root, *natulus* (which shows a racial substratum

of meaning), but the one, *nation*, has definitely become poli-

tical in meaning, the other, *nationality*, while it also has a

certain political content, lays emphasis on the root mean-

ing of common birth and other common elements (language,

traditions, etc.), usually accompanying common birth.

Nationality is a spiritual sentiment or principle arising

among a number of people usually of the same race, resident

on the same territory, sharing a common language, the same religion, similar history and traditions, common interests, with common political associations, and common ideals of political unity. Territory, race, language, history and traditions, religion, common interests, common political associations, and common hopes of political unity are the elements on which nationality is based. They are the basis of nationality, not nationality itself, which is a spiritual principle supervening when some or all of these elements are present. Not all of these elements taken together, nor any one of them, nor any combination of them, will make nationality. Not one of the elements is absolutely essential; nor are all of them taken together essential. But every nationality has as basis some of them. Nationality is spiritual. The physical element *must* be accompanied by the spiritual; otherwise, there is a body but no soul.

Our distinction of state, nation and nationality may now be made clear by saying that the nation is the state *plus* nationality. Almost every nationality either has been a state (as the Scots), or aspires to be a state, whether it be a new state or the rehabilitation of a previously existing state (as the Poles or Czechs before the war). A nationality may be none the less real though it does not wish to become a complete organic state. Scotland, for example, does not wish severance from the British nation. The cry for Scottish home rule has few supporters: yet the Scotsman is one of the most distinct persons in the world as regards his nationality. It may be said, however, that a nationality which rests on its past glories and does not wish to be a distinct state is in the process of being lost, or of being fused in a greater whole. The Scots may be said to be in the process of fusion in "British" nationality. The Americanism "Britisher" already supplants to a large extent, to members of other nations at least, the older distinctions of English, Scottish, and Welsh. The preservation of nationality depends on the preservation of the social and political institutions of the populations forming the nationality. These may be preserved without absolute autonomy. A federal system, which harmonizes the desire for self-government with the fact of dependence on a wider state, may fully satisfy national needs.

4. THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONALITY

Common residence on common territory is a very usual accompaniment of nationality, but it is by no means either essential or universal. A population living together, definitely settled on a given territory, will naturally tend to have a uniformity of culture and experiences, or, conversely, a population living in the cyclopean "dispersed state" of which Aristotle speaks, will more likely form groups with different experiences and purposes, and thus prevent the growth of the "friendship" so essential to national fusion. Continued residence on a fixed territory is rightly set down by most writers as one of the first elements of nationality. It is essential, indeed, to the growth of nationality, but it is not essential to the continuance of national feeling. A nomadic tribe cannot form a nationality so long as it is nomadic; but if it settles down for a long period and develops, it may become distinctly national. If this tribe by any chance resumes its wandering, quite probably it will preserve its nationality. A glance at the existing nationalities of the world will show firstly, that most nationalities have a given territory, the territory and nationality giving their names to each other (Scotland for the Scots, Denmark for the Danes, France for the French, etc.). Secondly, there are many nationalities distinctly marked as such which have not achieved this ideal of a country of their own (as the Slovaks, Slovenes, and Ruthenians in Austria-Hungary before the war). Thirdly, several nationalities are scattered throughout the length and breadth of the world. This last point shows that common residence on common territory must not be regarded as either a universal characteristic of nationality, or essential to its vitality. Migration does not affect nationality. An Englishman, Scotsman or Irishman is English, Scotch or Irish from one end of the world to the other. The Jews have preserved their nationality in spite of their dispersion. The Czechs, till they achieved nationhood, were as active nationally in the United States as in Bohemia, their home. So also were the Slovaks. One of the biggest and most clearly marked European nationalities, the Poles (though they have still a

Poland), were, and are, almost as dispersed as the Jews ; yet the Pole keeps his nationality in alien environment, even to the third and fourth generation. Dispersion may very easily lead to extinction of nationality, especially if the members of the nationality come into contact with a more virile culture. A weak nationality always tends to be swallowed up by a stronger. Its culture disappears, or is assimilated by the stronger one. Unless the numbers forming a nationality are sufficiently strong to transplant their own home lives, their nationality is in danger of decay. The United States furnishes a good example of how cultures are fused. The descending generations of Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians or Germans usually become thorough-going Americans.

One of the most universal bases of nationality is community of race. This unity of race is characteristic of most nationalities, but here again one must not be too ready to make it an unqualified necessity of national solidarity. For one thing **Community of Race** modern races are so mixed that it is difficult to say what is one race and what is another race. Even the science of races, Ethnology, gives no undisputed theory of races. Opinion on many racial questions among experts is, in even leading questions, confusedly divided. The racial bond of nationality, however, need not be so exact as the science of races demands. Belief in a common origin, either real or fictitious, is a bond of nationality. Every nationality has its legendary tales of its non-historic origins, whether it be the Patriarchs of the Jews, or Hunyor and Magyor of the Huns and Magyars, or the well-known stories of Greece and Rome. Scientifically speaking, a nationality cannot be regarded as a pure family descent. The origins of clans or tribes may, with a considerable degree of truth, be ascribed to some single progenitor, but national feeling cannot emerge without some intermixture of blood. The *ius connubii*, or right of intermarriage, must as a rule precede it. A notable instance presents itself before one's eyes in India. The caste system is essentially non-national. The essence of the Hindu caste system is separation ; the essence of nationality is solidarity. Were nationality dependent on this *ius connubii* alone, there could be no real nationality in India ; but, of course, as has just been pointed out, no single

ingredient of the list given above is essential to nationality. Race-unity is one of the strongest bonds, not because of the ethnological signification of race, but because it implies the further unities of common language, common traditions, and common culture. Were the real race issue to be the criterion, some of the most distinct of modern nationalities would at once break up the theory. The English and Scots are, to a fair extent, ethnologically the same, but they are distinct nationally. Germans and English, Dutch, Danes and Scandinavians, are racially more or less homogeneous, but nationally they are quite distinct. The United States—the most interesting study in nationality in the world—is racially very diverse, but nationally “American.”

Community of language, traditions and culture are closely connected with community of race. Language and race usually go together. Even modern Ethnology uses terms which strictly belong to linguistic divisions. The word Aryan, for example, is, properly speaking, a linguistic term, but it is universally used to designate the “race” of people using Aryan languages. So it is with terms such as Ural-Altaic and Finno-Ugrain, used to distinguish “races.” Most writers on nationality have laid great emphasis on the necessity of common language. Fichte, for example, one of the chief apostles of German nationality, declared that nationality was a spiritual thing, a manifestation of the mind of God, its chief bond of union being language. Language is developed from, and connected with, common experiences, interests and ideals. It really forms the basis of the other elements. Community of interests or ideals is no bond of unity unless they can be understood, and language is the vehicle of understanding. Most of the recent European national movements turned largely on national language, e.g., the Polish and Bohemian movements. The obverse is seen in the German and Magyar policy of suppression of languages of subject nationalities. That language alone must not be taken as a determinant of nationality is shown by the United States, which uses the English language but has its own nationality; and again by Switzerland, in which there are one nationality and three distinct languages.

This community of language, implying common intercourse, common culture, and, as is usually the case, ac-

companying a real or fictitious common origin and common history, is vitally important to nationality. The greatest barrier to intercourse between peoples used to be mountains and seas. These are now overcome, but there remain the barriers of language, and in this connection the modern world witnesses two diametrically opposed tendencies. On the one hand, many zealous people believe, and try to translate their faith into fact, that there should be one universal language. On the other hand one of the chief pleas of all nationalists is language. Thus Bohemia for the Czechs means a Czech language for a Czech people. The national movements of the Slovaks and Slovenes and other small nationalities mainly turned on language. At the present time there are distinct movements in India in favour of one Indian language and for the encouragement of all Indian languages.

Religion is an important basis of nationality, but history provides many examples of nationalities which have developed in spite of religious differences. An important distinction must be kept in mind in this connection. National union, other things being equal, is not likely to be strong and lasting where there are fundamental differences in faith, as between Christianity and Mohammedanism. Nationality may develop in spite of difference of *sect*. The Serbo-Croatian national movement is a case in point. The Serbs are mainly Orthodox; the Croats, almost to a man, are Roman Catholic. The language of Serbs and Croats is the same (though written in a different script), their traditions and culture are similar, but their religious sects are distinct. None the less the bridge of union has been built in spite of sectarian differences. In the new Serb, Croat, and Slovene State, which includes the old Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina, there are over one and a quarter million of Moslems who must either migrate from a unified Jugo-Slavia or be content to remain a hostile minority. The Magyars and Turks, sons of the same legendary father, are racially the same, with close affinities in language; but their religious separation into Christians and Moslems has for ever destroyed hopes of national reunion. Religion can undoubtedly be a strong incentive to national feeling. The identification

of Protestantism with patriotism, for example, made England defeat Spain in the time of the Armada. The State and Church for many centuries in Western history were so much interrelated that the finest logicians of the time could not satisfactorily demarcate their spheres. Their affairs were so inextricably connected that in mediaeval and early modern times state wars were church wars and church wars state wars. The conjunction of church and state meant very intense patriotism; and in the modern world, where the church has, relatively to the state, receded to the background, patriotism is based on other and new ideals. Yet this also must be noted that religions, either as a whole or in their sects, are powerful agents of dissolution.

Political Union, either past or future, is one of the most marked features of nationality, so marked indeed that of the various unities it may almost be said to be the only essential. A nationality lives either because it has been a nation, with its own territory and state, or because it wishes to become a nation with its own territory and state. Most of the vocal nationalities of the modern world depend for their national vitality on the fact that they aspire to nationhood. The extreme expression of this tendency is the cry "one nationality, one state"—an aspiration which, if carried to its logical extreme, is dangerous and deleterious. The feeling of nationality, in fact, often emerges only through opposition of the ideals of a subject unified population to those of its masters. Misgovernment is a prolific parent of nationality. On the other hand, a population living for a considerable period under one state, if that state is tolerant in its ideas and practice, tends to become one nationality. A prominent example is the United States, where peoples of many different nationalities have been fused in the one American nationality. The terms German-American, Czech-American, and the like, indicate the process of fusion. The population of the United States is composed largely of immigrants who in the first generation are pure Englishmen, Scotsmen, Germans, Poles, Magyars, or Czechs. Their children become political half-castes, and the third and fourth generations lose their parental prejudices and become pure Americans. Common political union is the most powerful, though not the only agent in such a fusion.

Common interests are likewise closely connected with the development of nationality. A population which is clearly marked off from others by characteristic commerce and industries tends to develop a characteristic nationality. These interests need not be merely commercial. They may be diplomatic. Common interests are rather aids towards strengthening union than fundamental agents of union. They have had their importance in conjunction with other elements more than by themselves. They have played their part in nationalities such as the Dutch and Belgian, but, were they the sole determinants, Holland and Belgium would probably not exist at all. They were obvious considerations in the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, but they are quite discounted in North America where the material interests of the United States and Canada are very much the same. With the co-operation of other agents, we see it working in the British Responsible colonies where distinct colonial nationalities in the Australians, South Africans, etc., are visibly developing.

Nationalities are based on some or other of the above factors; but nationality is spiritual, formed by common ideals acting on a number of minds. Its natural basis may be one element or a combination of elements: in itself it is essentially spiritual, usually seeking its physical embodiment in self-government of some form. Self-government once attained, the national ideal becomes no longer an ideal but a realized fact, and is therefore dormant, to be revived by some external danger to the state. The various "unities" given above are the chemical elements of the protoplasm; the ideal gives the life. It is necessary to emphasize this, for many theorists have tried to sum up nationality in one, some or all of these "unities". Certain writers have argued that the economic motive (common interests) is the main bond of nationality. Economic forces have played their part, a powerful part, in moulding new nationalities, and states have not been blind to the importance of this force. The Germans, for example, tried to supplant Polish nationality by "planting" Poland with Prussian peasants; but history, instead of teaching how economic forces have made nationalities, shows rather how nationalities have lived in spite of economic forces.

Nationality may exist before national ideals are definitely

talked of in the press or on the platform. The consciousness of social union emerges from the natural fact of social grouping, but only gradually does the national self emerge as a definite group force as distinct from other group forces. From the lowest form of tribal group-consciousness the feeling of community develops till, in more advanced forms of social organization, it is complex and difficult to analyse. The child is born into his social group, and gradually assimilates the particular customs, traditions, mannerisms and mental outlook of his group. He feels a pride in his own characteristic culture, even though it may be only parochial. His culture is his own: he rejoices in it, and feels as a personal insult any slur cast on his own community. Nationally, thus, the individual becomes a type living in a society of such types, and to preserve his community he is willing to surrender himself for the general good. Not every individual, of course, is as intensely national as this. But national feeling always has the double aspect of altruism and egoism, each of which aspects may go to extremes. The extreme of egoism leads to the desire of domination, to the pride of type which insists on the imposition of its *Kultur*, or mental and moral habit-code, on everyone else. This, in part at least, is the explanation of the German imperialism which led to the Great War. The extreme of altruism takes the form of an exaggerated, nervous, unreasoning patriotism resulting in sacrifices superficially noble but in reality wasteful.

5. NATIONALITY AS A FACTOR IN PRACTICAL POLITICS .

As a principle of practical politics nationality belongs to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, at which the map of Europe was resettled after the Napoleonic struggles, represents the high water-mark of the previous determining factors—policy and dynasty. In the eighteenth and previous centuries boundaries were fixed according to the policy of individual states or the desires of individual rulers. Kings waged wars for aggrandizement of their territories on the old feudal theory that to rule and to own were synonymous. Personal ambition or greed, arising often from the patriotic desire to enlarge the state

boundaries and add large numbers to the population, made supreme the idea of conquest as the decisive element in fixing the size of states. Heedless of the wishes of the people concerned, the stronger seized the territory of the weaker. Sometimes small states were allowed to exist, not from any desire to meet the wishes of the people, but to suit the defensive or offensive aims of the greater states.

Though feudalism had disappeared long before the eighteenth century, certain feudal ideas survived the actual feudal system. One of these—and a most important one—was the idea that the king was owner of the nation's land. This led frequently to division and sub-division of territory among the king's family, just as a private landlord often does now. Large portions of territory could be inherited in this way, and in the same way, could be given as a gift or dowry. State boundaries, therefore, were largely at the will of royal families or dynasties. For centuries this was the accepted rule; the people as well as the rulers were imbued with the old feudal ideas. Neither did the kings take the will of the transferred or conquered peoples into account, nor did the people themselves regard such consideration necessary. It is no matter for surprise then that frequently in one state resided the most heterogeneous collection of peoples, castes and creeds.

In spite of this, some of the greatest nations in the West achieved nationhood early, and the fact that they had no national difficulties partly accounts for the late appearance of nationality as a practical question. The national boundaries of England, France, Spain—all leading powers in Europe for several centuries—were settled relatively early in modern history. Because they had no national difficulties themselves, they were not likely to be affected by the practical aspect of nationality. Besides the national elements in the wars of modern history, such as the Dutch struggle against Spain, three things have acted together to break up completely the old feudal and dynastical ideas. The first is the spread of enlightenment to the masses; the second, the partition of Poland; the third, the French Revolution.

1. Nationality is a sentiment which is stronger or weaker as the circumstances in which it occurs vary. With the raising of political consciousness by means of education,

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national feeling is strengthened. Often, it is true, in spite of the ignorance of the masses, the thread of national sentiment has remained unbroken for centuries.

1. Spread of Enlightenment Unity has often been preserved for centuries in spite of both conquest and ignorance. With the growth of enlightenment, the common ideals

are not only better understood and appreciated but more talked of and written about. Education raises the dignity of the individual, and brings forward claims of personal freedom. Personal freedom leads to the idea of national freedom. The demand for personal freedom leads to democracy, and nationality has developed by the side of democracy. The Great War was the culminating point of the struggle, for in that war democracy was fighting autocracy, and nationality fighting dynasty.

2. The Partition of Poland The Partition of Poland, by which dynasties by superior force took advantage of an unwilling people, stands out as one of the most callous acts in history.

Poland had an elective kingship, which her neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria regarded as dangerous to their own hereditary principle. In 1772, at the suggestion of Frederick the Great of Prussia, these three powers agreed to what is known as the First Partition. Each received a certain amount of territory, but Poland, roused by their theft, abolished the elective in favour of a hereditary monarchy, and began to reform herself in other ways. The fact that Russia supported the old system drove the Polish rulers to ask the help of Prussia. Prussia not only refused assistance, but sent an army to occupy part of Poland. This led to the Second Partition in 1795, whereby Prussia, Russia and Austria divided the whole of Poland among themselves.

Like the Jews of old, the Poles scattered to all parts of the world, carrying with them not only burning indignation at the rapacity of the neighbouring dynasties, but also the fervid desire for the re-establishment of their old state. They became political agitators in every state of Europe, and so strongly did they press their claims that thinkers were forced to recognize that there must be some juster principle for settling the boundaries of states than that shown by the plundering rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria.

3. The French Revolution completed the work of the

Polish partition. The French Revolution was not primarily a matter of nationality, for the French national boundaries had been settled long before 1789. It was primarily a social revolution, but indirectly it fanned the national flame. The execution of the king, Louis XVI., was a severe blow to the rights of dynasties. If the French, with their nationhood complete, could behead a king, surely other nationalities, ruled not by their own but by foreign rulers, could dispute the rights of dynasties. Not only so, the French Revolution awakened the peoples who had for several centuries been sleeping under the feudal system and its results. The French Revolution threw off the old social and political order and decided to begin anew. To begin anew required the formulation of new principles of political order. The central doctrine was liberty, interpreted both as individual and constitutional liberty. Class privileges and effete constitutions alike had to be abolished, and the new order was to be founded on the sovereignty of the people. The doctrine of the general will propounded by Rousseau, the apostle of the French Revolution, implied the rights of nationality and self-determination. The people, he said, should be free to determine with whom they are to associate in political union. The triumph of democracy was the first result of the Revolution. This was succeeded by the conquests of Napoleon, which apparently dealt a death blow to nationality. At the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 the map of Europe was drawn on the principle not of nationality but of dynasty. Instead of granting the right of self-determination to nationalities, the Congress restored the pre-Revolution system. Poland was not restored to statehood; Norway was joined to Sweden, and Belgium to Holland; Germany and Italy were re-established in their possessions of the previous century.

The overthrow of Napoleon, like the overthrow of Spain in the Netherlands, was really due to the national forces opposed to him. As the century advanced, national feeling became strong enough to destroy the basis of the Vienna settlement. The Congress left six separate questions of nationality to be solved:—(1) Belgium and Holland, joined as the Kingdom of the Netherlands; (2) Germany, divided into thirty-eight sovereign states; (3) Italy, with eight

separate governments ; (4) Poland, divided between the three neighbouring powers ; (5) Austria, with several distinct nationalities—German, Magyar, Polish, Bohemian or Czech, Ruthenian, Slovak, Moravian, Roumanian, Slovenian and Italian ; and (6) The Turkish Empire, in which the Turks ruled five distinct Christian nationalities. Practically all these questions have been solved. Belgium separated from Holland in 1830 ; Germany and Italy, each after a long struggle, achieved their present nationhood in 1871 and 1848–70 respectively. The new principle of self-determination was particularly discernible in the Italian union where some of the smaller states were actually asked to select their government by plebiscite. Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro all achieved independence during the century. The Great War was fought largely on the principle of nationality, and the various peace treaties have solved the remaining questions. Alsace-Lorraine has been returned to France ; Poland again is independent ; the various subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary have either been given independence or have been allowed to join those with whom they have political and national affinities.

6. ' ONE NATIONALITY, ONE STATE '

One of the most common characteristics in modern nationalities is the desire to become nations, or to be incorporated in independent states. Their common ideals, it is said, require a common organization to give them reality. The extreme formula of this idea is "one nationality, one state."

It is impossible here to do more than mention a few leading considerations arising out of this doctrine. In the first place, the rights of nationalities are not absolute. No nationality has a right to dismember the state of which it is a part, unless that state so cramps the members of the nationality that the continued existence of the nationality and its traditions is threatened in such a way as to impair the moral lives of its members. All national claims are conditioned by the paramount claims of the state of which the nationality is a part, but the claims of the state may be of such a nature as to make the continued existence of the nationality impossible. In such a case the ultimate issue may be force. The ultimate justification of state and national rights alike

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is the common good, and in a struggle of nationality and state the issue is to be judged accordingly.

In the second place, while some nationalities may be vigorous enough in themselves to resist the influences of others, that is, strong enough to preserve their national identity, others tend to be absorbed by stronger neighbours. A more advanced or stronger type of civilization tends to swallow up a weaker. The attempt of the Germans to subdue the Poles by settling Germans on Polish territory, so far from succeeding, actually resulted in many of the Germans becoming Poles. The Polish nationality, instead of being absorbed, proved itself capable of absorbing others. The same is true of the French in Alsace-Lorraine. But in Germany itself are smaller sections of non-Germans called the Wends, who can scarcely be said to be sufficiently strong to establish a state on national grounds. They will be absorbed by the stronger culture around them. In America and New Zealand potential nationalities in the Red Indians and Maoris have been absorbed by their more virile environment, with a distinct gain to the general forces of civilization. A similar process is observable in India, where the primitive tribes tend to be absorbed by the stronger civilizations around them, e.g., the Santals by the Bengalis.

The process of absorption is most observable in the United States of America, into which annually pour many thousands of immigrants from Europe. In most cases these new-comers preserve their nationality, but in the second generation they fuse with the Americans.

It is very difficult to say whether any given nationality deserves statehood. Underlying all political life there is the moral and social ideal of the common good. This common good is really the criterion of national life, and, as the view of man is limited, it is impossible to say with any finality whether the incorporation of a given nationality in a state is for the common good. Most thinkers look forward to a final unity of mankind. That unity must be a unity of various types and qualities. Diversification of elements gives a fuller meaning to the unity; on the other hand, too great a diversity may destroy or prevent the unity.

In the third place, the so-called rights of nationalities, apart from the difficult question of "one nationality, one

state" are (1) the right of each nationality to its own language; (2) the right to its own customs; (3) the right to its own institutions. These rights, as we have shown, are not by any means absolute. Language, combined with political community, is one of the most necessary elements in nationality. But it is questionable how far national languages should be fostered. As a rule each language has certain qualities which give it a claim for existence. The song literature of one, the music of another, the peculiar method of expression of another, the interest to the comparative philologist and anthropologist of them all: these may be excellent claims to existence. On the other hand, it may be argued that the erection or perpetuation of linguistic barriers does not serve the well-being of humanity. The common aims and ideals of mankind are best appreciated when they are understood through the same tongue. At the present moment, on the one hand we hear of the rights of nationalities to their own speech, and on the other, of the abolition of the differences between peoples by the institution of a common language. The artificial fostering of language as a national element is a particularly questionable policy. Languages, like cultures, are absorbed by stronger neighbours. Gaelic is practically dead in Scotland, though as a language it will continue to be studied for its literature and philology. In India, there are several hundreds of languages, and it is questionable whether all these languages should be encouraged to become living languages for national groups. Even now there is a strong movement in India in favour of a single language and alphabet. The same is true of customs and institutions. Higher civilizations, without objection from the advocates of the rights of nationalities, have suppressed customs and institutions in lower civilizations which they regarded as evil. Sometimes national customs are suppressed for the salvation of a state in which the nationality is either proving dangerous or is hindering development. Such was the cause of the suppression of the wearing of the kilt, the national dress of the Scottish Highlanders, by the Earl of Chatham after the Stuart rebellions in Scotland. It cannot be said that the suppression injured Scotland, while it helped in the unification of Great Britain.

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In the fourth place, in the modern world development is taking place in two opposite directions—nationalism and internationalism. Many thinkers consider the final solution of world politics to lie in federalism. Federalism is an attempt to reconcile two opposites—local independence and central government over a large area. The claims of nationality may be satisfied by federalism, a form of government which may be a solution to the difficulties of both nationalism and internationalism.

It is impossible to lay down any hard-and-fast rules or principles. Rights exist in the state, which is founded on the common well-being of man, and the only general principle which we can extract from the many-sided question of nationality is that nationality, with national language, customs, and institutions, is to be fostered only in so far as it is conducive to the common well-being.

7. THE ORGANIC NATURE OF THE STATE

We have already seen that Bluntschli mentions the organic nature of the state as one of its essential characteristics. The state is a living organized entity, not a lifeless instrument. Its organism, he says, is a copy of a natural organism, particularly in the following respects :—

(a) Every organism is a union of soul and body, i.e., of material elements and vital forces.

(b) Although an organism is and remains a whole, yet in its parts it has members which are animated by special motives and capacities, in order to satisfy in various ways the varying needs of the whole.

(c) The organism develops itself from within outwards and has an external growth.

He goes on to show how there is a body and spirit in the state, how it is organized with different functions in its members, and how it grows and develops. He also ascribes to it a moral and spiritual personality, which, in contrast to the feminine church, is masculine.

The organic analogy is a very old one, in fact it is one of the commonest comparisons in Political Science. It has come particularly to the forefront since the

appearance of the theory of evolution. It appears in Plato, and in Aristotle, who compared the symmetry of the state to that of the body. In mediaeval writers it is particularly prolific, and like most of the theories of that age it was used as a polemical weapon.

Mankind as a whole was regarded as an organism. This idea of organism, clothed in the religious language of the day, was based on St. Paul's statement that the Church was a mystical body whose head was Christ. Church and State each adopted the idea, the imperialists holding that the Emperor, and the ecclesiastics that the Pope, was the head in this world of the mystical body. As obviously a two-headed organism was unnatural, some thinkers held that there were two bodies, each with its own head, and both part of a greater body whose head was God. From this was concluded that, instead of being mutually exclusive, the Empire and Church should live together in amity, as they were really parts of one whole. Others used the analogy to discredit the state. The soul and body were the counterparts of the Church and State, and as the soul is greater than the body, so was the Church greater than the State. Not only were the Church and Empire compared to organisms, but the analogy was used for individual groups and states, and even in these early writers we find excesses of analogy such as occur later in the works of Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless, in spite of many crude comparisons, some of the mediaeval writers show a very reasonable use of the analogy. John of Salisbury, a twelfth century ecclesiastic and philosopher, held that a well ordered constitution consists in the proper apportionment of functions to members of the body and in the proper condition and strength of each member. The members, he said, must supplement each other, and as the body is joined to the head, so the unity of the state depends on their coherence among themselves and with the head. Another writer, Ptolemy of Lucca, starts his deliberations on political matters thus—“For as we see that the body of an animal consists of connected and co-ordinated members, so every realm and every group consists of diverse persons connected and co-ordinated for some end.” This is a perfectly orthodox modern view.

Other well-known mediaeval writers, such as St. Thomas

Aquinas, Ockham, and Marsiglio of Padua, give the analogy. Ideas which are still very common were all voiced then. The idea of membership, for example, was developed to show the place of the individual in the various political and ecclesiastical groups. Growth, development, differentiation of function, the existence of the nervous system, and other points were used for various purposes, the common centre being the Church and State controversy.

Passing from mediaevalism to the modern world, we find the analogy common property. Machiavelli uses it with great effect on occasion, while one of the most trenchant chapters in Hobbes's *Leviathan* (entitled "Of Those Things That Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth") carries out a thorough-going parallel between the diseases of the body and the weaknesses of a commonwealth. "Amongst the infirmities of a commonwealth I will reckon, in the first place, those that arise from an imperfect institution and resemble the diseases of a natural body which proceed from a defectuous procreation." And he goes on to speak of the equivalents, in the commonwealth, of boils, scabs, and wens in the body organic, as well as of pleurisy, ague, and lethargy.

The most elaborate modern analogy between the state and the living organism has been given by Herbert Spencer. A brief exposition of his theory will show both its virtues and weaknesses.

Spencer holds that society is an organism. The attributes of each are similar. The permanent relations existing between their various parts are the same. The first point which makes society an organism is its growth. A living body grows and develops ; so does society. The parts of each become unlike as the bodies grow, and as they become unlike they become more complex. There is a progressive differentiation both of structure and of function in society, but this differentiation does not mean separateness. The functions are inter-related, so much so in fact that they can have no meaning otherwise. Just as the hand depends on the arm and the arm on the body and head, so do the parts of the social organism depend on each other. Every living body depends for its very life on the proper co-ordination and interrelation of the units. The life of society depends on

exactly similar conditions. Another point of comparison is that in each case the life of the whole may be destroyed without immediate destruction to the parts, or the life of the whole may be continued longer than the lives of the units. But between the two there are points of difference. The parts of an animal body form a concrete whole, but in society there is no concrete whole. The parts are separate and distinct. Yet the social organism is made a living whole by means of language, which establishes the unity which makes social organization possible. The cardinal difference between the one and the other is that in a living body consciousness is concentrated in one definite part of the whole; in society it is spread over the whole. Hence, argues Spencer, not the good of the whole but only the good of the units is to be sought in society. (This is the basis of Spencer's individualism.)

Spencer goes on to show how society grows and develops like a living body. Both begin as germs, and, as they grow, they become more complex. The structure which they finally reach is far more complicated than the simple unit from which they develop. In the body politic, as in the body natural, growth goes on either by simple multiplication of units or by union of groups. Society never reaches any considerable size by simple multiplication: union of groups makes larger societies. Integration takes place in society as it does in the animal body in the formation of the mass: it also takes place in the simultaneous process of the cohesion of the parts making up the whole.

Spencer gives a number of structural analogies between society and the living organism. Each has its organs—the animal its organs of alimentation: society its industrial structures. Just as in animals of low types there is no real organ, but only a number of parts acting as an organ, so in social development there is a primitive stage where each man carries on his work alone and sells his produce to others. Then, in the course of evolution, comes the cluster of cells in the animal; the social parallel is the group of families clustered together in a fixed locality where each does its own work. Then as the developing animal requires a more active “glandular” organ, so society passes from the household to the factory type. The analogy again is evident in the functions the living organism and society per-

form. A simple animal, if cut in two, will live on as before : so a simple form of society, such as a nomadic tribe, can easily be divided. But to cut a highly organized animal (as a mammal) in two means death. Likewise to cut the county of Middlesex off from its surroundings would mean death, for the social processes would be stopped by lack of nutrition or supplies. Again, increase in the development of animals means increase in the adaptation of particular organs for particular functions. So also specialization takes place in society, and specialization in each, while it implies adaptation for one duty, means unfitness for other duties.

In the social as in the individual organism there are various systems. These are (*a*) the sustaining system, (*b*) the distributory system, and (*c*) the regulating system. The first constitutes the means of alimentation in the living organism and production in the body politic. Just as the foreign substances which sustain the animal determine the alimentary canal, so the different minerals, animals and vegetables determine the form industrialism will take in a given community. The second (distributory) is the circulatory system in the organic body : in the body politic its parallel is transportation. The vascular system in the body has its social equivalent in roads and railways. The third, the regulating system, is the nervous and nervo-motor system in the animal ; in the body politic it is the governmental-military.

The organic analogy in Political Science performs a useful function. It emphasizes the unity of the state, the dependence of individuals on each other and on the state as a whole. The individual properly understood is not an individual in the sense that he is distinct from society. Each individual is essentially a social unit. He cannot be separated from society, just as the hand or leg, without losing its virtue, cannot be separated from the body. The state also depends on the individuals composing it. So far the organic idea is invaluable. It points out the intrinsic connection of the individual with the state and the state with the individual. The analogy, again, if properly used, is harmless. One can no more object to a writer saying that the state is like a body than he can to the common analogy that the state is like a building.

**Criticism :
Uses of and
Dangers of
the Theory**

The danger of the analogy lies in the qualification "if properly used." The analogy has been used with various degrees of thoroughness for various purposes. **Its Practical Effects** The writers of the Middle Ages used it to prove important points in practical policy; and (such was the condition of opinion of the times) their contentions had far-reaching practical effects. Herbert Spencer uses it as a basis for individualistic theories. He declares that the unit in society is "discrete" and exists for his own good only.

Spencer, however, recognized the limitations of the analogy in theory, but in his enthusiasm in working out his theory the analogy became identification. The **Analogy not Proof** chief fault of the organic analogy is that it is an analogy. An analogy is not a proof. Many essential features of the human body are not obvious in the body politic. The assimilative and reproductive powers of animals have no counterpart in the state. The state cannot react to stimuli in the same way as a living body. It does not grow, live or die in the same way. Organisms grow by internal adaptation: but the state grows by accretion of new parts, or by conscious effort on the part of its component elements or individuals. This points to the crux of the whole position. An animal body is made up of individual cells, non-thinking units, incapable of action independent of the body. Society is composed of thinking units, capable of exercising will and of acting according to chosen ends. Their action is the action of conscious purpose: the action of cells is mechanical and unconscious. The state has thus no equivalent to many of the most characteristic points of the organism. And when we take into consideration the phenomena of diplomacy, declaration of war, and making of peace (involving "growth"), the analogy is useless.

Further, as already pointed out, cells cannot live away from their body. Individuals are likewise all "social" or "state" individuals by nature and necessity. **Possible Results of the Theory** So far the analogy, in pointing out the intrinsic connection between society and the individual, is good. But to use the analogy in its most thorough-going application may mean either (1) as Spencer says, that the individual must seek his own happiness independently of others because, while the organism is con-

crete, society is discrete. In this way Spencer, while allowing certain bonds of unity in society, denies the intrinsic relation of the individual to society. In common with most individualists, he desocializes the individual because he finds no single "nerve sensorium" in society. To do so is to nullify what merits the organic analogy possesses; for though there is no actual physical body which we can point to and call the "state" or "society", yet the state is a very real entity. The individuals in a state, we may say, are organically bound together by common purposes and ideals. Or (2), it may mean that the individual is so bound to the state that he is, as the ancient Greek citizen was, a purely state-individual. All his activities are centred in and conditioned by the state. These two extremes of the theory point to its danger. Dr. Leacock's chief objection to the theory rises from this. "Too great an amalgamation of the individual and the state," he says, in his *Elements of Politics*, "is as dangerous an ideal as too great emancipation of the individual will." The organic analogy emphasizes unity, indeed, but too often at the expense of diversity or variation.

Dr. Leacock also points out that it furnishes no criterion of conduct. "The organic theory in telling us that our institutions grow and are not made hardly offers a practical guide to political conduct." It might lead to an inactive fatalism; but certainly to no sound theory or a political ideal realized by conscious, hard effort.

Further, the analogy, when carefully analysed, proves to be only partial. One of the chief points in the analogy is the interrelation of whole and parts. This is true of the state and of organisms; but it is true of inorganic objects as well. The parts of a state have a relation to the whole and the whole in idea is prior to the parts. Bluntschli says: "An oil painting is something more than a mere aggregation of drops of oil and colour; a statue is something other than a combination of marble particles; man is not a mere quantity of cells and blood corpuscles: so too the nation is not a mere sum of citizens and the state not a mere collection of external regulations." Bluntschli's own comparison applies to the inorganic. The notion of continued growth is as true of an

**No Criterion
of Conduct**

**Further
Analysis**

inorganic fire as of an organic animal. Why, then, it may be asked, should these qualities of growth, etc., be called *organic* if they are also characteristic of inorganic objects?

Some scientists and philosophers (such as Kant) regard the organism as implying a certain end, which is the condition of its present state of development. The state is also said by Aristotle to be an end, and to be prior to the individual, but modern science, while it may grant that the organism fulfils a certain end, does not regard that end as prior in intention to its fulfilment. The organism is adapted to its environment and fulfils certain functions in relation to that environment, but its adaptation is due to natural causes, not to preconceived ideas. Not only so, but these analogies of end and purpose apply to human intelligences, and therefore are taken from human society and applied to the organism. To reflect an idea from society to the organism, and then try to explain society by the analogy does not help us.

To sum up, the organic analogy is useful in bringing into prominence the fact that the state is not a mechanical unity. It brings out the essential unity of the state, the differentiation of functions in government and the mutual interrelation of citizens. Applied beyond these simple comparisons, it is illogical and misleading. Though the analogy seems clear at first, a closer analysis makes its usefulness less obvious. Some of the most applicable points of likeness to the state in the organism are those either which biological science does not admit or which are ultimately taken from society itself. Common purpose, acting on human minds, keeps society together. To explain the action of mind by an analogy with the non-intelligent, to explain moral action by what is non-moral, beyond the general limits indicated, only leads to confusion. •

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

I. GENERAL REMARKS

An investigation of the origin of the state gives us two distinct lines of study—one historical, the other speculative.

Types of Enquiry How this or that state came into existence is a matter for history. History tells us the various ways in which governments come into being or perish ; but it does not tell us how mankind originally came to live under state conditions. Did history extend back to the beginning of society, our enquiry would be mainly historical. Of the circumstances surrounding the dawn of political consciousness from history we know little or nothing. Where history fails us, we must resort to speculation. Many theories, each of which has something to commend it, have been advanced to explain the origin of the state. At the present time the evolutionary or historical theory finds almost universal support : but finality of judgment is difficult. In the last few years much has been done by the sciences of Anthropology, Ethnology and Comparative Philology towards the elucidation of the question, and as these sciences are only in their infancy, great discoveries may await them in respect to this particular problem.

The sacred veil which Burke says is drawn over the earliest types of government has not been lifted by history. Long before historical documents existed, tribal and national characteristics had been formed, and even the first stage of political society—the relation of command and obedience—had passed. Aristotle thinks that the Cyclopes illustrate the earliest type of actual political society. A description of the Cyclopes is given in the *Odyssey*. The Cyclopes had no assemblies and no laws. Each man made laws for his

wives and children, and, says Aristotle, they lived "dispersedly" (i.e., with no fixed abode or institutions) "as was the manner in the earliest times." This Cyclopean existence is somewhat similar to the hypothetical "state of nature" which has appealed to so many thinkers. Unfortunately it does not explain to us the origin of political society: it does not show how political consciousness first evolved and took actual form. The Cyclopean society is a form of organization: it does not explain its own origin. It marks a stage in political development.

An enquiry into the origin of the state leads us to some of the fundamental problems of Political Science, or, particularly, of Political Philosophy, for which history gives us only certain material for induction. Anthropology, which collects, arranges, and explains the many facts concerning social institutions, is even more helpful in this respect than history.

2. HISTORICAL FORMATIONS

The best classification of historical formations from the **Bluntschli's** point of view of their origin is that of Bluntschli. **Classific-** He gives three main classes of historical **ation** forms:—

I. The original formation of the state, when it takes its beginning among a people without being derived from already existing states.

II. The secondary forms, when the state is produced from within, out of the people, but yet in dependence upon already existing states, which either unite themselves into one or divide themselves into several.

III. The derived formation of the state, which receives its impulse and direction not from within but from without.

It is necessary to remind the student in this connection that a change in the form of government in a state is not a change of the state. Where, for example, a monarchical system is replaced by a republican, the state continues though the form of government is changed.

These main classes are subdivided by Bluntschli in the following way:—

I. ORIGINAL

1. *Creation of an absolutely new state.*—This takes place

when a number of people, coming together on a definite territory, gather round a leader or leaders (often religious) who forthwith establish statutes for the approval of the people. The creative act of the leader or king and the political will of the people form the law of state. The state is the work of the conscious national will. An example of this process exists in the legendary origin of Rome where, according to the story, the people, coming together in the city of Rome, consciously created a state. The historical authenticity of this is doubtful.

2. *Political organization of the inhabitants of a definite territory, where the people, though gathered together on a definite territory, may not yet have organized themselves into a political society.*—The organization of the people in this case leads to a state. An example is Athens, where, according to the legend, the hitherto unorganized people were organized by Theseus, who concentrated the government in Athens. Bluntschli cites also the example of California in the United States of America. In California, in the first half of last century, attracted by the gold mines, a big population of all sorts of people gathered together. In 1849 they elected representatives to a constituent assembly which drew up a constitution for the state. The common will of the whole population, not the will of particular individuals, established the state.

3. *Occupation of territory by an already existing nation.*—In this case a nation already in existence occupies land necessary to its continued existence. The most frequent form this takes is conquest, examples of which abound in history. Another form of occupation is the peaceful settlement of a territory, as in the case of the Pilgrim Fathers. In similar cases it is usually superiority of civilization, not force of arms, that conquers.

II. SECONDARY FORMATIONS

(1) *Formation of a Composite State by a League between States.* (2) *Union.* (3) *Division.*

(1) Of the Composite state Bluntschli gives three types—
(a) Confederation, where several hitherto independent states unite for certain purposes, but do not make a new state. In a confederation the units are free to withdraw if

they wish. The management of common affairs is given either to one member of the union or to an assembly of delegates.

(b) Federation, where hitherto independent states unite in making a new state. In a federal union the "states" are not states properly so-called, as they do not possess sovereignty. Federation is the most complete type of union.

(c) Bluntschli gives federal empire as a third class, the example of which is Germany (before the War). Both confederations and federations are best fitted for republics, he says, and as Germany differed from them in having a monarchy with kings at the head of states, and in the predominance of Prussia, he puts the German Empire in a distinct class.

(2) *Union*.—Two or more states may be united under one ruler, or a single new state may be formed. The lowest and most imperfect union of this kind is (a) *Personal Union* where two hitherto separate states may come under one dynasty by succession. The succession may later fall to two different persons—the union never being very real.

(b) *Real Union*.—In this case the supreme government in legislation and administration is one for the constituent elements of the union.

(c) *Complete Union*.—The highest type of union is where a composite and single state is formed.

(3) *Division*.—(a) *National Division*, where previously there was a bond but where the bond has decayed, e.g., in the empires of Alexander, Charlemagne and Napoleon.

(b) *Division by Inheritance*—This took place frequently in the middle ages when the feudal idea prevailed that the king was owner of the land and could do with it as he liked.

(c) *Declaration of Independence*, as in the case of United Provinces of the Netherlands against Spain in 1579, and the United States of America in 1776.

III. DERIVED FORMATIONS

1. *Colonization*.—(a) Greek, where the people went from the mother state and consciously formed a new state independent of the mother state, but preserved the same manners, government, and religion.

(b) Roman, in which the colonies were in strict

dependence on Rome. They were really extensions of the existing state.

(c) Modern, of various types.

2. *Concession of sovereign rights*, which is an extension of the colonial idea, as in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the Philippine Islands.

3. *Institution by a foreign ruler*, as when conquerors, like Napoleon, set up states.

We shall have to return to a more detailed analysis of several of the types of historical formations given by Bluntschli. These historical types do not give us the origin of the state as such, as distinct from the origin of any given state. To discover the origin of the state as such, we have to resort largely to speculation. The historical ladder of development is defective, but by using the material, often shadowy and usually very debatable, which sociology, history and anthropology give us, we can, with a fair measure of certainty, build up a reasonable theory of the origin of the state. This theory is generally known as the Historical or Evolutionary Theory of the origin of the state.

3. SPECULATIVE THEORIES. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Before stating the Historical Theory we must first examine certain theories which, though now rejected, have had great influence on political development as well as on political thought. These theories are three in number—

1. The Social Contract Theory.

2. The Theory of Divine Origin.

3. The Theory of Force.

Though these theories are now practically universally rejected, a study of them is valuable for more than one reason. In the first place, these theories represent an attempt to solve the fundamental questions of both how and why the state came into existence, and each contains some important truth. In the second place, each of these theories has had considerable influence on actual political practice. Many of our modern political institutions can be properly understood only when examined in relation to the political ideas current at the time of their inception. Political theory and practice are closely related. Sometimes political ideas

Value of
Speculative
Theories

definitely lead to changes in old institutions or the creation of new ones. The theorist comes first in this case, while the practical reformer carries out what is theoretically desirable. Sometimes the opposite course is followed. Political changes happen, especially sudden political changes, with no reasoned basis. Actual events in this case are followed by theory.

The Social Contract theory has played such an important part in modern political theory and practice that it demands treatment at considerable length. In the theory there are two fundamental assumptions—first, a state of nature, second, a contract. The contract, again, may mean either (*a*) the social or political contract, which is the origin of civil society, or (*b*) a government contract, or agreement between rulers and subjects.

The state of nature is supposed to be a pre-political condition of mankind in which there was no civil law. The only regulating power was a vague spirit of law called natural law. There was no law of human imposition in the state of nature. The views of writers vary greatly as to the condition of man in such a state. Most writers picture it a state of wild savagery, in which the guiding principle was "might is right." Others think of it as a state of insecurity, though not of savagery; some consider it to have been a life of ideal innocence and bliss.

The contract is interpreted in various ways, according to the theory which the individual writers wish to establish. Some writers regard the contract as the actual historical origin of civil society; others look upon it as a governmental contract, made between rulers and ruled. Some regard it as historical, others take it only as a basis or emblem of the relations which should exist between government and governed. The main idea of the contract as the origin of civil society is a surrender by individuals of a certain part of their "natural" rights in order to secure the greater benefits of civil society. Man, consciously and voluntarily, made a contract, whereby the free play of individual wills was given up to secure the advantages of social co-operation. For the surrender of his natural rights each man received the protection of the community.

4. HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

The Contract theory is first found in the Sophists, a school of Greek philosophers who lived before Plato. In the philosophy of the Sophists a sharp distinction is made between nature and convention. This distinction they applied to society. The fundamental principle of human life, the Sophists said, is self-assertion. Man's nature is such that, if he is not hindered by social institutions, he will seek his own interests. His true nature, however, cannot be fulfilled because of conventions, that is, social institutions. These social institutions curb the natural play of human activity, and, as such, are wrong. The state is a barrier to self-realization, and, therefore opposed to nature. It is a result of contract, or a voluntary agreement between men.

Both Plato and Aristotle mention the theory only to repudiate it. In the *Republic* Plato represents one of his philosophers, Glaucon, as attributing the true origin of political society to a contract. Each man, he says, tries to get as much as he can for himself, but to escape such individual self-seeking and its consequences men formed a contract, which, according to Glaucon, is the criterion of law and justice. In another book, the *Crito*, Plato gives the arguments used by Socrates against those who tried to effect his escape from prison. Socrates says that, as he is an Athenian citizen, he has made an agreement to obey the laws of Athens even though he considers them unjust.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle has any sympathy with such views. They are, they hold, essentially unsound, and after two thousand years, during part of which the Contract theory ruled supreme, the modern world has reverted to their position.

The Epicurean philosophers, though in theory they professed to have no dealings with the state, offered the Contract theory as an explanation of justice, not as the origin of the state. Epicurus held that right is only a compact of utility which men make not to hurt each other in order that they be not hurt. There is no such thing as justice in itself. It exists only as the result of mutual contracts. There is no justice where, as in

the case of animals, there is no contract ; nor, therefore, is there justice where men either cannot, or are unwilling to make contracts.

Except for occasional appearances, as in the works of the Latin poet Lucretius, the Social Contract theory was not revived for many centuries in the West. In the East the theory in an undeveloped form appeared in Hindu Sanskrit literature, in books such as the Mahabharata, (especially Book xii, Santiparvan). It is not clear that, in the West, the later and earlier theories are connected by more than chance. After the foundation of the Christian Church political thought was dominated for centuries by religion. The early Christian Fathers held that government is the result of sin, and, therefore, an evil. God imposed civil society on mankind because of man's fall. Such a theory gives no room for the exercise of man's will which is necessary to a contract. There were, however, influences at work during the early centuries of the Christian era to bring the idea of contract to its fruition. One of these influences was in the Church itself. The Bible, which was the criterion of truth to the Church Fathers, contained several instances of such covenants or contracts between the Lord and the people or between the king and the people. Thus in the Old Testament, (2 Samuel v. 3) we read—"So all the elders of Israel came to the King in Hebron: and King David made a covenant with them in Hebron before the Lord; and they anointed David King over Israel." This and several other instances in the Bible gave the necessary support to the ecclesiastical writers who wished to give a contract theory. The theory had little vogue as a political instrument, but it bore much fruit in the many ecclesiastical councils of the middle ages.

The chief influence in keeping alive the contract notion was Roman Law. According to Roman Law the people was the source of political authority, and the predominance of the conception of contract in Roman Law was also not without its effect in this matter. The Roman Emperor held authority from the people. "The will of the Emperor is law," said Ulpian, one of the greatest Roman jurists, "only because the people confers supreme power upon him." This idea was not only universal among the Roman jurists but latent

in the thought of the time. From Cicero onwards the idea constantly recurs, not only as an idea in philosophical speculation but as an inherent element in the constitutional practice of the Roman Empire. In Cicero's work "On the Commonwealth" we find the view that the state is the natural order of life, founded on justice, with the aim of securing the common well-being. A state is no state, he says, where all are oppressed by one or a few, where there is no common bond of law, no real agreement or union. Cicero looked on political liberty as identical with a share in political power. Common consent, common will, common power run through his thought, implying, indeed almost directly stating the idea of contract.

Though the Roman lawyers did not adopt the idea of liberty as meaning a share in authority, they certainly regarded the people as the source of authority. The social contract as a definitely stated theory did not appear till the eleventh century, but Roman legal ideas contained an undeveloped form of the theory. Consent is common to both the theory of contract and to Roman Law, and, if Roman Law does not directly express the theory, it certainly furnishes one of the chief foundations on which it was built.

Another important influence in the development of the theory was the Teutonic idea of government. The Teutonic theory went further than the Roman. Not only did the king require the theoretical consent of the community for his election, but in actual practice he was under the law. In the Roman theory the authority of the ruler was derived from the people: in the Teutonic it was both derived from and continued under the people. At the time of their election the Teutonic kings practically made an agreement with the people, the chief article of which was the guarantee of good government. There are many examples of kings renewing their promises in cases where they thought the confidence of the people had been shaken.

Still another influence is to be found in feudalism. The feudal system was largely personal, yet there was a certain basis of contract between the lord and his vassals. The two principles of feudalism, loyalty to the person of a superior, and contract, seem mutually exclusive, but in reality they were not so either in theory

or in practice. There was a mutual obligation in the feudal system. Each side had duties. The vassal performed certain duties on the understanding that the overlord performed others. Further, in the feudal system the ruler was the owner, but gradually the notions of rulership and ownership were separated. Ownership was regarded as a contractual relationship between owner and tenant, and rulership came to be looked on as a contract between people and ruler.

Though the theory of the early Christian Fathers, that civil society was the result of the Fall, held the field for a long time, gradually it gave way to the idea that the state was the creation of the will of the community. Influenced both by Roman Law and Teutonic ideas, the Church leaders took up the position that God was a "remote" cause of civil society, the "immediate" cause being either the will of an individual ruler or of a community. The chief current of opinion was in favour of the act of will on the part of the community, an act which was compared to the self-constitution of a corporation, although a corporation was only a subordinate body in the state.

The Church Fathers had never disputed the state of nature—in fact it was an accepted part of their creed. Thus one of the constituent elements of the Social Contract theory was already generally current. **The State of Nature** Natural law, as we shall see, was also an accepted fact. The Roman and Teutonic ideas were easily fitted to the notion of contract or consent; and it was left to the various theorists to draw what conclusions they wished from such premises.

The first definite statement of the contract was given in the eleventh century by an ecclesiastic, Manegold of Lautenbach. Manegold regards the office of the king as sacred. It is above all earthly offices; the holder therefore must be above all others in justice, goodness and wisdom. Though God is the ultimate origin of the kingly office, the immediate origin is the community. The people set the king over them to secure them against tyranny and wickedness. If the king, who is elected for such security, turns against the people by acting tyrannically himself, the people are freed from his rule, because he has broken the pact or contract on which he was elected. The

people may swear allegiance, but their oath is conditional on the king observing his oath to administer justice and maintain the law. These oaths are reciprocal: they constitute a contract, the breaking of which by one party leads automatically to the freedom of the other from its terms.

Manegold's theory is not an explanation of the origin of the state; it is an interpretation of current constitutional ideas. The Social Contract theory has always been used with some reference to constitutional theory or actual political events. Its use as an explanation of the origin of political society is often secondary. Just as Manegold formulated the theory to explain the current position of ruler and ruled, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, several centuries later, used it to justify absolutism, constitutional government, and popular sovereignty respectively.

From the eleventh century onwards the theory became more and more accepted, till in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was universally held. The aims of those who supported the theory varied. Some used it to support absolutism, some to support the liberty of the people. Only a few give it as an explanation of the origin of civil society. Among the many exponents of the theory we may mention Languet, the supposed author of the *Vindiciæ Contra Tyrannos*, or the *Grounds and Rights against Tyrants*, 1579, one of the earliest of the modern systematic treatises accepting the contract theory; George Buchanan, the Scottish Reformer, whose book *On the Sovereign Power among the Scots* was also published in 1579; Althusius, the German jurist, whose *Systematic Politics* (1610) gives a wonderfully modern position, showing a clear appreciation of the distinction between state and government; Mariana, a Spanish Jesuit, whose anti-monarchic doctrines in *On Kingship and the Education of a King* (1599) are surprising, considering his environment—he was a Catholic in the most absolutist country in Europe, Spain; Suarez, also a Spanish Jesuit, who, in his *Treatise on Law and God the Legislator* (1613), starts by giving a theory of popular sovereignty akin to that of Rousseau, but proceeds to argue that the people in virtue of their sovereignty give supreme power to the king; Grotius, the Dutch jurist, founder of our modern International Law, who, in his *Law of War and Peace* (1625), followed the abso-

**Subsequent
History**

lutist theory of Suarez ; Pufendorf, the German philosopher, whose work *On the Law of Nature and of Nations*, is an attempt to reconcile the doctrines of Grotius and Hobbes ; Spinoza, the philosopher, who argued for individual liberty on practically the same grounds as Hobbes did for absolutism, in his *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1677). Among English writers accepting the theory may be mentioned Hooker, the author of the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594), who gives the first definite statement of the theory in English. Hooker, a clergyman, set out to defend the church as established in England, and in its defence he made an analysis of authority in general. He concludes that authority depends on consent. His arguments are founded on the state of nature and the social contract. The poet Milton in his *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1644) tries to show that ultimately political power rests with the people. Filmer, an English seventeenth century royalist, whose antagonism to the contract theory led to John Locke's *Treatises*, and Hume, the philosopher, whose essay *Of the Original Contract* is one of the most telling attacks on the contract theory, are both opponents of the theory. The views of three writers on this subject demand special attention—Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), both Englishmen, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), the French writer.

Hobbes's theory is expounded in his *Leviathan*, published in 1651. Hobbes lived in the stirring times of the Great Rebellion and the Commonwealth. He was much affected by the miseries caused in England by the Civil War, and concluded that the salvation of the country lay in an absolute system of government. Adopting the current theory of contract, he started from a state of nature in which man was subject to only one law—the natural law of self-preservation. The state of nature was a state of savagery, where every man was either trying to kill, or in danger of being killed by, his neighbour. Man's life was, as he says, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". The law of self-preservation meant the rule of brute strength or of cunning. The same law impelled man to seek a way out of such a wretched condition. This he found in a covenant of each with all, whereby a state was established. Hobbes's own words best explain the process. The state is established

by a covenant of every man with every man in such a manner as if every man should say to every man: "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner."

In this way people resigned their natural rights to a person or body of persons, which person or body became the sovereign in the community. This sovereign was not a party to the contract, but a result of it. He (or they) derived from it absolute authority, which could not be revoked, for the individuals had left no rights to themselves. The people, says Hobbes, have no right to rise against the sovereign. The sovereign therefore possesses unlimited power, and, however arbitrarily that power is exercised, the people must obey.

In his desire to support absolutism Hobbes entirely fails to recognize what we now call political sovereignty. He gives a theory of legal sovereignty which, so far, is perfectly correct, but he does not recognize that the will of the state is not the will of an individual ruler. Instead of being completely independent of the people, the ruler is, properly regarded, the agent of the people. The people may indeed give him a legal status, but that legal status does not empower a ruler to oppress the people irrespective of all moral rights. As Locke pointed out afterwards, civil society exists for the common good, and, if that purpose is defeated by a ruler, the society may change the ruler. Changing a ruler does not mean the abolition of civil society. The state is more than government and the state-will more than the will of an individual. Hobbes does not recognize the difference between state and government; in fact, as we have already seen, he so far confuses them as to say that the state is dissolved with the death of a ruler.

The theory of John Locke is given in his *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, published in 1690, two years after the English Revolution. It is important to note the historical background of both Hobbes's and Locke's theories. Hobbes, impressed by the miseries of the great Rebellion, argued on the basis of the social contract for a system of absolute monarchy. Locke, on the same basis, tried to justify the deposition of James II. and the

**Criticism
of Hobbes's
Theory**

Locke

establishment of constitutional government. Locke starts with the idea of a state of nature which, he considers, was a state of equality and freedom. In the state of nature men were subject to the law of nature, which constituted certain rights over life and property. The state of nature was not, as Hobbes held, a state of war and misery. It was a state of insecurity, because, although rights did exist, there was no impartial or final arbiter to protect the individual in the enjoyment of his rights. For this reason, men agreed to resign to a ruling authority just so much of their rights as was necessary to secure their ends. The state was thus created to protect certain rights already in existence. The individual surrendered certain rights to secure his remaining rights and liberties. These individuals could not invest their rulers with unlimited rights over life and property, for they had not possessed such rights themselves. And, as Locke says, it is not reasonable to suppose that the individuals would resign more of their rights than was actually necessary to secure the benefits of civil society. The sovereign, therefore, could not, as Hobbes said, be unlimited. The sovereign could claim only limited authority. If he betrayed his trust, he could lawfully be deposed. The people in such a case could resume their original liberty and establish a new form of government.

Locke's theory is a theoretical justification of constitutional government. He represents a great advance in political thought. By showing that the sovereign (or ruler) is not independent of the people in all his actions, he gives us the fundamentally important distinction of state and government. Hobbes, as we have seen, identified the one with the other. Where Locke errs is in his failure to recognize that the ruler may quite legally oppress a people. Hobbes declared that the sovereign could not act illegally, and so far as the sovereign occupies a legal position which says he cannot act illegally, this is quite correct. A people may be oppressed by the sovereign legally enough, if the law permits the sovereign to oppress them; and their right to depose the sovereign does not arise from the sovereign's legal position. They may, however, have a *moral* right to depose him. What Hobbes does not recognize, and what Locke does recognize, is that there is a power behind the

**Criticism
of Locke's
Theory**

throne, that the exercise of sovereignty depends ultimately on the will of the people to obey. The sovereignty of the state is not the sovereignty of a ruler. The will of the state may limit the will and actions of a ruler. Thus Hobbes confused the state and king, but Locke did not recognize the full bearings of legal sovereignty. To use our modern terminology, Hobbes gives a theory of legal sovereignty without recognizing the existence and power of political sovereignty: Locke recognizes the force of political sovereignty but does not give adequate recognition to legal sovereignty.

The theory of Rousseau is contained in his *Social Contract* published in 1762. Rousseau tries to combine the theories of Hobbes and Locke. He sets out to harmonize the absolute authority of the sovereign with the absolute freedom of the citizen. His purpose, as he said himself, was "to find a form of association which may defend and protect, with the whole force of the community, the person and property of each associate or citizen and, by means of which, each uniting with all, may nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before." The starting point in his theory is a state of nature, which he says was idyllic. It was the happiest period of human life. Each one, unsophisticated and free from social laws and institutions, was able to seek and secure his own happiness. The state of nature was ideal, and the nearer we are to that state the better for us. With the growth of population, however, man was forced into civil society. He had to give up his natural freedom. "Man is born free," he says in a historic passage, "but is everywhere in chains." Civil freedom was substituted for natural freedom by a social contract. This contract is made by the individuals of the community in such a way that every individual "gives in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will and receives again each member as indivisible part of the whole." The individual gives himself up to the control of all, but not to a particular person. The community, not the ruler, as Hobbes held, receives the sovereignty. The sovereignty of the community is inalienable and indivisible. The "prince," that is government, is only a subordinate authority, or servant. The ruling power or government is only a commission: it

exercises its power in virtue of the sovereignty of the people, and the people can limit, modify or take it away as it wishes. The government wields the executive power but the legislative power remains with the people. When the people assemble together, they resume full power and the "prince" is suspended from his functions.

In this way Rousseau tries to reconcile the absolute authority of the whole with the absolute freedom of the parts. Thus, if an individual suffers the death penalty for his misdeeds, he is really a consenting party to his own execution, for he is part of the sovereignty which made the law which condemned him. The central idea in Rousseau's theory is the doctrine of the general will, a doctrine which, more than any other single doctrine, has moulded modern political thought. The legislative power always belongs to the people, only that law is a real law which is in accordance with the general will. This general will (which is to be distinguished from the will of all, or individual wills) can be expressed only in a mass meeting of the people. A representative assembly cannot adequately voice it. Representative assemblies once elected become the masters, not, as they should be, the servants of the people. The true sovereign is the totality of the people. "As nature gives a man absolute power over his members," he says, "the social contract gives to the body politic absolute power over its members; and it is this same power, which, directed by the general will, bears the name of sovereignty."

The obvious difficulty of this is that only unanimity, which in practice is impossible to secure, could make a law valid. Rousseau, however, says that the general will is not necessarily the unanimous will of the citizens. Absolute unanimity is necessary only for the original contract. After the state is established, consent is implied in the fact of residence. "To dwell in a territory," he says, "is to submit to its government." Within the state a majority is sufficient to make a law valid. The general will (which, he says, always wills the common good) is the criterion.

Just as Hobbes's theory supports absolutism and Locke upholds constitutional government, Rousseau's theory supports popular sovereignty. Rousseau's chief merit lies in making clear the distinction between the state and govern-

Criticism of Rousseau's Theory

ment, but he goes to extremes in making the state-will equivalent to popular demands. The general will, which always wills the public good, is not, as he makes it, equivalent to the decision of the majority of the people. In his desire to establish a sound enough theory, he goes so far that he completely destroys the stability of government. Government, in his view, excludes the legislative function. It is purely executive ; it simply carries out orders. It cannot make laws, i.e., express the will of the state, and it is liable to instant dissolution when the people assemble in a sovereign body. But government includes the legislative as well as the executive.

Like Hobbes, Rousseau advocates absolute, inalienable sovereignty. Hobbes says it belongs to the ruler ; Rousseau to the people. Like Locke, Rousseau recognizes the distinction between the ruler and the power behind the ruler, or between legal and political sovereignty. Locke, however, regards as legal all acts made by the government except those which violate the rights of the individual. The people reserve certain powers for use in cases of necessity. In Rousseau's theory all laws depend on the general will, which can be expressed only in a general assembly of the people. The people are continually sovereign ; they do not exercise sovereignty in cases of emergency only.

The Social Contract theory reached its high-water mark in Rousseau. The historical commentary on his theory is found in the French Revolution, which was a practical application of an extreme theory of the sovereignty of the people. After Rousseau the theory gradually died out. The theory, as one writer puts it, " faded away in the dim light of German metaphysics."

Kant and Fichte, the German philosophers, each gave a distinctive setting to the theory. Kant regards it not as an

Kant historical fact but as an " idea of reason." The Contract, he says, may be looked on as " the coalition of all the private and particular wills of a people into one common and public will, having a purely juridical legislation as its end." It is unnecessary, he says, to presuppose the contract as an historical fact. It has, however, practical reality, for " it ought to bind every legislator by the condition that he shall enact such laws as might have arisen from the united will of a whole people, and it will

likewise be binding upon every subject in so far as he will be a citizen so that he shall regard the law as if he had consented to it of his own will." The contract is thus the criterion of the justness of law. If it is impossible that the whole people could have consented, then the law is unjust. A law, for example, establishing certain birth-privileges would be unjust according to this standard of judgment.

Fichte, Kant's disciple, just as in many respects Kant was Rousseau's disciple, carries the theory to its utmost limits. Fichte (though his opinions did not remain uniform throughout his life) says that, as man is subject to the moral law alone, he can terminate the contract at will. Every man, therefore, can take himself away from the civil society of which he is a party by the original contract. The same right applies to any party of men. Fichte allows the most extreme form of secession, for, he says, what belongs to a smaller number of men logically belongs to a greater number. The right of secession of course passes into the right of revolution. Fichte later changed his views from this extreme individualism.

It is natural that the idea of consent in the Social Contract theory should have appealed to the makers of the American constitution. The War of Independence had been fought on that ground, and, not unnaturally, the Social Contract appears in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence. The ideas of Rousseau in particular appealed to the Americans, and these are traceable in almost every American constitution drawn up at that time. In the constitution of New Hampshire it is stated that "all men are born equally free and independent. Therefore all government of right originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good." In the often-quoted constitution of Massachusetts the contract is definitely accepted. "The body politic," it says, "is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the general good."

The contract idea is also voiced by the early American writers—such as Jefferson and Madison, but there is nothing particularly noteworthy in their presentation of the theory.

In the nineteenth century the theory gradually died. The causes of its death were—

1. The rise of the historical spirit in Political Science, marking a change in the mental attitude of the time from speculative to positive. Montesquieu, the French writer, was the leader of this school. His *Spirit of the Laws*, published in 1748, is one of the most epoch making books in the history of Political Science, though it failed to have immediate effect on his contemporaries. Montesquieu, in sharp contrast to the writers of his time, who started from nature to prove their theories, adopted history and observation, with generalizations drawn therefrom, as his method. Burke, in England, used this method with great effect against Rousseau.

2. Darwin and theory of evolution. This theory, applied first to the plant and animal, gradually suffused all departments of thought and enquiry. At the present moment it is supreme, and Political Science, like every other science, is interpreted in the light of evolution.

3. The replacement of the sound elements in the theory by new theories, e.g., the doctrine of political sovereignty, and the recognition of the distinction between state and government on which the doctrine of political sovereignty rests.

4. The general unsoundness of the theory itself.

5. CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

The above sketch of the history of the Social Contract theory will enable the student to appreciate the main points of criticism to which it is open. Two things must be remembered: first, that the social contract is sometimes regarded as an actual historical fact, to which the origin of the state is ascribed; second, that it is often used only as an idea either to interpret current constitutional usage or to express certain fundamental relations existing in political life. In the first of these lies the chief weakness of the theory; in the second its chief strength.

1. As an historical explanation of the origin of society it is false. Nothing in the whole range of history shows a stage of historical development such as the theory

demands. History gives no example of a group of primitive people, without any previous political knowledge or development, meeting together and consciously forming

Criticism : an agreement like the social contract. Not only
1. It is so, but to assume that individuals either could
false or would do any such thing presupposes either a knowledge of political institutions learnt from somewhere else, or a fairly highly developed social consciousness inconsistent with the ignorance and simplicity which are usually associated with the state of nature. Some writers, indeed, suggest what seem to them actual instances of contracts. The most notable is that drawn up by the English emigrants to America in 1620. "We do," it says, "solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic for our better ordering and preservation." Another example is the State of California, already quoted in Bluntschli's classification of historical origins. Several of the American state constitutions are of a similar type. These, however, do not give the origin of the state as such, but the origin of particular states. The contracting parties were already familiar with government; what they did was to institute among themselves what they were familiar with under different conditions.

Not only is there no historical evidence of a social contract as the origin of the state, but what evidence there is shows that a contract of any kind was unlikely. Research has shown that early law was more communal than individual. In early times law existed not for individuals but for families. Sir Henry Maine in particular points this out. Early laws, he says, "are binding not on individuals but on families. . . . The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The individual has been steadily substituted for the family as the unit of which civil laws take account. . . . The movement has been from one of *status* to one of *contract*." Though history does not give us an absolute solution, we may reasonably argue by analogy that in the period preceding that of which Maine speaks, there was still less individualism. The social contract theory, however, speaks of

individuals making contracts for *individual* safety and the security of property for *individuals*.

2. The whole conception of the state of nature and natural law is wrong. The social contract is a mechanical, artificial explanation of the origin of civil society. The state is in the proper sense of the word as "natural" as was the supposed "natural" law. (Natural Law is a subject which requires fuller treatment, and it receives such in the chapter on Law.) The distinction between nature and convention, which is so prominent in the Sophistic philosophy, and underlies the whole theory of contract, is false. Man is part of nature and his impulses and actions are as natural as is his life itself. Far from being artificial, the state is the very expression of man's nature. The state depends on the society of man who by nature is social, or, as Aristotle said, is a political (or, rather, social) animal. No better refutation of the social contract from this point of view has ever been given than by Plato and Aristotle.

2. **Natural law: its Meaning** **Plato** (in the *Republic*, Books I and II) refutes both the contract and force theories in the same ways. Two of the characters of the *Republic*, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, contend respectively that force and the social contract are the bases of civil society. Both, says Plato, are wrong. The state is a growth, not a manufacture. Its origin is natural, based on the need that man has for his fellow members of society. This mutual need, at its lowest an economic need, exists from the beginning of man's existence and is part of his human nature. Men do not make a bargain consciously: the agreement exists because of their nature. No man is self-sufficient: of necessity he depends on his fellow-men. This does not mean that civil society is merely utilitarian. Justice does not exist for self-interest; it is the expression of the true nature of man. It is the inner relation which makes civil society a true unity.

The arguments of the *Republic* are brought out more clearly in the *Protagoras* where Plato illustrates his meaning by a myth. Men in their earliest state lived in a scattered condition. Gradually they gathered together in towns, but the mere fact of congregation did not improve them, as they had no form of government. Zeus then sent his messenger, Hermes, to distribute justice and reverence, the two bonds

of civil society, among them. Zeus ordered Hermes to distribute these not to a few, as the arts were distributed, but to every man.

Aristotle, like Plato, his master, combated the idea that the state was mechanical or artificial. The state, he says, is a type of life, necessary for life. Nature, he says, always seeks some end, and the end is the good life. This good life is the final cause of the state, man's need being the efficient cause. The state arises from the needs of life and continues to exist for the sake of good life. Nature therefore intended man to live in a state from the very beginning, and for this reason man was given the power of speech. The true nature of a thing is its full development. The state is the final point of development in a series stretching from the household, joint family and village community. Just as the household or family is natural so is the state.

The positions taken up by Plato and Aristotle are substantially those adopted to-day, though we make a distinction, not given by them, between the state and society. The Sophistic contrast between nature and convention which troubled Plato and Aristotle has lost its point in the modern world. We no longer contrast the two, although we often contrast nature with society as a whole.

3. On an appreciation of the nature-convention fallacy depends the understanding of another point of criticism, that the theory is illogical. Liberty cannot exist in the state of nature. Liberty implies rights, and rights arise not from physical force but from the common consciousness of common well-being. Rights imply duties: the two terms are correlative. If I consider I have a right to do such and such, I must concede the same right to others, and why both my neighbour and I agree in this is that we are both conscious that it is necessary for the common welfare. In the state of nature the only right is force: there is no such thing as duty, except the duty of self-preservation. The physical or brute force of the state of nature is not a bond of society: it is only a personal weapon. It creates no rights and therefore gives no liberty. Law is the condition of liberty. The so-called liberty of the state of nature is really licence.

4. It has been pointed out, too, that the conditions of a

contract presuppose a system of law to support it. There must, therefore, be the will of a community behind a contract, which at once ascribes the origin of the state to something behind the contract, i.e., common will.

5. Bluntschli and others point out that the contract theory is dangerous, and, as evidence, quote the intimate connection of the French Revolution with Rousseau. The theory certainly has been used to establish positions dangerous to the stability of the state. To the superficial observer it might appear that the state and government are due to individual caprice, while several upholders of the theory actually encourage revolution.

Though these weaknesses exist in the theory, due credit must be given to it for one fundamental truth. Civil society rests on the consent not of the ruler but of the ruled. By bringing out this the theory became an important factor in the development of modern democracy. It served a useful purpose in its time by combating the claims of irresponsible rulers and class privilege. The theory of Divine Right was a more complete instrument of absolutism than the Social Contract of Hobbes. The chief enemy to the Divine Theory was the Contract theory. While the former gave divine power to the ruler, leaving only the duty of implicit obedience to the ruled, the latter brought into prominence the fact that the state and government are actually founded on the minds of the citizens themselves.

CHAPTER IV

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE—(*continued*)

6. THE THEORY OF DIVINE ORIGIN

The central idea of the Theory of Divine Origin is that the state was founded by God. The type of state in which the ruler is regarded as the vice-regent of God (or, to use a phrase current in the mediæval literature on the subject, the Vicar of God) is called a theocratic or God-ruled state. The Divine theory takes us back to the very earliest stages of political life. Modern research has shown that universally among early peoples the rudimentary forms of government were intimately connected with religion. The earliest rulers were a combination of priest and king. Their powers as king depended mainly on the superstitious dread with which the people regarded their priestly position.

**General
Explana-
tion**

The best repository for examples of the theory of Divine origin is the Old Testament, where God is looked on as the immediate source of royal powers. He is regarded as selecting, anointing, dismissing, and even slaying kings. He is pleased or displeased with them: their policy is judged according to the greater policy of God. The king in the Jewish state was the agent of God and responsible to God alone. The early history of the Jews not only gives no trace of the will of the people instituting the king, but shows the unquestioning acceptance by the people of the theocratic state.

**The Old
Testament**

In neither Greece nor Rome did political theory run in the Jewish channels. Though religion was not divorced from politics, early in their history both the Greeks and Romans gave a definite place to the will of the citizen in political institutions. The Greeks considered the state to be an outgrowth of man's nature.

**In Greece
and Rome**

The Roman legend of the foundation of Rome, while not omitting religion, said that the people and king created the state. The blessings of the gods followed.

The idea was current in the epic ages of Sanskrit literature. The *Mahabharata*, in particular, contains many passages which either express or suggest the divine origin of the state. The idea does not occur to any marked extent after the epic age.

In Sanskrit
Literature

With the advent of Christianity the theory of Divine Origin received a new impetus. For many centuries it held almost undisputed sway. The only counteracting influences were the theory of Roman Law, which regarded the people as the ultimate source of law, and the Teutonic ideas of popular government. The Church Fathers founded their theory on the well-known saying of St. Paul (Romans X, 1 and 2)—“Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.”

The
Christian
Fathers

The result was a purely theocratic doctrine. The early Church Fathers looked on government as an institution founded by God because of the Fall of man. Before the Fall man lived in a state of sinless innocence, but with the beginning of sin, God instituted government. The king was the representative of God and in the name of God his law had to be obeyed. Two of the greatest of the Fathers, St. Augustine and Pope Gregory the Great, teach that the reward of a good people is a good ruler and the punishment of a bad people a bad ruler. [It is in the work of Pope Gregory the Great that the later Fathers found most of their authority.] The Roman lawyers traced the authority of law to the people: Gregory ascribes it to God. The insistence on the divine character of authority by the Fathers was due to three causes: first, the influence of the Old Testament, second, the necessity for the abolition of disorder in the early Church (the divine theory proved an excellent lever for the exercise of despotic power in the Church); and third, the existence of two powerful bodies, the Church and the Empire. The cast of mediæval political theory was determined mainly by the last of these causes.

As we have already seen, the theory of the Church writers later underwent a considerable change. The influence of Roman Law had always been on the side of the will of the people as a determining factor in political phenomena. Teutonic ideas helped in the same direction, and the later ecclesiastics began to make a difference between the "impulsive" cause (in Latin, *causa impulsiva*) or the "remote" cause (in Latin, *causa remota*)—both of which were God—and the immediate cause, the people. This distinction favoured the growth of the social contract, in which a place was definitely found for the idea of consent.

Both the Divine theory and the Social Contract theory were used for more than one purpose. We have seen how

Uses of the Theory both absolutism and popular government were justified by the Contract theory. Similarly the

Divine theory was used for various purposes; in fact, its use as an explanation of the origin of the state was secondary. One of the best-known uses of the theory was the justification of absolutism. There is no place for the will of the people in a theory which regards the king as the vice-regent of God, and an agent to carry out His orders. The theory was used as a bulwark against the onrush of democratic ideas. For the individual to set himself up against the king was equivalent to disobeying divine law, or committing the sin of sacrilege. Both before and after the Reformation the theory was used by certain ecclesiastics to discredit the civil power as compared with the Church. The Church, like the Empire, had become a vast organization with wide powers and possessions. To elevate religion it was held that the Church received its power from God, whereas the state was a purely human or worldly organization. The inference was that, as God was superior to man, so was the Church superior to the state.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, the form the theory took was the Divine Right of kings.

Divine Right of Kings That theory was supported not only by the Stuart kings but by a large school of thought.

Even the absolutism which Hobbes tried to justify by means of the Social Contract was questioned by the royalists of the time. Sir Robert Filmer, for example, declared that Hobbes was wrong in supposing that absolute sovereignty was based on a contract. No such contract was

possible, for there was never a condition of man such as Hobbes pictured in the state of nature. Equality never existed, for when God made man, He made Adam master over Eve and the children born to them. Authority was founded from the beginning by God Himself. God is the Father of Men, and from His Fatherhood came royalty, and absolute power.

The causes of the decline of the Divine theory were—(1) the rise of the Contract theory, with the emphasis it gave to consent; (2) the rise to supremacy of the temporal as distinct from the spiritual power, or, in other words, the separation of church and state; and (3) the actual refutation of the absolutism which the theory supported by the growth of democracy. Though the theory as an active influence is dead, it is still current in the popular consciousness of to-day. In India in particular we are familiar with the religious reverence with which the throne is regarded, while in Germany the Ex-Emperor, both before and during the war, often expressed the theory of the divinity of kings as applied to himself.

The chief criticism of the theory is given in the *Ecclesiastical Polity* of Richard Hooker, himself an ecclesiastic.

Revelation (or religion), he says, is concerned with matters of faith. In other matters man has reason as his guide. Modern political theory leaves to religion the decision on the question of divine intervention. That God is

the origin of or intervenes in the state is not a political but a religious view. The modern political scientist regards the state as essentially a human institution, organized in its government through human agency. It comes into existence when a number of people come together on a fixed territory, and, through their consciousness of common ends, organize themselves politically. No one now accepts the originaive power of God as a criterion of the rightness or wrongness of any given form of government. To say that God selects this or that man as ruler is contrary to experience and common sense. Monarchs conceivably might claim certain powers or qualities consequent on descent from a remote divine ancestor: but it would be very difficult to establish such a claim for a modern president, elected by the people.

In the theory, too, as in the Social Contract theory is an element of danger. In a theocratic state the ruler is responsible only to God. Irresponsibility to human opinion might be a grave danger in the hands of an unscrupulous man. Modern research has shown that the priest-king of primitive society not infrequently used his divine status to cheat and oppress his people. The theory also condemns all forms of government except the monarchical. The theory was responsible largely for the ruin of absolute monarchy. It was the "corruption of European monarchy in the seventeenth century." The responsibility of a ruler must be to man. His relations of God must be his own private affair ; his relations to man are public. As Bluntschli pointedly remarks, the statesman must not, in the belief that God determines the destiny of nations and states, and in the confidence that God will govern well, "tempt God and shirk his own responsibility."

Even from the religious point of view it is difficult to justify the theory. The early Christian Fathers held that a bad ruler is given by God to men as a punishment for their sins. It is difficult to regard some historical examples of bad rulers as divine, however sinful the people, they may more properly be looked on as living examples of blasphemy. Nor does it appear from history that evil results have always followed from the removal of kings.

In the New Testament, moreover, there is as much authority against the Divine theory as for it. The very phrase "the powers *that be*" in itself implies the possibility of change in the form of government. But the best-known passage is that on which the separation of Church and State is founded—the statement of Christ's "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's." This is evidence of the human character of the state from the very fountain head.

The Divine theory has had its merits. In the days when the terrible nature of religious law appealed to men more than it does now, the idea of divine origin was useful as a factor in preserving order. However mistaken or unscrupu-

lous the theory was, it at least deserves credit for the prevention of anarchy. The strong arm of the Church did much in the dark ages towards the security of person, property and government.

The theory, again, is an emblem of an undoubted historical fact. Early political and religious institutions were so closely connected that it is not possible to describe them separately. The earliest ruler was a mixture of priest (or magician) and king. His power as king depended mainly on his position as priest, a position which allowed scope for various kinds of cruelty and deception.

The theory, again, explains many modern survivals of the close connection between religion and the state. All great state functions are to-day accompanied by a considerable amount of religious ceremony. Kings are still crowned by religious men with religious rites. State or "established" churches, some of which receive support from the public funds, are still recognized. Ecclesiastics still, as in the British House of Lords, in virtue of their offices, take part in law-making. There are modern examples, too, of religious states, such as Turkey, before the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.

The chief merit of the theory, however, is not in religion as such but in the close connection of religion and morality. To regard the state as the work of God is to give it a high moral status, to make it something which the citizen may revere and support, something which he may regard as the perfection of human life. The law of the state does not cover the field of morality. Morality deals with intentions and motives; law deals with external actions. The state deals with these outward actions only, but its end must essentially be a moral end, and to regard it as the creation of the all-wise and all-good God brings into prominence this central fact of its being.

To use the theory as many have done to bolster up force and authority in the name of divine authority, however, shows how, from what in itself may be perfectly harmless, very harmful results may follow. In this respect the theory is essentially the same as the Force theory. The strength of both the Divine and Force theories lies in their emphasizing

one aspect of force—moral force. If the theory meant simply that, as one of the later Church writers said, God is a "remote" cause, that God simply implanted the social instinct among men, there would be little harm in it. What Political Science demands is that political institutions should be regarded as purely human creations.

7. THE THEORY OF FORCE

The Theory of Force states that civil society originated in the subjugation of the weaker by the stronger. In the early stages of the development of mankind it implies that those physically stronger captured or enslaved the weaker. This was true not only of individuals but of tribes and clans. From the more rudimentary political organizations it spread in successive steps to the more advanced. Finally kingdoms and empires fought against each other and survived or died according to their strength.

Statement of the Theory

The Force theory, like the other theories already examined, has been employed as the support of diverse contentions. Some of the Church Fathers, in order to discredit the state as compared with the church, which, they said, was founded by God, argued that the state was the result of brute force. The Force theory has also been used by writers of the individualist school to prove that it is in the nature of society that the stronger should prevail against the weaker. From this they try to demonstrate that there should be no regulation of competition in industry. The most productive system is that which gives the most unrestricted scope for individual efforts. The other school of thought, socialism, uses the theory for exactly the opposite purpose. The present system of industrial organization, say certain socialists, is the result of the improper use of force. The state is the outcome of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. This force, the origin of all civil society, has continued till at the present stage one part of the community robs the other of its just reward. Government is force organized so as to keep the working classes in check. The object of the socialist is to prove the justice of the worker's claim to a larger share of what he produces.

Uses of the Theory

The theory of Force was widely adopted by writers in Germany before the war. Their chief object was to educate the people in ideas of world domination by Germany. Treitschke, the Prussian historian, puts power or force in the forefront of his definition of the state. "The state", he says, "is the public power of offence and defence, the first task of which is the making of war and the administration of justice." General von Bernhardt, another modern German writer, says that war is a biological necessity of the first importance and the aspiration for peace is directly antagonistic to the first principle of life. Struggle is a universal law of nature, and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is the natural condition of existence. "The first and paramount law," he says, "is the assertion of one's own independent existence," and from this he proceeds to argue that the right of conquest is justifiable. "Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things."

The Force theory contains a considerable amount of truth. Force is an essential element in the state: it is necessary both internally and externally. Internally the state requires force for the preservation of its unity against disruptive elements. The relation of command and obedience necessary to government implies the existence of force. Externally a state requires force to repel aggression. To set up force, however, as an explanation of the origin of the state, and as a justification of its action, is wrong.

The Social Contract and Divine theories err in a similar way. The Social Contract, as used by some writers, justifies the most absolute form of government, and gives no place to resistance. The same is true of the Divine theory. Force may mean either that moral force or brute force might is right, that physical, brute strength is the determining factor in state development, or that will or moral force is the basis of the state. The former, physical force, is not a permanent basis of a state; the latter, moral force is. Might without right can at best be only temporary; might with right is a permanent basis for the state. Force does not create rights; rights, like the

state, are founded in the common consciousness of common ends. Mere brute force simply means despotism, violence and revolution, with no rights, save the rights of the physically stronger. True force, that is, moral force is the permanent foundation of the state. Might without right lasts only so long as the might lasts ; might with right is as lasting as the human minds on which it depends.

One aspect of the Force theory requires particular attention. Bernhardt, we have seen, argues that the exercise of force is essential from the very nature of society. Struggle, leading to the survival of the fittest, he says, is a natural law. Sir Henry Maine expresses similar sentiments when he speaks of "beneficent private war, which makes one man strive to climb on the shoulders of another and remain there through the law of the survival of the fittest." Herbert Spencer continually voices the same views. He speaks of the beneficent working of the "survival of the fittest," and he declaims against our modern legislators who pass laws to protect weak or unsuccessful members of society who, without their interference, would naturally go to the wall.

To discuss this question would mean a full analysis of the application of the theory of evolution to society, a task which cannot be undertaken here. Certain salient facts may be brought before the student.

The word "fittest" in the phrase "survival of the fittest"—the core of the evolutionist position—means, as Huxley says, the survival of those best fitted to cope with environment in order to survive and breed. As Dr. Marshall says, the survival of the fittest means the survival not of the man who does most good to his environment but of the one who derives most from the environment. In society the circumstances are so varied and complex that the meaning of fittest is by no means uniform. Among both animals and men the fittest may not be the physically strongest. In the struggle for food, for example, physical strength may be worsted by cunning, or the strongest may not survive in an environment where the puny may more easily find food and avoid enemies. What is true of individuals is true of groups of individuals in society, or of races. The actually strongest may not survive, or they may survive only in the sense that the-

**Survival of
the Fittest**

**Meaning of
"Fittest"**

word "strongest" is applied to those who, whatever their physical strength, actually do survive.

In society again the struggle is not only between individuals but between groups or races. In the lower creation the struggle is chiefly between individuals. Individual struggle between men is largely replaced by the contest between tribes or nations. Tribal or national survival may be achieved at the expense of the individuals. Oppression, slavery, even extermination of individuals may follow group or national survival.

The human individual, further, belongs to different groups. By race he may belong to one group, by language to another, by religion to another, by profession to another, by political allegiance to another, by culture to another. Among these groups struggle for survival goes on, and failure in one may be accompanied by survival in another. Thus a nation may be conquered, but its religion may survive among the conquerors, so that the terms failure or survival may be applicable and non-applicable at the same time.

More important in the case of man is the conflict of ideas. Ideas struggle with each other and fail or survive. Ideas are crystallized into laws and institutions, and the survival of ideas means the existence of the institutions embodying them. Thus against the idea of selection by brute force has prevailed the idea of respect for human life. Against the idea of the weak being allowed to die off unprotected have survived the ideas of human kindness and sympathy. Spencerians argue that the human race has suffered by the survival of such ideas; their opponents reply that, had the physical weaklings gone to the wall, the world would have lost its Miltons and Newtons. The fact is that these ideas exist and prevail, whatever the results of their survival.

All this points to the supreme differentia in society—consciousness. Man is a thinking agent, whose actions are directed by moral ends. This is in the very nature of man, and the results of his thinking are natural. The state, government, and indeed all institutions are the result of man's consciousness, creations which have arisen from his appreciation of a moral end. Huxley, in a well-known passage, gives what we

may accept as the only reasonable contrast between society and nature. "Society, like art," he says, "is a part of nature. But it is convenient to distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays the part of immediate cause, as something apart; and, therefore, society, like art, is usefully to be considered as distinct from nature. It is the more desirable, and even necessary, to make this distinction, since society differs from nature in having a definite moral object; whence it comes about that the course shaped by the ethical man—the member of society or citizen—necessarily runs counter to that which the non-ethical man—the primitive savage, or man as a mere member of the animal kingdom—tends to adopt. The latter fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal; the former devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle."

War, the supreme exercise of force between nations, is natural only because it is more primitive. In society the primitive force-struggle is modified by ideas. War undoubtedly has its value: it breeds courage, loyalty, self-reliance, but it achieves them at an enormous cost. Moral ideas—the characteristic of man—enable us to secure these virtues at less cost. In the more primitive world the process of evolution is mainly spontaneous or unconscious. Although man has the power of deliberate choice, the deliberation in primitive society may contain a considerable amount of unconsciousness. The progress of society shows how conscious choice takes the place of the "spontaneity" of the lower forms of creation.

8. THE HISTORICAL OR EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

The accepted theory of the origin of the state in modern Political Science is the Historical or Evolutionary theory. According to this theory the state is an historical growth. Its beginnings are unknown to history, but from what we do know from History, Anthropology, Ethnology, and Comparative Philology we can both construct a reasonable theory of origin and recognize a continuous course of development. An analysis of the rise of the state enables us to separate three distinct factors in its growth. These are Kinship, Religion, and Political Consciousness. Though it is possible

to separate these elements in an analysis such as is given here, it is not to be supposed that these are actually separated in the process of state building. A clear, cut division is impossible; they operate in various combinations. Each element plays its part in achieving the unity necessary for statehood, but the exact method in which it works varies from community to community and from one environment to another.

Factors in Development
Kinship
 1. Kinship. A study of early institutions shows that kinship played a considerable part in early civic development. Blood relationship is an inevitable bond in society, for it is one of the most fundamental facts in individual life. The closest bond of kinship is the family, composed of father, mother and children. With the expansion of the family arise new families, and by the multiplication of families of the same stock tribes or clans are formed. What the direct course of development from the family was is a matter of dispute, but there is no disputing the importance of the fact of kinship. That it was important may be judged from the various legends of their common origin prevailing among nations and nationalities both modern and ancient. Other factors, such as common purpose, entered in the process of development, but the fundamental bond of union was the family, or blood relationship.

On this subject have arisen two theories which require examination—the Patriarchal and the Matriarchal theories. An examination of the former—the Patriarchal—will explain the latter.

- The Patriarchal theory has its strongest supporter in Sir Henry Maine (at one time legal member of the Governor-General's Council in India), in his books *Ancient Law* and *Early History of Institutions*. The theory may be stated in Maine's own way. "The effect of the evidence derived from comparative jurisprudence is to establish that view of the primeval condition of the human race which is known as the Patriarchal Theory. There is no doubt, of course, that this theory was originally based on the Scriptural history of the Hebrew patriarchs in Lower Asia; but its connection with Scripture rather militated than otherwise against its reception as a complete theory,

**The Patri-
 archal
 Theory.
 Maine's
 Statement
 of it**

since the majority of the inquirers who till recently addressed themselves with most earnestness to the colligation of social phenomena, were either influenced by the strongest prejudice against Hebrew antiquities or by the strongest desire to construct their system without the assistance of religious records. Even now there is perhaps a disposition to undervalue these accounts, or rather to decline generalizing from them, as forming part of the traditions of a Semitic people. It is to be noted, however, that the legal testimony comes nearly exclusively from the institutions of societies belonging to the Indo-European stock, the Romans, Hindoos, and Slavonians supplying the greater part of it; and indeed the difficulty, at the present stage of the inquiry, is to know where to stop, to say of what races of men it is not allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was originally organized on the patriarchal model. . . . The points which lie on the surface of the history are those :—The eldest male parent—the eldest ascendant—is absolutely supreme in his household. His dominion extends to life and death, and is as unqualified over his children and their houses as over his slaves; indeed, the relations of sonship and serfdom appear to differ in little beyond the higher capacity which the child in blood possesses of becoming one day the head of a family himself. The flocks and herds of the children are the flocks and herds of the father, and the possessions of the parent, which he holds in a representative rather than in a proprietary character, are equally divided at his death among his descendants in the first degree, the eldest son sometimes receiving a double share under the name of birthright, but more generally endowed with no hereditary advantage beyond an honorary precedence. A less obvious inference from the Scriptural accounts is that they seem to plant us on the traces of the breach which is first effected in the empire of the parent. The families of Jacob and Esau separate and form two nations; but the families of Jacob's children hold together and become a people. This looks like the immature germ of a state or commonwealth and of an order of rights superior to the claims of family relation."

The family, then, he regards as the unit of primitive society, and the family at its lowest means father, mother and children. The single family breaks up into more-

families which, all held together under the head of the first family, the chief or patriarch, becomes the tribe. Withdrawals from that tribe make new tribes, which, still held together by kinship, act together and ultimately form a state. Maine's ascending scale of development is in these words: "The elementary group is the family connected by common subjection to the highest male ascendant. The aggregation of families forms the Gens or House. The aggregation of Houses makes the Tribe. The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the commonwealth"

Maine derives his evidence from three sources—from accounts by contemporary observers of civilization less advanced than their own, from the records which particular races have kept of their own history, and from ancient law. These sources provide ample proof of the power of kinship on the development of the state, though we shall find several insurmountable difficulties in the theory as Maine presents it.

The chief evidence in favour of the theory is found in the early history of the Jews, especially the Patriarchs of the Old Testament. In Athens there were "families" and "brotherhoods," and in Rome the three primitive tribes with a common origin. In Rome, too, there was the "patria potestas," the power of the father, which gave the head of the household almost unlimited authority over its members. The clan system in Scotland, the tribal system in many countries, the real or fictitious legends of common origin in many nationalities, all these go to show the importance of the family. In India Maine was familiar with the ramifications of the family system, by which very large numbers are included in one household, under the head of the eldest male. In certain rude communities to-day large groups of individuals have been found in one so-called family, each man having large numbers of brothers or sons or cousins. The patriarchal theory, adopting this as the unit and supposing the headship bequeathed from one chief to another, by easy stages transforms the father into the chief or king and the family into a civil community.

The theory is open to certain very grave objections. Its chief merit is that it points out what is undoubtedly a factor in state development, the family. Aristotle, while recognizing

the difference between a family and a developed civil community, likewise posits the relation of father to children as a fundamental fact in the origin of civil society. Aristotle said that there were three approximations to civic relations in family life—(1) the relations of a slave-master to his slaves, (2) the relations of a husband and wife, and (3) the relations of a parent to his children. The family is the ultimate form of social union. Command and obedience arise naturally in it, and logically enough it may be considered as the basis of all forms of social union.

The patriarchal theory is one of the simplest explanations of the origin of the state, but one of its chief weaknesses is this very simplicity. Primitive is not the same as simple. The more researches that are made into early society, the more is it clear that early forms of social organization were very complex. This danger of simplicity applies equally to other theories of the origin of the state. Sir J. G. Frazer, the most outstanding of modern social anthropologists, in his classic work *The Golden Bough*, makes a point of warning investigators against this danger. "He who investigates the history of institutions," he says, "should constantly bear in mind the extreme complexity of the causes which have built up the fabric of human society, and should be on his guard against a subtle danger incidental to all science—the tendency to simplify unduly the infinite variety of the phenomena by fixing our attention on a few of them to the exclusion of the rest. The propensity to excessive simplification is indeed natural to the mind of man, since it is only by abstraction and generalization, which necessarily imply the neglect of a number of particulars, that he can stretch his puny faculties so as to embrace a minute portion of the illimitable vastness of the universe. But if the propensity is natural and even inevitable, it is nevertheless fraught with peril since it is apt to narrow and falsify our conception of any subject under investigation. To correct it (partially) we must endeavour to broaden our views by taking account of a wide range of facts and possibilities, and when we have done so to the utmost of our power, we must still remember that from the very nature of things our ideas fall immeasurably short of the reality."

This procedure, applied to the Patriarchal theory, at once raises difficulties in it. In the first place, a considerable number of writers hold that not the patriarchal but the matriarchal family was the unit. This is known as the Matriarchal theory. The upholders of this theory (the chief of which are McLennan in his *Patriarchal Theory*, Jenks in his *History of Politics* and Morgan in his *Ancient Society*) say there is considerable evidence to show that the primitive family had no common male head, but that kinship was traced through females. Before the patriarchal family there was the matriarchal family. The patriarchal family is possible where either monogamy or polygamy exists, but the earliest form of marriage relation was polyandry, according to which one woman had several husbands. Descent in such a state could only be through the female. The prevalence of queens in Malabar and the power of princesses among the Marathas may be cited as evidence in favour of the Matriarchal theory.

Though examples exist of polyandrous types of society in various parts of the world, the evidence is not sufficient to justify the Matriarchal theory. The very existence of matriarchal descent, however, is a fatal argument against the Patriarchal theory. The patriarchal family is not universal, and where a male member of a family is chosen as leader, it is evident that some cause outside the family system is in operation.

The existence of another cause is also shown by the fact of adoption. In primitive communities we find that individuals were adopted by families, sometimes in large numbers, in order to give reality to the idea of kinship. The idea behind adoption obviously lies outside the family. Adoption was regarded as necessary to secure certain ends. The meaning of the family as a community is materially changed when this is taken into account. Still more important is the statement of Maine himself that the notions of power and consanguinity (or kinship) blend but they do not supersede each other. In the family was latent the idea of civil authority. The analogy to civil authority may be true in regard to the rule of a father over children, but something else is necessary to explain the continuance of paternal authority over grown

men. Physical force may account for the rule of the man over his wife and his children, so long as the children are young and relatively weak, but something beyond force is necessary to explain the power of a weak old man over men in the prime of life. Some deeper foundation exists. In Rome the *patria potestas* was enforced by the state, but where there is no state outside the family the rule could continue only because it was reasonable or because it served certain ends.

Actual examples of the patriarchal type of society, moreover, show that mere descent alone is not sufficient to establish a new head of the family. Thus in the Slavonic house communities the head was elected, not because of descent, but because of his capacity. Ability to manage is essential to headship. This, again, shows an idea outside mere kinship.

We may conclude that in early society kinship was the first and strongest bond. As the community evolved, the sanction of kinship continued till other elements—common customs, common speech, common purpose—became clear. The bond of blood was the first element of unity; the other independent bonds appeared later. The course of history shows the gradual supersession of kinship by these other elements. Thus in the earliest stages of society citizenship was equivalent to the membership, real or pretended, of a common family. Nowadays citizenship in a state practically means residence on or birth within a particular part of the world's surface. The various struggles of class against class, from the patricians and plebeians in Rome to the aristocracy and people of the modern west, or to the Brahmin and Sudra in India, all illustrate the struggle of various elements against kinship, or an aspect of it, heredity.

2. Religion. In the early stages of human society religion was far more powerful than it is now. It coloured every act of human life. In the home, in public life, in war, in festivals it played a predominant part. Every idea, every habit, every custom of primitive man was governed by religion. Its influence in later times is equally manifest. Only in relatively modern times has religion been separated from politics, and this development has taken place only in the

**Other
Elements**

**The Power
of Kinship**

**Importance
of Religion
to Early
Man**

advanced communities of the west. To-day in many parts of the world there are primitive tribes where superstition or religion is the supreme arbiter in all matters.

Primitive man, knowing little about the forces or laws of nature, yet recognizing their great power, ascribed such power to unseen spirits. He regarded these spirits or gods as responsible for every process of nature. In Greece and, Rome, the most advanced communities of the pre-Christian world, agriculture, war, the sea, the sun, each had a presiding deity. To the savage the mystery of death was particularly terrible. The departed spirits were looked on as capable of love and hate, of beneficence and malevolence, and were worshipped, or propitiated by sacrifices. Ancestor-worship, arising from this, was very common, and the worship of departed ancestors had a considerable influence in family life.

The religion of primitive man we now call either animism, or merely superstition. For a fuller study of this the student must turn to Anthropology. The most remarkable modern study of the influence of religion or superstition on the development of political society and social institutions is *The Golden Bough*, the work of Professor Sir J. G. Frazer. In *Psyche's Task* and *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, Professor Frazer gives in small compass the factors particularly bearing on our subject. It must be remembered that the investigation into this subject is modern and incomplete. As Professor Frazer points out, we are only beginning to understand the mind of the savage and his institutions, and the truth once found out "may involve a reconstruction of society such as we can hardly dream of."

Common worship undoubtedly was a most important element in the welding together of families and tribes. This worship was often ancestor-worship. Common devotion to ancestors provided a permanent basis of union. As we have already seen, in early society the family played an all-important part. The family was as much a religious as a natural association. Common worship was more essential than even kinship. The wife, the son, or the adopted son were all initiated into the family religion. With the extension of the family to the tribe, common worship

Sir J. G.
Frazer's
Theory

continued to be the bond of union. Tribal union, too, was impossible except for those who performed the same religious ceremonies. Worship thus provided a bond of union in the earliest civic communities, when as yet the end of civic unity was not recognized.

This is further proved by the character of primitive law. No legal relation existed between families or tribes unless the religion was common. The sanction of the law was religion and, as it was the terrible aspect of religion that appealed to primitive minds, the breaking of law was followed by terrible punishment. The relation of command and obedience, natural enough in family relations, was thus definitely established by religion. As far as we can judge, early societies were ruled with a rod of iron by the absolutism of religious law. There was no question of the right of the individual against the state, for no such right existed.

The evidence available points to the existence of monarchies in the religious stage of state development. The **Priest Kings** kings were priest kings, combining the duties of ceremonial observances and secular rule. Examples of the survival of these kings exist in historical times. Sometimes they survived as titular kings, their main duties being the conduct of religious ceremonies. They may have been instituted after the abolition of monarchy in order to discharge the religious duties which the old priest-king combined in one person. Professor Frazer quotes the case of the descendants of the Ionian kings at Ephesus who, though their duties were mainly religious, continued to enjoy certain royal privileges, such as a seat of honour at the games, the right to carry a staff instead of a sceptre, and the right to wear a purple robe. The same writer cites the Spartan kingship as an instance of the double function of priest and king. The two kings were supposed to be descended from Zeus, and as such they acted as the priests of Zeus. A modern example he finds in the Matabels of South Africa, where the king is at the same time high-priest. Every year he offers sacrifices at certain festivals, and prays to the spirits of his forefathers and to his own spirit, from whom he expects great blessings. "In early society" says Dr. Frazer, "the divinity that doth hedge a king is no mere figure of speech."

Before the days of priest-kings, according to Dr. Frazer, the "magical man-god" held sway. There are two types of "incarnate human gods." In one type man is looked on as divinely inspired, the inspiration coming either at birth or at some time during his life; the other is a magician. In primitive communities magical rites and incantations are practised both privately and publicly, privately for the benefit or injury of individuals, publicly for the community. The magician thus becomes a public personage of great importance, for the welfare (or the reverse) of the community depends on him. From chief magician the step to chief or king is simple. Once that step is secure, the profession of magician becomes the highest aspiration of the tribesmen. The clever men of the tribe not only appreciate the advantages of the position, but recognize that it is largely through deceit that the position is maintained. The supreme power therefore tends to fall into the hands of the cleverest and most unscrupulous men.

Dr. Frazer regards this step as one of the most important in the history of progress. Before the monarchy of the clever sorcerer was established, the council of elders ruled. Stagnation, social, political and intellectual continued till the emergence, through sorcery, of the clever magician-leader, who, once he reached the height of his ambition, discarded selfishness and worked in the interest of his community. A single-minded resolute man was infinitely more useful than the "timid and divided" counsels of the elders. The community then grew by conquest or other means, both in population and wealth, two necessary elements in moral and intellectual advance. Despotism at this stage, as in more advanced stages, was the best friend of progress and liberty, for it provided the means of advance and gave scope for the development of individuality.

From the sorcerer, magician or medicine-man developed the priest-king. Dr. Frazer gives a large mass of evidence to show how, after the sorcerers have raised themselves to power, an intellectual revolution takes place. The acuter minds of the tribe recognize the deception of the magicians, and magic is replaced by religion. The magician gives way to the priest, who tries to achieve the same end as the

sorcerer not by trying to control the forces of nature but by appealing to the gods. The king, in giving up magic, adopts prayer, but preserves his kingship, and is often regarded as a god because of the possession of his nature by a powerful spirit.

Enough has been said to show the importance of religion in the early stages of state development. The influence of religion in the later stages is a matter of history. Religion has both in the earlier and later stages been a powerful instrument for inculcating obedience and preserving order. By analogy from the effect of religion in the Christian era as well as from direct evidence of ancient law and primitive communities, we may argue that in the earlier stages of religion, when yet it was merely animism or superstition, its power was far greater. When we take into consideration that the relation of command and obedience is the fundamental fact of civil society, we are able to appreciate the great value religion has had in the development of the state.

3. Political consciousness. Under this general heading may be grouped a number of elements, which, working alongside religion or kinship, helped in the development of the state. Underlying all other elements in state formation, including kinship and religion, is political consciousness, the supreme element. Political consciousness implies the existence of certain ends to be attained through political organization. These aims in the earliest stages are not expressed; indeed, they may not be recognized. Other elements, kinship it may be, or religion, may seem supreme, but gradually the ends of political organization become evident, and political institutions arise consciously because of these ends. At the beginning the political consciousness is really political unconsciousness, but, just as the forces of nature operated long before the discovery of the law of gravitation, political organization really rested on the community of minds, unconscious, dimly conscious, or fully conscious of certain moral ends present throughout the whole course of development.

Among elements of development which may be classed under this general head are the need for security of person and property, the necessity of defence from external attack,

and the need for improvement, social, moral and intellectual. With the increase of population there is the need for the creation of some agency to control the manifold relations of individuals. The first need is order. No settled life or progress is possible without the security of the person. With the increase of population also comes the need for regulating social relations such as the family and marriage. With the increase of wealth arises the necessity for the protection of property.

**Security
of Person.
Regulation
of Family
Relations**

All these lead to some kind of law. In its earliest form law is religious, with terrible penalties. This religious law, as we have seen, secured the relation of command and obedience. At the beginning of history we find men ruled by customary law. Customary law was very rigid, obedience to it being still of a semi-religious character. Progress begins when the people appreciate the purpose of the law, i.e., when mere obedience is succeeded by intelligent obedience.

**The Exist-
ence of Law**

The earliest type of law, which existed before the invention of writing, may be divided into Doms law and Customary law proper. Doms law was merely separate "doms" or judgments. The relation of cause and effect was not yet recognized, nor was here any idea of universal law. Such laws were merely isolated judgments laid down by chiefs as cases of necessity arose. The existence of such law was really revealed negatively, i.e., when it was broken. Judgment was given after the fact, not as pre-supposing the existence of a general law bearing on the case. A doom was an inspiration of the moment to suit a given case.

**Earliest
Law.
Doms Law**

Customary law proper, also unwritten, emerged when the doms were regarded as precedents to guide the administration of justice. The laws, instead of being vicarious dicta of chiefs, now became stable. The chiefs or councils of elders became the repositories of legal knowledge and their duties were regarded as a sacred trust. The kings or councils did not actually make the law but were the interpreters of it. This customary law gradually was modified. The influence of migration, whereby tribes became familiar with laws different from their own, brought about this modification.

**Customary
Law**

Such comparison inevitably led to questioning. Some laws were better, some worse, and the wiser among the earlier peoples began to ask why. This "why" is the keynote of all progress. It brings to light the end of institutions, and leads to the replacing of custom by thought.

The need for defence among primitive peoples, with whom the aggressive instinct was highly developed, was equally great. Defence implies attack, and in early communities we find that war created kings. The ablest leader in war became king. This, of course, is true also of relatively highly developed communities. Finally, the need of progress, which marks the latest stage of political development, leads the conscious adaptation of political institutions to certain definite ends. We are accustomed to look on progress as a late appearance in social and political development. The conditions of progress arise, however, as soon as people question among themselves the purpose of their institutions.

9. CONCLUSION

Several false theories of the origin of the state have been examined; their good as well as their bad points have been brought forward. The chief elements in state formation and development have been specified, but at the conclusion of all this we can do little more than say that the state is a historical growth in which kinship, religion and political consciousness have been the predominant elements. It is impossible to say at what stage any one element predominated, or even when it entered or left the field.

In all probability family groups existed before the state, and the state, in a rudimentary form, first appeared as an extension of the family. Religion reinforced family discipline and gradually created the wider discipline necessary to the existence of a state. Custom was the first law, enforced by chiefs or patriarchs. It carried with it a religious sanction. Gradually politics and religion were separated, and definite political ends were responsible for political unity.

Many variations of the process no doubt existed. A

patriarchal state may have prevailed in one place ; a matriarchal in another. Magician kings may have existed in one community ; priest-kings in another. Any detailed construction of the earliest forms of civic organization is bound to be fanciful. The main issue is clear, namely, that the state is a gradual development. Its origins are lost in the mists of time, but from the evidence we have we may reasonably conclude that from imperfect beginnings the state has developed and is at the present moment developing towards the well-being of mankind, which, consciously or unconsciously, has been its mainspring throughout.

CHAPTER V

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE

1. THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY

The word sovereignty comes from a Latin word *superannus*, which means supreme. The use of the word as a technical term in Political Science dates from the publication of a work called the *Republic* by the French author Bodin, in 1576. The idea of sovereignty was common before his time, though it was called by other names. In Aristotle we read of the "supreme power" in the state, and the Roman lawyers and mediaeval writers speak of the "fulness of power" of the state. Obviously all reasoning about the state must have some reference to what is really the central characteristic of statehood, whatever name may be given to it. As we shall see, the term has certain definite applications in Political Science, but the notion of *supremacy* is present in all its uses, whether in Political Science or in ordinary speech. When one speaks of a person, a body of persons, a law, or a state as sovereign, one implies that there is in existence a power which is higher, better, greater than all other powers, a power which is at the very top. In speaking of any human agency as sovereign, we mean that it must be obeyed by other individuals or bodies. It is, in a word, supreme.

In Political Science there are several senses in which the term is used, and unless the various uses are clearly understood, the student will be in danger of much confusion. In the first place, the student must be on his guard against confusing the idea of the sovereignty of the state with titular or nominal sovereignty. The word sovereign is frequently used to designate a king or monarch. The king or monarch may seem to be the highest power in the state, but in modern democracies the king is.

**Different
Uses of the
Word in
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**1. Titular
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more a servant than a master. The use of the term in this sense dates from the time when kings had absolute power, or the power of final decision. Nowadays the king is a part of the machinery' of government, and the term sovereign applied to him is merely a name or title. Such sovereignty may be called titular or nominal sovereignty, and the chief merit of its use for the purposes of Political Science is to call the attention of the student at the outset to the radical distinction between the state and government.

The sovereignty of the state is simply the supreme power of the state, or as Professor Burgess says, "the original, absolute, unlimited power over the individual subject and over all associations of subjects." **2. Sovereignty of the State** This sovereignty of the state may be analysed from different points of view, but in itself it is the perpetual and complete power of the state over its members. It is not the power of any part or branch of government: in fact the distinction between the state and government, as already insisted on, is the key-note to the proper understanding of sovereignty.

The idea of the sovereignty of the state may be looked at from two main points of view: (a) legal sovereignty, (b) political sovereignty.

The legal sovereign is the authority which by law has the power to issue final commands. It is the authority to whose directions the law of the state attributes final legal force. In every ordered state there are laws which must be obeyed by the citizens, and there must be a power to issue and enforce these laws. The power, whether it be a person or body, to which in the last resort is attributed the right of laying down these laws, is the legal sovereign in the state. The test of the existence, or location of the legal sovereign lies in the law courts. A judge can enforce a law only if it is passed by the legal law-making body. The legal sovereign thus is the supreme law-making authority, recognized as such by the law of the state.

The political sovereign is the sum total of the influences in a state which lie behind the law. In a modern representative government we might describe it roughly as the power of the people. It is the power behind the legal sovereign, but whereas

the legal sovereign is definitely organized and discoverable, the political sovereign is vague and indeterminate, though none the less real.

The simplest way to understand the difference between the political and legal sovereign is to imagine a small state in which the opinion of the people is expressed by a mass meeting at which every citizen is present. The expression of the opinion does not make a law. Imagine further that in this small state the body legally empowered to make laws is a House of Representatives. The opinion of the mass meeting would be of no avail legally till it was definitely drafted into legal form and passed by the House of Representatives. A judge in the courts of the state could not apply the opinion of the mass meeting to a case which came before him; but when the opinion was embodied in legal form and passed by the House of Representatives, he would have to apply it, whether he wished or not. The mass meeting represents the political sovereign; the House of Representatives the legal sovereign, for it is the body empowered by law to issue final commands. The mass meeting might express its opinion clearly, it might even pass a resolution framed in legal terms, but till the law-making body passed it, no judge could take the slightest notice of it.

In modern governments we are familiar with the representative system. The electorate, by means of voting and electing representatives, indicates to the legislature the type of laws that are desired. In this way it expresses roughly the political sovereignty in the state. Modern democracies are representative or indirect—not pure or direct like the Greek democracies, where the general assembly of the citizens was tantamount to the legislative body. In a direct democracy the expression of the political sovereignty is equivalent to the making of a law. In such a simple case the legal and political sovereigns practically coincide. The distinction between the two is shown in any modern state. It is well brought out in the organization of the British Government. In the United Kingdom the legal sovereign is the King, House of Lords and House of Commons, technically called the King-in-Parliament. This sovereign is legally all-powerful; there is no legal limit to circumscribe its

power ; it can, as one writer says, do everything except make a man a woman or a woman a man. It is legally unlimited ; it can make or unmake any kind of law ; it can even make legal by an Act of Indemnity what previously was illegal. But this legislative supremacy of Parliament *is* limited, though not legally. It is limited by the will of the people. Parliament could legally make a law compelling the people to kill each other. Actually it would never think of doing so, because the will of the people has to be taken into account. In other words, the political sovereign lies behind and conditions, and thus limits the legal sovereign, though *legally speaking* the legal sovereign is omnipotent. The political sovereign in the state is the influences in the state, which, formulated in a legal way and passed by the legal law-making body, ultimately become the law of the state. The political sovereign manifests itself by voting, by the press, by speeches, and in manifold other ways not easy to describe or define. It is, however, not organized, and it can only become effective when organized. The organization of political sovereignty leads to legal sovereignty. The two are aspects of the one sovereignty of the state. They constantly react on each other. Sometimes, as in direct democracy, they practically coincide, and the distinction between the two is recognizable only in theory. In modern large nation-states the distinction is always more or less visible in changes of forms of government, in alterations in the composition of legislatures and changes in laws. The chief aim and problem of modern governmental organization is to find a structure in which the distinction is at a minimum.

Political sovereignty is to be distinguished from popular sovereignty. The phrase "popular sovereignty" is not used in any real scientific sense : it indicates more what is known as political liberty, which is discussed later. Popular sovereignty roughly means the power of the masses as contrasted with the power of an individual ruler or of the classes. It implies manhood suffrage, with each individual having only one vote, and the control of the legislature by the representatives of the people. In governments where the legislature is organized in two Houses, such as the House of Commons and the House of Lords, it further implies the control by the lower, or

“popularly” elected House, of the nation’s finances. The phrase “popular control” better indicates the idea underlying “popular sovereignty.”

Another distinction is sometimes made, namely *de iure* (legal) and *de facto* (actual) sovereignty. A *de iure* sovereign is the legal sovereign, as explained above. A *de facto* sovereign is a sovereign which, whether its basis is legal or not, is actually obeyed; in Lord Bryce’s words “the person or body of persons who can make his or their will prevail whether with the law or against the law: he, or they, is the *de facto* ruler, the person to whom obedience is actually paid.” A *de facto* sovereign may be a soldier, who by his army can compel obedience; or a priest, who may so awe the people spiritually that they will obey him whether his claim to obedience is legal or not; or any other agency which can compel obedience.

The existence of *de facto* sovereignty is most easily discernible in times of revolution. There have been recent instances in Russia, Germany and the old Austria-Hungary, where new powers have displaced the old legally constituted powers. Sometimes revolutions mean merely a change in the existing personnel or organizations, in which case the forms of the old legal sovereignty are fulfilled; in other cases the old legal sovereign is completely abolished, and the people are often in doubt whether to obey the new power or the old. Thus, in Petrograd in 1917, when the Bolsheviks came into power, many of the officers of the old government refused to obey them, thinking that the advent to power of the usurping power would only be temporary.

Many other instances of *de facto* sovereignties exist. Oliver Cromwell instituted a *de facto* sovereignty after he dismissed the Long Parliament. The Convention, after the Revolution of 1688, which offered the crown to William and Mary, had no legal status. Napoleon, after he overthrew the Directory; the French Constituent Assembly, convened in France after the 1870 war to make peace with Germany, were *de facto* sovereigns. Legal sovereignties have been in question recently in Russia, Germany, Austria and Hungary, and other European states.

Sometimes in a state there is partly a legal sovereign and

partly a *de facto* sovereign, as in some of the unsettled South American republics, where the army actually rules, while nominally the legal government is in power.

Relations of *de facto* and *de iure* Sovereign-
ties* Frequently it is difficult to locate a *de facto* sovereign. The legal sovereign is discernible according to the laws, but where the legal sovereign is in question or in abeyance, it is very difficult to gauge exactly the power that rules.

In a well-ordered state *de iure* and *de facto* sovereignty coincide, or, in other words, right and might go together. *De iure* sovereignty, whatever may happen, has always the legal claim to obedience. Until the law is altered, no judge properly can condemn a prisoner on the orders of a merely *de facto* sovereign. When there is a clash between the legal and actual sovereigns, either the one or the other must disappear, or they must coalesce. Either the legal must be reaffirmed, or the old legal sovereign must disappear and the new actual become the legal sovereign. Ultimately only that right will prevail which has might on its side, and in actual history we find that right and might always tend to coalesce. Sovereignty *de facto*, when it has shown its ability to continue, will gradually become *de iure*. New laws giving a definite position to the new powers will be made, with the result that the previously existing *de iure* sovereignty will disappear. On the other hand, *de iure* sovereignty is difficult to dislodge, because the legal power tends to draw force to its side. Men are more inclined to obey and support the legal power than to commit themselves to an unknown *de facto* power. Lord Bryce, in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, sums up the relations between the two thus—

"When Sovereignty *de iure* attains its maximum of Lord Bryce's quiescence, Sovereignty *de facto* is usually Statement of also steady, and is, so to speak, hidden behind the Relations it.

When Sovereignty *de iure* is uncertain, Sovereignty *de facto* tends to be disturbed.

When Sovereignty *de facto* is stable, Sovereignty *de iure*, though it may have been lost for a time, reappears, and ultimately becomes stable.

When Sovereignty *de facto* is disturbed, Sovereignty *de iure* is threatened.

Or, more shortly, the slighter are the oscillations of each needle, the more do they tend to come together in that coincidental quiescence which is an index to the perfect order, though not otherwise to the excellence, of a government."

De facto sovereignty is characteristic of war and revolutions, and certain rights have come to be recognized in regard to it. Thus when a *de facto* sovereign overcomes a *de iure* sovereign, but not for a sufficiently long time to make the *de facto* sovereignty real, the acts of the supporters of the *de facto* régime are usually pardoned, in an Act of Indemnity, when the *de iure* sovereign is resumed. *De facto* sovereignties also raise difficulties in international relations. Thus, in the case of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the allied Powers for some time refused to recognize the government, although they had recognized the new government formed when the Tsar abdicated. The test of *de facto* sovereignties is their power of continuance. If they show ability to become ultimately *de iure* sovereignties, they are usually recognized internationally.

The question of the location of sovereignty, so frequently discussed in books on the subject, becomes simple when we keep before our mind's eye the two-fold aspect of the sovereignty of the state. The location of the sovereignty of the state is simply the state and the state alone. Political sovereignty, one aspect of the sovereignty of the state, lies in the will of the people, moulded by the various influences which exist in any body of people. Political sovereignty, as one writer calls it, is the "resultant, or better still, the organic compound which includes the forces of every man and of every agency made or directed by human skill and intelligence within the society." It is the centre of the national forces, or, in the words of the same writer, "the concentrated essence of national life, majesty and power focussed to a point." Political sovereignty lies with the people; it is a real, ever-existing power, which is co-terminous with the state itself. *De facto* sovereignty or, as Bryce calls it, "practical mastery", seems at times practically synonymous with political sovereignty in the sense that political sovereignty is the ultimate deciding factor in legal sovereignty; but *de*

facto sovereignty is really the actual power which is obeyed at any time, whether it is *de iure* or not, or whether it rests on the will of the people or not. Political sovereignty is the power the organized issue of which is legal sovereignty. The location of legal sovereignty in a state is a matter for lawyers. In some governments it is easy to tell where the legal supremacy lies. In the United Kingdom it lies in the King-in-Parliament. Where, as in most modern governments, the legislature is limited by a rigid constitution, the discovery of the legal sovereign is more difficult. Where such a constitution exists, the ordinary legislature has powers only within certain prescribed limits; the legal sovereignty ultimately rests in the constitution.

The theory sometimes advanced that sovereignty is placed in the sum of the law-making bodies within the state, rests on a confusion between state and government. The sovereignty of the state, say those who hold this opinion, means the expression of the will of the state, and all law-making bodies share in expressing this will. These law-making bodies, however, express this will only because of the sovereignty of the state. The legislature in any state may delegate powers to County Councils, District Boards, Municipalities, and so forth, but these powers of the organs of government are merely concrete expressions of the sovereignty of the state. They are not divisions of the sovereignty of the state, but manifestations of its organic unity.

The modern theory of sovereignty arose with the modern national democratic state. In the middle ages there was really no state in the modern sense. Feudalism had to break up before the modern idea of a state could emerge. Feudalism was a governmental system based on personal allegiance, and the idea of the sovereignty of a person, or king was the natural result of the system. Co-existent with feudalism were the antagonistic claims of the Church against the Empire, leading to the ever-discussed question whether the temporal power (the Empire) or the spiritual power (the Church) was supreme. The modern theory, which regards sovereignty as the original, absolute and undivided power of the state, could not arise in such circumstances, especially as many of the writers of

Sovereignty as the Sum of Law-making Bodies

History of the Theory of Sovereignty: The Middle Ages

the middle and early modern ages added to the confusion by saying that either the Law of Nature or the Law of God was sovereign. With the disappearance of feudalism, the way was paved for the appearance of the modern theory, but it took centuries for thinkers to throw off the feudal confusion of state and government. Feudalism gave the idea of the territorial sovereignty of a king or prince. As the intermediate lords of the feudal system died out, the king's power and importance increased until he ultimately stood supreme. And it was only gradually, as the nature of the state was properly understood, that the sovereignty of the state as distinct from the sovereignty of an individual or part of government came to be recognized. The climax of the confusion in the identification of state and government is well represented in the historic utterance of Louis XIV. of France, "The state is myself".

The first modern ideas on sovereignty came from France, in the writings of Jean Bodin, in the sixteenth century. The state Bodin defines as an aggregation of families and their common possessions ruled by a sovereign power and by reason. Sovereignty he defines as "supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by the laws". Bodin emphasizes the perpetual nature of sovereignty; he says that there is no limit of time to it, though he admits that there may be life tenure of the supreme power. The chief function of sovereignty is the making of laws, and according to him the sovereign is free from the laws thus made. But he is not free from all laws, for all men are bound by Divine Law and the Laws of Nature and of Nations. Bodin grants that a legal sovereign is under these laws (of Nature or God), and is answerable to God. Regarding civil law, he says that the sovereign's will is the ultimate source of law, and is free. If the sovereign wills a change, the old order does not hold.

Bodin deals with legal sovereignty, for, he says, sovereignty may reside in one person or in a body of persons, the former being the better. Bodin is thus an absolutist, but he makes the proviso that the law of God or law of Nature be observed.

Hobbes, whose theory of the Social Contract we have examined already, says that the sovereign is the person or body to whom the individuals in the state of nature agree

to surrender their natural rights and liberty. This surrender is absolute, hence the sovereign is absolute, supreme in everything, able to change all laws. Hobbes, He is under no human power whatsoever. The Locke, sovereign power he regards as indivisible and Rousseau inalienable, and the source of all legislative, executive and judicial authority. Hobbes followed the absolutist lead of Bodin, and his theory, like Bodin's, is one of legal sovereignty only.

Locke, as we have also seen, gave a theory of sovereignty based on the social contract. But he carefully avoids the term "sovereignty"; instead, he uses the phrase "supreme power." "There can be but one supreme power," says Locke, "which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them." Thus, according to Locke, there are two "supreme powers" in the state. Of these two the community is always the supreme power; but this supreme power of the community is held in abeyance and is exercised only when the government is dissolved, and a new government has to be created; but so long as the government subsists, the legislative wields the supreme power. This distinction was worked out in the nineteenth century into the clear-cut concepts of political sovereignty and legal sovereignty.

It is to Rousseau, however, with his idea of the sovereignty of the general will, that the modern theory owes its immediate origin. According to Rousseau, Rousseau sovereignty is the absolute power which the social contract gives the body politic over all its members, when this power is directed by the general will, i.e., by the will of the citizens as a corporate whole. This general will (whether it means "the will that wills the common good," or "the will of the majority," or, what we may call, "public opinion") is with Rousseau, the sovereign. The sovereign, as conceived by Rousseau, stands out as absolute, infallible, indivisible, inalienable. It finds its source in an original contract and abides permanently in the body politic, Rousseau thus accomplished for the people what Hobbes had done for the ruler.

From Rousseau onwards the theory of sovereignty has gradually developed to its present form. Rousseau's ideas have provided the groundwork on which it has been built. The philosopher Bentham and the lawyer Austin, whose theory is examined later in this chapter, presented legal views of sovereignty on the hypothesis that the state was the supreme organization; its powers, or the powers of its organ, government, were unlimited and irresistible. The philosophic side of the theory, presented by such writers as Green and Bosanquet, justified the supreme power of the state by the end which it subserves. The state to them is the expression of the social nature of man; as Aristotle held, it exists "for the good life." Both lawyers and philosophers have looked on the state as a unity. For some time, however, there has been a growing school of thought which is inclined to question the hitherto accepted conceptions of the state and sovereignty. According to this school, the state is a mere abstraction; the reality is government, and government represents not a real unity of the people but the interests of a particular section which happens to be dominant at a given moment. Among the citizens of any given state there are various social groups, each with its own interests, and it is the will of the group which happens to control the governmental machinery which the state expresses for the time being. As the sovereignty of the state is really the sovereignty of government, so the sovereignty of government in its turn is only the sovereignty of a particular group, the aims and objects of which may clash with those of other groups. The existence of such groups, some of which are international in character, it is argued, destroys the hitherto accepted idea of the all-comprehensiveness of the state. The old idea, therefore, is said to be breaking up; the state is not a unity; in philosophical language it is "pluralistic" not "monistic." With this fundamental change in the conception of the state, there must follow a corresponding change in the conception of sovereignty, or the abolition of the old conception altogether. With the further implications of recent theory it is impossible to deal here, but the student must keep in mind that on no subject in Political Science is there more controversy than on sovereignty, and that, as

**Later
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new types of social organization arise, new theories are made to suit them.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVEREIGNTY

The various characteristics of the sovereignty of the state may now be summed up as follows :—(1) Absoluteness ; (2) Universality ; (3) Inalienability ; (4) Permanence ; and (5) Indivisibility.

1. Absoluteness. The sovereignty of the state is absolute and unlimited. Were it not so, the state would not be a state but a body of people subordinate to another state. Sovereignty is the supreme characteristic of statehood, in fact, so indissolubly are they connected that we may say no state, no sovereignty ; no sovereignty, no state.

The absoluteness of the sovereignty of the state implies—

(a) That within the state there is no power superior to it.

(b) That outside the state there is no power superior to it.

The absoluteness of the sovereignty of the state means the unlimited power of the state over its members ; no human power is greater than the state. Such absoluteness really implies the other characteristics—universality, inalienability, permanence and indivisibility. The theoretical absoluteness of sovereignty is modified only when sovereignty issues into power as exercised by government. The *exercise* of sovereignty belongs to government, and in the exercise of sovereign power government is limited. But the limits are not legal limits to the sovereignty of the state. They are limits to the practical exercise of sovereignty. These limits arise from the very nature of the state. The state would not exist but for individuals ; and government, the organization of the state, is composed of individuals. Government, therefore, which exercises sovereign power, is limited because of its very nature, by the ordinary limitations of human individuality. The supreme function of government—law-making—is governed in its exercise by the fact that laws are made for finite men by finite men.

Thus the sovereignty of the state as such is one and supreme, but there are influences which affect the exercise

of sovereignty. We have already shown how political sovereignty conditions legal sovereignty. Professor Dicey has summed up the limits to the legislative supremacy of the British Parliament thus: (1) the external limit—which lies in the possibility that the citizens may disobey or resist laws, and (2) the internal—which arises from the very nature of the body or person exercising sovereignty. The sovereign is thus a body (or person) of moral beings (or a moral being) who impose (or imposes) the inevitable limits of their (or his) personality on their (or his) powers. Even the most despotic ruler is limited by both these considerations. The most absolute ruler could not make or unmake any law at his pleasure, for all subjects, however obsequious they may be in many respects, have limits of human endurance. His own character, environment, education and religion, must also mould his actions. There are, accordingly, limits of individuality, expediency and common sense. Bluntschli expresses the same truth in a well-known passage: "There is no such thing as absolute independence—even the state as a whole is not almighty: for it is limited externally by the rights of other states and internally by its own nature and the rights of its individual members." This limitation of the "natural rights" of the members is the external limit mentioned by Dicey.

Many writers—especially earlier writers on sovereignty—have declared that sovereignty is limited by natural law, or divine law, a limitation that has been expressed in such terms as eternal principles of morality, natural justice, and religion. The remarks made above about the internal limits of sovereignty apply here also. In the same way as moral universals guide individuals, they guide the organizations of individuals. The principles of morality undoubtedly affect the exercise of sovereignty, whether the morality be called natural law (universal principles applicable to all mankind) or the law of God. Both the law of Nature and the law of God have to be interpreted by human agency; and these laws—of Nature and God—exercise no sovereignty in themselves. They are not legal limits on which a judge could insist as standing against the expressed will of a state in the actual state-laws. They are not legal limits, but conditions of law-making.

There are, however, one or two limits which have become prominent during the last century, and which merit fuller consideration. The sovereignty of the state, it is held by some, is limited (a) by its own fundamental laws, as drawn up in its constitution, and (b) by international law.

(a) Most modern states make a distinction between fundamental laws and ordinary laws. The fundamental laws are those general principles which are drawn up to guide future legislators and administrators. They are regarded as more important than ordinary laws: in fact, ordinary laws are valid only in so far as they are in accord with the spirit of fundamental laws. These fundamental laws are drawn up in a single document called the constitution, and the constitution cannot be altered save by some special process of law-making. The ordinary legislature cannot amend, abolish or add to the constitutional law. Such constitutions are called "rigid," as distinct from "flexible" constitutions, where there is no distinction between fundamental and ordinary laws. The most notable flexible constitution is that of the United Kingdom, while the constitution of the United States of America is a typical example of the rigid.

The existence of such laws limits the ordinary legislature of the United States. It reduces it to a position analogous to that of a British municipality or railway company, the constitutions of which are laid down by Act of Parliament. India is like the United States of America in this respect, for its legislature is a subordinate law-making body, limited by higher laws—viz., the laws of the Imperial Parliament, which act as its constitution. The Legislative Councils of India are subordinate, indeed, but so are the legislatures of France, Germany and the United States. Actual legal supremacy rests in the constitution. But the sovereignty of the state of the United States, Germany or France is not limited. The American people could sweep away the constitution and all appertaining to it and establish a legislature like that of Great Britain. The constitution limits the government, not the state. Only in so far as the state wishes to have these limitations do the limitations exist.

(b) The limits of international law may be reduced to the same terms. Each state is independent and interprets for itself how far the principles of international law are to

apply. International law is not law in the ordinary sense of law. It is more like international principles of morality.

These principles are somewhat like customary law. As a rule they are obeyed, but ultimately the individual states have to say what laws apply to them and how they apply. There are

as yet no international courts to enforce international law, though there are courts to interpret it; and what we find in practice is that states interpret international law for themselves, often as they find it expedient. When there are international courts to enforce international law, then states independent at present will no longer be independent.

All these limits to sovereignty, paradoxical as it may seem, are limits and not limits at the same time. Sovereignty is supreme power, and, as Austin has told us, supreme power limited by positive law is a contradiction in terms. The so-called limits are not legal limits to the sovereignty of the state. They are limits to the exercise of sovereign power, or, rather conditions of law-making, and most of them arise from the very nature of man and society.

2. Universality. The sovereignty of the state applies to every citizen in the state. No person, no union or organization, however universal, affects the sovereignty of the state. An organization, for example, like the socialist "International," though it may be excellently organized and have members in every country of the world, does not destroy the sovereignty of any one state. It could only do so by setting up a new international state with a sovereignty of its own which would destroy the sovereignty of individual states.

The only apparent exception to the universality of sovereignty is what is known as the extra-territorial sovereignty of diplomatic representatives. An embassy in a country belongs to the country it represents, the members of the embassy being subject to the law of their own country. This, however, is only a matter of international courtesy and is no real exception. Any state in virtue of its sovereignty could deny the privileges so granted.

3. Inalienability. "Sovereignty," says Lieber, the well-known American writer, "can no more be alienated than a

tree can alienate its right to sprout or a man can transfer his life and personality without self-destruction." The

state and sovereignty are essential to each other. *This does not mean that the state may not give up part of its territory, or, as it is said, cede sovereign rights. The ceding of sovereign rights does not mean ceding the sovereignty of the state as such; in fact the cession of such rights is an excellent example of the working of the sovereignty of the state. All that happens is that, whereas formerly there was one state, now, with such cession, there are two states. Far less does the abdication of a monarch or sovereign mean the alienation of sovereignty. It is merely a change in the form of government by the resignation of his position by a titular sovereign.

4. Permanence. The sovereignty of the state is as permanent as the state itself. The cessation of sovereignty means the end of the state; the cessation of the state means the end of sovereignty. We have noted above how Hobbes, in his confusion of state and government, regarded the immediate succession of a king on the death of his predecessor as necessary to the continuance of the state. The death of a king or president, however, is only a personal change in the government, not a break in the continuity of the state.

5. Indivisibility. The indivisibility of sovereignty arises from its absoluteness. There can only be one sovereignty of the state; otherwise, there would be more than one state.

On the subject of the indivisibility of sovereignty much has been written, and much authoritative opinion has been given on either side. The question of the divisibility of sovereignty came to the front particularly with the development of federal government. In a federal union, such as the United States, there are three chief grades of powers—first, the constitution, which contains the general conditions of government for the whole of the United States, and beyond the limits of which no legislature can go without amendment to the constitution itself; second, there is the federal government, or government of the United States as a whole; and, third, there are the governments of the individual states which make up the

3. Inalienability

4. Permanence

5. Indivisibility

Sovereignty and Federalism

union. The Government of the United States is empowered to legislate on certain matters, the governments of the States on other matters, and these governments are supreme in their own spheres, which are decided by the constitution.

The question of the divisibility of the sovereignty of the state is not affected by federalism. A federal union makes one complete state, and only one, with, therefore, one sovereignty. One aspect of the sovereignty of the state, some writers hold, does admit of divisibility, and that is legal sovereignty. Legally the constitution of the United States, or any federation or confederation, grants supreme powers to various units of government. To call this a division of sovereignty, however, is due to a misuse of the word sovereign. The division of governmental powers which the constitution grants is quite another thing from the division of the sovereignty of the state. In this matter, as in many others, Political Science is at variance with popular usage. We speak of the "states" of America when we mean the units which form the one state called the United States of America, whereas they are not states at all. They are subordinate law making bodies with guaranteed powers; but they have not sovereignty. The student would be well advised to keep in mind the difference between the sovereignty of the state and legal powers granted by a definite legal instrument. It is technically as correct to say that a municipality is sovereign with the limits set by the constitution given it by the central government, as to say that the "states" of the United States are sovereign. Were we to adopt this attitude, then sovereignty could be divided into thousands of fragments. The truth is that there is only one sovereignty of the state, which in its legal aspect issues into the various powers of its organization, or government.

This idea of divided or dual sovereignty, therefore, arises from the usual cause—the failure to distinguish state and government. All states are units with one and only one sovereignty: but in their organizations they vary one from another. The division of power or delegation of power by one part of the organization to another no more affects the central fact of undivided sovereignty than the existence of many nerve centres affects the existence of only one head in the human body. The hot arguments centred in this

question, ending in the United States with a civil war, arose from a very natural desire of states which lost their sovereignty when they became units of a federal system to preserve at least the theory of their lost supremacy.

3. AUSTIN'S THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY

An analysis of the theory of Austin will show the application of the various points mentioned above. John Austin was an English lawyer who wrote a book on Jurisprudence (published in 1832), containing a theory of sovereignty which has been violently criticized by practically every subsequent writer on the subject of Political Science. His theory is the outcome of the teaching of Bentham and Hobbes, but it is by no means the same as their theories. The criticism evoked by Austin's theory may justly be said to have led to the modern theory of the sovereignty of the state.

Law, Austin considers, is a command given by a superior to an inferior, and, with this guiding conception, he goes on to develop his theory in these words:—

“The notions of sovereignty and independent political society may be expressed concisely thus. . . . If a determinate human superior not in the habit of obedience to a like superior receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is the sovereign in that society and the society, including the superior, is a society political and independent.” He goes on, “to that determinate superior the other members of the society are subject, or on that determinate superior the other members of the society are dependent. The position of its other members towards that determinate superior is a state of subjection or a state of dependence. The mutual relation which subsists between that superior and them may be styled the relation of sovereign and subject or the relation of sovereignty and subjection.” That is, in every independent orderly political community there is some single person or body of persons which can compel the other persons in the community to do as he or it pleases. The sovereign may be a person, or the sovereign may be “collegiate,” (i.e., a group). Every community has a sovereign somewhere, for, supposing a community is broken up into parts, as in a

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of the
Theory of
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revolution, it will settle down ultimately and a state of equilibrium will be reached when the sovereign will be discoverable in the new scheme of things. Thus, before the rupture in America the sovereignty resided in one place, and after the Declaration of Independence in another. This sovereign, either single or collegiate, occurs in every independent orderly community, and it always possesses ultimate and irresistible force. Austin says that if a single person is sovereign, he is a monarch, if a small group, there is oligarchy, if a small group, but larger than oligarchy, an aristocracy : if it is a large numerous group then it is democracy. Austin did not believe in a limited monarchy, e.g., he calls the government of Britain an aristocracy.

Certain conclusions follow from his theory—

Conclusions following from his Theory (1) The superior or sovereign must be a determinate person or body ; therefore neither the general will nor all the people taken together can be sovereign.

(2) The power of the sovereign is legally unlimited or absolute, for a sovereign cannot be forced to act in a certain way by any command of his own. He makes his own limits.

(3) Sovereignty is indivisible. It cannot be divided between two or more persons or bodies of persons acting separately, for, if so, one would be limited in some way by the other, which would be a superior power, and therefore the real sovereign.

These are the main points of Austin's theory. Obedience and rule are the essential factors for the existence of a state, and a law is a command of the sovereign which demands obedience. A legal right is distinctly a state matter : it is granted by the sovereign authority and it will be upheld by the sovereign authority. It must be noted that the rights are *legal* rights, not moral or religious rights. The notions of law, right, and sovereignty run together, and in considering the theory of Austin we must remember that he gives a lawyer's view of sovereignty, i.e., legal sovereignty. "

In all Austinian "determinate" sovereigns there are limits of some kind—the external and internal limits mentioned above. Even despots rule according to the limits of common sense. Sir Henry Maine in particular criticized Austin on these grounds.

Maine's Criticism

Maine's experience in India had shown him that there is not necessarily a determinate body or person who is obeyed. He saw the power of custom in India, and that this custom controlled the people and rulers alike. Not only so, but custom is not a deliberate statute; it is the outcome of ages. Certainly it is not the fiat of a determinate superior. Maine's example is Ranjit Singh of the Punjab, who in Maine's words, never "issued a command which Austin would call a law," for the rules which regulated the lives of his subjects were derived from their immemorial usages, and these rules were administered by domestic tribunals, and, as Maine says, Ranjit Singh was a ruler the smallest disobedience to the command of whom would have meant death or mutilation.

This position Austin met by allowing the principle that "What the sovereign permits he commands." This is true so far. The English common law, for example, is not made by Parliament. It exists in customs, which are explained, modified, or expanded when the courts apply them. They are laws all the same, the courts taking cognizance of them as much as they do of parliamentary statutes. The King-in-Parliament as legal sovereign could, indeed, alter the common law, or make it statute law, thus making it a definite command of the legal sovereign. But much of the common law it could not alter without much danger to the state, for to try to upset tradition and custom might lead to revolution. Did Parliament merely make common law into statute law, the process would be an excellent example of the power of custom as influencing Parliament. In India the power is even clearer, for the legislative sovereign has to accommodate itself to the deeply ingrained popular customs, which are often based on religion.

The difficulties of the Austinian theory are more marked when he applies his principles to existing states. He applies his theory to two in particular—(1) Great Britain; (2) The United States. Let us examine the former. In England, he says, one component part of the sovereign or supreme body is the "numerous body of the Commons," who exercise their sovereign powers through representatives. In other words, he says that the electorate is a component part of the sovereign, and it exercises its powers

**Difficulties
in the Appli-
cation of
Austin's
Theory**

by electing representatives. Yet he says the electors delegate their powers to the representatives "absolutely and unconditionally," so much so that the "representative assembly might concur with the king and the peers in defeating the principal ends for which it is elected or appointed," i.e., it might deprive the people of their vote altogether. Therefore, he holds sovereignty resides with the King, Lords and Commons (not electors). But that sovereignty, he says, returns when Parliament is dissolved. This antinomy leads to one of the most glaring fallacies in his whole position. He goes on to say that, although the electorate delegates its powers absolutely or unconditionally, yet it may do so "subject to a trust or trusts". Then he goes on—"I commonly suppose that the Parliament for the time being is possessed of sovereignty. But speaking accurately, the members of the Commons house are merely trustees for the body by which they are elected or appointed, and consequently the sovereignty always resides in the king and peers with the electoral body of the Commons."

Thus Austin says variously that—

- (1) Parliament is sovereign.
- (2) The King and Peers and electors are sovereign.
- (3) The electorate is sovereign when Parliament is dissolved.
- (4) That the Commons have powers (a) free from trust, (b) are trustees.

The Austinian difficulty is easily solved by the simple device of the separation of the two conceptions of legal and political sovereignty. Austin's theory is the attempt of a lawyer to give a lawyer's view of sovereignty, i.e., legal sovereignty. In placing legal sovereignty in the United Kingdom in the King-in-Parliament he is right: but he does not stop there. He tries to give a place in his theory to the influences which lie at the back of legal sovereignty and this leads him into hopeless confusion. The electorate has no part in legal sovereignty: nor are the representatives in any sense trustees. No court would pay any attention to an act made by any other body than the King-in-Parliament:

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nor would any court listen to an action under trustee law between an elector and a representative for breach of trust. The sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament is, as Austin says, legally absolute, but really it is conditioned by the vast number of influences termed political sovereignty.

CHAPTER VI

LIBERTY

1. GENERAL MEANINGS OF LIBERTY

The subject of liberty follows naturally after a discussion on sovereignty. The finality of the various characteristics of sovereignty—absoluteness, universality, indivisibility—may lead to the notion that sovereignty and liberty are mutually exclusive ideas. Far from this being the case, sovereignty and liberty are correlative terms. The sovereignty of the state, instead of being the negation of liberty, is the medium of liberty. Liberty is possible only in an ordered state, a state, that is, where the legal and political aspects of sovereignty coincide, or nearly coincide. The fundamental maxim of liberty is that *law is the condition of liberty*.

These remarks are true of liberty in a general way, but for an analysis of the idea of liberty we must first separate the various meanings of the term.

Firstly, there is the general, unscientific use of liberty, common in everyday language and in poetry. This aspect of liberty may mean several things. It may mean mere licence, or the desire to do as one likes irrespective of what all others like; or it may mean freedom from the conventions of social intercourse and manners, such as may be achieved by living in distant country districts, or in solitary woods, far from the crowds and manners of towns. Or it may merely mean the freedom of thought as distinct from the slavery of the body; or the desire of the human soul to be free from the body, to be free, as one poet puts it, like the clouds flitting across the sky. Everyone has a vague notion of liberty of some

kind and a desire for it, but among ten people using the word, perhaps no two will be able to say exactly what they mean, or, if they do say it, will agree with each other in their definitions. This general, unscientific use of the word we may call Natural Liberty.

Secondly, it may mean the Rule of Law, that is, the limitation of the powers of government by established law, whether it be in the form of a constitution which contains fundamental principles to guide and limit the government, or, as in England, the fact that law applies equally and impartially to all, to the greatest and humblest alike. This sense of the term may be called Civil Liberty.

Thirdly, it may mean constitutional government, that is, a form of government in which the people as a whole have an effective voice. In this sense, what we may call Political Liberty, the phrase "free government" or "free country," means that the country concerned has a representative government, or is a democracy. It means that the people themselves determine how they are to be governed.

Fourthly, it may mean national independence. In this sense we speak of battles like Thermopylae and Bannockburn deciding the liberty of the Greeks or Scots. A "free" country in the sense means a country which is independent, or simply that it is a sovereign state. In this sense, therefore, sovereignty and freedom mean the same thing. This sense of liberty may be called National Liberty.

2. NATURAL LIBERTY: THE LAW OF NATURE

In connexion with the origin of the state, we have already mentioned the idea of liberty in the so-called state of nature, where natural law was supposed to prevail. We must now examine the meaning of natural law in more detail, and in doing so it is essential first to give a short review of its history. The law of Nature has a long and vexed history in both philosophy and jurisprudence. In its most familiar form we have seen it in the theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and their predecessors of the contractual school of thought. Its actual origin lies further back than history

shows; but from such historical evidence as we possess we can build up a fairly rational account of its earliest stages.

To early man all law was divine. In both its origin and sanction early law depended on divine powers, which to unthinking and simple men were beyond the scope of question. The more inquisitive minds in early days began to reflect on things of the world around them, and tried to find reasons for them and causes of their existence. One outstanding fact was obvious—the uniformity of nature. Implicitly or explicitly this uniformity was the basis of all questions and answers. The primæval reasoner could not fail to recognize that in nature there is much difference amid much similarity and much similarity amid the difference. Among the objects of nature he could make a rough division of animate and inanimate, and amongst the animate he could see distinctly what science has since called genus and species. These varied greatly, but in all the variation there seemed a common principle. A dog differs from a bird, but the stages of life are similar—birth, youth, age and death. Such phenomena to the early reasoner gave indications of something common working in all the animate world, something which was beyond the control of life itself. Not only so, but early thinkers could not help being struck with the distinctive features of their own special type. Man was distinct from other animate life, and, among men, as among the trees and animals, there were many differences co-existing with a principle of unity. Amid the various passions and emotions of man there seemed to exist a sameness. Though one man did not grow up exactly like another, the same weakness of childhood was succeeded by the same strength of manhood and the same decline of old age. In all this clearly there was a principle of growth or of decay, a principle independent of the will of the individual through whom it was manifested. The question as to the first principle or first cause was answered by the general name of Nature.

This conception of Nature involved two ideas, one, uniformity or rule, the other, power, or force, both applicable in a general way to all living beings. These ideas had a special application in the case of man. In the case of man the particular form that nature took was reason. Nature thus came

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of Nature**

to be looked on as rational, and as operating towards certain definite ends. In other words, nature, instead of being regarded as the material universe, the result of some blind force, was interpreted as an intelligent or rational force. The moral was added to the physical aspect of the universe, and gave a double meaning to the phrase " laws of Nature ".

In Greek thought the idea of nature varied according to the mental outlook of the users. In the earliest stages of thought the change or flux in material nature was sharply contrasted with the unvarying institutions of human society. In early society, where rigid custom was law, human life seemed to be more stable than the life of external nature. Later, the position was reversed by the ethical philosophers, who came to look on social institutions as far more variable than the external universe. Thus the Pythagoreans, who were primarily physicists and secondarily moral philosophers, applied the idea of Nature, the unifying principle of life, to human society with its definite laws and social organization. The phrase laws of Nature came to express in human society what is primarily characteristic of external nature, viz., uniformity. The uniformity in society, however, was gradually shown to be unstable. The acts of individual human agents, such as the law-giver Solon, the foundation of colonies, which made their own laws suitable for their own peculiar circumstances, and the comparative study of political and social institutions—all these showed as much diversity in human institutions as uniformity.

Studied by themselves, customs or laws (and early laws were simply customs) showed the same division of uniformity on the one hand and difference on the other. Thinkers saw that, though there were great variations among the customs and laws of peoples, yet everywhere there were certain phenomena in common. These common elements came to be regarded as the essential laws of mankind. They were everywhere similar ; therefore, it was argued, they must have a common principle. The common principle was Nature, and these laws were called Natural laws, and as such they were fundamental, prior both in time and in sanction to man-made laws, which varied from community to community.

Among the Greek philosophers the distinction was very

general]. In the Sophists it appeared in the distinction, already noted, of Nature, with its permanent institutions, and Convention, or artificial man-made institutions. Carrying out this distinction, the Sophists considered that mankind did not embody any of the permanent elements of Nature, but that every people legislated for itself according to its own notions. The Cynics, another school of Greek thought, maintained the view of nature later voiced by Rousseau, as meaning simplicity of life. Human institutions were looked on as artificial, and, as such, opposed to nature, and wrong. The distinction also appears in Plato, who contrasts abstract justice with the written laws of the state; and in Aristotle, who, in his *Ethics*, divides justice into natural and legal or conventional, and law into common and peculiar.

It is to the Stoics, however, that we owe the most important presentation of the theory of natural law. To the Stoics natural law was the universal divine law of reason, manifested in both the moral and the material worlds. Man's reason was only a part of the law, but in virtue of this natural element in him—his reason—man could understand the relations of things. Man's reason, therefore, was the instrument through which the law of Nature was revealed, and, as the Stoic ideal was to live according to nature, reason was the criterion of what was good or bad. Social institutions were not conventional: they were the results of reason, or, what is the same thing, manifestations of the law of Nature.

The Stoic theory passed through Cicero into Roman law. The centre of Cicero's teaching is that in every individual there are certain feelings implanted by God or Nature; these feelings are common to everybody. The law of Nature to him was the universal consent of mankind. "Universal consent," he said "is the voice of nature." Universal consent meant the ordinary common-sense opinions of reasonable beings, and in this form the law of Nature passed into the field where it had the greatest vogue—Roman law.

In Roman Law the conception of natural law was encouraged not only by the Stoic theory but by actual historical circumstances. From the earliest period in Roman history,

the foreign population in Rome had an important determining power in the course of Roman development. Various

Roman Law causes, such as commercial intercourse and the instability of provincial governments, led to a large number of immigrants coming to Rome every year, and these aliens, or *peregrini*, though they often had very close business and social ties with Rome, were really outside the pale of Roman civil law. At first they had no rights, either private or public, but the Roman courts had to adjudicate on cases in which they were concerned. Such a state of affairs is unknown in modern times. Modern European communities do not allow such accessions of alien elements as endanger the native population. Further, absorption of alien elements is far quicker nowadays. In ancient times the original citizens, believing themselves knit together by blood ties, did not favour the external usurpation of what was their birthright. In Rome these aliens at first had no law, but when the Romans recognized that their presence, instead of being dangerous, was often beneficial, they made special legal provision for them. They did not share in the Roman civil law, which was a privilege reserved for Roman citizens only. What the Romans did was to select rules of law common to Rome and to the different communities from which the immigrants came. They thus had one law for foreigners and another law for themselves. The law for the foreigners was merely a selection from the laws common to the various communities and Rome. The technical name of these laws was the *ius gentium*, or law common to all nations. This law, selected and codified by Roman lawyers, was quite distinct from the civil law, or *ius civile*, applicable only to Roman citizens. Two elements therefore co-existed in the Roman system: as the Institutes of Justinian express it, "All nations . . . are governed partly by their own particular laws and partly by those laws which are common to all mankind. The law which a people enacts is called the Civil Law of that people, that which natural reason appoints for all mankind is called the Law of Nations, because all nations use it."

The law for foreigners was promulgated by the Roman praetor, and, as it was the common law of all nations, it was also regarded as the result of natural reason, and called

ius naturale or natural law. The *ius gentium* and *ius naturale* were thus identified. The *ius gentium* was much looked down on in Rome, as it was applicable not to Romans but to the *peregrini* or foreigners. The pride of the Roman lay in the *ius civile*, or civil law, which was applicable only to those who could boast of Roman citizenship. One might reasonably expect that the more general and apparently fundamental principles of the *ius gentium* would have commanded more respect; but in Rome the sense of citizenship was so intense that everything non-Roman was only of secondary importance. The *ius gentium* really contained legal principles common to every known community. The basis of these principles was simply good faith or common sense in matters of trade and commerce, and, in family matters, normal family affections.

The fusion of the law of nature and law of nations was the result of Greek theory being applied in actual practice to Roman conditions. When the Roman lawyers looked about for a philosophical foundation of law, they found the Stoic idea of the law of Nature suitable for their purposes. The Stoic idea of brotherhood, too, was helped by historical events. The idea of universal empire had been shown practicable by the conquests of Alexander and the later extension of Roman power. The religions of the East overran the West; commerce was bringing the various Mediterranean peoples together. Greek and Latin spread to all parts of the world, and became international languages. The universal empire of Rome, in fact, seemed the realization of the Stoic ideal, and, in legal matters, it was recognized that there must be a law for Roman and non-Roman alike. This law was the *ius gentium*, founded on the natural reason of mankind: in other words, the *ius gentium* was the *ius naturale*.

Gradually it was recognized that the *ius gentium* or *ius naturale* was more important than the *ius civile*. The edict of the Roman praetor who legislated for foreigners thus superseded the *ius civile*. The contrast between the *ius gentium* and *ius civile* helped all the more to fuse the *ius gentium* and *ius naturale*. The strongest element in the fusion, however, was the conception of equity. Equity (which comes from the Latin word *aequus*, meaning fair)

conveys the notion of the levelling of differences, and this was essentially what the *ius gentium* did. The old Roman law recognized a multitude of differences between classes of men and property, but this distinction disappeared in the *ius gentium*. The "sense of practical convenience" of the Romans helped in this, for they were always ready to bend formal law to suit individual cases. Equity was fairness, or the common sense application of the law, and thus it had a moral application, though primarily its application was not ethical. The connexion between the levelling of the law, and the symmetry of nature on the one side, and the justice of the law of Nations on the other, brought about the identification of the one with the other. The identification, however, was not altogether complete, as in the case of slavery, which was universal, and, accordingly, a matter for the *ius gentium*, and philosophy had shown it contrary to nature. Likewise, in the *ius civile* there were statutes ascribed to natural reason. Further, there were elements in the *ius gentium* not universal, which were classed as *ius gentium* because they were certainly not matters of the *ius civile*. Generally speaking the two terms were synonymous, though the jurists use *ius naturale* when they speak of motive, and *ius gentium* when making a practical application to a given case. As Bryce says, the connotation of the two terms is different, while their denotation, save as regards these smaller points, especially slavery, is the same.


After the decline of the Roman jurists, the idea of natural law was kept alive by the religious and philosophical writers of the middle ages. Passing from law into religion and philosophy, natural law became an ethical ideal or standard. Identified as it was by many leading writers with the law of God, it represented divine justice, according to which princes had to rule, and subjects obey. The earliest traces of modern democracy are to be found in the writers who insist that if the law of God or Nature is broken by rulers, then automatically the duty of subjects to obey ceases. Modern civil and religious liberty owes much to natural law as a standard or ethical ideal.

It is impossible here to do more than mention the chief exponents of mediaeval theories of natural law. The Roman lawyer Ulpian (of the third century) divided law


Development in Mediaeval Times

into *ius naturale*, *ius gentium* and *ius civile*, a tripartite division, which, passing into the Institutes of Justinian, was almost universally accepted by the lawyers and ecclesiastics. The *ius naturale* and *ius gentium*, it will be seen, were separated. The *ius naturale*, according to Ulpian, was the law taught by nature to all living beings. It was not peculiar to man alone. It was equivalent to animal instinct. The *ius gentium* was the law peculiar to men.


The ecclesiastical writers, or canonists, were more uniform in their conception than the lawyers. Though the legal writers wavered from one view to another, the canonists accepted the division of Ulpian, over and above which they held that natural law (as in Gratian, the founder of canon law) was identical with divine law. Law was divided thus :—



The canonists rejected the idea of the law of Nature as equivalent to animal instincts. Gratian says natural law is the gospel teaching which tells you to do towards others as you would that they should do towards you. Rufinus, a commentator on Gratian, is more explicit: he says natural law may have the meaning of instinct, but it really should be looked on from its human side. It is, he says, a quality implanted by Nature, leading men to seek what is good and avoid what is evil. He divides it into three, thus :—



The canonists thus reject the instinct theory of natural law, replacing it by the idea that natural law is the law of the gospel or of God. The many difficulties arising out of this theory were dismissed in ways we cannot discuss here. We must, however, note the treatment of the question by St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas (who lived in the thirteenth century) represents the culmination of scholastic theory. Half a century after his death political theory became permeated with the questions of Church *versus* State, leading to the Reformation in the religious sphere and to revolution in the political. St. Thomas divides law thus :—



St. Thomas defined law in general as an “ordinance of reason for the common welfare, promulgated by him who has the care of a community.” Eternal law is the plan of the universe, the basis of the government of all things, pre-existent in the mind of God. It is the law of the Author of all things; it is the essence of law, known by “reflexion” to man. Natural law is that part of the eternal reason or law which carries man to his true end. It is summed up in one precept, viz., avoid evil and do good. This precept is fundamental, and is the basis of human law. Human law is based on natural law. It is natural law made known through human reason, and applied to earthly conditions. It is derived from natural law in two ways :—

- (a) In consequence of the general principle of do good and avoid evil.
- (b) As a particular application of the general principle (e.g., that so-and-so be punished for a definite act).

Divine law corrects the imperfections of human law and natural law. It is the law which supplements human law, which in itself is insufficient. It is necessary for man's true end, which is beyond nature, and, unlike human law, which is obscure, it is clear, exact, and infallible, affecting the internal part of man, while human law affects only externals.

Divine law is the law of Revelation, and is divided into (a) the Old Law (of the Old Testament), and (b) the New Law (of the New Testament).

To St. Thomas the *ius gentium* was part of natural law, the part applying to the relations of men with one another, e.g., in buying and selling. Natural law he conceived of as applying to both men and animals.

Summary of Meanings of Law of Nature Lord Bryce (in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, pp. 148-50) enumerates no less than six meanings given to Nature by the Roman jurists:—

1. The character and quality of an object, or of a living creature, or of a legal act or conception.

2. The physical system of the Universe and the character which it bears. Thus it is said that Nature has taken some objects (e.g., the sea and the air) out of the possibility of private ownership.

3. The physical ground of certain relations among men, as in the case of blood relationship, e.g., the rule that persons under puberty should have a guardian.

4. Reason is often denoted by the term Nature, e.g., Nature prescribes that no one shall profit by harm and injury to another, and that a buyer may make a profit on a re-sale.

5. Good feeling and the general moral sense of mankind. For instance, Nature ordains that parents shall be supported by their children, and that certain offences (e.g., adultery) are disgraceful.

6. (In Ulpian), Nature means those instincts which the lower animals have in common with man.

Generally speaking, the Roman conception of natural law in practice amounted simply to common sense, or fair dealing between men. In Bryce's words, it may be characterized as "Simple and Rational as opposed to that which is Artificial or Arbitrary. It is Universal, as opposed to that which is Local or National. It is superior to all other laws because it belongs to mankind as mankind, and is the expression of the purpose of the Deity or of the highest reason of men. It is therefore Natural, not so much in the sense of belonging to men in their primitive and uncultured condition, but rather as corresponding to and regulating their fullest and most perfect social development in com-

munities, where they have ripened through the teaching of Reason."

The Roman lawyers did not connect the law of Nature with the state of nature, so the application of the principles of the *ius naturale* or *ius gentium* was not hindered by the necessity of finding out what actually did exist among primitive communities. Neither did the Romans, as was done later, regard the law of Nature as a law apart from positive law, with a sanction distinct from the state; nor did they look on it as an ideal. The practical common-sense of the Romans kept them from these dangers inherent in the conception of natural law.

From the Roman lawyers and Christian theologians the law passed into modern Europe through the teachers of law and philosophers. During the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the precision of the old Roman conceptions was lost, for the idea entered the field of philosophical speculation and political controversy. Like most of the theories of the time, it was used at one time by the church school and at another time by the state school as a final appeal. Not the least important part of its history is the use made of it by the anti-monarchical writers, who argued that, as natural law was above civil law, therefore subjects were justified in resistance to kingly transgressors of natural justice. In this way natural law was a theoretical forerunner of modern democracy.

The modern history of the law of Nature culminates in the French Revolution, with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in 1789. After the Renaissance, thinkers began to seek a basis of law independent of the Bible or inherited authority. The French lawyers for centuries accepted in theory the idea of nature as giving simplicity and uniformity to law. Nevertheless, this idea as implying equality and liberty, just as in Rome, was not applied in practice. It was either a standard of law or an ideal, and till Rousseau's time, it did not become a power in practical politics. The French law, in fact, in spite of the passionate love of the simplicity of the law of Nature shown by the French lawyers, remained very heterogeneous. Nor did the centralized power of the monarchy bring uniformity into the legal system.

The idea of the state of nature was common from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The history of the state

of nature we have already given in outline in
The State of Nature connexion with the Social 'Contract theory.

Locke in particular drew attention to the connexion between natural law and freedom. In 1776 the idea was embodied in the American Declaration of Independence, in which the equality and freedom of men are postulated. These ideas, going to America from Europe, returned with renewed vigour to France, and provided the theoretical basis for the French Revolution. Rousseau's ideal was the state of nature. Everything inconsistent with the state of nature was wrong. The state of nature was his political criterion or standard. In the state of nature, all men were born equal. This idea was current also in Roman law, but the Roman lawyers applied it only in the sense that wherever Roman law applied, the Roman courts made no difference between men. In the French Revolution it was applied to all. Where the Roman lawyers had said that men were equal, the French said men ought to be equal. The notion of equality thus became a catchword for revolutionaries. What in Rome was a basis of right was made in France the cause of a terrible wrong. Passing from the cold realm of law to the heated area of political controversy, Nature became the gospel of dreamers and agitators, and shook the civilized world to its foundations. It ultimately died away as the result of the experience of anarchy in practical, and of the historical spirit in theoretical politics.

In modern law, the idea of nature operates or has operated, in three distinct ways :—

1. In Equity. Equity in English law is equivalent to the Roman application of common sense or fair dealing in cases where no direct law governed the issue. Though
1. **Equity** the law of Nature or the *ius gentium* is not specifically mentioned by English jurists as the basis of equity decisions, the ideas are Roman, taken from either Roman law or canon law. The older English judges referred rather to the law of God or the law of Reason. Excellent examples of the modern law of Nature are to be found in India, where, under the peculiar circumstances of the legal systems prevailing with the advent of the English, many cases were not covered by positive law. Thus from the East

India Company's earliest days, directions have been given to rulers to apply the principles of "justice, equity and good conscience"—in other words, the Roman law of nature or of nations. Bryce quotes the order of the Indian Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which lays down that a foreign judgment is not operative as a bar if, in the opinion of the Court which deals with the question, it is "contrary to natural justice".

2. Natural law and International law. The Roman equivalent to our modern International law was *ius feciale*.

2 Inter- national Law

The foundations of our International law are the *ius naturale* and *ius gentium*. International law is based on two things—first, the customs which have grown up among peoples in their commercial dealings with each other, and, second, the doctrines of legal writers, such as Grotius. The legal writers found in the law of Nature the permanent basis of all international relations. The law of Nature and the *ius gentium*, or law of Nations, to them were practically synonymous. The *ius gentium* of the Romans was really a part of Roman law applicable in the Roman courts, but in origin it was 'international,' and the phrase 'Law of Nature and of Nations' in the writers of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries came definitely to mean what we now know as International Law.

3. In the Philosophy of law, natural law (or, in German, *Naturrecht*) has in recent years been used as the metaphysical basis of legal ideas and doctrines.

3. In Philosophy of Law

This has been peculiarly the case in German writers, such as Röder, Ahrens, Stahl and Trendlenburgh.

Some other effects of the idea of Nature may also be noted. 1. The idea of Nature in literature and art. The

Other Effects of the Idea of Nature.

1. In Literature and Art

influence of Rousseau was not confined to politics. He attacked not only political but also literary and artistic forms. The classicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century writers was marked by artificiality and mannerisms, and the return to Nature in literature was a return from stilted language and subjects to the description of natural scenery, country and family life, in the simple language of the household. This

is known as the Romantic movement in literature, the English leaders of which were Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Scott, Shelley and Keats. These writers also were supporters of the new ideas of political or civil liberty current at the time of the French Revolution.

2. The idea of Nature in theology, giving us what is known as Natural Theology, which is based not on revelation, but on reason.

3. In Economics, the idea of natural liberty was a theoretical basis for the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, or complete freedom from government interference in industry and commerce. The assumption in this case is that things will *naturally* work out for the best benefit of man if government does not interfere.

4. The idea of Nature in natural science. The laws of cause and effect in the physical and biological worlds have been used with great influence as analogies for the social world. The most notable modern writer of this school is Herbert Spencer.

3. NATURAL RIGHTS. THE MEANING OF RIGHTS

From the above short history of natural law, the influence of the idea of Nature in human society will be clear. The consequences of the idea have been so great, both in theory and in history, that we must examine the notion in detail.

The earliest noteworthy distinction is that which existed between Nature and Convention. The natural life in this sense is the simple or primitive life; the non-natural or conventional is the life of society with its manners, customs and institutions. In its widest meaning nature includes everything that exists. Man, therefore, is a part of nature, and his institutions are natural. To say that what is natural is right and what is non-natural is wrong, does not apply accordingly to the social "conventions." We might substitute for the meanings of nature and non-natural in this sense the words normal and abnormal. What is *abnormal* is not *wrong*.

Natural law, in fact, cannot give an absolute rule of conduct. Where it is regarded as the equivalent of the divine law or the revealed will of God, it might be held that natural law is an absolute law, inasmuch as it is the will of the Absolute or God. This, however, raises the two-

fold difficulty of revelation, and of civil society as distinct from religious society. Natural law, like divine law, however eternal the latter may be, or in whatever way it may be revealed, must be interpreted through human agency. Human reason ultimately is the deciding factor. Natural law interpreted in this light thus becomes the law of human reason. Kant, who accepts the Social Contract theory not as an historical explanation of the origin of society, but as a standard of justice, regards the law of Nature as the equivalent of the law of reason (or, in Kant's language, the categorical imperative of practical reason). Unlike St. Thomas Aquinas, he considers that human reason itself is the law-giving authority.

Natural law, again, without a definite authority to enforce it, can only be an ideal, which people may or may not obey as their conscience directs. Natural law is often used in the sense of law as it ought to be, or perfect law, as distinguished from imperfect human law. In this sense it might be useful as an aim to human aspirations, or a standard of human law, if, indeed, it could be universally promulgated for purposes of comparison. Otherwise it is a distinct danger to the state. The state is a human institution, organized in government through human agency, and to set the rule of natural law against the rule of the law of the state is to introduce a dual sovereignty, and therefore, a dual state, which is inconsistent with the notions of both sovereignty and state.

Though natural law and natural rights are now very generally dismissed from the sciences of both morals and the state, they had a very considerable influence on certain types of political thought of last century. The particular school, the thought of which is based on ideas of natural right, is known as the individualist school, of which John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer are the most noted exponents. For a more detailed analysis of the ideas of that school, the student must refer to the chapters on the end of the State and the functions of Government. At this stage, our purpose is to analyse the meaning of rights, an analysis to which the above notes on natural law will be helpful.

Rights must be distinguished from *powers*. Nature gives every normal man certain powers. These powers are simply the brute force or instincts with which every one is endowed at birth; just as animals are. Rights arise from the fact that man is a social being. He exists in society along with other men who are more or less similar to himself. Each one in society is endowed with powers, but rights arise from the consciousness on the part of each individual that every other individual has similar powers, and that it is in the common interest that everyone should be able to exercise his powers. For the existence of a right, therefore, there must be (a) a power, and (b) a recognition of the exercise of that power as necessary for the common welfare by others having similar powers. These two elements form the raw material of rights; for the full confirmation of a right there must be a third element—the claim to the recognition of the power by everyone possessing the power.

Rights arise from the moral nature of man. Rights are powers of free action, and every individual must from his very nature have certain powers of free action.

How Rights Arise The elementary needs of life, not to speak of the higher needs of social life, demand movement, work, speech, etc. To fulfil one's needs as a man, one must thus have certain powers of free action; still more is such action necessary to fulfil one's nature as a social being. Every individual exists in society. As a moral agent each one is capable of acting according to a certain conception of what is good for him, or, as we may call it, a moral ideal. The rights of the individual are the conditions under which he is able to realize this ideal. The ideal is shared by other moral agents in society, and the claim of one individual to realize his ideal must be recognized by others. Everyone is conscious that not only has he certain powers of development according to an ideal conception of his own good, but that he possesses these powers in common with other individuals who likewise have a conception of a good or ideal towards the reaching of which they have certain powers. Rights arise therefore from individuals as members of society, and from the recognition that, for society, there is an ultimate good which may be reached by the development of the powers inherent in every

individual. The consciousness of the common interest turns *powers* into *rights*; and the only proper sense in which we can speak of natural rights is as rights necessary to the ethical development of man as man.

Another way of saying this is that rights imply obligations, or that rights imply duties. In society the acts of individuals are limited by the interests of other individuals. If one individual wishes to act in a certain way, he must concede the same power of action to his neighbours. The state exists to maintain and co-ordinate the various claims of individuals, so that the fundamental duty of every individual is obedience to the state as organized in government. The state represents the collective interests of the community. Its interests are therefore superior to the interests of any individual, for were there no state there would be no rights, but only powers, or brute force. The commands of the state, or laws, are the conditions of rights, and these rights involve the duties of obedience, allegiance and support, both moral, such as by public service, and material, such as by paying taxes.

The state, founded on the intelligences and wills of individuals composing it, must maintain and co-ordinate the rights of its citizens. This it does through its system of law, and behind its law is the supremacy of the state, the supremacy that actually arises out of the very rights the state exists to maintain. The state provides the permanent power whereby its citizens can live moral lives. The powers or forces of individuals become rights when mutually recognized, and the state gives the conditions whereby the conception of a common good can be worked out by each individual in his own life along with his fellows.

When these rights are formulated, they are upheld by the power of the state. It is in the formulation of rights that the state shows itself most necessary. Obviously, where there is a large number of individuals, each with his separate claims, it is necessary to define claims. In many cases both rights and obligations are vague. Thus, in matters of property, contract, and family relations, some general principles may seem obvious, but the applications of these prin-

Rights and Duties

Function of the State

The Formulation of Rights

ciples to individual cases may raise difficulties. In the case of a child reaching his or her majority, or in the case of the making of wills, many possible ways of deciding might be given, but the law must decide which method it will accept. Not only is there the necessity for the formulation of law; there must also be interpreters of disputes. No law is so clear or comprehensive that it can cover every possible case. Disputes, or cases not contemplated in the law, must arise, and interpretation and decision are necessary. Interpretation and decision require judges, who also must decide cases which are not met by existing law by what is known as the principles of equity. The law must also declare the penalties which will follow illegal actions; these penalties are decided according to the danger to the state involved in breaking the law. The law also must be known, i.e., it must be published, and definite.

4. RIGHTS AGAINST THE STATE

There are no rights of nature unless nature be understood in the sense indicated. Rights arise from the nature of man, it is true, but the proper interpretation of that nature gives a very different result from that given by the upholders of the so-called state of nature. The "natural rights" of these "men of the nature" are their natural powers or brute force, which are limited only by the brute force of others, or by the "natural" limits of mere muscular power or cunning.

No moral development is possible in such a condition for the reason that such individuals are not moral agents.

Rights arise from the existence of moral agents in the moral medium of society, and as such, rights imply duties. There is no absolute right in any man: absolute right to do or choose as one likes is an attribute not of man but of the Absolute, or God.

The state exists to maintain and co-ordinate the rights arising among men, and, as such, is a necessary element in the moral perfection of mankind. The question frequently occurs—both in theory and practice—whether the individual has any rights against the state. From the above discussion on the

**Rights
against
the State**

**The Relation
of the Individ-
idual and
State**

**No Rights
against the
State**

meaning of rights the answer to this question is clear. The individual has no rights against the state. To have rights against the state is tantamount to saying that the individual has no rights at all. If there is no state there are no rights, but only powers. The state is essential to the existence of rights among mankind. In a perfect society with everyone sufficiently moralized to know his own good, the state would be unnecessary: in other words, the state is necessary because our moral destiny is not reached. Men are weak and erring, and till they have ceased to be so, the state will be essential.

To say there are no rights against the state, however, does not mean that the individual has no rights against a particular form of government. A government may so far defeat its object as the organization of the state, which exists for the moral good of particular man, that, to fulfil their moral destiny, the citizens of the state may have to change the form of government. Thus where the form of government is a despotism, giving no security of person or property, obviously individuals cannot live a proper moral life. Where, to favour a few, a government reduces the majority of citizens to moral inanition, the citizens have a right on moral grounds to change the government. The form of government can be altered in the interests of the state.

In modern representative government to change the form of government is not difficult. The opportunity for the exercise of their own power is given to the people. They possess the political sovereignty which is the condition of the legal sovereignty. The right to change the form of government thus rests with themselves. The right to change the form of government is to be distinguished from any so-called right of revolution. Theoretically the right to change the form of government and the right of revolution are merely different degrees of the same thing, but revolution is not justifiable even as an extreme measure, inasmuch as revolution as a rule brings about greater evils than it suppresses. Revolution usually means general anarchy and a disappearance for a time of all conditions of the normal moral life. The recent example of Russia shows how revolution, however just the causes, may lead to a complete loss of

**Rights
against
Particular
Forms of
Government**

**This Right
in Modern
Democracy**

freedom, save the "freedom" of force. The evils of the Russian revolution were far greater than the evils of the previous autocratic rule. So-called bloodless revolutions, or as the French call them, *coups d'état*, are merely sudden radical changes in the form of government; the citizens are not deprived of the rights on which their lives as individuals are based.

Similar arguments apply to the right of resistance. In modern representative governments laws are made by majorities, and minorities must concur. Minorities have no right of unlawful resistance to a law which they dislike. A minority has always the right to make itself a majority, i.e., to make its own point of view so persuasive that the majority will support it. A law remains a law till it is repealed by the ordinary law-making process, and if the law is irksome to many individuals, they must first persuade others of the justice of their case to give them the majority necessary to repeal the law. A law sometimes dies out without formal repeal. The necessity for its existence may have passed, or its existence may be so unpalatable to the common consciousness that either the government will not enforce it or the law will be allowed to lapse. Every government must enforce laws vital to rights and the common good.

CHAPTER VII

LIBERTY—(*continued*)

5. CIVIL LIBERTY

The nature of rights has been explained, therefore we are now in a position to appreciate the meaning of Civil Liberty. Civil liberty arises from the state.

What Civil Liberty Means The state is organized in government, which lays down laws, executes them, and, through the judiciary, interprets them in disputed cases.

The powers of government are determined by the state, so that the sovereignty of the state is the guarantee of individual liberty against the government. Government exercises its powers only to the extent and in the way allowed by the sovereign community. The sovereignty of the state is expressed in its laws, and in every state there are two types of law :—

1. Public law
2. Private law

which guarantee the individual respectively

1. Against the government,
2. Against other individuals, or associations of individuals.

Public law guarantees the individual against governmental interference; private law guarantees him against other individuals or associations of individuals. In subsequent chapters more will be said about these types of law. Here it is necessary to observe that the methods whereby states guarantee individuals against government vary considerably. In every state there is a body of fundamental

principles which regulates the conduct of government. These principles, sometimes written, sometimes unwritten, are called the constitution. Where a constitution is definitely written, as in the case of the United States, the general principles of government, an outline of its organization and a definite number of general guarantees of individual liberty are given. Where, as in the United Kingdom, the constitution is unwritten, traditions, customs and laws prescribe the form of government and the guarantees of individual liberty.

Such constitutional guarantees are characteristics of modern democratic states. In states where the distinction between the state and government was, or is not clear, naturally there is no guarantee on the part of the state against government. Thus in a despotism, where the only will is the will of the despot, there can be no individual freedom save for the individual despot. The same is true of theocracy, where the interpreter of the will of God is supreme. Freedom in such cases means freedom to do what the despot allows. The same is true of the feudal and absolute governments of the mediæval and early modern ages. In modern democracies, however, we find that the will of the community continually checks the government. In most countries that will is expressed in the constitution, and the government cannot go beyond the constitution without breaking the law. Thus in the United States the legislature, Congress, must work within prescribed limits; and the government was so organized at the beginning as to give the least chance of despotism. The legislature, the executive and the judiciary were organized separately to ensure that the lawmaker should not carry out his own laws or interpret them in cases of dispute. In England the opposite is the case. The legislature is supreme: it can make or unmake any law it pleases, but behind its acts lies the will of the people, which, expressed in its various ways—at elections, in the press, on the platform—makes the conditions under which the legislature exercises its powers.

It must be remembered that constitutional governments are relatively new. In origin their powers were sometimes elaborately circumscribed to prevent despotism. Experience has proved that the theoretical limitation of govern-

mental powers is neither the sole nor the chief guarantee of individual liberty. Naturally enough constitutional government, coming after centuries of despotism and after bitter struggles with despotism and class privilege, guarded itself as carefully as possible, but these guarantees have sometimes been broken to serve the very ends for which they were established, and countries with no elaborate guarantees have possessed as much freedom as others. Thus in the United States there is no more freedom than in the United Kingdom. The key to British liberty is not a constitution or the separation of powers, but the rule of law, whereby every citizen of the country, of whatever degree, is amenable to the same process of law as his neighbour. On the continent of Europe, on the other hand, there is the system of administrative law, by which officials are subject not to ordinary law courts, but to special administrative courts. Reference will be made to this later.

**Modern
Constitutional
Government**

6. PARTICULAR RIGHTS

In modern civilized governments there is a tendency to regard certain rights as fundamental. There is much difference of opinion among thinkers concerning the extent of those rights, and considerable variation among governments as to the method of their guarantee. Taking a general survey of both political thought and practice, we may sum up these rights thus :—

**Types of
Particular
Rights**

1. Right of life and liberty.
2. Right of property.
3. Right of contract.
4. Right of free speech, reputation, discussion and public meeting.
5. Right of worship and conscience.
6. Right of association.
7. Right of family life.

A detailed analysis of each of these is impossible here. On each, however, a few words must be given.

1. *Right of life*, or as it is frequently called the *Right*

of life and liberty. As we have seen, rights arise from the nature of man in society. Obviously all rights depend on life, for without life man can exercise no rights at all. Fundamental among rights, therefore, is the right to life. This right includes not only the right to live but the right to defend one's self against attack. Every state, however primitive its organization, provides for personal safety. In early societies the power to avenge or punish was in the hands of blood relations; this led to what is known as blood-feuds. In modern highly organized communities the right to life is safeguarded by the law, and by the government through the police and courts.

Murder is heavily punished, though the notions of punishment vary from state to state. The idea of capital punishment, i.e., a life for a life, originates partly from the human desire for revenge and partly from the necessity of ridding society of one who is dangerous to it. Modern ideas of punishment tend towards the recognition of the right to life. Instead of a murderer being hanged, modern penal law tends to regard him as one who must be removed from society for some time, in order that he may reform and ultimately resume his place in society to contribute towards the welfare of society like all well-behaved citizens.

The right to life, based as it is in the common welfare of society, not only necessitates the prevention of murder, but demands the punishment of those who try to commit suicide. From the point of view of the general welfare, every life is valuable, and to murder another or murder oneself means the elimination of an individuality which has duties as well as rights. One cannot claim security to one's person from encroachment by others if one is allowed to kill oneself by one's own free act. Suicide, therefore, is an injury to society, and those who attempt it are punished.

The right to life also involves the right to self-defence. For self-preservation force may rightly be used even if that force may kill others. Force of this kind may only be used as an extreme measure where no other means will suffice. In English law the only justification for the use of extreme force is self-defence, which does

not imply the right of attacking. The interpretation of what measure of force it is necessary to exercise for self-defence remains with the courts, which are guided in their judgments by the right to defend one's life on the one hand, and the existence of private blood-feuds on the other.

The right to life involves also the right to a certain amount of personal freedom—such as freedom of movement, the right to the exercise of one's faculties and of determining the general conditions of one's life. Mere life without movement would be meaningless and without the exercise of the human faculties it would not rise above the level of that of animals. The right to freedom arises from the fact that there is a society to the general good of which each individual can contribute something and have a conception of what that good is. Thus slavery is universally condemned because the good of society demands that each man must be able to determine the conditions of his own life. In cases where such determination is not possible, e.g., idiots or lunatics, the right to life is still respected on the ground that either the individual is curable and capable of later self-determination or that the very fact of their continued existence performs a social function, by calling forth family or philanthropic feelings.

But the right to life and liberty, though fundamental, is not absolute. Thus in war the individual life is sacrificed. Many wars, it is true, have sacrificed individual life because of the personal vanity of rulers; the right to life was thus infringed. But wars such as the Great War, 1914–18, where two moral ideals were at stake, involve the sacrifice of life as a condition of the realization of that ideal. Green, the great modern English ethical and political philosopher, condemns all wars on the ground that they are emblems of human imperfection. War is only necessary because states do not really fulfil their functions as such in maintaining rights among individuals. Armies are due to the fact that states do not live up to their purpose, therefore no state is *absolutely* justified in traversing the right to life, though in particular instances states may be justified in going to war because of the good which may result. The right to life or liberty, again, may be suspended where the laws are broken. As laws, properly understood, exist to maintain a system of

**Personal
Freedom**

**This Right
not
Absolute**

rights, obviously if they are broken, action must be taken to preserve the system. Both life and liberty therefore depend on obedience to the laws. Thus in the case of murder or treason, the murderer or traitor may be deprived of his life, and in the case of stealing and violence the offender must be restrained. On the other hand, if the right to life and liberty is to mean anything, there must be safeguards against arbitrary action on the part of the government. In France before the Revolution there was a system known as *lettres de cachet*, by which the administration was able without judicial process summarily to deprive any individual of his liberty. These *lettres de cachet* were issued under the privy seal (*cachet*) and the individual had no legal process to secure either redress or freedom.

In the English system the maximum amount of individual liberty is secured in a very simple way. There is in England

Individual Liberty in England no definite constitutional guarantee of liberty, such as is given in some modern written constitutions. In England personal liberty is guaranteed simply by the courts of law. The existence of constitutional declarations of the liberty of the individual are of no avail without machinery to guarantee it. In England the right of personal freedom means the right not to be imprisoned, arrested or coerced in any manner which is not justified by the law. Physical restraint in England is wrong, unless the individual is accused of an offence and is to be brought to trial in the courts, or when, after trial, he is convicted and has to be punished. The two ways in which this principle is upheld are—

1. Redress for arrest, and
2. The Habeas Corpus Acts.

1. Redress for arrest means that a person who has been wrongly arrested can either have the wrong-doer punished, or exact damages in proportion to his injuries. Such action may be taken against any person in the realm, official or non-official.

2. The Habeas Corpus Acts. A Habeas Corpus writ is an order issued by the courts calling upon a person, by whom a prisoner is alleged to be kept in restraint, to produce the prisoner (or *produce his body*—the English equivalent of the Latin *habeas corpus*) before the court, and explain

why the prisoner is kept under restraint, in order that his case may be dealt with by the court. The prisoner may then be set free or brought to proper trial. By this means the individual is saved from any arbitrary act on the part of the executive government, or, in other words, the executive government must act strictly according to the law, otherwise the courts will interfere, on the application either of the prisoner or of some person acting on his behalf.

The rule of law in England thus secures the minimum amount of personal restraint. In times of emergency, such as wars or threatened revolution, special measures may have to be taken for the safety of the state—such as the Defence of the Realm Act during the Great War. In such cases for public reasons it is necessary to give the executive more arbitrary powers; but in times of peace the rule of law is paramount.

The Rule of Law 2. *Right to Property*.—The right to property has an ethical basis, and the political safeguards of property are really expressions of the ethical end. The ethical basis of property is that property is essential for the realization of the moral end of man. The word property comes originally from the Latin word *proprius*, which means own or peculiar, and *proprietas*, a peculiar or essential quality, arising from that ownership. The ethical quality of property is that it is essential in some form to the existence of man.

The Right to Property The many controversial questions regarding the origin, distribution and ownership of property cannot be discussed here. The question of individual as against public ownership will be discussed in a later chapter. The ideas on property change from age to age, and with the change of ideas there goes change in laws. At present the laws of all states give definite guarantees to private property, but the view as to what may be private property varies from place to place. While private property in land, rivers, moors, and such like is respected in some countries, in others the tendency is to regard such as public property. However much the views may vary, it may safely be said that there is a certain amount of private property which, whatever may be the type of state, will be guaranteed—such as houses, clothes, cooking materials, food, and books.

Property, like liberty, contains no absolute right in itself.

At any time the claims of the state may be so paramount, e.g., in a great war—that the usual property rights may be temporarily suspended. So it is also with confiscation of property. Property may be confiscated either as a punishment or for reasons of state. The whole question of taxation is also connected with property. It depends on the particular views prevailing in a community at any period whether any given type of property shall be taxed, or taxed more heavily than any other type. Thus speculation in buying and selling land near rising towns may be checked by a tax on unearned increment, or increase in values caused not by the investor's exertions but by the growth of the community. "Vested" interests, again, are often said to confer certain property rights on individuals. Vested interests arise from length of tenure, and it is held that the individual has a "right" to expect the continuance of the conditions under which he bought or developed his property. Such an idea rests on a wrong idea of the state. The state cannot allow any interests to continue if these interests defeat the object of the state's existence. No government can bind its successors for ever to a certain line of action. The change of circumstances in time may completely alter the meaning of a certain type of property or investment. The common welfare, not individual interests, is the main concern of the state.

3. *The Right of Contract.*—The right of contract is really a phase of the more general right of property. If one has certain rights of property, then reasonably enough one may have rights to dispose of or use that property as one desires. The phrase "freedom of contract," however, like the right of property, is variously interpreted by governments. Thus in America the constitution prohibits interference with contracts by the states, but in Britain there is a tendency to interfere with the so-called freedom of contract. The doctrine of *laissez-faire* demands that no restrictions, or as few restrictions as possible, shall be placed on the "natural" movements in commerce and in industry, but though that doctrine prevailed for many years, experience showed that many interferences were necessary in the freedom of contract. Thus there are Factory Acts, Employers' Liability Acts, Insurance Acts, etc.

No Absolute Right

The Right of Contract

A contract is a transaction in which two or more persons, or bodies of persons, freely impose certain obligations upon each other to act in a certain way with regard to some definite object. A simple kind of contract is the buying and selling of an article. Once the article is bought or sold, the contract ends. The ordinary type of contract, however, is more complex. It places two parties under certain obligations for the future: it is an act of will which imposes a certain restraint on each party for the future, and it might reasonably be supposed that each party could break the contract at will. Once a contract is made the parties can annul it only if both parties agree. One party cannot break it if the other does not wish to. The basis of contract is really truth and honesty. If one party fails to keep his word then he deceives the other party and may cause him material loss, which is equivalent to the theft of his goods.

Contract is an essential basis of society. In primitive forms of social organization contract is of a simple kind; whereas in modern society, where there is much differentiation of functions, contract is the basis of business and of social organization. Where there is no security of contract there can be no business more than mere barter. Contract, therefore, may be said to be essential to the progress of civilization, and if the state is to fulfil its function, it must have the support of the state.

The state must maintain and adjust the rights and obligations arising out of contracts, but certain contracts cannot be recognized by the state. Contracts made for illegal purposes, immoral contracts, or contracts endangering the safety of the state are necessarily invalid. The state could not support a contract made to deal in slaves, or a contract involving bribes. Gaming and betting contracts are ranked in most countries in the same class. The state can support contracts only which are consistent with the end for which the state exists.

4. *Right to Free Speech.*—This right arises from the nature of man, for speech is necessary for social union. This so-called right of free speech is much misunderstood. It does not mean the right to say anything one likes where one likes; it simply means

the right to speak (and write) so far as is consistent with the general well-being. As the general well-being is inextricably connected with the state, freedom of speech must be limited by considerations of the stability of the state. Thus a speaker or writer may give his views on the policy of government, but he must not stir up violence or revolution. Truth alone is no index for freedom of speech. Thus a citizen may wish to tell the evil character of a neighbour or enemy to the public, but unless the speaker can prove that his remarks were made in the public interest, however true the remarks may be, he will be punished under the law of libel.

The right of free speech is thus limited by the right of reputation. In social life an individual's good name is of the utmost value to him, not only because of the normal human sense of honour but in his business and political relations. If an individual insults another individual, and is insulted, the injury to the attacker's feelings must be taken into account. Where such an insult is private, i.e., takes place between two individuals, it may lead to blows or assault, and the law courts. Where it is public, it is subject to the law of libel.

President Woolsey gives the following six principles which cover the various phases of the right of reputation:—

“Here then we have the rights of speech and the statement of truth on the one hand, personal feelings and reputation on the other. The principles reconciling the two rights seem to be these: (1) To tell the truth, to disclose the truth when the character of a man ought to be known, to do this publicly when he is talked of for a public office, may be entirely justifiable. (2) To put the principles or conduct of a person in a ridiculous light by word or caricature, when he is thus before the public, is equally defensible. (3) It is reasonable, therefore, that the truth in a statement, even if uncalled for, should take off something of its libellous character, unless especial malice in bringing to light that which was not known, and was not necessary to be made public for the purposes of truth, can be alleged in the case. (4) In all cases, then, the malice and the causelessness of the injury to a man's name are important considerations,

nor can party any more than petty professional or other jealousies, excuse libels. (5) Ridicule, equally with sober statements, may violate rights, when it is malicious or causeless, whether there is reason for it or not. (6) The revelation of former faults or misdeeds (without good cause), of persons who have long led an upright life, is a wrong demanding redress."

The modern use of the phrases "freedom of thought" and "freedom of speech" comes from the times of the French Revolution. Originally the ideas came from England. In the Declaration of the Rights of Man it is laid down that the "free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man; each citizen therefore should be able to speak, write, and print freely, subject to the responsibility for breaking this liberty in cases determined by the law. The constitution guarantees as a natural and civil right to each man to speak, write, print and publish his thoughts without these writings being submitted to any censorship before publication." The Belgian constitution lays down similar principles, particularly regarding the freedom of the press. In England no constitutional provisions such as these exist. English law recognizes no principle of the freedom of discussion. The only security for freedom of speech in England is that no one shall be punished except for statements spoken or published which definitely break the existing law. The position is given in these words in Odgers's work on libel and slander :

"Our present law permits any one to say, write, and publish what he pleases; but if he make a bad use of this liberty, he must be punished. If he unjustly attack an individual, the person defamed may sue for damages, if, on the other hand, the words be written or printed, or if treason or immorality be thereby inculcated, the offender can be tried for the misdemeanour either by information or indictment."

In England there is thus no theoretical freedom of speech or freedom of the press; the only freedom that exists is freedom within the law. If anyone libels another, he may be convicted under the law of libel. The same is true with regard to libels on government. "Every person," says the well-known English

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in Modern
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Libel

writer, Dr. Dicey, "commits a misdemeanour who publishes (verbally or otherwise) any words or any document with a seditious intention." And again, to quote the same authority, a "seditious intention" means "an intention to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the king or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite British subjects to attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in Church or State by law established, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes."

The law only recognizes as legitimate the publication of statements which may show the government to have been misled, or to have committed errors, or statements which point out defects in the existing system which can be remedied by legal means. In other words, the law sanctions only criticism which is *bona fide*, and intended to bring about reform in a legal way.

The same general position holds with regard to discussion on religious and moral questions, which are governed by the same laws and the law of blasphemy. All **Blasphemy** cases arising under these laws are judged by the ordinary procedure of a judge and jury, so that the particular amount of immorality or religious danger in an act under judgment will be adjudged largely according to the current ideas of their danger to the public life of the country.

The freedom of the press in England, though not guaranteed by any constitutional maxim, is guaranteed by the rule of law. No license is necessary for a publication: the persons responsible may be **Freedom of the Press** punished, not for publishing, but for publishing anything which breaks the law. The same principle makes it unnecessary to give caution money or a deposit before publication. As Dicey says, in England men are to be interfered with or punished, not because they may or will break the law, but because they have committed some definite assignable legal offence. Except in the case of plays (a survival of the old licensing system) no license to print or publish is necessary either for books or newspapers, and most newspapers in England are definitely political. Nor

has government or anyone else the right to seize or destroy the stock of a publisher because it may contain what in the opinion of government is seditious matter ; nor can government supervise the editing or printing of a paper.

Press offences are tried in the ordinary courts by a judge and jury. With the jury, as in all cases of libel, lies the decision as to whether the press exceeds the law or not. It is to be noted that in France not only is there a large body of special press law, but that certain press offences are tried by special tribunals. In France the idea has for centuries prevailed that it is not merely the concern of the government to punish breakers of press law, but it is also their duty to guide opinion in the proper channels. In England, before 1695, there were numerous restrictions on the press and printing, including the monopoly of the Stationery Company, the Licensing Acts, which lapsed in 1695, and the special tribunal known as the Star Chamber, which with its other functions also controlled printing presses. Since 1695 the theory has prevailed that government has nothing to do with the moulding of opinion : its main concern is to see that the law is observed.

Another right, the right to Public Meeting, which is part of the right of free speech, is governed in England by the same principles. Any one in England can meet and discuss any question in any way provided the meeting obeys the law. If what is said be libellous, the law of libel will come into operation ; if blasphemous, the law of blasphemy ; if the object of the meeting is unlawful, the meeting is unlawful assembly. If a breach of the peace is likely to be committed or is committed, the meeting is unlawful and those responsible are liable to be punished.

5. *The Right of Worship and Conscience.*—The right to one's religious faith is not universally admitted. In some states only a certain type of religious faith is permitted ; in others there is general toleration. Modern history teems with instances of wars on religious grounds, either because of a fundamental difference in religion or because of quarrels between sects of the same religion. In the modern world the tendency is towards toleration in all religions within certain limits. Thus in the

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Meeting**

**The
Right of
Worship
and
Conscience**

United Kingdom, though there are state churches, dissenting churches are allowed to practise their faiths freely. During the nineteenth century the chief political disabilities were removed from Roman Catholic Christians and Jews. Only in a very few instances do civil or political disabilities exist. In newer countries, including the British self-governing dominions, there is no state church. Complete toleration is allowed to all religious faiths or sects. In India the government is neutral regarding religious matters.

Since the Reformation the church and state have gradually drawn apart; the church has given up its previous temporal powers and confined itself to spiritual matters. In certain states a species of autocratic rule still prevails, e.g., in Islamic states; but even in Mohammedanism the modern trend towards universal toleration is making itself felt. Modern opinion leaves matters of heresy to the church, and only if the church exceeded what the common consciousness regarded as just or reasonable would any action of government be likely.

Generally speaking, the right to one's faith is limited by two things. First, where the worship involves immorality, the power of the state may intervene. An example is the system of worship of the Thugs. Secondly, where the religious authorities so act as to endanger the state, the state must then safeguard its own existence. A religious body, for example, to further its faith might try to raise civil war or invite a foreign power to help it. In such a case the state would have to intervene to save itself.

It is difficult to say that in any state there is a right to worship as such. People as a rule may hold what opinions they choose provided illegal acts do not flow from these opinions. Thus in England though there exist the law of blasphemy and laws to uphold the Christian religion, the laws are operative only in cases where they are blatantly set at defiance.

Regarding the general rights of conscience it is often held that conscience, being the chief possession of man, is inviolable. In a sense it is inviolable. The state through government can compel a man to do which his conscience tells him is wrong, but the state thereby does not affect the

Church and State

Limitation of Right of Worship

conscience. The conscience as the inner unspoken voice can preserve itself in spite of the state or government, but what it cannot do is to prevent the state acting towards the possessor of the conscience in any way the state thinks fit. Thus, though the state cannot make a man's conscience say that which it thinks wrong is right, it can imprison him, or force him to act or not to act in a certain way. In this way the conscience of the individual must conform to the law of the state. Legally speaking, the state, not the individual, is the judge of conscience-rights. No man can be allowed on grounds of conscience to stand outside the law of the state, for, in the first place, the state is based on the intelligences of the community for the common good, and the existence of rights of conscience apart from the state would defeat the object of the state; and, secondly, the admission of rights of conscience against the law of the state would, in this imperfect world, open the way for the exercise of dishonest rights of conscience. The state, therefore, through government, must be the arbiter of rights of conscience, and as such be able to compel all individuals, whatever their consciences, to act according to the law. The state may on grounds of expediency, as with conscientious objectors to conscription, permit certain latitude, but it can never affect the innermost conscience. It cannot compel a man to believe that what is bad is good, but it must control his outward actions.

6. *The Right of Association*.—In modern highly developed society individuals enter into relationships for many purposes. They form unions, clubs, societies or associations for political, commercial, philanthropic, educational and other purposes. Sometimes these associations are temporary, with only a slight organization: sometimes they are permanent, with a very elaborate organization. The increasing inter-communication between the various political communities of the world has led to many associations which go beyond the limits of any one state. Some of the organizations extend over many states, that is, they are international.

The right of association in a general form is one of the elemental rights of man as a social being. The state itself depends on association; but the state as the supreme

association or unity, must preserve itself among other associations. It may happen in the future that **The State and other Associations** of any one state may lead to the disappearance of individual states and the formation of a single world state; but so long as there are individual states, and so long as these are necessary conditions for the moral development of mankind, so long must the individual states preserve their identity. Already thinkers are putting forward the claims of associations against the state; but so long as the state continues so long must associations be within and under the state.

The right of association must, therefore, be limited by the necessities of the state. As a rule, associations live under the protection of the state, but sometimes they may become so powerful as to endanger the state. Thus trade unions must be limited in such a way as to prevent them paralysing the moral life of a nation. The East India Company, originally a trading company, became such a powerful political body that it had to be transformed from a trading company into the Government of India. Secret political societies which aim at the subversion of government by unlawful means must also be suppressed. The same is true of all similar societies, whether secret or public, but secret societies are a particular danger as they usually favour revolutionary and illegal methods.

Generally speaking, all associations which prevent free moral development in a people are wrong, but their moral badness becomes a matter of state only when they endanger the state or openly contravene the end for which the state exists.

7. Right of Family Life.—The rights of the family rest on similar grounds to the rights of property. The family life represents an effort to make real what **Rights of Family** the individual conceives as necessary for his own good. 'The family state is a condition of the good life, but whereas in property the right is exercised over a thing, in the family state it is exercised over a person or persons, which implies that the individual exercising family rights must recognize that the good of others is permanently and indefeasibly bound up with his own good.'

Many rights are included in the general name rights of family. There are the rights of marriage ; the rights against others in the purity of the marriage relation ; the rights over children ; the rights of children ; and the right of inheritance. The family is one of the essential elements in human existence, and the relation of the state to it is determined by the fact that the rights arising out of it must be maintained and co-ordinated. The types of family life differ from one country to another, but some features are general. The whole question of the relation of the state to the family is a mixture of the legal and moral, and in many particulars these two aspects are not in agreement in every country.

Marriage itself is a contract in perpetuity. The state can recognize no temporary marriage. The state, however, may recognize the invalidity of marriage where impediments exist which defeat the moral end of marriage. The state, too, for various reasons, may prevent marriage between very near relations. In most modern states polygamy is forbidden. The marriage relation implies the mutual surrender of personalities by the husband and wife. In other words, there is in marriage a reciprocal recognition of rights, which implies monogamy. Polygamy not only excludes many men from the married state, but it does not preserve a real reciprocity of rights between husband, wife and children. The husband in a polygamous marriage is like a master over slaves. The wife is not the head of the household save for the time she happens to be favourite, and she is also required to exercise a self-control which the husband does not exercise on himself. Then, again, the claims of children on their parents can be satisfied only by the joint responsibility of the parents, which is impossible in a polygamous system.

The state recognizes certain rights and obligations on the part of husband and wife. The husband is the head of the family, its protector and supporter. The law forces him to support his family. The husband and wife, too, are bound to be faithful to each other. The law grants divorce in cases of infidelity, though it may be for the good of the family for the offence of infidelity to be condoned. The state as a rule recognizes the claims of the husband or wife against

other individuals, and may grant damages in case of the infringement of the right of fidelity.

The tendency in the modern world is towards legal equality of men and women in these matters, though up to the present the law distinctly has favoured the man.

The right of the parent in respect to the children is mainly a duty, viz., to support the children. The parents are the guardians of the children, and the child has no legal position till it passes out of the state of minority. The laws of the various states of the world recognize a fixed age of majority, an age which varies from state to state. States also recognize the duty of the parent to support the child, though the duty of the child to support the parent in old age is usually regarded as a moral, not a legal duty.

In conclusion, it will be noted that these particular rights are all relative. Not one of them is absolute. They exist in the state, which is the condition of their exercise, and not one of them in itself can be supported against the paramount claims of the state.

7. POLITICAL LIBERTY

Political liberty, in its modern meaning, is practically synonymous with democracy. Democracy is of two kinds—direct democracy, in which every citizen has a direct share in the management of government, and indirect democracy, in which the citizens elect representatives to carry on the work of government. The former type is possible only in very small states where all the citizens can meet together and express their opinions; the latter is necessary in our large modern states, where it is physically impossible for the citizens to meet together. In some countries attempts have been made by means of the *initiative*, which enables the citizens to compel the legislature to pass a certain type of law, and the *referendum*, by which a proposed law is submitted to popular vote, to eliminate representation, but as yet these have not found general favour.

Underlying democracy is the idea that each citizen should be able to express his views on the affairs of government which concern him or his country. The method by which

the citizens express their views is by voting, but not every one is allowed to vote even in the most advanced democracies. Both reason and experience show that certain classes of people must be excluded—such as aliens, whose loyalty is due to another state, lunatics, and children, both of whom cannot comprehend the issues to be voted on. The tendency of democracy in the modern world is to broaden its basis to include all adults, male and female, so that every one may have a say in government. Democracy, however, was not always so broad: the Greek democracy, for example, was a democracy only for citizens who were rich and leisured, whereas the slaves, the working classes of modern democracy, were omitted altogether.

For various reasons certain classes are sometimes excluded in modern democracies. Sometimes those who do not pay a minimum amount of taxes are excluded; sometimes illiterate people are excluded; sometimes certain classes of government servants are excluded. The varying principles and practice of governments are examined in more detail in the section on the Electorate.

In technical language, the chief difficulty of democracy is to find an organization which affords the greatest possible fusion between legal and political sovereignty.

The Problem of Democracy On the one side it is necessary to avoid the tyranny of the legislature; on the other, it is necessary to give as free play as possible to the minds of the people. For the avoidance of tyranny there are the guarantees of a constitution, and the division of powers between legislative, executive and judiciary in such a way that one checks the other. For the testing of the popular will there are elections, which should be as frequent as is consistent with the national peace of mind, for frequent elections are very disturbing where, as in the modern world, they are managed on a party basis. The initiative, referendum, and recall, are other instruments for giving full play to the popular will. The press is also important in this respect. Local self-government, whereby municipalities and other local areas manage their own affairs, is another important element in modern political liberty.

The modern world is either democratic or rapidly moving towards democracy. One of the chief dangers of democracy

is that it may go to extremes, or become mob rule. That the dividing line between political liberty and anarchy, which means lack of rule, and, as a result, social and political chaos, is not very definite is shown by the historical examples of the French Revolution and, recently, of Russia. In these countries the desire to have a share in political affairs overcame the ability to govern on the part of those who brought about the change from monarchical to popular government. The result in each case was a despotism marked by terror which no individual despot would have dared to perpetrate. The theory of democracy is that all are equal before the law, but in practice democracy has often gone to the extreme of mob rule which has resulted in the wholesale execution of all opposed to it, giving them neither a voice in government nor equality before the law.

Political liberty, therefore, must not be regarded as something to be attained as an end in itself. It is to be attained for the higher moral end of the perfection of humanity, and as such its course must be marked by the gradual enlightenment of the citizens. The greatest danger of democracy is that the voice of the people may be unenlightened. Hence the same argument that applies to lunatics and children applies to the unenlightened, that, not being able to understand the issues at stake, they should not be allowed to influence the course of government.

8. NATIONAL LIBERTY

National liberty is synonymous with autonomy or independence. It means that the community concerned is sovereign. Many of the greatest wars in the world have been fought for national liberty. National liberty also involves the right to choose in which nation a people wishes to be incorporated, e.g., the case of Alsace-Lorraine in France. This is the now well-known principle of self-determination.

The various questions connected with the rights of nationalities also come under this heading. These have been discussed already in connexion with nationality.

In the British Empire there are various grades of

National Liberty in the British Empire national liberty among the many dependencies. In all matters of every-day life British dependencies are self-governing. Some of them, the so-called Self-governing Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) are, in most respects almost independent. In India, the Government of India is gradually assuming a similar position, and we are approaching the Dominion status. Some dependencies are held for military or naval reasons (such as Gibraltar) and these are ruled by the authorities concerned. The chief matters in which the Imperial Government preserves its powers are foreign affairs and matters of war and peace, but in these all recent developments point to the dependencies being taken into council. As long as the Imperial Government is responsible for the defence of the dependencies, it must have power to defend them, but the recent war has shown co-operation in defence and now we may expect co-operation in power.

CHAPTER VIII

LAW

1. DEFINITION

The word law comes from an old Teutonic root *lag*, which means something which lies fixed or evenly. In the English language the word is used to denote that which is uniform. In physical science, for example, we speak of the laws of motion, where the word means a definite sequence of cause and effect; and in Political Science we use the term to mean a body of rules to guide human action. Every citizen is familiar with laws of various kinds, and with lawyers and judges, who interpret or apply them. In Political Science, however, we are not concerned with the various laws and interpretations of laws, knowledge of which is necessary for the training of a lawyer. We are concerned only with the general principles of law so far as an understanding of them is necessary for a proper conception of the nature of the state. The detailed study of the principles of law belongs to the science of Jurisprudence.

Laws, no matter in what form they may be expressed, are, according to Austin, in the last resort reducible to commands set by the person or body of persons who are in fact sovereign in any independent political society. To this Austinian definition of law Sir Henry Maine takes the objection, that it is too narrow, that it does not cover all those cases of usage in which not the direct command but the dictates of customary procedure have sway. To meet Maine's criticism Dr. Woodrow Wilson presents a conception of law which does not identify it with a definite command; he endeavours to include in it those customary usages which have come to have binding force.

"Law," he says, "is that portion of the established thought and habit which has gained distinct and formal recognition in the shape of uniform rules backed by the authority and power of government." Dr. Woodrow Wilson thus tries to harmonize the analytical view of law with the criticisms offered by Sir Henry Maine. The best definition of a law is that given by Professor Holland—"A law is a general rule of action taking cognizance only of external acts, enforced by a determinate authority, which authority is human and among human authorities is that which is paramount in a political society; or, briefly, a law is a general rule of external action enforced by a sovereign political authority."

The above extract gives the essence of law. To put it more shortly, law is, in Dr. Woodrow Wilson's words, "the will of the state concerning the civic conduct of those under its authority." For law two things are thus necessary, (a) the civic community, (b) a body of rules. No numerous body of men can live together for any length of time without having certain recognized rules of conduct. Just as the first thing necessary for the formation of a literary society or for the conduct of a public meeting is a body of guiding principles, so in a community there must be some definite rules. These rules need not be written down on paper; they may simply be the recognized customs of the people. Thus, in India, many of the rules which people observe in their daily intercourse with each other—such as caste rules—are not definitely written down, but are handed down from generation to generation in the form of custom. Before writing was invented, custom was the only source of law; the headman, chief, priest or council of elders interpreted in cases of doubt. After the invention of writing these customs were written down, and, with the growing differentiation of functions in society, laws became more numerous and more complex. With the growing complexity of law arose the necessity for skilled interpreters, viz., lawyers and judges. Not all customs were written down, and only those customs were law which the community accepted as such. In a modern government there is a definite organization to make laws—the legislature—but it does not make all the laws. Many laws existed before legislatures were organized in their modern form, but

legislatures, as the organs of the sovereign state, implicitly agree to those laws which they do not actually pass, on the principle that what the sovereign permits, it commands.

2. THE SOURCES OF LAW

Professor Holland gives the following six sources of law :—

Sources of Law (1) Custom or Usage. (2) Religion. (3) Adjudication or Judicial Decision. (4) Scientific Commentaries. (5) Equity. (6) Legislation.

The earliest kind of law was customary law. In primitive types of society, where the social organization was simple and there was no art of writing, disputes were settled by the patriarch, or council of elders, according to the prevailing customs. The customs were based on the general usage of the family, tribe or clan. This usage arose out of such needs as security of person and property, or the provision of the necessities of life, in short, utility.

Customary law was closely connected with religion. Decisions had the force of divine inspiration, and disobedience to them brought to the malefactors the severe penalties which early religion attached to all breaches of divine law. The law thus had the double advantage of arising out of the customs of the people and of receiving the support of the early types of religion or superstition. The promulgator of the laws varied from community to community ; sometimes the headman, sometimes a council, and sometimes priests or priest-kings issued legal decisions. In this respect there is a marked distinction between the east and west. In the west law tended to become political : in the east, religious.

With the growing complexity of social organization, custom had to be supplemented by legal decision or adjudication. By the mixing of one tribe with other tribes, either for trade or marriage, conflicts of custom arose. The custom of one tribe on one matter might be at variance with the custom of another tribe on the same point. To decide such conflicts, it was necessary to refer the case to the wisest men in the community, who thus became judges whose decisions were accepted not only for

How Custom and Adjudication Operated. Judicial Precedents

the single case in question but for all similar cases. Such judges naturally became very influential persons. Knowing the customs better, than others, they were referred to in all cases of difficulty, and where the old customs were obviously unfitted to the case, they would decide according to common sense. Their decisions thus became judicial precedents. At first they were given orally and handed down by tradition; later they were written down and made definite.

Custom and interpretation are characteristic not only of early law: they are operative in all law. Customs grow up and die away among men without obvious reasons, and men tend to do what custom prescribes, and judges tend to decide according to what custom dictates. Though laws now are chiefly written laws, and although writing tends to check custom, judges are always affected by custom. The necessity for the interpretation of law, as we have seen, created judges, or more generally, men skilled in law, or lawyers. Lawyers, like other people, are influenced by the ideas current in their community, and in arguing on the general principles governing individual cases they frequently must plead against old customary rules or old laws, and in this way gradually influence judicial decisions on old customary rules. Progress from the rigidity of custom thus is made possible through adjudication by trained lawyers.

This process is observable in practically all systems of law. In the most ancient systems of law, law-codes appeared. These codes were the summary, in a definite written form, of the customary law for the community. Thus there appeared the Mosaic code, the laws of Solon, the Roman Twelve Tables, the laws of Manu, and the Koran. These codes contained certain fundamental principles, the basis of future legal progress, but they were the products of individual genius, not the expressions of any national legislative activity. All these codes were expanded in order to suit new needs, not by legislation but by custom and adjudication or interpretation. Thus, in Rome, the Twelve Tables were not succeeded by any active legislation on the part of a legislature for several centuries. The gap was filled in by the Roman lawyers, who, working on the basis of the Twelve Tables, twisted the old law to suit new conditions. As we have seen in connexion with the *ius*

gentium, the process was helped by custom, whereby the Roman praetor issued edicts based on the common customs of mankind to cover cases on which the existing positive law had no bearing. The praetor, it is true, could not legally bind his successors by his rulings but in practice his successors followed him. His edicts thus became laws.

In Hindu law a similar process is observable. The most influential basis of Hindu law is the code of Manu, which is partly religious, partly legal. There are, of course, other codes, and though they belong to an early type of society in spirit, these codes are comparatively modern in form. The code of Manu recognized the influence of custom, and in this way opened the way to legal progress. "The king," Manu says, "who knows the revealed law must enquire into the . . . rules of certain families and establish their particular law." The recognition by the Hindus of the power of custom led to the creation of a class of interpreters, who, like the law itself, were partly priestly, partly legal, viz., the Brahmins. The Brahmins, adding learning to their hereditary position as the chief caste, were able, by writing commentaries, to add new interpretations to old rules in order to suit the newer conditions of society. With the advent of British rule the process was continued. The power of interpretation and custom are still recognized, and Hindu law progresses not only by legislative enactment, but by interpretation or judicial decision.

Mohammedan law is based on the Koran, which, though more modern than the Hindu codes, rests on divine authority. The Koran aims at a comprehensive regulation of the ordinary affairs of life, and as such has not been expanded so much as the Hindu codes by either interpretation or custom. Its basis is largely the old Arabic customs familiar to Mohammed himself. Mohammedan communities have not shown much favour for the direct legislative processes familiar in the west. Their religion and law are one. In cases (e.g., taking interest for money) they have altered the Koran, and in recent years both commentaries, such as the *Hedarya*, in India, and direct legislation in Turkey, have made the law more progressive by the admission of the power of custom, adjudication and direct legislation.

A similar process is observable in the spread of Roman

law in Europe, to which reference will be made presently.

In English Law The importance of judge-made law or precedents in modern English law is to be explained historically by the fact that the king used to delegate sovereign powers to judges. In all early societies the principal function of the king or head of the community was the interpretation of law. Thus, in the laws of Manu, the king is the "dispenser of justice," not the maker of laws. The dispensing of justice was also equivalent to the interpretation of the will of God. In England the tradition of the king as the dispenser of justice still survives in the fictions that the Lord Chancellor exercises his powers as keeper of the king's conscience, and that the king presides in person over the court of the King's Bench. Obviously in a growing society the king had to delegate powers to others, but the delegation of powers was accompanied by the fiction that the judge was the representative of the king, with the king's power. The decision of the judge, therefore, was equivalent to the decision of the sovereign, and, as such, law. The king's word was law, so the judge's word was law.

We have seen the close connection between custom and religion. Early laws were a mixture of customs and religion.

Custom and Religion Religion has importance in law not only as giving a concurrent sanction to law based on other principles, such as custom, but religion in itself is a basis of law in most communities. We have seen above the relations supposed to have existed between natural law and divine law. Divine law, in its proper sense, is law looked upon as revealed through man from God. God is the ultimate source of divine law, though man must promulgate it.

Examples The Greeks and Romans had very little idea of divine law as distinct from state law. The specially inspired people in Greece and Rome were not lawgivers, but advisers for particular occasions, such as the Oracle at Delphi and the Roman augurs. Among the Jews, the idea of divine law was very strong. God was looked on as the direct ruler of the people, and as such was in direct touch with them. The Old Testament continually speaks of the direct action of God in human affairs. Christ did not carry on the Jewish tradition in this direction. He left political matters alone; his life he occupied with spiritual

affairs. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's" was his principle. To the Christian there is a revelation, not of state-law, but of moral fundamentals. In India, the Hindu law is a revelation of God's mind, in which religious precepts are combined with regulations for everyday life. The Koran is a direct descendant of the old Jewish theocracy. It is the direct law of the Prophet, and binding in both the religious and civil spheres of life.

Divine law such as that of Manu or the Koran is a direct source of law inasmuch as it is always acknowledged by the state. No state can allow divine law as an appeal against state law. Instead of allowing the possibility of antagonism, the state acknowledges these laws. Thus the Shastras and Koran are acknowledged (21 Geo. 111, C. 70, section 17) to be the laws of the Hindus and Mohammedans in India. Conflict, therefore, between religious feeling and law does not arise. Moreover, in cases where positive law does not apply, judges are likely to go on the supposition that the sovereign authority, if it had legislated for this particular case, would have accepted the religious interpretation, and thus religion is also a source of judge-made law.

The next source of law is scientific commentaries. In courts of justice the greatest importance is attached by both lawyers and judges to the opinions of great legal writers or jurists. Thus, in England, the opinions of Coke, Hale, Littleton, Blackstone, and Kent are held in the highest respect, and in India the Hedarya, the Futwa Alumgiri, the Mitacshara, and the Dayabhaga. The opinions of commentators are not decisions; they are only arguments: as Sir William Markby says, "A commentary, when it first appears, is only used as an argument to convince, and not as an authority which binds." Arguments, however, by becoming recognized, are tantamount to accepted decisions. The authority of the commentator is established, just like a judge-made decision, by frequent recognition, "so that the principles enunciated by him become even more authoritative than judicial decisions. Judicial decisions, however, differ from commentaries in that judicial decisions apply to a given case: commentaries deal with abstract principles. The commentator, by collecting, comparing and logically arranging legal principles,

4. Scientific Comment- aries

customs, decisions and laws lays down guiding principles for possible cases. He shows the omissions and deduces principles to govern them. He provides the basis for new law, not the new law itself. It must be noted that legal commentaries must command sufficient respect among lawyers to enable them to be taken as standards. Relatively few commentators acquire a reputation sufficient to make them sources of law.

Equity is also a source of law. The influence of equity in connection with the *ius gentium* we have already seen.

5. Equity Equity, in the words of Sir Henry Maine, is "any body of rules existing by the side of the original civil law, founded on distinct principles and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles." Equity is simply equality or justice, or, in cases where the existing law does not properly apply, judgment according to common sense or fairness. Equity, as a source of law, arises from the fact that positive law, as the world advances, tends to become unsuitable for new conditions. To make it suitable either the law must be altered formally by the legislature or some informal method of alteration must be adopted. Equity is an informal method of making new law or altering old law, depending on intrinsic fairness or equality of treatment. Thus the Roman praetor, on assuming office, issued a proclamation telling the manner in which justice would be administered during his term of office. The basis of the proclamation was equity, based on the law of nature or nations.

In England the beginning of equity legislation is to be traced to the custom of giving to the Lord High Chancellor complaints addressed to the King which were not met by the existing common law. These appeals were made to the King's justice or conscience and were referred to the "keeper of the King's conscience," or the Lord High Chancellor (modern Lord Chancellor), who received powers to remedy injustice according to equity or fair dealing, or the moral law. Similar functions were assumed by other courts besides the Lord Chancellor's Court, or Court of Chancery, but the Court of Chancery is the supreme judicial organization for equity jurisdiction. In contrast to Rome, equity is enforced by a distinct set of judges.

The subject matter of equity belongs to the science of Jurisprudence. The usual classification of equitable jurisdiction is into exclusive, concurrent and auxiliary. Equity is exclusive where it recognizes rights not recognized by the common law ; it is concurrent, where the law recognizes the right but does not give adequate relief ; and auxiliary, where the necessary evidence cannot be procured.

The last and most important source of law is legislation. Legislation is the declared will of the sovereign state. In the modern world it is the chief source of law, and is tending to supplant the other sources.

6. Legisla- tion

Custom and equity are both largely replaced by definite legislative acts. The codification of law tends to narrow down the field of judicial decision as a source of law, and scientific commentaries are used mainly for discussion. In the creation of new enactments, custom, religious opinions and equity all play their part ; in doing so they are not so much direct sources of law as influences in law-making.

The organization of modern legislatures will be dealt with separately. Only a few general points need be mentioned here. In the modern world, legislation is the work of representative assemblies. These assemblies are the organs of the popular will, and as such they are constantly widening the field of legislation. The people, realizing their power as legislators, or as the electors of legislators, make constant demands on legislative bodies to make laws of this or that type. All modern democratic legislatures are so overcrowded with proposed laws that the most elaborate arrangements have had to be made for the conduct of public business in order to save time. Whereas, in earlier days, the assemblies legislated mainly in matters of public law, leaving private law to custom and the decisions of judicial tribunals, nowadays the legislatures deal with both public and private law. The people, jealous of law not emanating from their elected assemblies, have thus narrowed down the sphere of custom and judge-made law. As we shall see later, a most important modern theory of liberty, the theory of the separation of powers, demands a clear distinction between the legislature, executive and judiciary. This theory, the basis of the organization of the government of the United States of America, has given to legislation a theoretical independence at the expense of both the judiciary and

executive. Fallacious in many respects though the theory is, it certainly has heightened the importance of modern legislatures as the source of law.

3. THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW

Law may be classified in various ways, according to the particular basis adopted by the writer. For our purposes, however, we may divide law according to the agency through which it is formulated into :—

(a) Constitutional law, of which more will be said in the chapter on the Constitution. Constitutional law may be written or unwritten ; it may be promulgated by a body specially created for the purpose, or it may grow up gradually without any source other than the customs of the people and the ordinary law-making body in the state. However it arises, constitutional law is the sum of the principles on which the government rests, principles which prescribe the ordinary course of governmental procedure and lay down the limits within which the powers of government can be exercised.

(b) Statute law, the most familiar type of law made by the ordinary law-making bodies, e.g., by the King-in-Parliament in the United Kingdom, and by Congress in the United States.

(c) Ordinances, issued by the executive branch of government within the powers prescribed to them by the law of the state. Ordinances are not as a rule permanent, and are issued for the special purposes of administrative convenience.

(d) Common law, which rests on custom, but is enforced by the law courts like statute law.

(e) International law, or the rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilized states in their dealings with each other.

(f) Administrative law, which prevails on the continent of Europe, whereby public officers are subject to separate law and procedure from private individuals.

Professor Holland divides law according to the public or

private character of the persons with whom legal rights are concerned. A "public" person means either the state, or a body or individual holding delegated authority from the state. A "private" person means either an individual or a collection of individuals, who do not represent the state even for a special purpose. When both the persons with whom a right is connected are private, the right is also private; but where one of the persons is public, the right is public. Thus law may be divided into: (a) Private law, when the right is between subject and subject; (b) Public law, when the right is between state and subject.

Public law Holland subdivides into: 1. Constitutional law. 2. Administrative law. 3. Criminal Law. 4. Criminal procedure. 5. The law of the state considered in its quasi-private personality. 6. The procedure relating to the state so considered. This classification is only one among many, as classification depends on the basis adopted by the individual writer.

Laws have also been classified into written (or statute) law, and unwritten (or customary) law. In legislation, both the contents of the law are fixed, and legal force is given to it, by acts of the sovereign power. This produces written law. All the other sources of law (such as adjudication, usage, scientific discussion, etc.), give rise to what is called unwritten law. This classification is not, however, quite a scientific one.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LAW IN THE WEST

Modern European law has two sources—Teutonic and Roman. The Roman conquerors carried their system of law with them wherever they went, but that system did not supersede the indigenous systems of the barbarians. Roman law was markedly different from the Teutonic. To the Romans law was command of the state, issued through government officials; to the Teutons law was a matter of custom, each tribe or people having its own customs, and, accordingly, its own law. Roman law was the law of a unified

The Basis of Public and Private—Professor Holland's Division

Written and Unwritten

The Roman and Teutonic Systems

state, Teutonic law was the law of diverse peoples. After the fall of Rome, the invaders—Goths, Franks and Lombards—established separate governments of their own, so that the old unified Roman law was replaced by the particular law of each conquering people. Before the fall of the Empire, however, the Romans had established Roman law for Roman citizens, and the invaders allowed the Roman citizens to continue under their own law, very much in the same way as Europeans and Indians live at the present time in India. This continued through the various wars of conquest following the fall of the Roman Empire. Even the great Charlemagne respected the system he found. What happened was that everyone kept the law of his own people, with the result that under one ruler there were frequently several systems of law—one Roman, one Gothic, one Frankish, and so on.

With the advent of feudalism the basis of law changed. Hitherto the law had been personal. The son came under the same law as his father, but with feudalism the basis changed from personal descent to territory. Instead of law being applicable to families, it was made applicable to a particular area. This meant that all people living within a stated area were under one law. This tendency towards centralization was helped in other ways. Throughout the mediæval struggles Roman law had possessed the virtue of unity and system, which gradually prevailed against the multiplicity of the Teutonic customs. Though the Romans were overcome their law survived, so much so that, with the exception of England, the law of every modern European country is preponderatingly Roman in character.

The chief influences in the supremacy of Roman law were, first, the Latin language as the medium of intercourse among the higher classes, just as English is at present in India. Second, the Roman legal codes. Despite the overthrow of Rome, the barbarian kings recognized the strength of the Roman law, and they had codes prepared. The Breviary of Alaric, King of the Goths in Spain, drawn up in the sixth century, was an abstract of the Roman laws and imperial decrees for his Roman subjects. It kept alive the Roman legal system till the code of Justinian, the greatest

code of law in the world, was drawn up. This code, known as the *Corpus Juris*, or Body of Law, was created to systematize the existing Roman Law, which was in a state of much confusion in Justinian's time. Third, the Church with its law, technically known as canon law. The Church was essentially Roman in organization and spirit. Not only did the Church keep alive the form and spirit of Roman institutions, but it was the chief medium of education in the middle ages, and, through its preachers and teachers, was able to influence both ignorant and educated as it pleased. Fourth, the influence of lawyers, both ecclesiastical and secular. After the twelfth century, the code of Justinian was taught all over Europe. Law schools arose in considerable numbers, first at Bologna in Italy and in Paris, ultimately spreading to Spain, Holland and England. The lawyers trained in these schools were naturally imbued with the Roman spirit, and with the decay of popular courts and the growth of central courts their influence spread wider and wider.

The gradual amalgamation of the Teutonic and Roman systems, with the predominance of the Roman, is a matter of legal history. Among the various influences may be mentioned the Napoleonic code (Code Napoléon) of 1804, in France, the first code of the French civil law. This code has had great influence. The Belgian, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and partly the Spanish codes and the codes of the Spanish South American states have all been affected by it. Its only European rival is the German code, which was drawn up at the end of the nineteenth century.

A different course marked the legal development of England and countries which, like the United States of America, owed the origin of their law system to England. England, separated geographically from the countries of Europe which adopted the Roman system, developed along her own lines. Because she had been under Roman sway for some centuries, England could not escape completely from Roman influence in law, but that influence was exerted principally in the ecclesiastical courts. The influence was also felt in the admiralty courts (in matters of international law). In spite of the efforts of the

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church to further the cause of Roman law, the courts resisted its influence so strongly that, as Sir William Markby says, "no one has ever been able to quote a text of the Roman law as authority either in the courts of common law or the courts of Chancery."

The crown naturally preferred the Roman system because it was so suitable for national centralization; but the English courts were able to preserve their independence by restraining the ecclesiastical courts. In this they had the support of the nobles and commons, as well as occasionally that of the king, who did not look with favour on the growing power of the church. It is remarkable that the church, with learning and religious influence on its side, was unable to make a stronger mark on the law of England.

The indigenous English law was not able to fill all the gaps that the development of the times made. These were filled by custom, and the interpreters of the Custom and Case-Law customs were the judges. On the judges, therefore, fell the duty of extending the law, which otherwise might have been effected on Roman principles. Customs later led to the formation of precedents. Up to the time of Henry VII, Year Books of decisions were published. These decisions sometimes were original, and sometimes they followed previous decisions on similar points, or precedents. They were for the most part simply the application of common sense to the cases that arose. Precedents at first were only guides for subsequent judges, but in course of time they were compulsory. They became as important as statute laws, and their growing importance led judges to be more careful in the form of their judgments and to give more reasoned statements for their conclusions. Thus, while in the rest of Europe Roman principles underlie the legal system, its place in England is taken by previous legal decisions, or case-law.

The result in actual practice is that, where Roman law prevails, the decisions of judges must follow the Roman general principles. In England and the United Comparison with Roman Law Systems States, the judge is largely free to use his common sense. Obviously the English system, though lacking in symmetry, is more suited to change than the Roman. Another marked difference between the English and continental legal systems is that

on the continent judicial decisions are not authoritative, as they are in England. It is true that Imperial rescripts or decrees in particular cases were treated as authoritative, but that was because the Emperor was regarded as the source of law. No judge or tribunal had such authority.

In the western systems of law other influences have played a part. Naturally in Christian countries the Jewish law of the Old Testament is traceable. This law came from the church in the middle ages. At that time politics and religion were hopelessly mixed up. After the Reformation protestant ideas also found their way into the European legal systems.

Where fusion has taken place between Roman and Teutonic law, generally the Roman prevails in the domain in which it reached its highest perfection, namely, private law. Roman influence also is marked in colonial and municipal law, spheres in which Roman experience filled in the gaps in the legal system of the Teutons. Teutonic law prevails in public law, for the Teutons, with self-government and the idea of representation, founded their governments on their own familiar customs.

5. LAW IN BRITISH INDIA

Before the advent of the British, there were two principal legal systems in India. One was the Mohammedan law, the other the Hindu law. The Mohammedan law applied to Mohammedans, and the Hindu law to Hindus, but some of the penal provisions of Mohammedan law were applied to the Hindus also. The Mohammedan law, based on the Koran and its legal commentaries, treated some subjects, particularly family relations, inheritance, and *wakf* (the law concerning religious foundations), in considerable detail. The Hindu law was partly religious and partly social, but was far less systematic than the Mohammedan. In origin, as in the Institutes of Manu, Hindu law is supposed to be a direct emanation from God. Its interpretation was given to the Brahmins, whose sacred position continued the original religious sanction of the law. When the British power was organized in India, the newly estab-

lished courts enforced the rules of both Hindu and Mussulman law.

In the case of both Hindu and Mohammedan law, the original codes were to some extent amplified or modified by the writings of lawyers. The most learned Brahmin commentators became recognized authorities in Hindu law. The Sayings and Doings of Mohammed (the Sannat and Hadis), the decisions and writings of Mullahs and Muftis altered the Koran of the Mohammedans.

Besides the Hindu and Mohammedan law proper, there was a large number of customs, often purely local, affecting rights to the use of land, tillage, forests, etc. There was also a body of mercantile or trading custom, relating to the transfer of property.

Thus when the British came to India they found :—

The position when the British came 1. The Hindu and Mohammedan law, altered in certain respects by interpretation and commentaries, mainly founded on the Shastras and Koran.

2. Many customs, sometimes general, sometimes local, which governed the use of land, tillage, and forest-rights.

3. Certain mercantile customs, observed by traders and recognized particularly by the Mohammedans, and customs which governed the transfer and pledging of property.

4. Penal rules, drawn up and enforced by the Mohammedan rulers.

The law that the East India Company found in India was personal or religious, not territorial. It was applicable only to individuals belonging to the particular religion to which the law applied. The indigenous law also was lacking in certain well-established branches of English law, particularly in civil and criminal procedure and in the law of torts or civil wrongs. The law governing property and contract was also very defective. What the Company did was to accept what they found as applying to the various communities of Indians, but they made English law applicable to themselves. The English could not accept many of the provisions in the law they found—such as mutilation or stoning as punishments, the fact that Brahmins should have a special law to themselves, and that a non-Mohammedan could not

give evidence against a Mohammedan. The English, thus, while allowing the indigenous law to continue as applied to Indians, brought with them for themselves both the common and statute law of England.

The Legal Policy of the British

When the High Court of Calcutta was established in 1773, the English lawyers began to apply English law to both English and Indians. The Declaratory Act of 1780, by making it compulsory that their own law should apply to Hindus and Mohammedans, stopped this practice. The system of the Decla-

The Effect of English Law

ratory Act prevails to-day, and the Privy Council in England often has to determine the exact interpretation of the Koran or the Shastras. Both the Koran and the Shastras have been affected by western jurisprudence, and the precepts established in the courts. Not only so, but the Government of India has power to alter the Acts of Parliament enforcing the observance of Hindu law for Hindus and Mohammedan law for Mohammedans. Many statutory modifications have been made—notably the Bengal Sati Regulation (1829), the Indian Slavery Act (1843), the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (1850), the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act (1856) and the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes.

The chief source of modern Indian law is legislation, either by the British Parliament, or by the Indian legislative bodies. The old Hindu and Mohammedan divine law as well as a number of older English statutes, English common law, and Indian customary law still apply in their respective spheres.

Legislation

One of the most noteworthy things in modern Indian law is the codification which has taken place. With the organization of a judicial system it soon became necessary to organize procedure. In 1781 the British Parliament authorized the Government of India to make regulations for the conduct of courts. In 1773 the creation of the High Court in Calcutta had already necessitated a code of procedure. This code was made on English models, but the Act of 1781 enjoined that the English rules should be made suitable for the Indian people. What the English did at first was to adopt the prevailing Mussulman practices, but where these were unsuited to western

Codification

ideas they were supplanted by English rules. The result was a confused mixture which lawyers found difficult to interpret and judges to apply.

In 1833 the India Charter Act was passed. It provided for the appointment of a number of legal experts, called the Indian Law Commission, who were to ascertain the various rules applicable in the courts and in the law of British India, and to report regarding their consolidation, and, if necessary, their amendment. This Commission was appointed in 1833, Macaulay being the most prominent member. It drafted a Penal Code, which did not become law till 1860. In the meantime (in 1853) another Commission was appointed, which worked in England. The result of this Commission was the passing of the Penal Code, which was drafted by the previous Commission, and two Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure. A third Commission, appointed in 1861, drafted other proposals but resigned in 1870 owing to the resistance offered to its proposals by the Government of India. After this the work of codification and revision was carried on in India under the Law Member of the Governor-General's Council.

As the result of these Commissions, and of the activity of the Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council, legal systematization in India has been very great. Except in torts, or civil wrongs, certain branches of contract law, family law, and inheritance (both of which are decided by the indigenous law and custom, save as decided otherwise by the Succession Act), the statutes resulting cover the whole field of law. The greatest of them all is the Indian Penal Code (the I.P.C.), which was drafted by Macaulay. It is based on English criminal law, but its provisions are made specially applicable to India where necessary. Thus self-defence is more widely interpreted in India because Indians are usually unwilling to use force in self-defence. Dacoity, judicial corruption, police torture, kidnapping, insults to religious places, all these are treated more fully than would be necessary in England. The death penalty, compulsory in England, is in India made an alternative.

In practically every branch of law, save those mentioned, codification has taken place. Among the various Acts may be mentioned: The Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure of 1861-1882 and 1898 (Criminal), and 1859 and 1882 (Civil);

the Evidence Act (1872), which codifies the laws of evidence, the Limitation Act (1877), the Specific Relief Act (1877), the Probate and Administration Act (1881), the Indian Contract Act (1872), Negotiable Instruments Act (1881), which gives the law regulating promissory notes, bills of exchange, and cheques; the Trusts Act (1882), the Transfer of Property Act (1882), the Succession Act (1865), the Easements Act (1882), the Companies Act (1882), the Inventions and Designs Act (1888), the War and Cantonments Act (1889), the Guardians and Wards Act (1890), the Official Secrets Act (1904). The various acts governing railways, shipping, the post office, factories, co-operative credit societies, electricity, lunacy and provident insurance have also been codified. Some of these Acts have met with unfavourable criticism, but the process by which they were drawn up admits easily of amendment. Every year amendments are made to some of the Acts, the amendments not being new Acts but mainly textual alterations in the old ones. The codification has certainly been of great use in the administration of law.

A considerable amount of revision of Statute Acts also has been done, both by codification and consolidation. Of the work of consolidation an excellent example is the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (Act V of 1898) which repealed and replaced eighteen separate enactments by consolidating them into a new Act.

6. LAW AND MORALITY

We have already seen the general connexion between Political Science, the science of the state, and Ethics, the science of morality. Both Political Science and Ethics deal with man as a moral agent in society. The state is the supreme type of social union, but the state is only a means to an end. It is not an end in itself. It is a means towards the moral end of the perfection of men in society. Therefore the acts of the state must have an integral connexion with the moral end of man. Law is made by the state and enforced by the state, but the law of the state only affects part of man's life. It affects only the outward acts of life. Matters of the conscience must be decided by the conscience.

**Connexion
between
Law and
Morality**

Thus the state, by its law, punishes breach of contract, but it does not punish lying as such. Dishonesty, ingratitude, meanness, covetousness, anger and jealousy are all immoral; but they are not illegal, except when they lead to a breach of law. The state does not punish a man because he loses his temper, but it punishes him if he assaults or kills another man in temper. The state does not punish for covetousness but it punishes theft arising out of covetousness. Thus law and morality differ (*a*) in their sanction, one being enforced by the state, the other being a matter of conscience, (*b*) in the type of action affected, law dealing with the outward acts of men, ethics dealing with all the actions of men; and (*c*) in their definiteness. Law is thus a matter of force; but morality cannot be forced. Law, again, often is based on expediency. Acts which in themselves are not immoral are made illegal because it is expedient that they should be so. Thus it is not immoral to ride a bicycle without a light, but it is made illegal because it is dangerous to other people. It is not immoral for a trustee to buy the estate for which he is responsible, provided the other parties are satisfied, but law prevents such a contract because it opens the way too easily to fraud. Thus law creates a class of wrongs which are not moral but legal wrongs. They are wrong because they are illegal, not because they are immoral.

The state is founded on the minds of its citizens, who are all moral agents. The connexion between them, therefore, must be close. A bad people means a bad state and bad laws. An unhealthy public opinion, in modern representative government, must eventually mean bad laws. "The best state," as Plato said, "is that which is nearest in virtue to the individual. If any part of the body politic suffers, the whole body suffers." Modern political theory, with the organic view of the state, has returned to the Greek theory. The individual has an inherent connexion with the state. The state therefore must affect the morality of individuals as well as the morality of individuals must affect the state.

The individual moral life manifests itself in manifold ways. The state is the supreme condition of the individual moral life, for without the state no moral life is possible. The state therefore regulates other organizations in the common interest. The state, however, has a direct function in relation to morality. This function

is both positive and negative. As a positive moral agent the state makes good laws, that is, laws which are in accord with the best moral interests of the people. Negatively, the state must remove bad laws. It is to be noted that what may be a state law in one generation becomes a moral law in the next, so that the margin between illegal and immoral is not always clear. Thus when compulsory education is introduced into a country, it is at first illegal to keep one's child from school. In the next generation what was previously a crime becomes a sin. The father feels it a moral duty to educate his children.

Thus, though there are certain differences between the law of the state and the moral law, they are inherently connected. In the modern world we do not make the state the supreme end, as did the Greeks. We regard it as the condition of morality. The state and law continually affect both public opinion and actions; in its turn law reflects public opinion and thus acts as the index of moral progress.

7. INTERNATIONAL LAW

The subject of International Law affects us here only in so far as a general knowledge of its principles enables us better to understand the nature of the state. The subject now forms a special course of study, and its detailed treatment is a matter for lawyers.

We have seen that law is an order of the state. The state both makes it and enforces it, but the law of a state applies only to the citizen of that state. International law thus would imply an international state, if the word law has the meaning that we have just ascribed to it. An international state which could enforce international law would mean that the states that exist at present had a higher authority over them. It would thus destroy their sovereignty. There would then only be one state, properly speaking (that is, with the characteristic of sovereignty), that state being the international state. But states *are* sovereign, therefore, the first question that arises in connexion with international law is whether international law is really law at all. Law, as we have seen in the discussion on that subject, is the expressed or implied will of the state.

concerning the citizens of the state, which must be obeyed by those citizens. It is a general body of rules behind which lies the whole force of the community as organized in the state and government. If a citizen breaks the rules, he will be punished; in other words, he is forced to obey the rules. Does any such force lie at the back of international law? There *is* force, the force of the minds which made up these rules, but these minds are not organized into a single organ of compulsion. International law, to be real law, would require some international organ to enforce it. At present each state interprets international law for itself; there is no international court for interpretation of the law. States sometimes refer matters in which they have differed to a special tribunal, but even then they are not legally bound to accept the decision of the tribunal. Each state acts for itself and even if it acts against the opinion of the whole civilized world, there is no restraint upon that state outside an international war. No individual in a state can break the laws of the state with impunity: but a state may break international law at will. The only constraints are the fear of the disapprobation of other states and the risk of bringing war on the state itself.

The sanction of international law has the same basis as the sanction of ordinary law, viz., the common will underlying the legal principles. Law does not consist merely in the making of a definite code: it is rather the recognition by the state of principles already definitely existing among the people; and the sanction of the law, which in the first place is shown in the machinery of the state, really is the common agreement of the people. In a similar way international law must have at its root the mutual agreement of nations: its sanction will depend on the growth of a common will among peoples, and (though it seems a paradox), when international law has a firm sanction that sanction will destroy it as international law. A common will which can enforce international law will mean the breaking of the bounds of states and nations. The word "international" will then have lost its meaning. A complete sanction to law between nations as they at present exist would imply the fusion of states at present distinct. Even at present, in spite of the repeated breach of international law during the Great European War, a considerable body of the recognized

principles of international law is observed; none the less, the fact remains that it is observed merely as a law of convenience for individual states: no obligation, beyond the obligation of honour, binds states to observe international law.

International law is in this way half law, half morality. Some lawyers regard the term law as including not only the definite positive law of the state, but also law in the process of being made. In this sense International Law is law. It is in the process of becoming positive law, but it can become law in the national sense of law only when it has the sanction of a definite state.

Among the older writers, such as Hobbes and Pufendorf, International Law is not looked on as law. Bentham, Austin, and Professor Holland, among modern **Views of Authorities** writers, support the same view. The Austinian view of law as a body of rules for human conduct, set and enforced by a definite sovereign political authority, does not admit of the recognition of international law as law. It belongs to the sphere of positive morality. Modern jurists, however, tend to place International Law definitely within the sphere of law. Variation in views is natural, because both the content of International Law and the development of international institutions have altered considerably, especially in the last half century, and are likely to develop still more rapidly in the near future.

The chief reasons adduced by modern authorities for regarding International Law as law are :—

(a) that the rules embodied in International Law are in their nature not optional but compulsory. In the last resort they rest on force, although that force is exercised more through the action of society or public opinion than through a definite and authorized body. The Covenant of the League of Nations attempts to create a definite body for its enforcement;

(b) that already its legal qualities have been proved by the fact that its rules are accepted as law by states and are appealed to as law by contesting parties; and

(c) that its rules have been built up by legal reasoning and are applied in a legal manner.

Professor Westlake argues that as states live together in the civilized world substantially as men live together in a

state, the difference being one of machinery, we are entitled to say, not on the ground of metaphor, but on the solid ground of likeness to the type, that there is a society of states and a law of that society which goes by the name of International Law. Perhaps the aptest description of the legal nature of International Law is that given by Sir Frederic Pollock,—“International Law is a body of customs and observances in an imperfectly organized society which have not fully acquired the character of law, but which are on the way to become law.”

International Law, as defined by Wheaton, one of the highest authorities on International Law, is “those rules of conduct which reason deduces as consonant to justice from the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent.” In more simple language, International Law is the body of rules which civilized states observe in their dealings with each other, these rules being enforced by each particular state according to its own moral standard or convenience. Some states are as honourable in their observation of the rules of International Law as they expect their citizens to be in obeying state or municipal law, while others observe the principles only when it suits their own convenience.

The content of International Law may best be summarized by a list of the subjects discussed, and settled at the Hague Conferences. The various Conventions reached in 1907 were: (1) For the pacific settlement of international disputes. (2) Respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts. (3) Concerning the commencement of hostilities. (4) Concerning the laws and customs of war on land. (5) Respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land. (6) Concerning the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. (7) Concerning the conversion of merchant ships into warships. (8) Concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines. (9) Regarding bombardment by naval forces in time of war. (10) For the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime war. (11) Regarding restrictions on the right of

capture in maritime war. (12) Regarding the establishment of an International Prize Court. (13) Regarding the rights and duties of neutral Powers in maritime war. (14) Prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from balloons.

Many other subjects occur as time goes on. The most important recent subject is that of air control, on which no definite understandings have yet been reached.

8. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Lawrence, in his *Principles of International Law*, gives three periods in the development of international relations.

Three Periods These periods cover practically the whole stretch of history, and though one is divided from the other for the purposes of historical exposition, the earlier periods are really the bases of the later periods.

1. The first period stretches from the earliest times to the establishment of the Roman Empire. Among the earliest

1. To the Beginning of the Roman Empire peoples of which history tells, there was practically no international regulation. Each country was hostile to its neighbour and despised it. War was declared without ceremony and carried on without mercy. Even the highly civilized

Greeks regarded their neighbours as unworthy of notice save for the purpose of conquest. The only traces of any international dealings we have from them were in maritime trade, for which a code grew up in Rhodes. Greek thought, not Greek practice, contributed considerably to international development. The greatest philosophers of Greece, Plato and Aristotle, were limited in their political views by the small city state. But even they, in places, voice the idea of natural law, which later developed into the internationalism or social ideal of the Stoics. From the Stoics the idea passed to Rome

In Rome, before the Empire, such international law as existed was called *ius feciale*. This law contained precepts about war and peace, and was propounded by a special religio-legal college. The *ius feciale* is of little importance in the development of what we now know as international law. The great contribution of Rome was the *ius gentium*, the development of which has already been noticed.

2. The second period stretches from the beginning of the Roman Empire to the Reformation. With the spread of

2. From the Beginning of the Roman Empire to the Reformation Roman power over the whole world, as then conceived, there was no question of international relations, as there was only one state. Even after the fall of the Roman Empire the imperial idea continued, and it was only after the Pope and Emperor each claimed the imperial power that this idea was shaken. With the revolt

against the Papal authority at the Reformation, the Pope's claims to world-power were lost, and with the growth of modern national states the idea of the temporal supremacy of the Empire was killed. With the decay of the imperial idea arose other influences which helped the development of International Law. The feudal system, with its territorial sovereignty, brought out the idea of territorial states, each state having jurisdiction over citizens residing on a definite territory. The spread of Christian principles taught humane ideas. Grotius, the founder of modern International Law, was really instigated to his work by the devastation and sorrow caused by the many wars of his time. Roman law, with the *ius gentium* and the idea of equality before the law, also was an important influence. Schools for the study of Roman law sprang up all over Europe. Lawyers imbibed the principles which later became the basis of International Law. The idea, arising from feudalism, that the king was owner of his country also lent itself to treatment by the principles of Roman law.

3. The third period is from the Reformation to the present time. The ideas current in the common consciousness of Europe were systematized during this **Reformation to the Present Day** period. The rise of independent states made some definite regulation of their relations essential. The first modern work on International Law was *On the Law of War and Peace* by Hugo Grotius, a Dutchman. Grotius enunciated as the two main principles of international relations that (a) all states are equally sovereign and independent, and (b) the jurisdiction of any one state is absolute in the area belonging to that state. After Grotius many writers took up the question, and now it has become a special branch of law. As time goes on, both International Law and international organiza-

tions are becoming more definite. In the latest development, the League of Nations, provision is made for the creation of a permanent Court of Justice, which has been set up at the Hague, the seat of the previous international tribunals.

9. THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The various sources of International Law are :—

1. Roman law. We have already seen how Roman law affected the various law systems of the world. The same law also provided a basis for the settlement of questions arising between nations. Not only so, but Roman law provided a positive basis for International Law in two ways : (a) by the idea of the law of Nations ; (b) by contributing the notion of the equality of citizens before the law, a notion which was extended to the equality of sovereign states in International Law.

2. Writers of authority. These writers, by showing what rules nations actually do observe, by interpreting general opinion on given questions, and by giving definitions and modifications of previous rules based on general consent, provide a source of International Law. Such writers, like writers on municipal law, must be recognized authorities on the subject. The greatest name among them is that of Grotius, whose *War and Peace*, 1625, gave the theoretical foundation of International Law. Pufendorf, in his *Law of Nature and of Nations*, (1672) ; Leibnitz, in his *Diplomatic Code of the Law of Nations*, (1693-1700) ; Bynkershoek, (1673-1743), who first dealt with maritime law ; Wolf, (1679-1754) and Vattel, (1714-1767) are other important names in the development of International Law. The names of Kent, Wheaton, Manning, Woolsey, Westlake, Lawrence and Hall may be noted among more modern writers. Writers such as these are recognized authorities to whose opinions statesmen continually refer as authoritative or final.

3. Treaties of peace and commerce, alliances, and conventions. These define pre-existing rules or modify them. Treaties, which may be signed by two or more states, lay down the principles on the subject in question which the various states agree to observe. They may affirm existing rules, or

modify and explain them. They may affect territory, as the treaties of Westphalia, (1648), and Utrecht, (1713) or the transfer of sovereign rights, as the treaty of Paris, (1856). They may affect commercial relations or conduct to be observed during war by both belligerents and neutrals, such as the famous Geneva Convention of 1864.

4. The laws of particular states, or municipal law. In the municipal law of every state there are many statutes which effect international relations. Every state

4. Municipal Law must decide for itself the terms on which it will allow a citizen of another state to become one of its citizens. This is known as naturalization. The regulations affecting ambassadors who represent one state in another state, envoys, and consuls have all international bearings. Particularly important are the rules of individual states with regard to admiralty questions. Admiralty questions dealing with prize cases are based on international usage, and the decisions of admiralty courts form a basis of International Law.

5. The adjudications of international tribunals and conferences. Tribunals or conferences are sometimes set up to decide particular cases. These cases may be

5. Judgments in International Cases referred to them by another state, or they may concern only the states represented at the tribunal. The decisions of such tribunals are more authoritative if several states take part

in them.

6. The history of wars, of negotiations, the circumstances leading to treaties as contained in protocols (drafts, containing the fundamental principles), and manifestoes.

6. History of War and Diplomacy (containing statements of policy) and all international transactions are sources of International Law.

7. The written opinions of eminent lawyers contained in state papers and diplomatic correspondence in the Foreign Offices of states. Often these opinions are con-

7. Opinions of Diplomats and Statesmen fidential, but with the growth of democracy there is a greater tendency to publish them. Both England and the United States of America publish the main part of their diplomatic papers, and these, circulated in other countries, give a basis for future international action.

By far the most important International Conferences have been those held at Hague. The Hague Conferences have been called "the Parliament of Mankind". **The Hague Conferences** They have systematized International Law, and from them the Hague Court of Arbitration developed. Much that the International Conventions agreed to and systematized at the Hague has been incorporated in the municipal law of the states which took part in the Conferences. The Court of Arbitration was established to enable states, if they so wished, to refer disputes to it, and since its creation in 1899 it has decided many questions—and the decisions have been accepted by the parties concerned. From 1899 to 1912 eleven separate nations had recourse to it. The conference also attempted to create an International Prize Court of Appeal, which brought about a Conference in London (1908–09) on Prize, and led to the Declaration of London, concerning blockade, contraband of war, the position of neutrals and compensation. The Declaration of London was withdrawn during the Great War by the British government.

10. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The most recent development in international relations is the League of Nations. The immediate cause of the League was the Great War. Historically the **The Origin of the League** League is but a further development of the international movements which have just been examined. The Great War in several respects aided the growth of an international organization. In the first place, the struggle was so bitter and it caused so much misery, that all nations and individuals were convinced that wars should be avoided, and that some effective means of settling international disputes should be created. In the second place, the Great War was fought largely on the principle of nationality. Many nationalities were made into nations by the peace treaties, but some of these nationalities required guarantees to secure immunity from attack and freedom for development. In the third place, the Central Powers lost a considerable amount of territory, and the partition of this territory among the many Allies might have raised trouble among the Allies. By the League of Nations a system was devised whereby the territory lost by

the Central Powers will be ruled by individual nations under the League itself.

The Covenant of the League of Nations forms part of the Treaty of Peace signed by the German delegates on 28th June, 1919. The Covenant contains thirty-six articles, with an annex naming the original members of the League. The original members are the Ally signatories of the Peace Treaty, the new states created by it, and other states invited to join. The seat of the League is at Geneva, in Switzerland.

The first article of the Covenant lays down the conditions of admission into the League, and of withdrawal from it.

Membership and Constitution of the League The original membership consisted of the thirty-two allied and associated powers, with the new states which signed the peace treaty, and of thirteen neutral states. All the original members were to accept the same obligations.

The national sovereignty of each state was guaranteed, but it was provided that no state could withdraw without fulfilling all its international obligations and obligations under the Covenant. The right of withdrawal, subject to this condition, was granted on two years' notice being given.

The Covenant also lays down that "Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony may become a member of the League," under prescribed conditions. This article is looked upon as establishing what is practically the independence of the British Dominions. It is at least a theoretical recognition of their nationhood, but there is room for doubt regarding the scientific interpretation of "fully self-governing" as applied to a "Dominion or Colony".

The Covenant of the League also gives an outline of the machinery or organization to be established to carry out the purposes of the League. There are four organs of the League—(1) the Assembly; (2) the Council; (3) the Secretariat-General; and (4) the Permanent Court of Justice.

The Assembly The Assembly is the supreme body in the League. It is composed of the official representatives of the various members of the League, including the British Dominions and India. Each state is left to decide how its representatives are to be chosen,

and, according to the covenant, members are not necessarily bound by the views of their own governments. Each member of the League has one vote and may not have more than three representatives. The powers of the Assembly include the discussion of all matters affecting the League, the admission (by a two-thirds majority) of new members of the League, and the approval of the appointment of the Secretary-General. All decisions of the Assembly, except in certain minor matters, must be unanimous. Unanimity is insisted on to prevent dissension among sovereign states who might otherwise be forced by a bare majority to act in a way repugnant to them. It is presumed that absolute unanimity in the Assembly of the League by the moral force of such unanimity will compel states to act according to the League's desires.

The Assembly is a large body, consisting at present of the representatives of 54 nations, and for the conduct of business a smaller body is necessary. This body is the **The Council** Council, which originally consisted of four representatives of the "principal allied and associated powers," with representatives of four other members of the League, elected annually by the Assembly. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may nominate additional members of the League, whose representatives will always be members of the Council, and it also may increase the number of members of the League to be elected by the assembly for representation on the Council. In 1922, owing to the growth of the Assembly, the membership of the Council was increased to ten, two extra seats being allotted to the smaller nations, so that six members were elected every year. In 1926 another change was made. A permanent seat was made for Germany, thus increasing the permanent seats to five, and the number of non-permanent seats was raised to nine. Three of the non-permanent members sit for three years, three for two, and three for one year. The Council thus consists of fourteen members in all. The Council is competent to deal with all matters falling within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. A member of the League not represented in the Council may be asked to send a representative to meetings when matters affecting that member are discussed. Each member of the League represented on the Council has

one vote and cannot have more than one representative. Its decisions, like those of the Assembly, must be unanimous.

The relations of the Assembly and Council are not clearly defined in the Covenant. In practice the Council is the more important body, as on it sit the national leaders of the chief powers of the world. The Assembly, also, is too large for the efficient discharge of business, and in cases of emergency the Council has to act on its own initiative. The omission of detailed constitutional arrangements between the Council and Assembly is evidently intended: their smooth relations can be established only after experience, and the original Covenant does not create constitutional difficulties which might hamper the future Assemblies and Councils.

The Secretariat-General, the seat of which is Geneva, consists of a Secretary-General, and such staff as is required.

The Secretariat-General The Secretary-General (except the first who is nominated in the annex to the Covenant) is appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly, and the staff of the Secretariat-General is appointed by the Secretary-General and Council. The expenses of the Secretariat are apportioned among the members of the League. All representatives of the members of the League, and officials engaged on the official business of the League, enjoy the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities, as also do the buildings and property of the League. The functions of the Secretariat are to keep all records, procure information, and conduct the official correspondence of the League. Every treaty or international agreement entered into by any member of the League must be published by the Secretary-General, otherwise it is not valid.

In the Covenant, the Council was directed to formulate a scheme for a Permanent Court of Justice, to adjudge upon

The Permanent Court of International Justice international disputes referred to it. The Permanent Court of International Justice constituted by the Council consists of eleven Judges and four Deputy Judges, chosen for their high legal attainment; it sits at the Hague, and deliver opinions and judgments on all disputes regarding International Law, breaches of international obligations and the interpretation of treaties.

A large part of the Covenant of the League of Nations is taken up with measures for the prevention of war. The prevention of war, indeed, is really the main reason for the existence of the League.

The measures are :—

1. Limitation of armaments. The principle is recognized that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and common action necessary for the enforcement of international obligations. The making of munitions of war must also be limited. The Council, and a permanent Commission, is empowered to advise and draw up plans on this subject, these plans being revised decennially.

2. The members of the League mutually guarantee the territories and independence of the existing members of the League.

3. The Covenant lays down the principle that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting the members of the League or not, is a "matter of concern" to the whole League, and that it is the duty of the League to take such steps as will guarantee international peace.

4. The members of the League agree not to go to war till the matter in dispute has first been made subject to arbitration.

5. The Covenant gives also an outline of the machinery by which peaceful settlements may be effected. The Council, Assembly, and Court of Justice all have a part in this machinery. In the settlement of disputes publicity plays a considerable part. All points at issue are to be made public, and the peoples of the various countries informed regarding the dispute. Where individual states refuse to abide by the decision of the League, i.e., where an "act of war" against the League has been committed, the duty of recommending coercive measures is laid on the Council. The final measures contemplated by the League are the use of the League's forces, but in cases where sudden action is required, the individual states may take action.

6. The League also lays down the principle that no state, whether a member of the League or not, has a right to disturb the peace of the world. Executive action in cases of disputes between states not members of the League among themselves or between them and members of the League, is left to the Council.

The mandatory system is the result of the War. Considerable sections of the defeated countries—such as Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, German South-West Africa, and the German Pacific islands were seized from the vanquished states. The question arose as to how they should be governed. The general principles accepted by the League are set forth in these words (Article XXII)—“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

“The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

“The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.”

The principles accepted were three :—(1) That none of these conquered territories should be “annexed” by any one power ; (2) that the administration of these territories should exclusively be vested in the League ; and (3) that the League could delegate its authority to one state, which would be its agent or “mandatory,” and which, if it did not perform its duties acceptably, could be replaced.

The constitution of the League is made very flexible. Amendments to the Covenant are valid when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives form the Council of the League, and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly. If any member dissents from an amendment, it shall not be bound by it, but in this case it must give up membership of the League.

The Covenant includes other important clauses relating to existing and future treaties, and conditions of labour, but the above short sketch gives its main purpose and the outline of its constitution. The League marks a distinct era in the development of international relations. It puts the coping stone on the construction of the last few centuries. It makes as definite as can be under the present system of states the various international institutions of our time. It is a real attempt to translate into definite institutions the underlying forces of international fellowship. The League is largely a product of the statesmanship of President Wilson, but unfortunately the United States did not support him. Article V of the Covenant lays down that the first meeting of the Assembly and the Council should be summoned by the President of the United States, but the late President was not able to secure sanction in his own country for the objects he so greatly cherished.

11. THE UNIVERSAL STATE

Many present-day thinkers favour the abolition of single states and advocate the establishment of an International or Universal State. The idea of a universal state goes back to Greek philosophy, but only in the modern world have these ideas become prominent as actual practical issues. There are many indications in the modern world that the organization by individual states is breaking down. The Great European War in particular has shown that modern national states are a danger both to themselves and humanity, and that some means should be developed to organize states on an international basis. The first real approach towards a universal state is the League of Nations.

The evidences favouring the idea of a universal state are many. We may sum them up thus :—

1. Philosophical. Some philosophers state that in human nature there are two tendencies, one particular and one universal, or one personal and one social. The Evidences in particular tendency of man's nature is shown in favour of a practice by organization in small groups—Universal State. tribes, clans, etc., while the universal part of his nature demands manifestation in the organization of mankind as a whole. Such philosophers, too, point out that in all states there are the

same characteristics, which are emblems of universal similarities in human character. The nation, though it may be necessary at a particular stage of social evolution, is only a halting place on the road to a universal state, which will be the most complete and perfect embodiment of the human spirit. Just as the particular tendencies in man have made him organize in groups, the universal tendencies, which are stronger, will abolish group differences and unite man in one body.

2. Historical. History shows us that though there is no universal state, there have been real attempts in the past to organize mankind as a whole.
 2. Historical The most important attempts have been :—

(a) The Empire of Alexander the Great. Alexander tried to unite the east and west in one empire, but he died before he could establish his empire on a firm basis. His empire applied only to what was then regarded as the civilized world. The conflict of ideas between the Macedonians and Greeks, the mixture of races, and the lack of general enlightenment prevented lasting fusion.

(b) The Roman Empire. The Roman Empire stretched over the whole world, as understood in those days. Founded at first by conquest, the Empire was gradually welded together by a common organization, local government, and a common system of law. The Roman Empire broke up because of the resistance of the Teutons. Roman institutions did not harmonize with Teutonic ideas. The Roman Empire, however, left a permanent mark on the world, chiefly through its legal system.

(c) The Holy Roman Empire, which succeeded the Roman Empire. The idea of a universal state was encouraged by the universality of Christianity. The Holy Roman Empire broke up because of the struggle between the Emperor and Pope, and the development of parts of the Empire into nation states.

(d) Napoleon tried to establish a universal empire. Not only did he fail to achieve his purpose, but he kindled the modern fires of nationality, which culminated in the Great European War. His method was conquest, the method by which the late German Empire hoped to achieve world

dominion. Brute force, however, has never proved a lasting basis for states.

History also shows that historical development moves from smaller groups, such as the Greek and mediæval Italian city states, to larger groups, such as modern nation states and empires. At the present day, though the rights of small nationalities are to be respected, their existence can be guaranteed only by a League of Nations, which is really the first approach to an International State. The evolution of history, therefore, it is said, is leading us to a universal state.

3. Political. Even with the various antagonistic groups or nations of the present day the existence of treaties, leagues, and diplomacy generally shows the possibility of a permanent and complete league which will ultimately abolish the sovereignty of individual states and lead to the universal state.

4. Commercial. With modern means of communication the interests of different nations are so bound up with each other that self-interest urges the abolition of organizations which lead to war and destruction. The whole economic world is a delicately constructed machine which can work properly only when there is no danger of sudden crises arising from war or rumours of war. With the growing complexity of economic life, nations are not self-sufficing; they are inter-dependent, each one producing what it is best fitted for and supplying others with those things that they themselves cannot produce.

5. Industrial. The manual workers of the various nations of the world are gradually recognizing their common interests, and are organizing themselves accordingly. Thus there are international organizations affecting trade-unions. Socialism is founded on an international basis and it has deeply affected not only the workers but the higher classes. These international organizations, it is pointed out by many, already show that state-organization is in the process of decomposition.

6. Legal. The legal aspect of the universal state has already been mentioned in connexion with international law. International law, though not law in the ordinary sense of the term, is law in the making. The

common will to enforce it like ordinary law is gradually being formed.

7. Moral. This is seen in the growing tendency for nations to interfere in the affairs of other nations, to protect oppressed peoples, or to prevent wrong.

8. International, social and cultural. In the modern world there is, it is pointed out, much intellectual sympathy shown between the peoples of different nations, particularly in university work, where learned men work at similar problems and use each other's results. The increased study of social and political institutions of all countries also leads to intellectual sympathy. Then, again, there is the contact of what is known as "high society"—citizens of one country living as guests or citizens in other countries, or travelling in other countries. In this way a common understanding of each other's institutions and national characteristics is spread. This leads to a certain cultural community among mankind that in time will break down the intolerance between men which at present makes them organize in separate and often antagonistic groups or states. In this connexion it is also pointed out that religion and language, as barriers to inter-communication, are also breaking down. Religion more and more is tending to be separated from politics and left to the individual conscience. Newer states grant universal toleration in religion and old states are tending in the same way. With advancing education, the citizens of one country learn the languages of others. Some languages, such as English, are learnt almost universally. The attempts to start a new language such as Esperanto as an international common language are indications of the same universal community.

The various tendencies, it is said, are indications of the formation of a universal state. Just as individual states are based on the minds of the citizens composing them, so the universal state will be based on a new type of mind, of which these various points are evidences. It will take a long time for these tendencies to develop the homogeneity necessary for international union, but that they will do so ultimately is not doubted.

The various arguments produced to prove the coming of

a universal state seem to give good ground for the belief that the present political system of the world is only temporary. Many arguments have been voiced against the idea, but on examination they prove somewhat illusory.

1. One argument is that a universal state would abolish individual liberty. A vast organization, it is said, is not compatible with the free development of the individual. Against this it may be pointed out that the universal state will not affect the ordinary lives of individuals.

Arguments against the Universal State 1. That it Will Abolish Individual Liberty Its organization will affect only the most general interests of individuals. The universal state will not mean uniformity of organization.

Groups will still continue to be organized separately within the world state, just as local government in modern states co-exists with central government. The international state will look to only such general interests as universal peace, freedom of commerce, and freedom from oppression of groups by groups. The universal state, moreover, need not interfere with matters of religion and private association any more than modern advanced democratic states do. The individual will continue to live his life as now, but his life will be guaranteed to him by the absence of wars.

2. It is argued that either the universal state must be a monarchy or that, if organized, it will break up again into separate and opposed groups. There seems

2. That it Will not Last little force in this argument, for all modern political tendencies, even in individual states, are away from monarchy. The rapid spread of

the federal idea in state organization also points to a probable type of organization. Federalism is a system of government which reconciles local claims with the claims of central government, and its popularity in recent years points to its likely success as an organization of a universal state.

3. It is impossible to have a universal state till the various peoples of the world have reached approximately similar standards of development. This argument is a

3. That the World Is Not Fitted for it most powerful one against a universal state *in the immediate future*. But very few, even though they believe in the idea and ultimate possibility of a universal state, think it can be realized in

a few years or even in a few centuries. Till the peoples of the world are educated, they will fail to understand each other, and such lack of understanding will lead to conflicts. A universal state is only possible where there is a universal mind underlying it, and it will take a long time for all people to be so enlightened as to give reason sway over passion.

Even with the existence of unenlightened peoples a universal organization is possible, the less enlightened for the time being under the guardianship of the more enlightened. In the British Empire there are many millions of ignorant and barbaric peoples, but their existence need not prevent the Empire organizing with other powers for common purposes.

4. The universal state is really no state. The very existence of a universal state is tantamount to saying that every individual is so perfect that he is a law to himself. This may be the ultimate social ideal, but whether it is possible is quite another question. Even with his imperfections it is possible to organize man in a universal state, with law and government much the same as exist now. The ultimate moral destiny of mankind may be the moral perfection of all men, with perfect social union, perfect institutions and perfect freedom. To this the international state will be a step: it is a higher manifestation of man's nature, but even with imperfections in man it is possible.

4. That a
Universal
State is
Not Really
a State at
All

CHAPTER IX

CITIZENSHIP

1. THE MEANING OF CITIZEN

The word citizen literally means a resident in a city, or a resident in a city who enjoys the privileges of such residence. Thus we speak of citizens of London or Calcutta, meaning those persons who reside in these cities or exercise the rights which membership of the cities confers. In this sense the word citizen is equivalent to the Greek word *polites*, which meant a member of a *polis* or city. This is a very restricted and specialized use of the word.

In its widest sense the word *citizen* is opposed to *alien*. People residing within the area of a state are divided into two classes, citizens and non-citizens or aliens.

Citizens and Aliens A citizen of a state is one who lives in the state and is subject to the state in all matters.

Citizens owe their allegiance to the states in which they reside. Aliens owe allegiance to another state. Aliens must, of course, obey the ordinary laws of the land in which they reside, and these laws may also include regulations which are made by treaties between the country of the aliens and the country in which they reside. Aliens receive the protection of the law for their person and property in the state they inhabit, and for such protection they must obey laws even though they be different from those prevailing in the state to which they owe allegiance. The alien inhabitant must also, as a rule, pay rates and taxes according to the ordinary methods prevailing in the state or local area, but aliens do not receive political privileges. The

privileges of voting, of election for public bodies and the holding of public offices are generally denied them.

The privileges of citizenship may be divided broadly into two classes : (a) general protection of the law, and (b) the right to vote in elections, the right to be elected,

**Citizen and
Subject or
Resident**

or to be appointed to public office—what may be called the political privileges of citizenship. In popular speech two senses of the word citizen are often confused owing to lack of discrimination between these two classes of privileges. In one sense, citizen is used to mean all those who reside in a state, enjoy the protection of its laws, and also the political privileges. In another sense, citizen is confined to those only who enjoy political privileges. In modern democracies every one is theoretically equal before the law but not every one is allowed the privileges of citizenship. In Britain, for example, minors, and a certain number of adults, men and women, who have not a residential or property qualification, have not the privilege of the vote. In some other countries a distinction is made between those who are literate and those who are illiterate, as in some of the American states, where illiterate persons are not allowed to vote. In other states people who do not pay a certain amount of taxation are not allowed to vote, and in all states those who are of unsound mind and those who are habitually criminal are excluded from the political privileges of citizenship.

A distinction is sometimes made between *subject* or *resident* (the wider sense) and *citizen* (the narrower sense).

There are two classes of citizens: (1) citizens by birth or natural citizens, and (2) citizens by adoption or naturalized citizens. Naturalized citizens are

**Classes of
Citizens**

those who come from another state and choose to give up their 'natural' citizenship of that state and adopt the citizenship of the state in which they have come to reside. The rules governing naturalization vary from state to state. Generally speaking, natural citizens have superior rights to naturalized citizens. Naturalized citizens are often excluded from holding the highest offices of state. For example, the office of President of the United States can be held only by natural-born citizens. The citizen whose whole traditions belong to the state may be expected to be a more loyal member than one whose birth and

traditions are of another state. Accordingly, it is safer to allow only natural-born citizens to occupy those government posts which demand the greatest loyalty, and patriotism in service.

2. THE ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship may be acquired in several ways, viz.—

(1) Birth, which usually means birth within the country, but which may also be taken in a wider sense, e.g., according to English law birth in an English ship or in an English embassy is equivalent to birth in England;

(2) Marriage, whereby an alien wife becomes a member of the family and state of her husband;

(3) Naturalization.

The first and chief mode of acquiring citizenship is by birth. There are no uniform rules in the different states in this matter. Some states, e.g., Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, have adopted the rule that descent alone is the decisive factor. This is called *ius sanguinis*, or the rule of blood-descent. According to this rule, a child, whether born within the state or in a foreign country, becomes *ipso facto* by birth a citizen of the parent state. Other states, such as Argentina, have adopted the *ius soli*, or the rule that the territory on which birth occurs is exclusively the decisive factor. According to this rule, every child born on the territory of such a state, whether the parents be citizens or foreigners, becomes a citizen of the state, whereas a child born abroad, even although the parents may be citizens, is an alien. Other states, such as Great Britain, the United States and France, have adopted a mixed principle. According to the law of Great Britain and the United States, not only children of subjects born at home or abroad (*ius sanguinis*), but also children of foreign parents born on their territory (*ius soli*) become citizens. The French law considers children of French citizens born abroad to be French. Children of foreigners born in France, unless within one year after attaining majority they choose the citizenship of their parents, are also regarded as French citizens.

The rule of birth-place is the principle of Roman law. Its simplicity is its chief merit. But birth alone is not a

fair test. In the modern world particularly the place of birth is frequently accidental. A child may be born when its parents are touring throughout the world, and it is obviously unjust to compel that child to adopt the nationality of the state in which it happens to be born. It would be not only unjust but ridiculous to regard the child, say of an English officer who happens to be staying in Germany with his wife when his child is born, as a German citizen.

The most equitable rule is that of kinship or blood. Its chief difficulty lies in the complications that arise in proving the nationality of the parents. The English and the American rule is the old feudal rule of the place of birth, but it is frequently found necessary in each case to modify the legal rule by the application of commonsense principles.

The most important mode of acquiring citizenship besides birth is that of naturalization in the wider sense of the term. Through naturalization a person who is a foreigner by birth acquires the citizenship of the naturalizing state. According to the law of different states naturalization may take place through—

- (a) *Marriage*. A foreign woman marrying a subject of a state becomes thereby *ipso facto* naturalized ;
- (b) *Option*. Children born of foreign parents, after coming of age, may choose to be members of the state in which they were born, and thus be naturalized ;
- (c) *Domicile*. Some states allow a foreigner to become naturalized by his taking his domicile in their territory ;
- (d) *Appointment as a government official*. Some states let a foreigner become naturalized *ipso facto* on appointment as a government official ;
- (e) *Grant on application*. In all states naturalization may be procured through a direct act on the part of the state granting citizenship to a foreigner who has applied for it. This is naturalization proper ; it implies the reception of an alien into the citizenship of a state through a formal act. The object of such naturalization is always a foreigner who, if naturalization is granted, becomes a citizen of

the naturalizing state. The government which grants naturalization may prescribe such conditions as it likes.

One of the most usual conditions is residence for a set period of time. Some states lay down more conditions than others, but every state requires the fulfilment of some kind of conditions. Sometimes naturalization is only partial, that is to say, while a naturalized citizen may receive the ordinary benefits of citizenship such as protection of person and property both in the country in which he is naturalized and in other countries where his interests are looked after by the representative of his adopted country, at the same time he may be excluded from occupying the chief posts in his country of adoption. Thus in the United States the President and Vice-President must be natural-born citizens of the United States. In France and Belgium a distinction is made between ordinary naturalization and 'grand' naturalization. Only by grand naturalization can an alien be made politically equal to a natural-born citizen, and grand naturalization can only be granted when a specific number of conditions are fulfilled. Ordinary naturalization is granted on easier conditions.

In Great Britain there is a distinction between naturalization and denization. Naturalization is the result of an Act of Parliament; denization is conferred by the executive. Naturalization in Great Britain confers upon an alien the same rights as are possessed by natural-born citizens, whereas a denizen possesses those rights only partially. In the ordinary affairs of life there is not much difference between the two. But in certain matters the denizen is restricted, particularly in public life. He cannot be a member of the Privy Council or of either House of Parliament, occupy any high public office, or take a grant of land from the Crown.

When a foreign territory is incorporated under a state sometimes citizenship is conferred wholesale on the basis of residence on the newly acquired territory. In this way the citizens of the acquired territory become citizens of a new state. They have a new allegiance and new political obligations, but their relation to one another in private matters remains the same as before; in other words, their public

**Conditions
of Natural-
ization**

**Other Me-
thods of
Acquiring
Citizenship**

law is changed and their private law remains the same. There are many historical examples of such transfer of citizenship. Florida, Louisiana, California and Alaska were all annexed by the United States and at the time of annexation arrangements were made to admit the citizens to the full rights and privileges of the United States.

Sometimes when territories are ceded from one state to another the inhabitants retain their original citizenship, but this must be specially recognized in the act of cession, otherwise they would become citizens of the superior state.

The results of citizenship are matters partly of private, partly of public law. In private law, as a rule, citizens and aliens are alike regarded as both possessing full rights. In the sphere of public law, however, the distinction between the two is fully maintained.

The following rights, except in case of special grant, are confined to citizens—

- (a) the right of permanent residence in the country ;
- (b) the right to the protection of the state, even if the citizen is staying abroad ;
- (c) the exercise of the franchise ;
- (d) the right to hold public offices ;
- (e) sometimes such general political rights as those of association, petition or free publication.

This does not mean that aliens are absolutely excluded from the exercise of these rights ; it means only that they enjoy them on sufferance. Full citizenship implies membership in the nation and complete political rights ; it is thus the fullest expression of the relation of the individual to the state.

Citizenship may be lost in various ways according to the laws of the country in which citizens are domiciled. A woman may lose it by marriage with an alien. Service under an alien government may lead to the loss of it. Desertion from military service, acceptance of foreign decorations, judicial condemnation for certain causes, all lead to the loss of citizenship in the various states of the world. A very usual cause of the loss of citizenship is long continued absence from the country of birth or adoption. The laws of several states declare that if a citizen is absent for a

**The Results
of Citizen-
ship**

specified period of years and does not declare his intention to continue his citizenship, it automatically lapses.

The most common method of losing citizenship is voluntary resignation and adoption of new citizenship. In this matter, as in most others, the laws of states vary exceedingly. Some states completely deny the right of a citizen to resign his citizenship under any circumstances. Others allow the right of resignation under certain stringent conditions. Others allow a temporary withdrawal of allegiance so long as the person concerned is residing in another territory. Several states refuse the right to resign citizenship to any males of requisite age who have not performed military duties.

The modern tendency in matters of citizenship is to recognize the right to adopt a new citizenship if the individual so wishes. The English theory used to be that an Englishman always remains an Englishman unless with the consent of the Crown he definitely renounces his allegiance. The consent of the Crown was necessary, otherwise, in the eyes of the English law, no act of a foreign government could change an Englishman's nationality. In 1870 the British Government gave up the old theory and made a general rule that any British subject voluntarily naturalized under a foreign government should cease to be a British subject.

Most states allow for a naturalized citizen returning to his own country, i.e., for the reversal of naturalization; they allow for repatriation after expatriation.

3. DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP

The state, with government, exists to further the general good of the community. But the state and government are not something apart from the citizens of the community. The attitude of many citizens seems to be that government is a tyrannical machine, especially invented for oppression. It is not; it is the machinery of the state, which consists of individuals and exists for them. In modern democratic countries, where government is accused of oppression, mismanagement, etc. in all likelihood the citizens themselves are at fault. The purposes of the state are their purposes, and if the state is to serve its purpose properly citizens must fulfil their civic duties. The errors of government may be many, but the neglect of their

civic duties by citizens is much more marked. Were the energy spent in destructive criticism of government spent in real constructive work, in the proper fulfilment of the duties of citizenship, there would be much less cause to carp at the acts of government.

The chief duty of each citizen is obedience to the law. If one citizen disobeys, and is not punished, then other citizens may also disobey the law. If all citizens disobey the law, then the law practically does not exist and the individuals are living without the benefit of the state. The interests of the state are the interests of the community. The interests of the community are greater than the interests of any one individual. Laws exist in order to further the interests of the community. Obedience to the laws, therefore, is one of the most necessary things for securing the interests of the community as distinct from the interests of individuals. It may indeed sometimes appear hard that an individual should be punished, but the fact remains that punishment for breaking the laws is the chief instrument in the hands of the community for preserving its own interest, and individual interest must always be sacrificed to the general interest.

Another duty of the citizen is allegiance to the state. Allegiance means that the individual gives his whole-hearted service to the state. This implies many things. In the first place, allegiance implies the duty of defending the state against danger, if the state is involved with another state in war. It means that the individual must serve the state in the way most suitable for the defence of the state. For able-bodied men this service as a rule takes the form of military service. The individual must be prepared to sacrifice his own life for the state. In most states military service is compulsory, that is to say, each male citizen, when he reaches a certain age, is called upon to undergo a period of military training in order to fit him for active military service, should necessity arise. If the individual deserts from the army or refuses to perform the duties for which he is called upon, he may be either imprisoned or deprived of his citizenship. In some countries, notably Great Britain, the voluntary military system prevails. There is a standing army in peace times which is recruited on the voluntary

principle. In cases of emergency, as in the Great War, it may be found necessary to introduce compulsory service.

Another form of service which citizenship implies is the support of the public officers in the performance of their duty. It is the duty of every citizen to support the police and legally constituted authorities in the suppression of riot and revolution. In fact, in Great Britain it is a legal duty of every citizen to support the authorities in preserving the public peace, and a citizen is liable to punishment if it can be proved that he deliberately refrained from discharging his duty. It is also the duty of citizens to refrain from disturbing the public peace, to refrain from instigating riots, sowing sedition or disturbing people's mind against the authorities. As the state and government exist for the common good, it is impossible to expect that individuals with grievances will not voice their grievances, but in voicing their grievances citizens should always proceed in the ordinary constitutional method which the law of the land allows. It may happen, of course, that the existing type of government may render it difficult to voice grievances, but it must be kept in mind that the destruction of government by revolution or rebellion always brings greater evils than it suppresses. The most recent example is Russia. Practically everybody in Russia admitted that the machine of government required remaking, but instead of remaking it in an orderly and constitutional way, the discontented people of Russia smashed it completely to pieces. The evils of the revolution were a millionfold more pronounced than those existing under the old system. Under the old system of Russia there was absolute monarchy or autocracy which, however inefficient it may have been, preserved peace and order, and gave security to person and property. Under the popular or Bolshevik rule a far more rigid autocracy was set up, without security to person or property and without ability to preserve peace and order.

Allegiance also demands from the citizen the giving of his service for public duties such as holding public office and recording his vote. In modern democracies most citizens above a certain age possess a vote. Not every one can occupy a definite public office, but every one who is physically able can vote.

**Other
Public
Duties**

It is a fundamental duty of the citizen in a modern democratic country to record his vote even if he does not aspire to office. The government rests on the will of the people, and unless the people express their will through their vote, then they cannot complain if the government is not conducted according to their own desires. The duty of voting is a simple and effective duty, but in a properly constituted state it implies something more. It implies that the citizen should be a student of public matters, that he should acquaint himself with the problems of the day, and, by close study of the problems, train himself to be as judicial in his decisions in political matters as he should be if serving on a jury in a law court.

In many countries in bygone days public duty of some sort was compulsory for every citizen. For example, in some rural communities (areas of local government) each citizen was forced to give certain days of the year for service on the public roads. This has now disappeared, but it has been replaced by two things—(1) voting for public bodies, and (2) the payment of taxes.

Public bodies have to perform certain functions for the community and these functions must be performed in the best possible way. Public officers have to arrange for the various public works for which they are elected, and in order to do so they must levy taxation. For the central government the money is raised in various ways, by income-tax, customs duties, excise duties, etc. For local government the taxation (called rates) is levied according to the requirements of the local areas. In this way citizens are able to commute the old service that they had to perform. A permanent staff of officials and workers is kept at the public expense for the performance of public duties.

A little consideration will show that if there were no taxation there could be no government. Government servants must be paid, government agencies conducted; and if the people agree that government has to perform certain things, then they must also provide ways and means. They must, therefore, admit the right of the state to levy taxes, or, if necessary, even to confiscate private property for the public welfare.

Of course, every government tries to apportion its

taxation among the people as fairly as possible. To tax one class at the expense of another, or to tax one industry or trade at the expense of another, would be grossly unfair. It is a very difficult matter for government to apportion its taxation satisfactorily. Everybody, whatever his status in society, complains when he has to pay taxes, and the government must do its best in order to make these complaints as unimportant as possible, or, on the other hand, to prove to the complainants, if necessary, that they have very little grounds for complaint.

The duties of government towards citizens are not fixed. Some people (called individualists) think that government interference should be limited to the protection of person and property. The opposite school (called socialists) think that government should undertake the management of every branch of social activity. As modern governments rest on the minds of the people themselves, it depends on the type of minds at any particular time whether the government is individualistic or socialistic. Before the Great War government did not interfere in any marked degree in industry and commerce. During the Great War government found it necessary to interfere in many ways not only in industry and commerce but in the private life of the people. The circumstances of the case justified the interference. As soon as the war ended, the cry arose among a large section of the community for the withdrawal of government interference; by others, the extension of government interference was asked. A large section of miners and railway-workers are now demanding that government should take over the management of railways and the management of mines. The future activity of government in this direction will be determined by the public interest and the mind of the people, as shown at the periodical elections.

CHAPTER X

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

1. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

The constitution of the state may be defined as the fundamental rules which regulate the distribution of powers in the state or which determine the form of government. Austin, the law-writer, calls it "that which fixes the structure of the supreme government." Lewis, the well-known English writer on Political Science, calls it "the arrangement and distribution of the sovereign powers in the community, or form of government." This is practically a direct reproduction of the definition of Aristotle, who says that the constitution is the way in which citizens, who are the component parts of the state, are arranged in relation to one another.

The constitution of a state is that body of rules or laws, written or unwritten, which determines the organization of government, the distribution of powers to the various organs of government, and the general principles on which these powers are to be exercised. Every state must have a constitution. It is true that some constitutions may be more clear and more developed than others; but wherever there is a state there must be certain fundamental rules or principles governing the exercise of power in the state. Even in what we know as "advanced" states the constitution may be somewhat indefinite. Thus in Great Britain it is difficult to say what exactly is the constitution. Nevertheless, the constitution exists. It is impossible to conceive of a state in which there is no constitution.

The traditional classification is *written* and *unwritten*

constitutions. The distinction between the written and the unwritten constitution is founded on the distinction between written and unwritten law, or between statute and common law. This distinction, however, is not satisfactory. An unwritten constitution is one which is based on custom or usage; a written constitution is one which has been definitely enacted in a single legal instrument. On examining constitutions of these two types we find that in unwritten constitutions a large number of customs are definitely written down, and that in written constitutions, however definite they may be, there is always an unwritten element, an element of custom or usage. In the unwritten constitution, a custom, once written down, is as important as an enacted law. In a written constitution the element of custom is as important as the constitution which is written. The distinction, therefore, between written and unwritten constitutions is not satisfactory; but it has been accepted because of the difficulty of finding any other basis of classification. The classification *evolved* and *enacted* is adopted by some writers, the evolved constitution being practically the same as the unwritten constitution, and the enacted the same as the written. Sir Henry Maine classifies constitutions as, firstly, historical and evolutionary, that is, constitutions which have developed gradually according to historical experience, and, secondly, *a priori*, that is "founded on speculative assumptions remote from experience." Of the historical and evolutionary type, the constitution of Great Britain is the chief example. Of the *a priori* type, the constitutions of France of the eighteenth century are examples; these constitutions were drawn up according to certain pre-conceived ideas of justice.

The most satisfactory basis for the classification of constitutions has been given by Lord Bryce in his book, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*. Lord Bryce's Classification Bryce classifies constitutions as Flexible and Rigid. His argument is as follows:—

Constitutions, past and present, are of two leading types. Some are of natural growth, made up of enactments, understandings, and customs which have practically the same force as enactments. They are largely an accumulation of traditions and precedents, and, as a rule, are unsymmetrical

and unwieldy. Others are the work of conscious art. Such constitutions are contained in one legal instrument, which has been drawn up at one time by a definite body. These constitutions might be distinguished as *old* and *new* types, or they might be called *common-law* constitutions and *statutory* constitutions ; but the latter description is open to the criticism already given in connection with written and unwritten constitutions.

Bryce himself takes as the basis of distinction the relation which each constitution has to the ordinary laws of the state and to the ordinary authority which passes these laws. In some states the constitution is subject to the same machinery as the ordinary laws of the land. In such cases the term constitution simply means those statutes and customs of the country which determine the form of government and the arrangement of the political system. It is often difficult in this case to say what is constitutional and what is not constitutional. Some statutes, while containing definite constitutional matter, at the same time may contain much that is not constitutional, and other statutes which at first sight seem to have nothing to do with constitutional usage, may in reality contain important constitutional matter.

In other states, the constitutional legislation in the state is subject to a special process. In this case constitutional law is clearly demarcated from ordinary statute law. The constitutional law is passed by a special authority and can be amended only by a special authority, and, further, if the ordinary law of the land conflicts with constitutional law, the ordinary law must give way.

Bryce adopts the terms *flexible* and *rigid* to describe the nature of these two types of constitution. The one type is called flexible because it is elastic, and can be bent in various ways, and still retain its main features. The other called is rigid because it is definite and fixed. The flexible type is the earlier in date. In the other classifications mentioned, it is equivalent to the unwritten, the evolved, or historical. In the modern world flexible constitutions have almost died out. The one notable example is the constitution of the United Kingdom. Austria-Hungary had a flexible

His Basis
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Flexible
and Rigid
Consti-
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constitution before the Great War, but now that constitution has disappeared. Italy has a constitution which is half-way between the flexible and the rigid types.

The rigid constitution has taken the place of the flexible constitution over practically the whole world. All the states of Europe have adopted it, and even Great Britain, the chief example of the flexible type, must adopt it if a scheme of Imperial Federation is carried into effect. All the Self-Governing Dominions of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand, have the rigid type of constitution. Their constitutions originally emanated from Great Britain herself. They are really Acts of the Imperial Parliament. The same is true of India, where the constitution cannot be amended or changed by the Indian Legislature, but by a higher legislative authority, viz., the King-in-Parliament—the legislative sovereign of the British Empire.

The well-known writer on British and American constitutional practice, De Tocqueville, says: "Technically there is no British constitution." This remark has often been quoted carelessly by speakers and writers, as if it were a discredit to Great Britain to have no constitution. What the statement means is that in Great Britain there is no definite constitutional enactment such as exists in the United States or France. But that there is no constitution at all is far from the truth. Great Britain has a flexible type of constitution. Both constitutional and ordinary law can be enacted and amended by the same legislative process. It is true that no lawyer can definitely put his finger on any enactments or number of enactments that can be said to form the British constitution; but that does not mean that the constitution does not exist.

The British constitution consists of a mass of authorities and enactments such as the Great Charter, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Acts, the Petition of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the various Reform Acts (1832-1928), the various Municipal Acts, Local Government Acts and various Acts concerning the organization of the law courts. All these Acts are definitely constitutional. There are other Acts, such as the Scottish Universities Act, which, though primarily educational, ecclesiastical or municipal measures, really contain important constitutional matter. In addition to these

enactments there is a large number of customs, traditions and precedents in the British constitution. The whole system of cabinet government depends not on legislative enactments but on custom. The British constitution, therefore, may be defined, in the words of Lord Bryce, as "a mass of precedents, carried in men's memories or recorded in writing, of dicta of lawyers or statesmen, of customs, usages, understandings and beliefs bearing upon methods of government, together with a certain number of statutes, some of them containing matters of petty detail, others related to private just as much as to public law, nearly all of them presupposing and mixed up with precedents and customs, and all of them covered with a parasitic growth of legal decisions and political habits, apart from which the statutes would be almost unworkable, or at any rate, quite different in their working from what they really are."

It is, therefore, quite untrue to say that there is no British constitution. It is true that in Britain there is not the same difference between an ordinary statute and constitutional law as there is in America or France. The word "unconstitutional" is often used in political debates, particularly in reference to new laws proposed by the government. If these laws imply new methods of government, or any striking departure from the old methods, the word is used by opponents of the proposed law to discredit the government. What is really meant by "unconstitutional" is that the proposal, if carried into effect, will be an unusual breach of a principle which has come to be regarded as inviolable.

Constitutional law and statute law differ from each other (a) in content. Statute law is simply the law passed by the legislature in a state for the regulation of the lives of the citizens. Constitutional law deals with fundamental principles and methods of government. (b) In the method of enactment and amendment. This distinction, however, is applicable only in those states which have a rigid constitution. In Great Britain constitutional law can be distinguished from statute law only by its content or purpose, both constitutional and statute law being subject to the same legislative procedure. The King-in-Parliament, that is the

**Meaning of
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**Constitu-
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Statute
Law**

King with the House of Lords and the House of Commons, is the legal sovereign in the British constitution and as such can pass a law raising the income-tax by one penny in the pound, or a law making the profoundest constitutional change.

The difference between statute and constitutional law in rigid constitutions is very marked. In the United States of America the legislature for ordinary legislation is Congress. For constitutional legislation, however, a totally separate machinery exists, a machinery which makes an amendment of the constitution very difficult. The constitution of the United States cannot be amended without the consent of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states in the federal union. Very elaborate procedure exists for the proposal of amendments and the adoption of amendments. So elaborate, indeed, is the procedure that it is extremely difficult in the United States to carry through any amendment at all. The same is true of the state constitutions in the United States. The whole theory of the constitutional law in the United States is that it is something higher, more fundamental, and more important than the ordinary law of the land, and as such must not be interfered with too easily. In France also constitutional amendment is subject to a special process. The ordinary legislature in France is the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which meet in Paris. But any proposed constitutional amendment must pass through the National Assembly, that is, the two Houses sitting together at Versailles, as well as through the two Houses separately. In Germany, under the old system, the constitution could be amended very much in the same way as ordinary legislation was passed. It required, however, a special number of votes.

It is thus clear that in Great Britain constitutional and statute laws are subject to the same process. This is true of all flexible constitutions. In Italy, though the constitution is contained in one enactment, the ordinary legislature may amend it. In all rigid constitutions, however, there is a definite distinction between constitutional and statute law. The constitutions are made by a definite body distinct from the ordinary law-making body and can be amended only by special process varying in difficulty from step to step, but always different from the normal law-making process.

2. THE QUALITIES OF FLEXIBLE AND RIGID CONSTITUTIONS

Each type of constitution has both its merits and its demerits. The fact that each tends to assimilate some of the characteristics of the other seems to prove that the best type of constitution is a mixture of the flexible and rigid. The chief merit of the flexible constitution is its adaptability. It is alterable without any difficulty and, therefore, it easily meets new emergencies. The flexible constitution is thus very well suited to an advancing community. It can be amended as easily as an ordinary law can be passed. When amendment is necessary, there is no unusual disturbance in the law-making process of the country. The flexible constitution is also valuable inasmuch as it is not subject to popular passion. It is not recognized as particularly sacred by the people. A rigid constitution, on the other hand, is often looked on as a sacred repository of popular rights, and as such in times of popular excitement it is subject to popular violence. In France, for example, during the Revolution the people concentrated their minds on constitutions as the guarantees of rights. The extraordinary number of French constitutions passed during the past century and a half proves that rigid constitutions may often be a danger to national peace. Since the Revolution France has had many constitutions, each of which was actually in operation for some time; but, except for the present one, no one of them continued in existence for as long as twenty years. Flexible constitutions provide an easy method of legal amendment and legal development. Whereas in national crises rigid constitutions may be completely shattered, flexible constitutions are so adaptable that they easily can survive political storms. Further, a flexible constitution provides an excellent mirror of the national mind. A rigid constitution may represent the national mind at a particular period; but, especially if amendment is difficult, rigid constitutions do not move with the times. This is obvious in the constitution of the United States, where the rigidity of the constitution has necessitated several developments outside the constitution in order to suit the national life of the United States. The most notable

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extra-constitutional development in the United States is the party system, which arose in order to bring about co-ordination between the legislative and executive branches of government which were so rigidly separated by the constitution.

The great merit of rigid constitutions is their definiteness. Being embodied in a single document, such constitutions are definite and certain. Beyond this definiteness and certainty, however, the rigid constitution frequently is useless. It very often lays down fundamental principles of popular liberty, but these principles, however definitely enunciated, are of little avail unless they are accompanied by constitutional methods by which they can be guaranteed. For example, in the Belgian constitution, there are fundamental ideas governing the liberty of the press and the liberty of speech, but no method is laid down whereby either the press or speech is to be made free. In Great Britain, where there are no such constitutional guarantees, this liberty is secured far more effectively than in Belgium by the rule of law. It is thus very easy to exaggerate the value of rigid constitutions as guarantees of individual liberty. General principles of liberty are apt to be enunciated more as the result of popular passion than as the reasoned basis of civic life, and popular passion loses its meaning in the succeeding generation. It is absolutely impossible, in any one document at one period in history, to give a final statement or analysis of the principles of political life. Rigid constitutions attempt to do this but, unless amendment is extremely easy, they attempt to do what is impossible. Progress demands adaptability and flexibility, and such adaptability and flexibility can only be secured in countries with rigid constitutions by a sufficiently easy method of amendment.

Some writers hold that rigid constitutions are more valuable than flexible constitutions because they are less subject to party feeling. This, however, is not true. Rigid constitutions are the focus of national sentiment; they are centres of national discussion and as such are more subject to party forces than flexible constitutions. Further, the flexible constitution, it is sometimes said, is not suited to democracy, because democracies are suspicious of what they cannot understand. Flexible constitutions are

long historic growths not easily understood by the average man. Rigid constitutions are clear, and easily understood. Flexible constitutions, therefore, it has been said, are more suited to an aristocratic type of government. This, however, is a theoretical objection. It is questionable whether in normal times the masses trouble about constitutional matters at all. In abnormal times, as we have seen, the rigid constitution is in more danger of destruction than the flexible. It may also be pointed out that the two most free countries in the world, each of them a democracy, Great Britain and the United States, are diametrically opposed in constitutional type, a fact which suggests that both liberty and democracy depend on other bases than rigid or flexible constitutions.

The modern tendency in constitutions is towards rigidity. It may safely be said that in a few years not a single example of the flexible type will exist. A rigid constitution is the enunciated will of the sovereign people, and, as such, should be definite, and as clear as human language can make it, so that there should be no dispute or likelihood of dispute as to what the constitution means. The constitution usually has three sets of provisions :—

- (1) A series of fundamental rights, civil and political.
- (2) The outlines of the organization and the government.

(3) Provision for the amendment of the constitution. These provisions have been called the three essentials of a constitution : namely, liberty, government and sovereignty. But as these provisions are fundamental, they should be as brief as possible. Brevity lessens the chances of dispute in subsequent generations. Moreover, no one generation should venture to lay down the final laws of political life or organization. Not only should the constitution be brief, but it should be amendable without too much difficulty. In some of the state constitutions in the United States, not only do the constitutions contain much detail (e.g., sumptuary laws) which properly belongs to the sphere of ordinary statute law, but they are difficult to amend. They err both in their content, which is too detailed, and in their process of amendment, which is too difficult.

3. CREATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS

The constitution is the expression of the national will of a people, and it is not really correct to say that a constitution, whether flexible or rigid, is definitely created at a given point in time. The national will exists independently of its formulation in a legal instrument: in other words, the state does not begin when a constitution is drawn up. From the point of view of Public Law, not of Political Science, we can say that constitutions are created, or amended in such-and-such a way at such-and-such a time. From this point of view we can say that flexible constitutions are not created at any particular point of history—they grow gradually—and that rigid constitutions are definite instruments *enunciated* at a particular point in history.

Rigid constitutions may be made in two ways:—

- Methods of Creating Rigid Constitutions**
- (1) They may be made by a legislative assembly.
 - (2) They may be granted by a superior government.

Examples of the first type are the constitutions of the United States, of France and of Germany. In each of these cases constitutions were formulated and adopted by special legislative bodies as the result of war or of revolution. The first constitutions of the United States were granted by the English Government. After the War of Independence the American colonies drew up constitutions for themselves and for the federal government. In France during the revolutionary period several constitutions were drawn up by special legislative bodies, or "constituent" assemblies, but they were all short lived. The present constitution of France is the result of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It was created by a National Assembly elected by manhood suffrage. In the French constitution a distinction is made between the constitutional laws, which can be amended only by a special process, and organic laws which can be changed by the ordinary legislature. The constitution of the German Empire, as it was before the Great War, was also the result of wars and revolutions. After the Napoleonic wars the German Confederation was established, but this Confeder-

ation went through several changes before it culminated in the German Empire. After the Franco-Prussian war the German constitution was drawn up and ratified by a parliament of the whole of Germany. The present German constitution was also the result of war. It was drawn up by a constituent assembly (the National Assembly) elected after the end of the Great War, in 1919.

The British Dominions have constitutions which were granted by the British Parliament. These constitutions, it is true, are only constitutions granted to subordinate law-making bodies, but with the advance of time these subordinate law-making bodies are becoming more and more independent. The form of their own government is determined by the constitutions which they have received from the Imperial Parliament.

We have already noted that even the historic flexible constitution of Great Britain is in danger of becoming rigid.

Circum- stances Favouring the Growth of Rigid Constitu- tions	The future seems to be with rigid constitutions. Several circumstances favour the adoption of rigid constitutions. In the first place, the citizens of modern democratic countries desire to guarantee their rights by restraining the powers of government. In the second place, democratic ideas of self-government have taken the form of granting constitutions to subordinate bodies, in order both to guarantee the rights of the people concerned and to prevent controversy regarding the principles of government. In the third place, when a people changes its form of government, it naturally desires to make explicit the basis of the new government. In the fourth place, the rapid advance of federalism as a form of government has given much impetus to rigid constitutions. Federalism is one of the most popular methods of modern organization and in a federal form of government, it is absolutely necessary definitely to mark off the spheres of the central and of the local governments by a rigid constitution.
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Rigid constitutions thus seem likely to survive at the expense of flexible constitutions. For many years no new flexible constitution has been established, whereas flexible constitutions have been replaced by rigid constitutions. No rigid constitution, moreover, is likely to become entirely flexible. The whole tendency of democracy is towards the

establishment of constitutional safeguards through the means of rigid constitutions.

Obviously no assembly in drawing up a constitution can foresee all the circumstances that are likely to arise in the future. In the making of constitutions some provision must be made for alteration or amendment. In a flexible constitution the question of amendment does not really arise because the ordinary legislature makes, and can amend both constitutional and statute law. In rigid constitutions, special methods of amendment are provided. These methods are four in number :—

(1) The function of amendment may be given to the ordinary legislature but at the same time be made subject to a special process, for example, a fixed quorum and a minimum majority. In Belgium for the amendment of the constitution two-thirds of the members of each house must be present and a two-thirds majority is necessary. A minimum majority only may be required, such as three-quarters of the total house. Two-thirds is a very common majority required. Sometimes the legislature is dissolved in order that the opinion of the people may be tested before the proposed amendment is carried out. The idea in this case is to submit the proposed amendment to a new set of men. This arrangement of dissolution is as a rule combined also with the necessity for the special majority. The constitutions of Holland, Belgium, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Roumania are of this type.

(2) A special body may be created for the amendment of the constitution. The most notable example of this is the United States where a Convention is called to consider constitutional questions. This method in America is combined also with special majority in the legislature. Two-thirds of Congress and three-quarters of the states must consent to the adoption of the constitutional amendment. Amendment to the United States' constitution may be *proposed* either :—

(a) By two-thirds of the members of each house of Congress ; or

(b) By the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. These may petition Congress to call a Convention to consider the proposed amendment and this Convention may propose

the changes. In either case the change proposed must be submitted to the individual states, to be voted upon either by their legislatures or by conventions called in the states for the purpose, as determined by Congress. Any amendment which is agreed to by three-fourths of the states becomes a part of the constitution.

In the pre-war Serbia and Bulgaria amendments used to be twice passed by the ordinary legislature and then submitted to a special assembly elected in the same way as the legislature. This assembly had the final decision on the amendment. In France for constitutional amendment the two houses of the legislature sit together as a constituent assembly, at Versailles. The houses first decide separately that amendment to the constitution is necessary. The amendment is adopted by the Houses sitting together at Versailles.

It will thus be seen that in some states a combination of both the first and second methods is adopted.

(3) Sometimes proposed amendments of the constitution are submitted to local authorities, either for consideration or for approval. This method is particularly suitable for federal states where, naturally enough, the individual states which compose the union must be consulted before the character of the union is altered. This method exists in Switzerland, Australia and the United States. It is not, however, invariably adopted in federal governments. In the Argentine Republic, for example, a majority of the legislature, with a special convention, and in Brazil the legislature alone, by a two-thirds majority in three successive debates can alter the constitution.

(4) Proposed amendments may be referred to the people. This is the most democratic method of amendment. The theory behind it is that a constitution is a guarantee of popular rights and as such should not be amended without direct reference to the people. This method exists in Australia, in some of the states of the United States of America and in Switzerland.

One or two separate points arise in connection with the amendment of constitutions.

(1) Sometimes a constitution does not make special provision for amendment. In such a case either the ordinary legislature may amend it, as in Italy (the Italian constitution although a definitely enacted instrument is, according to

Lord Bryce's criterion, a flexible constitution); or the authority which created the constitution may amend it.

(2) Constitutions are amended by other processes than by formal legislation. In rigid constitutions there is a certain amount of flexibility. No rigid constitution can exist without change of some kind. New conditions of life, new ideas of political organization and new ideals gradually change the setting of constitutional laws. Rigid constitutions thus gradually change by usage as well as by formal amendment. They are also changed by judicial interpretation. The courts have to determine cases connected with constitutional law and in doing so they bend the law to suit new and unforeseen circumstances. This is particularly the case in the United States of America where the process of formal amendment is extremely difficult. Because of this the United States' courts have had to suit the constitutions to modern conditions by the doctrine of "implied powers."

CHAPTER XI

THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

1. CLASSIFICATIONS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The first point to be noted in the classification of the forms of government is the distinction between the state and government. In many books the classification of the forms of government is entitled the "forms of the state". Strictly speaking, all states are the same. The student must bear this in mind: the "form of state" is really the form of government. It is true that we might classify states according to the type of mind evident in the state, or according to population or territory. Such classifications, however, would be of little value. It would not be helpful, for example, to divide states according to the size of their population, making the classification of large, medium and small.

Many classifications of the forms of government have been given by writers of Political Science. The most common bases are (1) the number of people in whom the supreme power rests, and (2) the form of the state organization or government. As we shall see, it is extremely difficult to find a satisfactory basis for the classification of modern governments. While certain general characteristics are common to some governments, we often find along with these common elements marked dissimilarity. Moreover, the forms of government change very quickly, so that while a classification may be satisfactory at the present moment it may be quite unsuitable a generation hence.

The most famous of all classifications of forms of consti-

tution or government is that given by Aristotle in his *Politics*. Aristotle's classification is not, however, an original classification. He himself was a pupil of Plato, and Plato's classification, though not so well known, is almost of equal value and importance.

The
Classifi-
cations of
Plato and
Aristotle

Plato's classification has not the definiteness of that of Aristotle. His views, moreover, are not consistent. He gives a different series of forms in the *Republic* and the *Statesman*. In the *Republic* he gives the forms which are noted below in connexion with the cycles of political change. From the

Plato's
Classifi-
cation

Statesman may be extracted a logical classification, which bears a striking similarity to the later classification of Aristotle. As Aristotle borrowed from Plato, so did Plato borrow from Socrates. According to Socrates the three main forms of government are monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Monarchy and tyranny each is the government of a single person, but in monarchy, as contrasted with tyranny, there is respect for law. Aristocracy is contrasted with plutocracy, or government by the few rich. In aristocracy the capacity to rule is recognized: in plutocracy mere wealth is the test of rule. Democracy is the rule of ignorance. Socrates held that "only those who know shall rule".

Plato adopts the Socratic criterion of knowledge as the supreme test of goodness in government. Working with this principle he gives three grades of state :—

1. The state of perfect knowledge, where the real sovereign is knowledge. No such state exists, but this is the best state of all. It does not count in ordinary classifications, but it is the ideal state, and other states are to be judged by it. Plato seems to regard this ideal state sometimes as a monarchy, or the rule of an all-wise one, sometimes as an aristocracy, or the rule of the best (the original meaning of aristocracy). It may best be termed Ideocracy, the state of the sovereign idea or reason.

2. States where there is imperfect knowledge. In such states laws are necessary, because of man's imperfection, and these laws are obeyed.

3. States where there is a lack of knowledge: states of ignorance, where laws exist and are not obeyed.

Deducting the first class, which does not exist, we have two classes left—states where law is obeyed, and states where it is not obeyed. With this basis, we also have the Socratic basis of the rule of one, of few and of many. Thus we have :

Form of constitution	States in which law is obeyed.	States in which law is not obeyed
Rule of One.	Monarchy.	Tyranny.
Rule of Few.	Aristocracy.	Oligarchy.
Rule of Many.	Moderate Democracy.	Extreme Democracy.

Plato classifies these also in order of merit. Monarchy is best : tyranny is worst. Aristocracy and oligarchy are intermediate. Democracy in states in which law is observed is the worse type ; but in non-law states it is the better. It is the weakest for virtue and also the weakest for vice.

Aristotle's classification likewise has a double basis. The first basis is that of Normal and Perverted. The criterion in this case is the end of the state. As a moral entity, the state pursues, or should pursue, the good life. Therefore every state which pursues the end of the good life is a Normal or True State. States which do not pursue this end are Perverted. Thus Normal, or True, and Perverted is the first basis. The second is the basis of number, as in Plato's classification, or the constitution, which determines the government. Thus we have :

Form of constitution.	Normal forms, in which the rulers unselfishly seek the common welfare.	Perverted forms, in which the rulers seek their own welfare.
Rule of One.	Monarchy.	Tyranny.
Rule of Few.	Aristocracy.	Oligarchy.
Rule of Many.	Polity.	Democracy.

"Polity" is a Greek word used by Aristotle to designate this particular type of government. Its nearest modern equivalent is constitutional democracy. It is the unselfish rule of the many for the common welfare.

Aristotle's classification is thus founded on (a) the end of the state, and (b) the constitution, or number of persons who actually hold power. It is important to remember the first of these bases, because many critics have rejected Aristotle's classification on the ground that it is based purely on number or quantity, as distinct from quality. Obviously, however, Aristotle accepted number only as a secondary standard. His chief standard for the definition of all things was the end, hence his distinction of normal and perverted, which is a distinction of quality.

Aristotle's classification may be called the fundamental classification of the forms of government. The classification is not sufficient for modern forms of government, but it has provided the historical basis of practically all classifications made hitherto. Even in modern classification the general ideas of Aristotle are frequently adopted.

In addition to their classifications of government, both Plato and Aristotle give what in their opinions are the cycles of political change. Plato's cycle starts from the highest form, ideocracy, the form which is the result of the highest type of mind. Plato classified states according to the qualities of mind shown in them, and his cycle of political change follows the same procedure. The highest type of state is that which has the highest type of mind as its basis, that is, the state where reason is supreme. The constitution resulting from this is Monarchy or Aristocracy, or preferably, in the Platonic language, Ideocracy, the rule of the idea or reason. Ideocracy degenerates in time into the type of state where spirit replaces reason. This type of government is known as Timocracy. Timocracy means government by the principle of honour or spiritedness. It is a military type of state. In the Timocratic state there are still elements of reason, but it also contains the element of desire, because of private property. Private property leads to money-making and in time Timocracy gives way to Oligarchy. In Oligarchy the wealthy classes rule. Gradually the people revolt against

**Cycles of
Political
Change :
Plato's
Cycle**

wealth and the oppression which wealth brings. This leads to Democracy. In Democracy the ordinary man-in-the-street is the characteristic type. It is the negation of order and freedom. There is no justice in Democracy, and no unity. Gradually Democracy passes into the hands of demagogues, and ultimately the most powerful demagogue seizes the reins of government and becomes sole ruler. This form of government, tyranny, is the worst type possible.

According to Aristotle, the cycle of political change starts from monarchy. The first governments, he considers, were monarchical. In early communities men of outstanding virtue were created kings. Gradually other persons of virtue and merit arose and tried to have a share in political power. This led to aristocracy. By the deterioration of the ruling class, aristocracy passed into oligarchy; from oligarchy the form of government changed into tyranny, and from tyranny the change was to democracy. Aristotle's theory of political change is based on the end of the government, just as was his classification of states. Plato's theory of political change is founded on the type of mind prevailing in the state.

2. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS

Many other attempts at the classification of the forms of government have been made by political theorists of all ages.

Other Classifications Machiavelli, the Italian writer, who ends the mediæval era and heralds the modern, adopts the

Aristotelian classification, and adds the mixed form of government, which, he says, is the best. The mixed form is given by both Cicero and Polybius. Machiavelli is mainly concerned with monarchies and democracies: different circumstances, according to him, require different forms of governmental organization. Jean Bodin, the first comprehensive political philosopher of modern times, bases his classification solely on the number of men in whose hands sovereignty rests. When the sovereign power is in the hands of an individual, the state is monarchic; when the sovereignty is in the hands of less than a majority of the citizens, the state is aristocratic; and when sovereignty rests in the majority, it is democratic. Monarchy, again, is classified by Bodin into three species—(a) Despotism, in

which the monarch, like the ancient patriarch, rules his subjects as the *pater familias* rules his slaves ; (b) Royal Monarchy, in which the subjects are secure in their rights of person and property, while the monarch, respecting the laws of God and of nature, receives willing obedience to the law he himself establishes ; and (c) Tyranny, in which the prince, spurning the laws of nature and of nations, abuses his subjects according to his caprice. Of these three species, Bodin regards Royal Monarchy—if the matter of succession is firmly fixed on the principle of heredity, primogeniture and the exclusion of the female line—as the best form of state or government. Thomas Hobbes is a close follower of Bodin and adopts Bodin's classification unreservedly. John Locke gives a new classification ; according to him “ the form of government depends upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative.” When the “ natural ” men first unite by compact into political society, the whole power of the community resides naturally in the majority. If this majority exercises that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and in executing those laws by officers of their own appointing, then the form of government is a perfect democracy ; if the power of making laws is put into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, it is an oligarchy ; if it is put into the hand of one man, it is a monarchy. Locke is careful to point out that there can be forms of government, but not forms of state. Montesquieu, the great French writer, classifies governments into (1) Republics, with their two varieties of democracy and aristocracy, (2) Monarchies (of the West), and (3) Despotisms (of the East). Each form has its peculiar principle—of democracy, public service ; of aristocracy, moderation ; of monarchy, honour ; of despotism, fear. The duration of any of these forms depends upon the persistence in a given society of that particular spirit which is characteristic of the form. According to Rousseau, the famous contemporary of Montesquieu, a government is called a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy, according as it is conducted by a majority or a minority of the people or by a single magistrate. There are, again, three forms of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary—of which elective aristocracy is the best, and hereditary the worst. Rousseau also allows for the existence of,

the "mixed" form of government, in which the various elements are combined.

Bluntschli accepts Aristotle's classification as fundamental, but he considers that a fourth form is necessary. This fourth form is Theocracy. Its perversion Bluntschli calls Idolocracy. There is no real necessity for this additional form of government. It is useful, indeed, to have the term theocracy to describe that form of government in which the ruler is supposed to interpret the will of God or in which God himself is actually supposed to rule, but theocracies can be classified under either monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. The modern Political Scientist is not concerned with the intervention of God in politics. His duty is to decide where in the last resort the supreme power in the government lies, and that supreme power, so far as he knows, must always lie in either one person or a number of persons.

The German writer, von Mohl, tries to classify states on an historical basis. His classification is (1) patriarchal states; (2) theocracies; (3) patrimonial states (in which sovereignty and the ownership of the land both belonged to the ruler); (4) classic states, such as those of Greece and Rome; (5) legal states; (6) despotic states. Von Mohl gives other types in addition to these and sub-divides classic states into monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. His classification is based on no single principle and it makes no attempt to distinguish the state from government.

Many other classifications have been given, particularly by German writers of last century. But not one of them gives a satisfactory basis on which to classify modern governments. Before proceeding to the classification of modern forms of government, we may first dismiss the form of state sometimes called "mixed state". In addition to monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, Aristotle himself speaks of this mixed type. The Stoics considered the mixed type as a good type of state, and Cicero and Polybius, both speak of the Roman state as a mixed form, composed of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. There is really no such form of state. The mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy does not make a mixed state. The state is sovereign and cannot be mixed. The form of government, however, may contain

The
"Mixed
State"

elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, but to say that there is a mixed state is to confuse the state with government.

For the classification of modern forms of government, it is hardly possible to adopt any single basis. Sir J. A. R. Marriott, the modern English writer, adopts a

**Sir J. A. R.
Marriott's
Basis of
Classifi-
cation**

tripartite basis. While accepting Aristotle's classifications as fundamental, he regards monarchy, aristocracy and democracy as somewhat inadequate for modern governments. Thus, to take five examples, England is a monarchy, Germany (before the War) was a monarchy, France is a democracy, Russia (before the War) was a monarchy and the United States is a democracy. Yet Germany, nominally a monarchy, was really more akin to the United States, which is a democracy, than it was to England which is a monarchy. England, a monarchy, is really more akin to France, nominally a democracy, than England was to the monarchical Russia. This comparison suggests a principle. If we take the pre-war Russia, France, Spain, Italy and Great Britain, they agree in this respect, that they are simple or unitary governments. Germany, the United States, Switzerland, the old Austria-Hungary, Canada, Australia and South Africa are complex, federal or composite. This is one basis of division. In a unitary type of Government the local organs, such as provincial and county bodies, are created by the central government ; the central government preserves power to abolish or alter these bodies as it wishes. In a federal government, both the central or federal authority, and the provincial or state authorities derive their powers from a constitution. In a federal government, each authority holds its power in such a way that the powers cannot be altered without the alteration of the constitution. So long as the constitution remains as it is, neither can affect the powers of the other.

The next basis is that of rigid and flexible constitutions. In a rigid constitution there is a marked distinction between the ordinary law-making powers and the constitution-making powers. In a flexible constitution, the ordinary legislature has constitution-making powers. In this way we may classify the United Kingdom and the old Austria-Hungary and all despotisms (where the will of a single individual is


the law-making power) as flexible, and the United States, France, Germany—in fact all other governments—as rigid.

The third basis of classification is Monarchical or Presidential government on the one hand, and Parliamentary, Responsible, or Cabinet government on the other. This is undoubtedly the most important basis of classification for modern governments. The criterion in this case is the relation of the executive to the legislature. Executive power in government may either be co-ordinate with, superior to, or subordinate to the legislature. Where the executive is superior to the legislature, the type of government may be called despotic. The executives in practically all modern democratic states are either co-ordinate with or subordinate to the legislature. In the United States, the executive is theoretically co-ordinate with the legislature. In France, Italy, Great Britain, the British self-governing Dominions and many other countries, the executive is subordinate to the legislature. Where the executive is subordinate to the legislature, the type of government is called *responsible* government, because the executive is responsible to the legislature. This type is also called Cabinet government. The name Cabinet government owes its origin to the English system where the Cabinet, which is the executive, is responsible to the House of Commons.

Thus we have, according to Marriott, three bases of division : (1) Simple or Unitary and Composite or Federal, or, simply, unitary and federal ; (2) Rigid and Flexible ; (3) Monarchical, Presidential, Non-responsible or Non-parliamentary and Parliamentary, Responsible or Cabinet government. Applying these criteria, we find that Great Britain is unitary, flexible and parliamentary. The United States is federal, rigid and presidential. France is unitary, rigid and parliamentary. Germany, before the War, was federal, rigid and presidential, or rather monarchical. The present Germany is federal, rigid and parliamentary. Austria-Hungary was composite, but not federal, flexible and parliamentary. The British self-governing Dominions, Canada, Australia and South Africa, are federal, rigid and parliamentary. India, at present, is difficult to classify, because it is in a transitional state. Its constitution is partly flexible, partly rigid : according to the Government of India Act of 1919, it is partly parliamentary and partly non-parliamentary. At

present India is more unitary than federal, but the future organization of India as a whole, including British India and the Indian States, is likely to be federal.

Professor Leacock, of McGill University, Montreal, gives almost a similar classification. Professor Leacock adopts as the fundamental distinction, despotic and democratic. Democratic states he subdivides into limited Monarchy, in which the nominal headship of a personal sovereign is preserved, and Republican Government, in which the head of the executive is appointed by the people. Each of these kinds, he subdivides into unitary and federal, and in turn each of these he subdivides into parliamentary and non-parliamentary. Professor Leacock's classification is best explained by his own table.



3. MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

The classification of Aristotle we have seen to be applicable only in a very general way to modern forms of government. The manifold new developments of modern democracy, and of government organization in general, have materially altered the traditional classification. We have now to adopt new bases of classification, but, mainly for historical purposes, we must analyse shortly the Aristotelian forms of government by themselves.

(1) Monarchy is the oldest type of government known.

It is the type invariably found in early societies. In connection with the origin of the state, we have already seen how from both the religious and civic senses of early man evolved a monarchical form of government. Whatever may be said against the various historical types of monarchy, there is no doubt that in the ruder stages of social development, the monarchical system was the most beneficial. Monarchy is marked by singleness of purpose, unity, vigour and strength. It secures order and strong government. The monarch in early societies combined in himself the functions of law-maker, judge and executive, and was thus able to hold together by his own personal force a society which otherwise might have broken up into many elements.

Monarchy may be classified in various ways. The most usual classification is Absolute Monarchy and Limited or Constitutional Monarchy. Another classification is Elective Monarchy and Hereditary Monarchy. Hereditary monarchy is the normal type, but there are several historical examples of elective monarchy. In early Rome the kings were elected, as also were the emperors in the Holy Roman Empire. The Polish kings used also to be elected. In early societies, too, there was a considerable element of election. Sometimes the crown fell to the lot of the ablest general of the royal family, who was elected by the chief men of the tribe or people. All modern monarchies are hereditary, although sometimes, as in the United Kingdom, the legislature regulates the succession to the throne.

Absolute Monarchy means that ultimately the monarch is the final authority in making, executing and interpreting law. His will is the will of the state. There are many historical examples of absolute monarchies. The most notable is the French monarchy under Louis XIV., who declared "The state is myself." Absolute monarchy is still common in parts of Asia and Africa, but with the spread of enlightenment it is rapidly dying out.

Hobbes is of opinion that of all forms of government absolute monarchy best answers the purpose for which sovereignty is instituted, and that, for the following reasons:—

**Hobbes's
Views**

- (1) A monarch's private interest is more intimately

bound up with the interests of his subjects than can be the case with the private interest of the members of a sovereign assembly.

- (2) A monarch is freer to receive advice from all quarters, and to keep that advice secret than an assembly.
- (3) Whereas the resolutions of a monarch are subject only to the inconstancy of human nature, those of an assembly are exposed to a further inconstancy arising from disagreement between its members.
- (4) A monarch "cannot disagree with himself out of envy or interest, but an assembly may, and that to such a height as may produce a civil war."

**Theo-
cracy** Absolute Monarchy is sometimes combined with theocracy. In theocracy, the ruler is supposed to be either the interpreter of the will of God or the direct instrument of God. Such a theory of government can have only one organization, and that is absolute monarchy. If the ruler is directly equivalent to God, then there is no appeal against his will. History gives many examples of theocratic government. The Jews considered themselves directly governed by God whose instrument was the King. The only states that can be called theocratic at the present day are the Mohammedan states, the fundamental law of which is the Koran. But in the modern Mohammedan states absolute monarchy is gradually being tempered by constitutional elements.

**Limited
Monarchy** By Limited Monarchy is meant a monarchy that is limited by a constitution. Sometimes constitutional rights have been wrested by the people from unwilling monarchs: sometimes monarchs have granted constitutions on their own initiative. Limited monarchy is thus a constitutional type of government, and as such is the same in principle as the republican type of government. The only difference between the limited monarchy and a republic is that in a republic the chief executive is elected, whereas in a monarchy the chief executive is hereditary. One of the chief merits of limited monarchy is that it secures continuity in the executive head of government. The main defect is that the hereditary principle is not a sound basis for the selection of the head of an executive. As a matter of fact, in modern limited

monarchies, the monarch as a rule has only nominal powers. In the United Kingdom, for example, the chief executive, though nominally the king, is really the Cabinet. For every public act of the king the ministers are actually responsible.

The limited monarchy of the United Kingdom occupies a special place. For one thing, the monarchy has been con-

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Limited Monarchy in the United Kingdom continuous, with only a slight break, ever since England became a nation. The institution is ingrained in the popular mind, and when other monarchies have been attacked or destroyed, no voice has been raised against the English kingship. The constitutional position of the king

makes him powerless in government affairs, nevertheless by his personality he is able to exert considerable influence on his ministers. But the chief virtue of the English monarchy is the sense of security which it fosters among the people. Monarchy, too, has the virtue of impressiveness. The pomp and dignity surrounding a throne not only attract the people but give additional impressiveness to both the institution of monarchy and the personality of the monarch. The usefulness of the king's personality was amply demonstrated in the Great War, when by practice and precept he encouraged, guided and warned the people.

The English monarchy is also invaluable as an Imperial asset. The king is the chief bond of union in the vast Empire: as Professor Lowell has pointed out, "the Crown is the only visible symbol of the union of the Empire, and this has undoubtedly had a considerable effect upon the reverence felt for the throne." General Smuts, the South African statesman, expressed identical sentiments when, speaking of the Empire, he said: "We are an organic union forming one whole with the king as the connecting link."

2. Aristocracy may be of various kinds: it may be aristocracy of wealth, of heredity, of intellect, or it may be military aristocracy. The real meaning of Aristocracy is the government of the best (the word "aristos" is a Greek word, meaning best). According to Aristotle's classification, aristocracy is a normal type of government, the perversion of which is oligarchy, or the rule of a few for their own interests. Unfortunately, aristocracy is very frequently confused with oligarchy, hence the

sinister meaning usually associated with the word aristocracy. Aristocracy is popularly regarded as equivalent to the rule of the higher classes in their own interest. Throughout the history of political thought the aristocratic type of government has been held up as the ideally best type. To avoid the word aristocracy, some writers use the term "aristo-democracy" which means that form of democratic government in which the best types of men wield the power.

Although aristocratic government, in the sense of the rule of the higher classes, is a thing of the past, it is not to be thought that aristocracy is essentially evil. Its chief quality is that it is conservative. It does not like change, and strongly resents rapid change. It reveres custom and tradition and tries to prevent the quick inrush of new ideas into government or society as a whole. In every government, for the sake of stability, there should be a certain amount of conservatism. The best principle of both social and political progress is the principle of conservative innovation. This means that every reform should be integrally connected with past institutions. A reform which is either too new or too unexpected disturbs popular feeling and as such is a danger to the stability of government. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance in social and political progress that the principle of progress or liberalism should always be joined to the principle of stability or conservatism.

We shall see in connection with the organization of the legislature that most modern governments attempt to preserve a certain amount of aristocracy in government by the system of Second Chambers. For Second Chambers the basis of selection is sometimes aristocracy of birth, sometimes aristocracy of wealth, sometimes aristocracy of intellect. Where the Second Chambers are elected, the elections are usually so arranged as to make the Second Chamber representative of the best minds in the nation. Such a system, therefore, is aristocratic in the best sense.

The chief weakness of aristocracy is that division of the people into classes pleases nobody. It is impossible for any man or body of men to divide a people into social classes by any satisfactory criterion. A very common basis of classification is property or wealth. In any society the propertied or wealthy

Merits of Aristocracy

Weakness of Aristo- cracy

class is relatively small, and rule by this class is resented by the large or non-propertied classes as oligarchical (oligarchy literally means the rule of the few). It is equally impossible to divide any community into classes by intellectual or moral qualifications.

3. Democracy is pre-eminently the modern type of government. It is the type of government to which all other types are moving. Democracy literally means the 'rule of the people (the Greek word "demos" means the people), or popular government. It is the government of the people, by the people and for the people. It is of two kinds : (1) pure or direct democracy, and (2) representative or indirect democracy.

In the first type, pure or direct democracy, the will of the state is expressed directly through the people themselves. Such a type of democracy is possible

Direct

Democracy

only where the area of the state is very small,—where the people of the state can all meet and deliberate together to make laws. This type of democracy existed in all the Greek city-states. It must be remembered that in these city-states, only the citizens were allowed to take part in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. Not all the inhabitants were citizens. The citizens were often in a minority of one to two ; the majority was made up of slaves. The direct democracy of the ancient Greeks was possible only because the manual work in the state was done by slaves. In modern democracy the very class which was excluded in Greece—the workers—is the most important. Greek democracy was a democracy in relation to the citizens in the state, but it was a very close aristocracy in relation to the total population in the state.

Modern Democracy is indirect or representative. In modern large nation states it is physically impossible for all the citizens to meet together and deliberate.

Indirect or

Represent-

tative D-mo-

cracy

Even if it were possible, the work of legislation would be so great that the ordinary industrial and commercial life of the country could not be carried on. Modern democracy, therefore, rests on the principle of representation. Instead of everybody attending the Legislative Assembly the people elect representatives by vote. These representatives attend the Legislative Assembly and act on behalf of the citizens. If the

citizens are not satisfied with their representatives, they may reject them in the next elections. This system of representative democracy combines the principle of aristocracy—in the sense of the rule of those best qualified to rule—with that of democracy.

Representation is only an approximate way of expressing the will of the people. As yet no perfect system of representation has been devised. The chief defects of democracy are due to the fact that it has been found impossible to make a perfect organization for democracy. In theory democracy is the best form of government. It is the government of the people as distinct from the government of an individual or of a class of people. It makes all the citizens interested in their country by giving them a voice in legislation. It educates and ennobles the individual citizen: it gives each a sense of responsibility which gives a new meaning to his personality.

Another virtue of democracy is that it is less liable to revolution than other forms of government. Popular government is government by common consent. From its very nature, therefore, it is not likely to be revolutionary. On the other hand there is always the danger in democracy that it may develop into what Aristotle regarded as the perversion of democracy, namely, mob rule or ochlocracy. The Greek writers continually bring before us the danger of demagogues and this danger is as marked in modern democracy as it was in ancient democracy. The word demagogue literally means a leader of the people: actually it means one who tries to stir up popular passion against either the government or the higher social classes.

The greatest of all the dangers of Democracy, is, as Plato pointed out, that it may be the rule of ignorance. Democracy, it is often said, pays attention to *quantity* and not to *quality*. The business of government is highly technical. It requires expert administrators, and expert legislators. Not everyone can be a profound thinker on government matters, but every citizen should acquaint himself with current problems so as to pass an intelligent opinion on them. The danger of democracy is that the citizens may not be sufficiently educated to appreciate the meaning of the issues.

**Virtues and
Dangers of
Modern
Democracy**

**The
Rule of
Ignorance**

which come before them at elections. They may be misled either by demagogues or by class passions. Great responsibility is thrown on them at every election, for upon the type of representatives they choose will depend the future course of legislation. The popular vote must be given to the best men. Both in Britain and in America it would be possible to show that the best thinkers of their time, if indeed they wished to be elected to the Legislative Assembly, could have been elected. In modern democracies, on the whole, the popular vote has proved a good selective agency. The modern "demos" has not proved so lacking in judgment as many of the opponents of democracy would have us believe.

The only certain antidote to demagoguery is the sound education of the masses : in fact the back-bone of all democracies is sound education. Where each individual has a voice in government, he should be instructed in public matters to make his voice intelligent. In modern democracy the necessity of a sound educational system as a rule has been recognized. Democracy is the result of popular education, and sound popular education is the chief need of democracy.

4. CABINET OR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENTIAL OR NON-RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

It is necessary to give a little more attention to the above types of government because either they are, or they are tending to become, the prevailing types of government at the present day. The Cabinet system of government owes its origin to Great Britain, and the present system of government in Great Britain is the best existing example of Cabinet government. The government of the United States provides the best example of Presidential or non-responsible government. The Great War has tested both these systems of governments and enables us to pass certain definite judgments upon them.

In the English system the Cabinet is the head of the executive as well as the directing power in the legislature. The Cabinet is chosen from the political party which commands the majority in the House of Commons. The head of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, is appointed by the king and after his appointment he selects his ministers who also are technically appointed by the king. The Cabinet

**Cabinet
Government
in the United
Kingdom**

is representative of both the House of Lords and the House of Commons, but is responsible only to the House of Commons. As a rule it includes the heads of the chief executive departments of the government. Indirectly it may be said that the Cabinet is chosen by the House of Commons for, although the Prime Minister can exercise his own will in the matter of choice, he is bound to select the chief men of the political party in power. The Cabinet is jointly responsible to the House of Commons for the action of its individual members and, in the case of defeat by the House, the Cabinet must resign. The Cabinet, moreover, has the power, through the Prime Minister, to advise the king to dissolve the House of Commons. Although the Cabinet is but a committee of the legislature, it really is its master.

The Cabinet system in Great Britain is a direct contradiction of the theory of the separation of powers, of which we shall speak later. The theory of the American constitution is that the legislative, executive and the judicial branches of government should be independent of each other, but in the English constitution, both the legislative and the executive control lies in the Cabinet. The Cabinet links together the executive and the legislature. In theory the king is the head of the executive, but in actual practice the king is not responsible for the acts of his ministers. The Cabinet also is a permanent link between the people as a whole, and the legislature. In virtue of its power to recommend a dissolution of Parliament, it helps to preserve harmony between the will of the people and the legislature. Further, during the War, by the Defence of the Realm Act, the Cabinet was able to interfere with the ordinary rights of the citizens as enjoyed in peace time. During the War it was able to circumvent the fundamental fact of English liberty, namely, the rule of law. This action was necessary in order to strengthen the executive, as a strong executive is essential for the conduct of war.

According to the American Constitution, the President of the United States is the independent executive head. The founders of the constitution recognized that an essential of good government is a vigorous head of the executive. To make the executive independent from interference, the Americans adopted the theory of the separation of powers.

**Presidential
Government
in the
United
States**

They established an independent legislature, an independent executive and an independent judiciary. The President is head of the American executive. He is elected for four years and, according to the custom of America, cannot be elected more than twice. His powers are definitely limited by the constitution. Some of his executive authority he holds in conjunction with the Senate: the greater part of his authority he exercises by himself. He appoints his own ministers and can remove them. His ministers are not members of the legislature nor are he and his ministers responsible to the legislature for their acts. The limits on the power of the President are: (a) the limits laid down in the Constitution; (b) the limits laid down by the statute law of the land (if the President or any of his ministers exceed their legal authority their acts will be nullified by the courts); and (c) the political limits. The President is elected by the people. He is the nominee of a political party and as such to a certain extent must try to please the party, but as no President may be re-elected more than once, the political limit is only temporarily effective.

In time of peace Cabinet government has several advantages. In the first place, it secures men of outstanding ability as leaders in the legislature and in the executive. **Comparison** In modern democracies it is difficult for men without ability to rise to Cabinet rank. The Prime Minister especially must have qualities which mark him out above his fellow-men. Not only is the Prime Minister responsible for the making and the execution of the laws, but he is also the leader of his own party. As a leader of his own party his policy very largely is the policy of the party. The Prime Minister must therefore be a man of commanding personality; and it is to his advantage to have round him the ablest men we can find.

In the second place, the Cabinet system of Great Britain is educative. The party system, on which it is founded, demands high organization, and the duties of party organizations are to win elections. To win elections means securing the votes of the people, and, as each party is as keen as the other to win, the people have always before them the various sides of the questions before the country. In America, too, the party system prevails, but in the Cabinet system of Great Britain the responsibility of the Cabinet to the House

of Commons, or its ability to secure the majority of votes in the House gives an additional zest to party politics. In America the executive, once in office, cannot be turned out by any party till the period of office is over. In Britain the Cabinet may be turned out of office by an adverse vote at any time.

In the third place, the Cabinet, by virtue of its position as head of the executive and as directing power in the legislature, is able to carry through measures which *for executive reasons* are necessary or advisable. In America Congress need not carry through a single measure recommended by the President.

In the fourth place, the Cabinet is continuously responsible for its executive actions. The members of the House of Commons by means of questions, motions, etc., exercise continual supervision over the executive departments.

In the fifth place, the debates in the House of Commons are party debates. They give both sides of the question at issue, and, to avoid defeat, the Cabinet has to present as sound a case as possible before the House.

The Great War showed also that the Cabinet system is flexible. It is well known that in times of crisis, such as a great war, one directing head is better than many heads. The government in England was able to adapt itself to the new situation created by the war by evolving from within itself a small body whose special duty it was to conduct the war. But the advantage of flexibility was more than discounted by the lack of unity which became apparent in England soon after the beginning of the war. Undoubtedly the greatest defect of Cabinet government is that it cannot *at once* adapt itself to meet great emergencies, such as wars. For emergencies a dictator is more useful than a council. One bad general, as Napoleon said, is better than two good ones.

Presidential government is shown at its best in time of war. . Once war was declared in America, President Wilson became a dictator. He was able to direct all resources of the United States without any interference to one end. It is true, particularly in the very early stages of the War, that the Cabinet was able to do very much the same for Great Britain, but as the war progressed, it became more and more

The Experience of the Great War

necessary to concentrate the power of direction in the hands of fewer men. Throughout the whole War, the Cabinet in Great Britain was subject to the will of the House of Commons. If the House of Commons had so cared, it might have turned the Cabinet out of office at any critical period in the War. As a matter of fact, in the later stages of the War, it is well known that there were considerable dissensions in the Cabinet and in Parliament itself. One Prime Minister had to resign, and several appointments were made not for purely executive reasons, but from the desire to conciliate the party leaders in the House of Commons. While the President of the United States belongs to a political party, he is completely independent while he holds office. In war he is an autocrat. He dictates to Congress legislative measures necessary for the conduct of war, and on the executive side he can carry on his work without fear or favour.

It may be said that a dictatorship of this kind is a danger to public liberty. The liberty of the American citizens was no more adversely affected during the war than the liberty of the British. In both Britain and America everything had to be subservient to success in the struggle, and the old ideas of individual liberty were completely submerged for this end.

It is clear, then, that in times of war the presidential is the better system. Although both the Cabinet and the president are elected by party votes, the president is able to shake himself free from party ties more easily than the Cabinet. In Cabinet government, too, a great deal of time may be lost in useless discussion. During the War a considerable part of the time and energy of those responsible for its conduct was taken up by meeting objections to various points raised by members of the legislature. While discussion in times of peace is one of the benefits of Cabinet government, in time of war it is one of its greatest defects.

Presidential government of the type existing in the United States, although it is more beneficial in war, does not appear to be so beneficial in time of peace. Thus in the United States of America, the great Presidents have been those men who have had to cope with national crises. The history of the United States has been marked by relatively

few national crises, so that the good qualities of presidential government have not been frequently tested. In times of peace the President's general duties are to execute the laws as efficiently as possible. His executive work is largely done by his ministers, and if he is careful in his choice of ministers, the tenure of his office may be uneventful and easy. The only statesmanlike act which the President is called upon to do in normal times is to review the position of the country in his presidential messages to Congress. These messages may be or may not be acceptable to Congress. The President has no power to compel Congress to pass any law. The future of his messages is entirely at the mercy of the good feeling of Congress. By the party system in the United States, the President usually belongs to the same political party as the majority in Congress for the time being. But although the party organization in the United States is the strongest in the world, the actual dividing lines between the parties in matters of political opinion or proposed legislation are so indistinct that the party similarity of President and Congress is no guarantee that the President's views will prevail.

To sum up, the English Cabinet system compares favourably with the presidential system in times of peace, but unfavourably with it in times of war.

CHAPTER XII

THEORY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

I. STATEMENT OF THE THEORY

The Functions of Government In every government there is a large number of activities or functions, which are usually classified thus—legislative, executive and judicial. In India the division is effected by the existence of legislative councils, executive councils and the courts, with the judicial services. The legislative function is concerned mainly with the making of laws, or the laying down of general rules to guide those within the state. The executive ‘executes’ or carries out these general rules; the judicial decides how these rules apply in given cases.

Montesquieu's Statement of the Theory of Separation of Powers The classical statement of the Theory of the Separation of Powers is given by Montesquieu in the *Spirit of the Laws* (1748), in the course of his analysis of the Constitution of England. He says :—
“ In every government there are three sorts of power : the legislative ; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations ; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.

By virtue of the first, the prince, or magistrate, enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.

The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted that one man be not afraid of another.

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

Again there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.

There would be an end of everything, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals."

The English jurist Blackstone's expression of the theory is also much-quoted :—" Whenever the right of making and enforcing the law is vested in the same man or one and the same body of men, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws and execute them in a tyrannical manner since he is possessed, in his quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which he as legislator thinks proper to give himself. . . . Were it (the judicial power) joined with the legislative, the life, liberty, and property of the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges whose decisions would be regulated only by their opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law, which, though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound to observe. Were it joined with the executive, this union might be an over-balance of the legislative."

**Black-
stone's
Statement**

Although Montesquieu's statement was made in the 18th century, the existence of various " powers " was recognized long before then. Aristotle, Cicero, Polybius and other writers of Greece and Rome distinguished various functions in government.

**Historical
Divisions of
" Powers "**

Aristotle (in *Politics*, IV, 14) divided them into—

1. Deliberative.
2. Magisterial.
3. Judicial.

The first, deliberative, was concerned with such general

questions as war and peace, treaties, law-making, finance, death-punishment, exile and confiscation. Deliberation was also concerned with general political questions. The scope of the deliberative function of government was thus very wide including more than the modern legislative function. Some modern writers use the term deliberative to denote a function of government which is not properly speaking the legislative, but the power behind the legislative power, i.e., public opinion, the press, etc., which is the thinking function, preliminary to legislation. Aristotle's magisterial function is roughly equivalent to the modern executive; the third is our modern judicial.

Aristotle's division is a rough one and as such it represents the actual practice of his time. In Greece there was no clear distinction between the "powers". The Assembly in Athens considered the laws (deliberative) and made the laws (legislative), and it also had wide executive and judicial powers. The archons were executive officers chiefly, but they were also judges. Likewise in Rome, there was no legislative clearly demarcated from the judicial or executive, although there was not as much concentration in one body as in Greece. The comitia in Rome was predominantly legislative, yet it did both executive and judicial work, (e.g., it decided on death sentence appeals). The magistrates were mainly executive, but by their edicts they were legislators and they had also jurisdiction as judges. The Senate was both legislative (its resolutions had the force of law) and executive. Polybius, the Greek historian of Rome, gives the idea of separation when, in describing the constitution of Rome, he praises the balance of power between senate, consuls and tribunes.

In the mediæval world there was little distinction. The king was regarded as the maker of laws, the supreme executor of the laws and the supreme judge. This theory held also for subordinates of the king. In England, for example, the king was the final repository of justice. For purposes of administration he had to delegate powers, e.g., to the Lord High Chancellor, who was technically the "keeper of the king's conscience" and as such the dispenser of equity in the king's name.

Bodin, in *The Republic*, voiced the theory much in the same way as Montesquieu did later. He urged especially

that judicial functions should be given to independent judges. This in fact was an actual historical tendency, for in France the king had, in part, given over the administration of justice to tribunals, reserving powers of confirmation to himself. Bodin argued that, if the king were both law-maker and judge, then a cruel king might give cruel sentences. Justice, he said, and the prerogative of mercy should not be mixed up together. Later, in English history, the union of the powers was shown by the "suspending" and "dispensing" powers whereby the arbitrary earlier Stuart monarchs, in virtue of their combining legislative, executive and judicial functions in themselves, could depart from law either in their own cases or in the cases of others. The reaction against this is seen in the constitution of the Protectorate where the executive and legislative were separated. Locke, whose theories of government were meant to justify the Great Rebellion, divided the powers into legislative, executive and federative.

The division into legislative, executive, and judicial is not universally accepted by modern writers. Other powers have been given, for example:—

- (a) The deliberative, as distinct from the legislative. (The making of laws, however, really includes this, though it is a useful distinction to make in order to study the organization of the intellectual and moral forces in a state).
- (b) The moderating power, or co-ordinating power.
- (c) The administrative power.
- (d) The inspective power.
- (e) The representative power.

Bluntschli divides the powers of government into legislative, administrative or governmental, and judicial, but to these he adds two other groups of functions or organs, each subordinate to the administration or government—(a) superintendence and care of the elements of civilization (in German, *Staatskultur*) ; (b) the administration and care of material interests (the earlier sense of Political Economy). Bluntschli regards both these matters as not properly belonging to the administration ; they are outside government, and all that government can do in their case is to superintend and foster. The place of such additional functions depends

on the more fundamental conception of the province of government.

A modern American writer, Professor J.Q. Dealey, divides the functions thus :—

- | | |
|--|---|
| Professor
Dealey's
Classification | (1) The executive, from which is differentiating |
| | (2) The administrative, |
| | (3) The law-making department, from which should be distinguished the following :— |
| | (4) The legal sovereign, |
| | (5) The judicial system, from which is separating (in the United States), |
| | (6) A special court for the authoritative interpretation of the written constitution ; and |
| | (7) The electorate, which is steadily increasing its powers at the expense of the three historic departments of government. |

Such a classification opens the way to almost endless subdivision, all of which may be useful for description, but not for general classification. There is no essential difference between the ordinary judicial system and constitutional judicial system. Nor, again, is there any reason why the classification should stop at the electorate. The electorate in modern democracy is all important, but as an electorate it does not make laws. If the electorate is given as a subdivisor, then the pulpit, press and platform might be added as well. Further, if the legal sovereign is separately classified, still more should the political sovereign be mentioned.

A Two- fold Division	Some modern writers (mainly French) prefer a twofold to a threefold classification. They give a division into legislative and executive, regarding the judicial as a part of the executive. The writers who give this dual theory usually subdivide the executive into
	purely executive, administrative, and judicial.

The purely executive consists in supervision and direction, the administrative in the actual performance of the details of the work ; the judicial is the interpretation of the general laws and their application to individual cases. Continental theory and practice give a sharp distinction between the judicial executive and the administrative executive. The system of administrative law, by which public officers are

subject to a separate law and legal procedure from private individuals, is the deciding factor in this distinction.

To regard the judicial function as part of the executive is unsound. The reason for the union is that most legal decisions as a rule involve executive action. A **Criticism** judge says whether a law applies or how it applies to a given case, and action is taken accordingly. Law courts make orders, but that is not essential to the judicial function. Many judicial decisions do not involve execution. In certain spheres of legislation there is no executive action, whereas in even ordinary cases actual execution (as between parties in a law suit) does not depend on the courts. There is a distinct connexion between the executive and the judicial: they cannot be separated from each other absolutely: nor can the legislative and executive or legislative and judicial. Judges make laws by setting up precedents, and to refuse the distinction between legislative and judicial would be as logical as to refuse that between executive and judicial. The Theory of the Separation of Powers is not an absolute rule; properly understood, it indicates only general theoretical and practical tendencies.

The practical effect of Montesquieu's theory was very marked. Among the many doctrines of liberty which have influenced men's minds, this more than any other has affected the actual working of government. **Practical Effect of Montesquieu's Theory** Concentration of power favours absolute monarchy or despotism, and after the blows dealt to monarchy in England in the seventeenth century and in France in the eighteenth century, it was natural that some practical theory of government should be produced. The Social Contract of Locke was democratic enough, but it was a mere theory, and partially an unsound one. The separation of powers, however, was a practical issue of the most far-reaching importance. Montesquieu's doctrine became a political gospel which bore fruit in the reorganization of governments in France after the Revolution and in the United States after the War of Independence.

Most of the leaders of opinion in America after the War of Independence favoured the theory. The individual state constitutions adhered to the principle as far as **In America** possible. One of the most typical is the constitution of Massachusetts (1780), which declares that in the

government of Massachusetts "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them, the executive shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them to the end that there may be a government of laws and not of men." In France, too, the Declaration of Rights, at the time of the French Revolution, expressly accepted the theory, saying that where there is no separation of powers there is no constitution. The actual scheme formulated as a result was a legislature not dissolvable by the head of the executive; executive officers could not sit in the legislative houses, and judges were elected. The king had no initiative and a very limited veto.

2. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY

The greatest defect of the Theory of the Separation of Powers is that, as expressed by Montesquieu and Blackstone, it states as a universal theory what can only be partially realized in fact. The theory expresses some general tendencies, but there can be no rigid demarcation between the so-called "powers." The state is an organic unity, and just as the various parts of the body depend on each other so the various parts of the state machinery are interrelated. A glance at the actual practice of governments shows this. It may also be noted, considering that England did not resort to an absolute separation of powers, and that England was the example referred to by Montesquieu, that he did not intend to advocate the entire disjunction of the powers or departments as has been done by so many of his followers. As Madison says (in the *Federalist*) Montesquieu's theory meant that where the *whole* powers of one department are exercised by the same hands which possess the *whole* powers of another department, the fundamental principles of a free government are subverted.

In the government of the United States, where the theory was consciously adopted, the legislature is not absolutely separated from the executive. The head of the executive, the President, exercises very considerable influence over the legislature (Congress). He has a partial veto over acts passed by the legislative bodies, and although not himself a member

**Absolute
Demar-
cation is
Impossible**

**America,
an
Example**

of Congress, by his presidential messages he can influence the course of legislation. The Senate also has certain executive functions, e.g., ratification of treaties and of certain appointments.

The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the federal judges, and the federal courts have an enormous influence on both the legislature and the executive. In a federal form of government the judicial branch of government occupies a unique place in relation to both the executive and the legislature. The existence of the federal constitutional law colours every act of the legislature. Constitutional law being above ordinary law, the courts have to decide whether legislative and executive acts are *intra vires*, that is, within the legal powers of the legislature or not. The same is true of the judiciary and executive. In fact the all-pervading nature of the judicial element shows the complete impossibility of absolute separation. In the state governments in the United States separation is more marked. In the states the system of separate election of the various legislative, executive, and judicial officers of government prevails, but even there the governors have as a rule certain powers of veto over the legislatures, and the system itself has proved far from satisfactory, particularly in the election of judges and subordinate executive officers.

In the United States the whole system of party organization, the most elaborate in the world, has grown up as a protest against the rigid demarcation of powers insisted on by the founders of the American Constitution. Where, as in America, there is no guarantee that the head of the executive and the majority of the legislature will be in general agreement, there is the possibility of friction and deadlocks. The party system has grown up to ensure that the legislative houses and the President should be of the same political ideas, and thus secure harmonious working in the government machine.

The British Constitution is the best example of the non-applicability of the theory. The Lord Chancellor, who is at once a member of the Cabinet, of the House of Lords, and the head of the Judiciary, is a standing refutation of the doctrine of separation of powers. This is all the more peculiar, because Montesquieu greatly admired the British system. Instead of

**The British
Constitu-
tion**

the executive and legislative being separate in Britain, they are virtually one. Nominally, of course, the legislature (the King-in-Parliament) is distinct from the executive (the King and ministers), but as a matter of fact the controlling force in both executive and legislative is the Cabinet. The Cabinet consists mainly of the heads of departments who carry on the actual executive work of government, and, as a Cabinet, they guide the whole course of legislation. The House of Lords, which is the upper chamber of the legislature, is also a supreme court of appeal. Thus in Montesquieu's favourite type lies the negation of his theory. The union of powers in the Cabinet, however, was not so marked when Montesquieu wrote as it is now. Blackstone, as a jurist, did not recognize the Cabinet, which is an extra-legal organization.

In France and Germany there is no thorough-going separation. In France, the President is elected by the two houses of the legislature convened together. His ministers are very much like the English Cabinet, only as ministers they have a separate name ("Council of Ministers"), and have a slightly different organization from their organization as a Cabinet. The members of the Cabinet are the representatives of the majority in the popular house, and in practice they are the ministers of the President. The Cabinet is a political body, which controls the President. The Council of Ministers are his servants; yet they are the same body. The President is head of the executive: the executive departments are created by his decree: yet no decree of the President holds good unless it is agreed to or countersigned by the minister who is head of the department affected. The President has no veto over legislation, but he can demand reconsideration of a measure, and with the consent of the Senate he can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. He has also considerable powers in matters of adjournment and in re-election. In the new Germany, the "powers" are combined as in France, except that the President has more power of interference in legislation. In all Responsible governments, the executive is subject to the legislative; thus the "powers" are really combined.

In the pre-war Germany, the Emperor was the head of the executive for the Empire; but he was also King of

Prussia and as such could influence the legislation of the Empire in any way he pleased by means of his all-powerful Prussian representation in the Bundesrath. The Bundesrath, too, had large administrative powers. As the federal organ it had the oversight of imperial administration. It had large powers of appointment, including appointments to the chief Court or Reichsgericht. It was also a judicial body with extensive powers.

On the continent of Europe the prevalent system of administrative law is a contradiction of the Theory of Separation. By this system government officials, in respect to their official acts, are subject to a separate judicial process from ordinary citizens. They are judged by Administrative Courts which are composed partly of executive officials and partly of judges. On the continent this system is regarded as essential to the liberty of the citizen. It may be noted that it is continued in the new German constitution, which was adopted by a very democratic National Assembly.

In no constitution in the world can there be absolute separation. The functions of modern governments act and react on each other like the parts of a delicately constructed scientific instrument. A state is an organic unity, and any attempt to break up the unity by absolute separation of the parts must necessarily fail. Actual experience has shown that where the most thorough-going attempts at separation have been made, sores have broken out in the body politic. Where the constitution, as in the United States, is difficult to amend, extra legal organizations have grown up to remedy the sores. Liberty, moreover, does not depend on the mechanical separation of powers. Great Britain, where the organization of government is a complete negation of the theory, is one of the freest countries in the world. The United States, where the theory has been tried, is also a very free country, which points to the fact that freedom depends on factors other than the separation of powers. Freedom depends on the spirit of people and their laws and institutions, not on the mechanism of institutions themselves. In Britain, the rule of law secures freedom; and America borrowed the legal principles of

**Adminis-
trative
Law**

**Government
the
Organ-
ization
of an
Organic
Unity**

**Liberty
has other
Causes**

Britain. Both peoples are free in spirit, therefore their institutions are free.

Again, as John Stuart Mill points out in his *Representative Government*, if every department were rigidly cut off from every other department of government, one department would be so jealous of the other that it would try to defeat its object. The result would be loss of efficiency. This argument would be particularly true where an executive was opposed in political opinion to a legislature. Either consciously or unconsciously the executive would not carry out the laws of the country according to the spirit in which the laws were passed.

The theory, further, may prove actually harmful in practice. In the United States, the election of judges and executive officers has resulted in much evil, and these elections were meant primarily to secure the independence of the various branches of government. What has happened is that the individual citizens have suffered in order to test a theory. The principle of separation may thus be actually antagonistic to liberty.

Further, each department at once exercises all three functions. An executive officer has to judge in every act whether it is legal or not. Likewise he may make many bye-laws. It is impossible to cut off any one function or any combination of functions from the others.

Again, the theory leads to the mistake of the equality of the powers. The departments or "powers" are not equal.

The legislative is superior: it makes the framework in which the machinery operates. The expression of the will must come before the movement of the hand; as Bluntschli says: "As the whole is more than any of its parts of members, so the legislative power is superior to all the other particular powers." The supremacy of the legislative is particularly confirmed by its power over the purse. By its control over finance it limits and controls the executive, however theoretically independent the executive may be.

One point of separation which the theory demands has been adopted in the independence of the judiciary. How far the judiciary is actually independent will be discussed later.

The theory of the Separation of Powers thus indicates only general tendencies. It is not an absolute law, and experience proves that, where it has been most thoroughly applied, it has not proved satisfactory. The cause of its existence, the liberty of the people, does not depend on the rigid division of powers, but upon other things.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ELECTORATE AND LEGISLATURE

1. THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION

We have seen that democracy is of two kinds, direct and indirect. In direct democracy every citizen takes a direct part in making the laws of the state ; in indirect democracy the citizens elect representatives to voice their opinions. Modern states are much larger in area than the old Greek city states, and it is a physical impossibility for all citizens to meet together to propose or discuss measures. Modern democracy rests on representation, the system by which citizens, instead of attending the law-making assembly themselves, elect others to act for them.

In every modern state there is an electorate, the people who are qualified by the law of the state to elect members of the legislative assembly. In modern democracies there is considerable variation in electoral laws. In some states theoretically every adult has a vote ; in others many are disqualified from voting. The tendency of democracy is to widen the electorate. " One man, one vote " is a central maxim of democracy, and in the most advanced democracies women are allowed to vote on equal terms with men.

During the last century and a half an enormous amount has been written on theories of representation. Exercise of the vote, or suffrage, says one school, is an inherent right of every citizen in a state. This theory owes its modern vogue to the theory of Rousseau that sovereignty resides in the general will. This was held by many leaders of the French Revolution, who, however, did not put the theory into practice when they had the chance. The opposite school says that only those should vote who can understand the questions on

**Direct and
Indirect
Democracy**

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Electorate**

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Represent-
ation**

which they vote and are able to contribute something to the common welfare. Among well-known modern enemies of the theory of universal suffrage may be mentioned John Stuart Mill, Lecky, Sir Henry Maine, Professor Sidgwick, and Bluntschli. These writers are not enemies of democracy as such; they are enemies of a particular type of democracy or of particular tendencies in democracy.

What we find in actual practice is a middle position. Those who hold that every citizen should have a vote must first define the word citizen. If the word means every able-bodied, sane, grown-up individual who can understand the elementary relations of things, and who by birth and loyalty belongs to the state in which he, or she, votes, then there would be little to say against the theory of universal suffrage. But if the word citizen means merely residents in a particular territory without owning allegiance to the state in which they live, then modern practice is against the theory. In modern states not every one is allowed to vote. Generally speaking, only those who know what they are voting about are allowed to exercise the suffrage. Thus children and lunatics are excluded. It is difficult to say, of course, when a person is grown up. Some are more intelligent than others at an earlier age, but what we find is that for all purposes each government recognizes an age of majority. Minors are not allowed to vote: similarly people of unsound mind, who cannot understand public questions, are universally excluded.

John Stuart Mill, in a well-known passage in his *Representative Government*,^{*} voices the theory of the educational qualification thus:—"I regard it is wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write, and I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic. Justice demands, even when the suffrage does not depend on it, that the means of attaining these elementary acquirements should be within the reach of every person, either gratuitously, or at an expense not exceeding what the poorest who earn their own living can afford.

If this were really the case, people would no more think of giving the suffrage to a man who could not read, than of giving it to a child who could not speak; and it would not

**The
Educational
Qualifi-
cation:
John
Stuart
Mill's.
Statement
of it**

be society that would exclude him, but his own laziness. When society has not performed its duty, by rendering this amount of instruction accessible to all, there is some hardship in the case, but it is a hardship that ought to be borne. If society has neglected to discharge two solemn obligations, the more important and more fundamental of the two must be fulfilled first : universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement. No one but those in whom an *a priori* theory has silenced common sense will maintain that power over others, over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired the commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of themselves, for pursuing intelligently their own interests, and those of the persons most nearly allied to them. This argument, doubtless, might be pressed further, and made to prove much more. It would be eminently desirable that other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic could be made necessary to the suffrage ; that some knowledge of the conformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of general history, and of the history and institutions of their own country, could be required from all electors. But these kinds of knowledge, however indispensable to an intelligent use of the suffrage, are not, in this country, nor probably anywhere save in the Northern United States, accessible to the whole people ; nor does there exist any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have been acquired or not. The attempt, at present, would lead to partiality, chicanery, and every kind of fraud. It is better that the suffrage should be conferred indiscriminately, than that it should be given to one and withheld from another at the discretion of a public officer. In regard, however, to reading, writing, and calculating, there need be no difficulty. It would be easy to require from every one who presented himself for registry that he should, in the presence of the registrar, copy a sentence from an English book, and perform a sum in the rule of three ; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity, the honest application of so very simple a test. This condition, therefore, should in all cases accompany universal suffrage, and it would, after a few years, exclude none but those who cared so little for the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be an indication of any real political opinion."

Bankrupts and criminals are excluded from the vote.

Other Excluded Classes The exclusion from the vote is not a part of their criminal sentence but the logical result of their acts. People who cannot be honest or who will not obey the laws of the land cannot be expected to contribute to the public welfare by their votes.

Criminals

In some states government servants are excluded from the vote—particularly soldiers on active service. Large bodies of men congregated together, servants of government, might unite to overcome the government; or the influence of electoral excitement might undermine the discipline so necessary in an army.

Government Servants

In most states government officials responsible for the conduct of elections are debarred from the vote. Exclusion in their case is aimed at securing fair-mindedness and neutrality in the conduct of elections.

Election Officials

A very common qualification for the exercise of a vote is the property qualification. The theory underlying the property qualification is that only those who own a certain amount of property may fairly be regarded as having a stake in the country. One aspect of this qualification is that only those who pay taxes should be allowed to vote. John Stuart Mill, in his *Representative Government*, holds this view. "It is important," he says, "that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and not to economise as far as money matters are concerned, and any power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government, a severance of the power of control from the interest in its beneficial exercise."

The Property Qualification

If it is true that only those who pay taxes should be electors, modern democracy holds it equally true that there should be no taxation without representation. If an individual pays taxes, it is now recognized that he has a right to have a voice in legislation. It will be remembered that this principle was the basis of the American War of Independence.

Taxation and Representation

In modern democracies the control of national finance lies

usually in the lower house of the legislature, i.e., the house which is elected directly by the people. In Britain, for example, the House of Lords has no voice in the annual budget, so that in a sense, although the Lords compose a legislative chamber by themselves, they really are unrepresented in financial matters.

Sex^o Another test, which is now rapidly disappearing is sex. Only in recent years have women
Qualifica- ing is sex. Only in recent years have women
tion been allowed to vote.

The actual practice of modern governments will be seen in the analysis given in later chapters of the con-
Modernstitutions of several states. The actual laws
Practice prevailing may be shortly summarized here :—

1. In the United Kingdom, till 1918, the laws governing suffrage were exceedingly complex. So complex were they that no one save those whose special
In the duty it was pretended to know their details. In
United 1918 the system was simplified by the passing of
Kingdom the Representation of the People Act, which introduced an approximation to universal manhood suffrage. This measure, however, allowed only a limited system of female suffrage. In 1928 the franchise was again altered, by the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act. Under this Act, which assimilated the franchise for men and women for both parliamentary and local Government elections, any person is entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector who is twenty-one years of age and is not subject to any legal incapacity. Persons must have resided or occupied business premises of an annual value of not less than ten pounds in the same parliamentary borough or county, or one contiguous thereto, for three months before they may be registered as electors. Every elector must be registered. No elector may vote in more than two constituencies, and the second vote must rest on a different qualification from the first one. Certain classes are excluded from the franchise, e.g. peers, minors, aliens, bankrupts and lunatics.

2. In France, universal manhood suffrage exists, save
France for lunatics, convicts, etc., and men on active military or naval service.

3. In the late German Empire, there was a near
Germany approach to manhood suffrage. The age limit

was twenty-five, not, as in England and the United States, twenty-one. In the individual states of Germany there was no unity of system. The most notable of all the systems was the three-class Prussian system. One-third of the electors for the popular assembly (Landtag) was chosen from the three classes arranged according to the amount of taxation paid. In this way the rich classes had a much greater representation than the poor. According to the new German Constitution all Germans, male and female, over twenty years of age have a vote.

4. In the United States there are two grades of elections—one for the federal legislature and the other for the state legislatures. The House of Representatives, which is the federal lower house, is composed of members who are entitled to vote for the state legislatures according to the laws of the individual states. By various amendments to the Constitution, disqualifications on the grounds of race, colour or sex have been removed, and, in theory, it may be said that the electorate is composed of citizens, male and female, of over 21 years of age. To this general statement, however, there are several qualifications, as there is considerable variation in the detailed rules of individual states. In some there is a property qualification: in others an educational test. Some states insist on definite naturalization before an immigrant is allowed to vote; some require residence for a minimum period, and in others only a declaration of an intention to become naturalized is necessary. By the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution, carried in 1920, women have the right to vote for both the federal and the state legislatures on the same terms as men.

5. In India the electorate for the Provincial legislatures was considerably widened by the Government of India Act of 1919. Generally speaking, every person is entitled to have his name registered on the electoral roll of a constituency who has the qualifications prescribed for an elector of that constituency, and who is not subject to specified disqualifications, e.g. :—(a) is not a British subject, (b) is a female, (c) has been adjudged by a competent court to be of unsound mind, (d) is an undischarged bankrupt or (e) is under twenty-five years of age. Some of these disqualifications, e.g. sex, are removable with-

out fresh legislation. The qualifications of an elector for a general constituency are generally based on—(a) community, (b) residence, and (c) occupation of a building, or payment of municipal or cantonment taxes, or rural rates or cesses, or payment of income-tax or the holding of land, or the receipt of a military pension.

2. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

In order to elect members of a legislature in a modern state it is necessary to subdivide the country into electoral areas. Theoretically there is no reason why all representatives should not be chosen from the country at large, but in practice, except when states are very small, it has been found difficult for electors to have sufficient knowledge about candidates in a large area to vote intelligently for them. Modern states, therefore, are usually subdivided into areas for electoral purposes. These areas are fixed as a rule according to numbers, but it may happen that district limits fixed for other purposes, such as local or municipal government, may be adopted. These areas should be as equal in population as possible. With modern industrial and commercial conditions population changes very quickly, and it is often found that where originally electoral districts were equal in number, now, owing perhaps to the rise of a new industry in a hitherto agricultural area, or to the decay of an industry in a hitherto industrial area, the population has completely changed. In almost every state there are examples of this, which lead to very glaring discrepancies between the number of electors and number of representatives. For electoral areas, therefore, frequent revision is necessary. This is called Redistribution of Seats, whereby seats may be abolished in one area and added in another area. In countries with a rapidly growing population periodical revision is very necessary. This revision may not only necessitate redistribution of seats but an actual increase in the number of representatives, unless a new basis of members is adopted.

In most countries every ten years a census is taken, and the best way to decide distribution is to follow the census. In the United States, the basis of representation according to numbers shifts from census to census. Thus after the census of 1910 there was

one representative to about every 210,400 inhabitants. In Great Britain periodic Redistribution Acts are passed (the last was passed in 1928) by which the inequalities resulting from changes in the population are rectified as far as possible.

In the actual making of electoral districts there are two leading methods. One is to subdivide the total area into as

**Methods of
Making
Electoral
Areas :
Single
District
and
General
Ticket**

many districts as there are representatives to be chosen, one member to be chosen from each.

The other is to make a smaller number of areas from each of which several members are chosen, the number from each being proportionate to the size of the district as compared with the total number of members to be chosen. The first of these methods is known as the single district system, or, in French, the *scrutin d'arrondissement* (voting by arrondissement, or district).

The other is the general ticket method, or in French, the *scrutin de liste* (list voting).

In actual practice most states favour the single district method, although in many both systems have been tried at various times. In Great Britain the single district plan is the general rule, but some larger constituencies return more than one member. In France the single district was adopted at first for the Chamber of Deputies, but in 1885 it was abolished for the general ticket method, which in 1889 was abolished in favour of the single district plan formerly in vogue. In 1919 the *scrutin de liste*, with proportional representation, was again adopted, to be replaced in 1927 by the *scrutin d'arrondissement*. In Italy the general ticket plan was adopted in favour of the single district system in 1891, and in 1928 the whole country was made one electoral area. Where proportional representation has been adopted, the general ticket method necessarily prevails. In municipal and local government elections there is the greatest variety. Often where the single district method is adopted for central government the general ticket method is adopted for local government, and *vice versa*.

The advantages of the single district plan are several. In addition to performing his duties as a legislator for the whole state, the member chosen also knows the particular needs of his district, and brings these before the central government. In all systems of government, however great

may be the decentralization, the sanction of the central government is necessary for many types of work. Thus in Great Britain the Ministry of Health possesses large powers of sanction, and district members are useful in helping to secure it. Not only so, but for local purposes sanction is sometimes necessary from Parliament itself. Bills of this type are usually non-contentious, but the local member must guide them through the House of Commons.

Another advantage of the district method is that the member is known to his constituents: often the member is either a native of the area or has lived in the area for a considerable period. In this way the electors come to know their member, a fact which in Great Britain especially is important because re-election of the sitting member is common.

Another advantage of the district method is that it secures a reasonable balance of interests, especially where there is strong party organization. Where the general ticket method prevails, the stronger party can secure all the seats, but in the single district, minorities have a chance of representation. Agricultural areas, for example, may secure representation, whereas in the general ticket plan it may easily happen that, in highly industrialized countries, the town interests will always outvote the rural interests. The district method thus secures variety in representation, and as such is a better method of representing the will of the people than the general ticket method.

Another advantage of the single district plan is simplicity of organization and ease in counting votes.

The disadvantages of the single district plan are, firstly, the fact that population changes rapidly and the basis of representation may become unjust. This can be remedied by frequent revision of areas. This defect applies equally to the general ticket method. Secondly, it is often said that election by single districts leads to particularist views in politics. To secure votes members tend to look after local interests more than general interests. This is more an academic than a real argument, as local interests tend more and more to become matters for local bodies, and members of the central legislature are judged by the electors according

**Advantages
of the
Single
District
•**

**Disadvan-
tages of the
District
Method**

to the opinions the members hold on matters of general policy. Members do look after local interests, but in modern governmental organization, this, far from being a defect, is a positive advantage of the district plan. Thirdly, the single district plan, it is said, restricts the choice of the electors, with consequent loss of man-power in the legislative assembly. Here, again, facts prove the argument fallacious. Most electoral areas may choose their candidates as they wish. Where, as in some municipal elections, the candidates must reside in their electoral areas or wards, a more general method of election may secure better men, but in central politics, electors, as in Britain, may choose any one they please. Often the member is a native of or resident in the electoral area, but in that case he is usually one of the most prominent inhabitants. But frequently it happens that non-natives or non-residents are elected. In modern democracies, where every man and woman is educated, it is not easy for second-rate men or women to be elected. The normal civic sense of the people is strong enough to prevent inferior men from even contesting elections.

The single district plan has proved a fairly satisfactory basis of election. That it has drawbacks is obvious, but all plans of representation have drawbacks. The **Conclusion** single district method requires careful control and management, especially in periodical revision, to preserve the balance of numbers. On the whole it is the most favoured electoral method for central government at the moment, though the general ticket plan, with proportional representation, is making rapid headway against it. In local government a combination of the single district and general ticket methods seems to be most satisfactory.

In all democratic elections the principle of the ballot, or secret voting, has come to be recognized. The ballot, both in principle and procedure, may best be explained by the following extract from the English Ballot Act of 1872 :—

" In case of a poll at an election the votes shall be given by ballot. The ballot of each voter shall consist of a paper, showing the names and description of the candidates. Each ballot paper shall have a number printed on the back, and shall have attached a counterfoil with the same number printed on the face. At the time of voting, the ballot paper

shall be marked on both sides with an official mark, and delivered to the voter within the polling station, and the number of such voter on the register of voters shall be marked on the counterfoil, and the voter having secretly marked his vote on the paper, and folded it up so as to conceal his vote, shall place it in a closed box in the presence of the officer presiding at the polling station.

After the close of the poll the ballot boxes shall be sealed up, so as to prevent the introduction of additional ballot papers, and shall be taken charge of by the returning officer, and that officer shall, in the presence of such agent, if any, of the candidates as may be in attendance, open the ballot boxes and ascertain the result of the poll by counting the votes given to each candidate, and shall forthwith declare to be elected the candidates or candidate, to whom the majority of votes have been given."

3. METHODS OF VOTING AND PROBLEMS OF SUFFRAGE

In all systems of election, the candidate chosen is the one who receives the majority of the votes cast. But it is clear that if A. B. C. and X. Y. Z., two candidates for a legislative assembly who represent opposed political ideas, receive respectively 5,000 and 4,999 votes, the 4,999 voters will not be represented as they wish. A. B. C. is elected by a majority of one, but he cannot be said to represent all the voters in his constituency.

Minority Representation

Many political thinkers hold that no true democracy can exist where mere majority election of this type prevails.

Lecky and John Stuart Mill, in particular, are strong advocates of minority representation. Mill in his *Representative Government* devotes considerable attention to this aspect of the representative system. "A completely equal democracy," he says, "in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, cannot be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are not equal, but systematically unequal in favour of the predominant class. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the

John Stuart Mill's Statement

whole people, equally represented. Democracy, as commonly conceived and hitherto practised, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens ; but strangely confounded with it is a government of privilege, in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the state. This is the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of minorities," and, after saying that the majority will prevail in a representative body actually deliberating, he goes on to say : " But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all ? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all votes, the minority none ? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard ? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives ; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege : one part of the people rules over the rest : there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation."

Many expedients have been suggested for the representation of minorities, the most important of which is proportional representation. The aim of proportional representation is to give every division of opinion among electors corresponding representation in national or local assemblies. A distinction is sometimes drawn between proportional representation and minority representation. The latter gives representation of some kind to minorities, whereas proportional representation gives representation in proportion to voting strength.

**Methods of
Minority
Represent-
ation :
Propor-
tional
Represent-
ation**

The scheme most commonly connected with proportional representation is called the Hare or Andræ system. This system was first proposed in 1851, by an Englishman named Thomas Hare, in a book called *The Election of Representatives*. It was strongly supported by John Stuart Mill (in his *Representative Government*), by Lord Avebury, Lecky, and Lord Courtney. It was introduced into Denmark in 1855 by Andræ.

There are many variations of the Hare system, but they all have the same underlying principle. The scheme is also known as the preferential system, or transferable vote system. The basis of it is that each electoral district or constituency shall have a minimum of three seats. No maximum is necessary. Lord Courtney suggested a fifteen-membered constituency as a reasonable limit. The candidates stand on the "general ticket" (or, in French, the *scrutin de liste*). The elector may vote for only one candidate, or for a limited number, and on the ballot paper he may write also 1, 2, 3, or more, indicating his first choice, second choice, and so on. To secure election the candidate need only have a certain number of votes. The number is fixed by dividing the total number of votes cast by the number of seats vacant. This number (known as the "quota") secures election as soon as a candidate reaches it. At the first count of votes, only first choices are taken into account. As soon as a candidate receives a sufficient number of first choices to give him the "quota" necessary for election, he receives no more votes. The surplus votes which otherwise would have gone to him are given to the second choices. If these second choices do not bring up the necessary number of candidates to the electoral quota, then the third choices are counted, and so on till all the seats are filled.

Proportional representation has made rapid progress in recent years in both central and local Government. It has also been used in some provinces or "states" of federal unions, though not adopted for the federal unions themselves. It is also in vogue in certain constituencies in India.

In some countries, e.g. Finland, a special type of proportional representation is in force, known as the list system, by

which candidates are grouped in lists, and all votes given to individual candidates on the list are counted first as votes for the list itself. Each voter may cast as many votes as there are seats vacant, but he cannot give more than one vote for one candidate. The number of votes necessary for election is, as in the Hare system, decided by the total number of votes cast by each party and is then divided by the electoral quota, which gives the number of seats to which each party is entitled. If there is any deficiency, it is made up by the parties which have the largest fractional quotas.

In spite of the evident reasonableness of the principle of proportional representation it has not found universal favour.

The List System It was proposed in the draft of the South African constitution, but ultimately given up. It was proposed and rejected in England in 1918. The chief difficulty of proportional representation is its complexity. Where constituencies have a large number of seats, the minds of electors may become confused. Thus in Belgium the largest constituency has twenty-two members, and electors find it difficult to sort out their various choices. The process of counting is also very difficult. The practical difficulties of the scheme have hitherto prevented its wide adoption. Recently proportional representation has been strongly supported as a means of countering the claims of small minorities, such as Trade-Unions, to control Government. By proportional representation such minorities would be placed in their proper perspective in the voting strength of the country. At present they claim to represent the whole of one class of men and women; whereas actually they may represent only a minority of that class. Over a whole country it would make the results of elections correspond more closely with the actual public opinion of the time.

Arguments for and against Proportional Representation Some writers point out that minority representation of this kind tends to produce a type of "minority thinking" resulting in class prejudice and class legislation. Not only so, but it is argued that, by such schemes, the ablest men in the country are excluded by those who pander to a particular class. It may also be mentioned that the supporters of the Hare scheme argue that it makes more

room for able men, insomuch as, though party supporters give their first choice votes to their own candidates, they give their second choices to the best men of other parties.

The chief argument against minority representation in general is that by dividing up political opinion it encourages sectarianism in politics at the expense of the general welfare. Ultimately minorities have only one right—the right to convert themselves into majorities. If their opinions are acceptable to others, they may be able to convert these opinions into actual law. If, however, minorities were represented there would be no end to subdivisions in society. Further, sometimes an opinion is unfitted for the times in which it is voiced but may be adopted under other conditions. It might also happen that any set of what is known as “cranks”, people who hold very peculiar opinions, might demand representation. Government by discussion depends on the power to convince.

Other methods of voting have found favour for the representation of minorities. The Limited Vote system provides a method of securing minority, but not proportional representation. The limited vote system requires a constituency of at least three members. The voter in the district is allowed a smaller number of votes than there are seats, and he may not give more than one vote to any candidate. If there are five seats the voter may be allowed only three votes, the minority thus having a reasonable chance of getting two seats. In practice representation is secured only for fairly large minorities, and that is unsuitable for a party system where there are three or more parties. This method has been used at various times by Great Britain, Italy and Japan for elections to lower houses, but it no longer prevails. It is still in vogue in some countries, but it is not generally used as a prevailing method for parliamentary elections. It is used for special purposes, e.g. in Brazil, for constituencies with three to five seats, in both local and national elections.

Other methods that may be mentioned are, substitute voting, by which candidates may cast surplus votes, that is, votes over and above what is necessary for election (the electoral quota), and insufficient votes, those under the

electoral quota, and thus fill up the places not filled by the voting of the electors; and proxy voting, by which a representative may cast as many votes as he receives multiples of the electoral quota.

The cumulative vote system allows each elector to have as many votes as there are seats vacant, and to cast his votes as he wishes. Thus if there are five representatives, he may give all his five votes to one member, or four to one and one another, and so on. This system, known popularly also as "plumping", when all votes are given to one candidate, is successful in giving representation to small minorities. These minorities must be well organized in order to ensure the election of their candidate. The cumulative system does not secure proportional representation, and it is wasteful insomuch as candidates for minorities often receive far more votes than are necessary to elect them. The system is in vogue chiefly in local areas, when different interests require representation. Thus in the old School Board in Scotland, it enabled small communities representing the Roman Catholic and Scottish Episcopal church interests to secure representation, and it frequently happened that the candidates for these minorities, though the minorities were very small, were returned at the top of the list. In this way the system engendered sectarian ill-feeling and strife.

Another plan for securing a just electoral system is the second ballot. Where there is one seat and only two candidates, the simple majority system is sufficient, but where there are more than two candidates it may happen that the candidate elected may secure only a relative majority, not an absolute majority. Thus in a three-cornered election A may receive 5,000 votes, B, the second candidate, 4,000, and C, the third candidate, 3,000. A has secured a majority over B and C, but B and C between them have 2,000 more votes than A. The second ballot makes a new vote necessary between A and B, C dropping out of the contest. Those who voted for C may then redistribute their votes, and if they all voted for B, then B, not A, would be elected at the second poll.

The second ballot (there might be a third or further ballot where there were many seats) secures a more just reflection of the opinion of the electorate where three or more candidates seek election. In pre-war British elections it often happened that Liberal, Labour and Conservative candidates contested a single seat, and the Conservative candidate succeeded because the general or progressive vote was split between the Liberal and Labour candidates. The second ballot, of course, does not secure proportional representation.

In many countries there are arrangements which allow for the representation of special classes or interests. The most notable modern example is pre-war Prussia, in which electors were divided into three classes according to the amount of taxes paid. To each class was given a third of the seats in the Assembly, so that the richest class, which had fewest members, had the same representation as the poorest class, which was most numerous. The class system prevails in the composition of upper houses, such as the British House of Lords. The British system is the historical descendant of what used to be universal representation by classes. In the early stages of representative government in the mediæval and early modern world there used to be three classes or "estates", each of which had its own representatives. The French parliamentary organ was known as the States-General, and the origin of both the British Houses (Lords and Commons) is, both in name and fact, due to class representation. The old classes were the nobility, clergy and commons, and the House of Lords is really the descendant of the greater nobles and clergy, and the House of Commons of the lesser nobles and common people. Representation of interests, known as communal representation, prevails in India.

Class representation is objectionable from many points of view. In the first place, it is impossible to draw a satisfactory line of distinction between one class and another for purposes of representation. Secondly, if each trade, profession and industry were to be represented, the legislative assembly would be an assembly of individual interests, not of the common welfare. Each class would be at variance with every other class. The best way of securing class

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representation is for the government to ask the views of classes or interests before they make laws which affect them.

By means of plural voting certain individuals receive more than one vote. Thus men with sufficient property in more than one electoral area—if property is a qualification—may vote in each area in which they are qualified. This is possible only where the areas are sufficiently near each other to allow the candidate to go from one place to another in time to vote. Sometimes the qualification for plural voting exists but is neutralized by elections being held on one day, thus preventing one man from recording votes in widely scattered constituencies.

Plural Voting

Another form of plural voting is what is known as the "weighted" vote, which was strongly supported by John Stuart Mill. Weighted voting means that the persons who have greater interests at stake or persons better qualified to vote receive more votes than those less qualified or who have smaller interests in the country. One type of this is the university vote, by which a university graduate receives a vote as a university graduate in addition to a vote on other grounds. It may be argued that rich men have more interest in elections than poor or that the more educated are better fitted to voice their opinions than the less educated. Against this are the arguments that the poor have more need of protection, and that the educated classes are as much ruled by self-interest as the uneducated.

The Weighted Vote

The chief difficulty in weighted voting is the absence of any standard of judgment. Thus, while a university graduate may receive a special vote, the civil engineer or architect, who is as highly qualified in his particular branch of work, may justly complain that he has no extra vote. It is absolutely impossible for any man, however wise, to "weigh" the claims of either financial or intellectual interests. Everyone, for example, who was left out of the educational added vote, would justly resent the omission if he were an efficient man at his own work. In countries where everyone can read and write, it is impossible to say that a graduate school teacher deserves two votes and an

Difficulty of "Weighing" Votes

efficient coal miner only one. Not only so, but against the statement that an employer should receive more votes than an employee, it may be said that the employee may be more interested in political matters and have a better understanding of them than his employer. A "weighted" system would give satisfaction to few.

An actual example of plural and "weighted" voting exists in Belgium. Every male citizen of twenty-five years of age and above is allowed one vote. An additional vote is allowed to certain landowners and to men of thirty-five years of age and over if they pay five francs in taxes and have legitimate children. Two additional votes are allowed to male citizens of twenty-five years of age and over who receive certain educational certificates, or who hold certain offices. No one has more than three votes.

It is sometimes held that each citizen qualified to vote should be compelled to vote. In Spain and Belgium there is actually a legal obligation on citizens to vote ; certain punishments follow failure to do so. **Compulsory Voting** Few governments, however, compel electors to vote. If an elector does not vote, it may be taken for granted that the country is better without his vote. If he did vote he might vote wrongly, or vote for a candidate because of a bribe. It is the moral duty of every citizen to interest himself in affairs of government, but to compel voting by law would be to take away the stimulus rising from the public good. Compulsory voting, however, teaches the citizen his duty, and what is compulsory in one generation may become moral duty in the next.

The question of female suffrage has solved itself. Half a century ago, John Stuart Mill's book on *The Subjection of Women* was considered far beyond its times, yet **Female Suffrage** Mill himself prophesied that before a generation had passed the political disabilities of women would be removed. Though not literally correct as to time, he was correct in principle. One by one the democracies of the modern world have admitted women to the vote, the last notable example being Great Britain, in 1918 and 1928.

The question of female suffrage has been, like all innovations, hotly debated. In favour of women's suffrage it is held that sex is no criterion for giving the vote.

Where women are educated in the same way as men, where they have proved intellectually fit for the exercise of the vote, it is ridiculous to refuse it. History shows us examples of great queens, authoresses and social workers; why should women such as these be debarred from the vote when relatively ignorant male labourers are given the privilege? Women need protection against unjust legislation. Up to now laws have been made for men by men, and women have been subjected to many civil disabilities. To remove those disabilities women must be represented.

Women have proved their value in public life in local bodies—for women, illogically enough, in many states have been allowed votes in local government but not in central government. In Australia, and other countries, where women vote on equal terms with men, they have not exercised any sinister influence. It might be proved that the advent of women into politics has helped to purify public life.

The usual argument against woman's suffrage is that political life is not woman's proper sphere, and to entice her from her home is to endanger her proper functions as a woman. It is argued too that women cannot serve in the army, and that the suffrage depends really on the ability to serve as soldiers. It is also argued that to allow women to interest themselves in politics may bring discord into the home. It is also said that women do not deserve the vote because the majority of them do not want it.

All these arguments are somewhat puerile. Experience has proved that women can both vote and fulfil their functions in the home. The Great War has proved that women, as nurses and workers in all kinds of employment, are as necessary as soldiers in war, and in Russia there were even female battalions. That the granting of the vote to women will bring discord to the home is as true of the man as of the woman, and that women do not interest themselves in politics is untrue, and even if it were true it was equally true of many men enfranchised by the Reform Acts in England. In advanced democratic countries, moreover, women are recognized as legal persons with similar rights to men. In the West only in comparatively recent years have the many mediæval legal disabilities been removed in the case of women, and with their increasing legal status there

follows a natural demand for a recognized civil status. For many years in western countries women were regarded as unfitted not only for civil rights, but also for education ; but the spread of universal and compulsory education to both men and women has completely altered the previous notions on female suffrage. For many years now women have proved their capacity not only for exercising minor civil privileges, but for holding high and responsible offices ; and the proof of this capacity has broken down the old prejudice against granting them the right to vote.

The various devices which have been proposed for voting all go to show that a representative system of government can only approximately represent the will of the people. No scheme of election can be perfectly satisfactory. Direct democracy allows every opinion to be heard, but even in direct democracies the laws must be made by majority votes. No satisfactory method can be devised to give a due position to every phase of political opinion. But it is questionable if every type of opinion deserves representation. Many individuals hold theories which they consider in practice would be the salvation of society, but however good these opinions may be when judged by absolute knowledge, they may fail completely to appeal to the common consciousness of the time. There will always be unheard minorities. If they wish to be heard they must convince others. If a man with a new message is able to convince others, then in time his opinion will be regarded as better than other opinions.

The electorate increases with importance as democracy advances. So important is it, that it is sometimes looked on as a special branch of government. In modern legislation, and, where election prevails, in both the executive and the judicial departments of government, the electorate is the continuous "power behind the throne". Though it does not actually legislate, it ultimately controls legislation, and consequently both the execution of and the interpretation of the laws. For the success of democracy it is essential that the electorate should be as highly educated as possible, and in modern democracies we actually find that education always ranks very highly as a basis of government. Only by education (in its widest sense) can the people attain the

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necessary enlightenment, mental and moral, which guarantees democracy against its terrible enemies, ignorance and passion.

4. INDIRECT ELECTION

In some states election is indirect. In direct elections the electors choose representatives by individual voting ; but in indirect election the electors choose an intermediary body which ultimately chooses the representatives. Indirect election prevails in few states. In France the second Chamber (Senate) is elected by electoral colleges in the departments. Theoretically indirect election holds for the presidency of the United States, though to all intents and purposes the election is now direct. The old Prussian three class system was indirect.

Indirect election helps to check popular passion. Where electors do not have the final choice there is likely to be a filtering of popular feeling. Those elected by the electors may be expected to be freer from the waves of passion than the electors themselves. The intermediate body, too, may also be expected to contain men of more intellectual force than the average elector. The system introduces the element of delay in elections, which means that the final election is more passionless and calculated than is direct election.

The system was tried in France after the Revolution till 1830, when it was abandoned for direct election, save for the Senate. Lower houses are elected directly, and many publicists support indirect election for second chambers. Such indirect election is more likely to secure men of mature judgment and more conservative temperament, both of which are qualities of prime importance in second chambers. In modern democracies, with party systems, the lower houses are usually elected on a party basis, and the indirect system has been supported as a means to avoid party elections in second chambers.

Where, however, the party system is highly developed, the indirect elections are likely to become party elections just as are direct elections. An excellent example of this exists in the elections for the President of the United States,

where the party system, in spite of indirect elections, is supreme.

The greatest argument against indirect election is that it tends to make the people apathetic. In direct elections each representative feels that his vote counts for something, because the representative chosen by his constituency is a member of Parliament. Where his vote is only for an elector to elect the member of Parliament, the citizen cannot but feel that his vote is comparatively unimportant. He is not sure how the intermediate elector may act, and his interest will naturally be lukewarm. In modern democracy if direct elections excite popular passion, they also stimulate interest in political affairs. It is for these reasons that the system of direct election has been adopted for the Indian Legislative Assembly and Council of State in preference to the system of indirect election which prevailed under the Indian Act of 1909. It may be said that if an elector may elect an elector he may also elect a representative directly. There is not the same objection to indirect election where it co-exists with direct election, as in France. The interest of the people is kept alive by the direct elections for the popular house, while the indirect elections for the Senate help to introduce those elements of reason and passionless consideration which are so important in second chambers.

5. LENGTH OF OFFICE AND INSTRUCTED REPRESENTATION

The purpose of representation is the expression of the will of the people. In order to secure this, it is necessary to provide means whereby changes in popular opinion may be represented in legislatures. Were representatives elected for life, it might easily happen that they were representatives only in name, not in fact. The term of representation therefore must be definite. The term varies from country to country, and also in the same country according to the type of body elected. In Great Britain, for example, the maximum statutory length of tenure for the House of Commons is five years, but in local elections three years is a common term. Four or five years are the most favoured terms in modern

legislatures. In second chambers tenure is usually longer. In the House of Lords tenure is hereditary and for life ; but in elected second chambers tenure is usually longer than in popular assemblies.

Annual elections, it is sometimes held, are necessary for a real test of popular feeling. The objections to annual

Annual Elections elections, however, are overwhelming. In the first place, there is no real necessity for them.

Popular opinion changes quickly, it is true, but not so quickly as to justify the dissolution of the legislature every year. Normally the legislative process extends over a considerable period, and there is ample time for the legislature to consider the opinions of the people as expressed on the platform, in the press, in memorials, and such like. Annual elections, moreover, would seriously interfere with the work of legislation. In the short space of a year few important measures could be passed, and to elect new legislatures every year would mean a certain unwillingness on the part of a legislature to start measures which it might not be able to pass finally or which it might have to submit to the next body. The loss of energy and time would be enormous. Apart from these objections, there is the most serious drawback of all, namely, the repeated excitement of the people caused by elections. In modern democracies, with party government, elections mean much agitation throughout the country. An equally strong objection may be advanced from the opposite point of view, that frequent elections might tend to make the people disinterested. The agitation caused by canvassers, party agents, etc., might so disgust the masses by its frequency, that elections might pass into the hands of cliques and factions. In some form the electoral agitation would disturb the country and lead to evil. Moreover, representatives of the best type would not submit to the ever recurring strain and excitement—and expense—caused by annual elections.

Annual elections, therefore, are essentially bad. They lead to dislocation of public business, unhealthy party agitation and excitement, and cause an undue strain on the representatives. Nor do representatives change their opinions so suddenly as to demand the censorship of the voters every year.

Another theory is that electors should have mandates from

their constituents. This is sometimes known as "Instructed Representation". Representatives, it is said, should receive instructions from their constituents, and if they do not obey these instructions, the representatives should be recalled. The idea behind this is that the very meaning of representation is that the elected representative should record the will of his constituents, not his own will. He is in a sense a servant, and must do what he is told.

Few responsible writers support this view. It will be remembered that Austin, the English law writer, looked on the representatives as "trustees" of the people.

Objections to Instructed Representation The meaning of this is that the representative normally does voice the feeling of the majority of his constituents, but if he does not, the only remedy his constituents have is to eject him at the next election. They cannot take legal steps against him for changing his opinions or breaking his "trust". The objections to instructed election are manifold and strong. In the first place, the system of election and re-election, with a reasonable maximum term for the life of the legislature, is sufficient guarantee that representatives will not to any dangerous extent misrepresent the feeling of their constituencies. With modern party government, the opinions of both electors and elected are to a great extent made for them by party leaders. If a sitting member changes his party, he may continue to sit till the next election or he may submit to re-election if his conscience urges him so to do. Changes of party in this way are very infrequent, and if they are frequent the likelihood is that the party in power (if the change is *from* it) will be beaten, and the legislature dissolved in order to appeal to the electors.

Secondly, representatives for central legislatures are not elected for local but for general interests. Local matters are dealt with by local bodies, of which, as a rule, the life is shorter than those of central legislatures. Central legislatures exist for the whole, not for the parts, and instructed representation would result largely in the representation of local interests.

Thirdly, able men could hardly be expected to serve in legislatures where they could only say what pleased their constituents. Every representative to a certain extent must

consider the will of his constituents, especially if he desires re-election, but to bind him absolutely would be to deprive a nation of the best mind force in it. The very essence of representative government is government by the people for the people, but the representative system is quite sufficient for this without instruction.

Fourthly, were instruction necessary, it is not clear how instruction could be provided. How could a constituency be so organized, and how could the interest of the people be so kept alive, that real instruction could be given on every proposed law? The instruction would be mere repetition of party formulæ or the opinions of local factions who took the trouble to record an opinion. The average elector is not interested in every law that is proposed, and on many laws the average elector is incompetent to give an opinion. In local organizations for instructing representatives, the opinions of the few experts in a constituency on a special or technical law might easily be drowned by the voice of factions.

Fifthly, it may be argued that, as the representative is usually an abler man than the electors, it is as much his duty to give instruction as to receive it. In election campaigns the best efforts of candidates are put forward to persuade electors. No body of electors is so unreasonable as to expect a representative to be a mere cork on the ocean of popular opinion. A representative is respected by his constituents not for supineness but for strength, and if his ability is shown by disagreement with the electors on certain points, the electors regard it not as weakness but as strength.

Sixthly, it is difficult to see how the work of legislation could proceed at all if every representative had first to receive instructions. It would take a long time to secure the opinion of a constituency and the necessity for a particular measure might have passed before the representatives could vote. Instructed representation is thus not only unnecessary but bad. There is, however, one case in which instruction may be reasonable. This is in a federal government, where, as in the old German Bundesrath, the representatives were representatives of individual states and had to vote according to the instructions of their own governments. The representative in such a case is really a kind of ambassador.

Such instruction, however, though more defensible than instruction in ordinary legislatures, is by no means good. It preserves provincial or "state" differences at the expense of the unity of the state. In other federal unions the representatives of state are also representatives of the common interests, and thus help to complete national unity. In a federal system of government there is a continual tug-of-war between central and state governments, and it is better to place the common welfare in the first place, and not to keep separatism alive by needless separatist organizations.

6. THE QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES

Qualifications In all states certain qualifications are necessary for election as representatives. These are :—

1. Only those who are citizens of a state either by birth or loyalty can be elected to legislatures. Clearly aliens, whose sympathies belong to another state, should not become law-makers in a state. Were any alien to seek election in a legislature, his aim would either be personal in order to push his own interests, or to secure favourable legislation for his financial interests, or political, in order to secure legislation favourable to his own country, and in all probability, against the interests of the country in the legislature of which he served.

2. Legislation being vital for the interests of the people, it is necessary that only mature or relatively mature people be chosen as representatives. Twenty-one or twenty-five are common age limits in the West. For second chambers often a higher age limit is necessary. Belgium, France and Italy require forty as the minimum for the second chamber.

3. In many states a property qualification is necessary for election. Where members are not paid, the property qualification though not necessary by statute becomes necessary in fact, as only men with leisure can become members of the legislature. The property qualification is rapidly disappearing, though it still holds

even in advanced democratic countries. In Canada membership of the second chamber is reserved for those who have 4,000 dollars worth of property. In England Members of Parliament are now paid from public funds, so that poor men, if they can succeed in the elections, may sit in the House of Commons.

There is a theoretical justification for a property qualification. The possession of property shows that the representative has a stake in the country and is therefore likely to be cautious in legislation. Possession of a considerable amount of property, if it is not inherited, may also argue for business ability in the possessor, and, whether inherited or not, it provides him with leisure for legislative work.

Modern opinion favours the equal chances of citizens for election to the legislature, whether they have property or not. The lack of property of considerable value should not deprive the country of the services of able, but propertyless men. Further, the labourer is worthy of his hire. The modern work of legislation is so heavy that it can scarcely be held that the mere honour of being a Member of Parliament is sufficient payment, especially for those who have difficulty in affording the honour. Payment of members is now common. The payment often combines a fixed salary and free travelling.

4. In every state, holders of certain offices are ineligible for election to legislatures. In the United States, where the theory of the separation of powers governed the creation of the constitution, the executive is divorced from the legislature. In Cabinet governments the heads of the chief executive departments of government are also members of the legislature, but the permanent officials are not. Judges cannot be members of the legislature. In Great Britain, previous to 1925, when a Member of Parliament (that is, a member of the House of Commons) was selected for a Cabinet post, he had to be re-elected by his constituency.

5. Religious disabilities exist chiefly in countries where, for historical reasons, it was necessary in the interest of the public to exclude from the legislature individuals holding certain religious opinions. Thus the Jews and Roman Catholics were excluded till the nineteenth century in England, and even to-day ministers of

the established churches in Britain cannot be elected to the House of Commons. The clergy of the Roman Catholic Church, though it is not the state (or established) church, are also excluded.

7. THE LEGISLATURE

The relations of the legislative, executive and judicial have been compared to the major and minor premises and conclusion of a syllogism. The legislative authority forms the major premise ; the judiciary, the minor ; and the executive, the conclusion. The legislative lays down general laws applicable in all cases ; the judicial says whether particular cases may be treated according to the rule ; the executive carries out the decision of the judicial. A simple example will illustrate. The law says all that trespass on private grounds will be prosecuted : A is declared by the law courts to be a trespasser, and the executive punishes him. The syllogism makes more demarcation between premises and conclusion than acts of government do between the legislative, executive and judicial functions. Every executive act involves the three aspects of law, execution and judgment, whether separate authorities are involved or not. But the syllogism analogy is useful in showing one important point, viz., that the so-called three powers do not stand to each other in the relation of equality. As the major premise is more important than the minor and conclusion, so the legislature is more important than the executive or judicial. Laws must exist before judgment can be given or the executive take action. The legislative is the more important—indeed the fundamental—function of government ; without it the executive and judicial cannot exist. Whether a government be a stable or unstable one, whether or not laws are observed in their letter or spirit, every executive act involves primarily a legislative act. Save in cases where sheer unreason rules, every executive and judicial act logically involves legislation.

In our analysis of the three powers, we must therefore analyse the legislature first. The legislature is the law-making power. It includes two kinds of work which are sometimes looked on as separate "powers"—the purely

law-making and the deliberative. It is really impossible to separate these two functions. The purely law-making

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may be taken to include the actual mechanism of making laws—drafting, etc.,—a not unimportant function. John Stuart Mill considered this function so important that in his scheme of government he recommended a special committee for it. But the mechanism of law-making is a duty for specialists in that particular work. The wording, formulating, etc., of laws is not of the most vital importance. The content and end of the law are the most important things, and it is the deliberative function which has to decide these. The deliberative function does not belong to any particular branch of government: it is the thinking of a nation and that is done by various agencies, such as the pulpit, press and platform. In order that this thinking may become definitely formulated, it is necessary to have some central organization to act as a focus for it. That organization is the legislature, or, as the English call it, Parliament. Parliament comes from the French word *parlement*, which means originally a meeting for discussion. Parliament being, as it were, the epitome of the nation, expresses its centralized thought, and that thought, when formulated in proper language and “passed”, becomes the law of the state. Parliament thus performs the double function of deliberation and law-making, but in neither does it act by itself. The sum total of the thinking forces of the nation—as given in books, newspapers, speeches, advice by experts—moulds its deliberation. In the actual drafting of laws Parliament uses the services of expert officials.

In modern states the organization of a legislature or Parliament presents many problems. Even in the smallest state there exist a multitude of interests, each of which asks to be heard. In Greek city-states Parliament included all interests; but in modern nation-states only representatives can attend. All interests had an equal chance of being heard in the old city-states, but now we have only an approximation. Legislation affects everyone in the state, and laws necessarily must be made with much caution. The chief problem in the organization of modern legislatures is to represent the will of the people, and, at the same time, prevent hasty legis-

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lation. Laws should, as Aristotle said, be "reason without passion", but men often give way to momentary impulses. Passion is dangerous in law-making. The experience of ages had led most modern legislatures to adopt means to avoid the dangers of hasty legislation. These, and other considerations have to be taken into account in organizing the legislature. What actually happens will be seen when we examine the constitutions of individual states. At present we give a short account of the chief means adopted by modern legislatures to secure harmony and unity in the state.

One of the most common characteristics of legislative bodies is that they are divided into two bodies or houses—the upper and lower. This is known as the **Unicameral and Bicameral Organization** bicameral system (*camera* is the Latin for "chamber"). The bicameral system is all but universal in modern governments; in only a few cases does the unicameral or one-chamber system exist. Modern examples of states that have, or till recently have had the unicameral system are Greece, Serbia, and several units of bigger states, e.g., some of the old German states, some of the Swiss cantons, and the Canadian and Indian provinces. None of these is typical inasmuch as they are all subordinate law-making bodies. In modern independent states the bicameral system is the rule. The constitutions analysed in this book show several types of the two-chamber system—the House of Lords and House of Commons in the United Kingdom; the Senate and House of Deputies in France; the Reichstag and Bundesrath in pre-War Germany, the Reichstag and Reichsrath in the present German constitution; the House of Representatives and the Senate in the United States; and the Legislative Assembly and Council of State in India.

The unicameral system has, generally speaking, been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The most conspicuous historical examples of it are furnished by France. The National Assembly of 1791, after the Revolution, decided in its favour, but the experiment did not last many years: the very conditions of its existence foreshadowed its failure. A unicameral system leads to hasty legislation, internal strife, class struggles, and general instability. These self-same

conditions allowed it to live in France and caused it to die. Another example of how unsettled political conditions brought about a single chamber is furnished by the English Commonwealth which followed the Great Rebellion. In this case the House of Lords was abolished in England, soon, however, to be restored. Unicameral systems result from unstable conditions of government and, once existent, are a cause of them.

Political experience condemns the unicameral system, and even the most rampant champions of popular rights hesitate before condemning the bicameral system. The House of Lords in England is very frequently condemned not because it is a second chamber but because it is an anomalously constituted second chamber. What the enemies of the House of Lords want is not a single house of legislature, but two houses properly constituted.

The reasons for the existence of a two-chambered system of legislature are many. The chief one is the prevention of hasty legislation. It is one of the three methods for such prevention, the other two being a constitution and procedure. The electorate also is a preventative of hasty measures, but it also can be the chief compelling force behind them. Where a second chamber exists there is less likelihood of ill-considered measures becoming law, because they are more carefully considered. A single chamber, specially in the modern days of popular government, is liable to be carried away by momentary impulses or persuaded by the powerful rhetoric of one man ; but where there is another house to consider a measure, a brake is added to the wheel of legislation. Ill-considered legislation has thus less chance of passing. On the other hand, the fact that one chamber feels that its responsibility is not final may lead to less considered and balanced action than might be the case did final responsibility rest with it.

Another reason for the existence of second chambers is the representation of interests and minorities. In modern nations suffrage rests on a wide basis with the result that there is a constant tug-of-war of interests, of class against class, or trade against trade. In the days of autocracy there was no place for representation beyond the expression of

opinion to the autocrat by leading men in any particular interest. With the expansion of the suffrage the first or lower chambers have become more and more "popular," i.e., representative of the proletariat as distinct from the moneyed or upper classes. These "upper" classes must have their interests safeguarded, hence their claim to be represented in the second chamber. A second chamber is—and in fact should be—conservative in temperament. As we have seen, the ideal of political progress is "conservative innovation." The popular houses are always ready to innovate and the conservative element should be supplied by the second chambers. From this point of view it may well be argued that the second chamber should be as free as possible from party bias. The actual facts of political life, however, show quite as strong party divisions in second as in first chambers. Special measures are often adopted to prevent such bias—special methods of election, special qualifications of the representative, special periods of tenure and special periods of election for part of the house, as in the French system.

One of these points—special qualifications—suggests another of the main reasons for the existence of a second chamber, viz., the necessity of choosing specially able and experienced men for the work of legislation. A popularly elected house might conceivably elect a number of men, who, though fit enough in one path of life, are not fitted for the work of general legislation. The deficiency must be supplied by a fitter selection in an upper house, which is less liable to be affected by passing political whims. Upper houses should be placed as far away as possible from the tempest of popular elections, so that the members of them may consult not their own interests at the next election but the interests of the nation as a whole.

It is only in this way that the tyranny of popular majorities can be avoided. Were second chambers composed in the same way as lower chambers—dissolvable in the same way, elected in the same way, having the same tenure, etc.—then the upper would be merely a reflection of the lower chamber, and there would be no rational justification for its existence.

**2. For the
Represent-
ation of
Interests
and
Minorities**

**3. For the
Selection
of able
Men**

There is still another reason, which is a result of modern development—the representation of individual states in a federal union, e.g., the United States of America. The Senate is in a Federal Government composed on a state, not on a population basis.

No general rule can be set down which regulates the relations of first and second chambers. The first chamber initiates legislative measures; the second chamber is usually a revising, criticizing body. But that is by no means universal, as some second chambers can initiate legislation by themselves, thus reversing the ordinary legislative process. Generally speaking, the second chamber is a revising and criticizing body, its composition being, as we have just seen, directed to its fitness for this end.

Second chambers have considerable influence in criticizing ordinary legislation, but in one kind of legislation—financial—the lower or first houses have as a rule supreme control. In the United Kingdom, for example, the House of Lords has practically no power in financial legislation. The power of the purse in modern democracies belongs to the people, and though the second chamber represents capital and land—the wealthy classes generally—yet it has no say in financial matters. Too much stress, however, must not be laid on the *wealth* element in second chambers. In newer countries—such as the United States and Australia—there is no social line of difference between the lower and upper houses. The trend of development of modern democracies is to abolish such a line, though other means (especially the method of election) are used to make the second chambers serve their real purpose.

Legislative bodies, as a rule, have powers of internal organization by themselves. Sometimes the constitution determines the main lines of organization, as in the American Senate, where the Vice-President is the constitutional Chairman of the Senate. The permanent officials of legislative houses are, as a rule, appointed by the Houses themselves.

All legislative houses have organizations for the despatch of business. Certain types of organization are common to modern legislatures. Firstly, and most important, is the committee system. Committees are appointed to examine more closely than the full legislature could, measures proposed in the house. Sometimes the committees are temporary: they are appointed for a special temporary purpose and cease when the purpose is served. Sometimes they are standing or permanent committees. The committees are as far as possible representative of all opinions. There is a tendency in some modern states to appoint party committees, but these really defeat the very objects for which they exist. In the new German Constitution the committee system is carried further. By it permanent committees are formed, which continue in spite of dissolution of the lower house.

In all law-making bodies rules for the conduct of business are necessary. These rules or procedure of the various parliaments of the world have two opposing objects: one is to prevent hasty legislation; the other is to prevent delay or confusion. The most important part of procedure is the number of readings through which a bill must go; this prevents hasty legislation. The procedure which prevents undue delay relates to length of speeches, the end of debates and similar subjects. In large bodies unlimited discussion on measures would make the actual work of legislation almost impossible.

The general course of legislation in modern legislatures shows certain similarities. Laws may be initiated in either the upper or the lower house. The assent of both houses is necessary for the passing of a law; and a quorum or minimum number of members must be present before a vote is valid. The number of a quorum varies from house to house and state to state. A majority vote, provided a quorum is present, is decisive in ordinary legislation. In modern states the lower houses of the legislatures are ever increasing their control of financial legislation.

8. MODERN METHODS OF DIRECT LEGISLATION

The theoretical and political difficulties of the representative system have led to the desire on the part of many

to make the citizens as a whole responsible for legislation. The theory of modern direct democracy comes from Rousseau, and is implied in his doctrine of the General Will. In practice the representative system has often proved very unjust. Minorities as a rule are unrepresented ; legislatures elected for a period of time sometimes lose touch with the electorate, and before the members can be dismissed by new elections, new and undemocratic laws are passed. These and similar facts and arguments have led to a demand in many quarters for the initiative and the referendum, or as the French call it, the plebiscite. One of the chief reasons of the modern agitation for the referendum is the example of Switzerland.

The initiative is the system by which a certain number of voters (the number being fixed by statute) may both petition and compel the legislature to introduce a certain type of law. In one kind of initiative, sometimes called the formulative initiative, voters may draft a bill and compel the legislature to consider it. After the legislature considers and passes the bill, they must resubmit it to the popular vote.

Literally the word "referendum" means "must be referred," and the full meaning is "must be referred to the people." In plain words the referendum is a popular vote on laws or legislative questions which have already been discussed by the representative body of the nation. The principle underlying any form of referendum is the democratic ideal of going behind the interpretation of popular will by delegates or representatives to the fountain of authority—the will of the people as expressed by a direct vote of the majority of citizens qualified to vote. The referendum may be (a) facultative or optional—that is, it may be brought into action on the petition of a certain number of voters ; or (b) compulsory or obligatory, in which all laws must be submitted to popular vote.

The idea of the referendum is no new one. The people of Rome used to meet together and exercise their sovereign authority ; the Greeks, the Macedonians and the ancient Franks held councils of the people. In his writings Rousseau did not hesitate to declare that the happiest

people were a company of peasants sitting under the shade of an oak tree "conducting the affairs of the nation with a degree of wisdom and equity that do honour to human nature." The idea of direct government by the people he also favoured. "Some will perhaps think that the idea of people assembling is a mere chimæra," he wrote, "but if it is so now, it was not so two thousand years ago, and I should be glad to know whether men have changed in their nature." The theories of popular rights, derived mainly from these and similar teachings of Rousseau, are largely responsible for the modern vogue for the referendum.

The home of the referendum, Switzerland, the most democratic country in Europe, is a small state, organized as a federal union in which the individual states are known as cantons. The supreme legislative and executive authority is vested in a parliament of two houses, namely, the State Council and National Council. The upper house has 44 members, two for each canton; the National Council, chosen by direct election, has one member for every 20,000 inhabitants. A general election takes place every three years. Both chambers taken together form the Federal Assembly, which is the supreme power in the state. The chief executive authority is the Federal Council (Bundsrath), consisting of seven members and elected for three years by the Federal Assembly. These members must devote their whole attention to their executive work. The executive body introduces all measures into the legislative councils and takes part in the proceedings. The President and Vice-President of the Council are the first magistrates. Both are elected by the Federal Assembly for one year and are not re-eligible for the same office till after one year's interval.

The unit of local government in Switzerland is the canton, in which there is full popular control. In the smaller cantons the people meet together as a whole and make laws for themselves (Landsgemeinden). In the larger cantons a legislative body is elected, but the initiative and referendum are also in force.

The practice of referring proposed laws to the people prevailed in the cantons before it was applied to the central government. It was applied in the cantons primarily to

The
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constitutional matters and afterwards to ordinary laws. The Swiss thus had a long tradition of popular local government behind them before the referendum became an instrument of national government.

In the federal government of Switzerland the referendum is compulsory for constitutional amendment ; it is facultative or optional. at the request of 30,000 citizens or the legislatures of eight cantons, for ordinary laws. For constitutional amendment the initiative may be used at the request of 50,000 citizens. No federal initiative exists for ordinary laws. In all the cantons the referendum is compulsory for constitutional changes. In all the cantons save one (Freiburg), and those with direct assemblies (Lands-gemeinden) the referendum, either compulsory or facultative, exists ; the number of votes (in the case of the facultative) necessary for demanding a referendum depends on the population. In all save one canton the initiative may be used for constitutional amendment, and in all but three for ordinary legislation.

The actual cases in which the referendum has been used in Switzerland show the rather surprising result that the people are more inclined to reject than to pass laws. It has proved a conservative, not a radical or revolutionary measure : it is thus a type of veto on legislation. Whereas in many modern states the veto or partial veto lies with the head of the executive, in the referendum the veto lies with the people.

The referendum has been adopted in several states in the United States for particular purposes. There is no national referendum in America ; it is applied only in state governments for particular purposes, or in local government (as in municipalities). It is in use in several other countries for constitutional amendment.

The supporters of the initiative and referendum usually bring forward the following merits of such direct legislation : (1) that it makes the sovereignty of the people a reality, compelling reluctant legislatures to act in a certain way ; (2) that it destroys party and sectional legislation, the people as a whole being less likely to split up into parties when they are given individual proposals to consider

In the
United
States

Arguments
for and
against
the Re-
ferendum

(3) that, in the case of local government it leads to harmony—all interests being taken into account ; (4) that it arouses public interest in legislation as distinct from politics, or general political interests ; and (5), one of the most powerful arguments in favour of a referendum, that it compels men carefully to think of the laws that govern them, for it saddles them with their share of national responsibility.

Against the referendum is the important objection that it submits laws to the most ignorant classes. Representatives are usually better educated men than the mass of electors, and as such are fitter to control legislation. Actual experience, moreover, shows that the percentage of votes in a referendum is small. The referendum does not create interest in legislation, but it opens the way to party influences because parties are better organized than electorates. It also encourages agitators. Again, if legislatures are compelled to obey electorates in every law, they may lose their standing and responsibility. Able men would prefer to be electors, not representatives, in such a system. Further, it is impossible so to draft laws on complicated subjects, such as the tariff, to make them easily understood by the masses. It is claimed that the adoption of the referendum in Switzerland has resulted in a complete destruction of parliamentary government in the English sense of the word and has reduced the National Chamber of Switzerland to a mere collection of "registering ciphers."

Finally, the Swiss example is misleading. The cantonal councils are really responsible for legislation, and their laws are rarely amended by the people. The Swiss referendum is successful because of the traditions of the Swiss people. It is also conservative, whereas ordinarily advocates of the referendum support it as a measure of radical reform or revolution.

CHAPTER XIV

THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY

A. THE EXECUTIVE

1. MEANING AND APPOINTMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE

The executive is that branch of government which carries out or executes the will of the people as formulated in laws.

Meanings of "Executive" In its widest sense the executive includes all officials engaged in carrying out the work of government except those who make or interpret laws, i.e., the legislative and the judicial. In this wide sense, the executive includes everyone from the highest official to the lowest menial, from the Governor-General to the policeman or village chowkidar. The word, however, is used in a narrower as well as in a wider sense. In the narrower sense it denotes the heads of the executive departments, for example, the President and the ministers in the United States, and, in England, the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Thus when we speak of the executive in Great Britain we may mean either the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet, or all the executive officials from the highest to the lowest. Sometimes the highest officials are called the executive proper, while the others, that is, those who carry out the details of a policy laid down by the heads, are called the administration or the administrative officials.

A distinction must be made between nominal and real executives. In Great Britain and India—in fact, in all the British Empire—the executive work is carried out in the name of the Crown. The familiar letters O. H. M. S. always indicate the head of the executive in the British system. The King, however, is the nominal head: the real head in Britain is the Cabinet.

The most essential quality for an executive is unity.

Every executive act involves a single act of will. Unity of purpose, secrecy, quickness of decision and action are better secured by one than by many.

**Essential
Qualities
in Execu-
tive
Work**

For deliberation and legislation two heads are better than one; for execution one head is better than two. Unity, finality, quickness, and secrecy, the essentials of good executive work, all require an executive organization where one voice is finally supreme. Thus in the United States of America, the President is the final executive authority. In Great Britain, where there is the Cabinet or a body of executive officers, the Prime Minister dominates. In a plural executive time is spent in argument and discussion. The members check each other, and, particularly in times of war or civil trouble, when quick decision is necessary, this is dangerous. The executive is not a proper body for discussion. Discussion should take place in the laying down of general principles of action or legislation. Once laws are enunciated or passed, it is the duty of the executive to carry them out as quickly and efficiently as possible. It is also the duty of the legislature to make laws as clear as possible in order to prevent subsequent discussion by the executive.

In existing governments there is no uniform method of appointing the executive; but three general ways may be enumerated: (1) by hereditary succession; (2) by election, which may be of three types; (*a*) directly by the people; (*b*) indirectly by the people; (*c*) by the legislature; (3) by selection or nomination.

**The
Appoint-
ment of the
Executive**

Hereditary executives exist in the older countries of the world. According to this system, office goes according to the law of primogeniture. The tenure is life-long. In newer countries the hereditary principle has invariably been replaced by either the elective or selective principle. Where the hereditary executive does exist, it has the merit of long historical traditions behind it, and the very length of its historical connection gives it a stability which elected executives frequently do not have. The real stability of hereditary executives, however, does not depend upon their historical antecedents, but upon the extent to which they rest upon the will of the people. In many cases hereditary

**1. Here-
ditary
Executives**

executives are nominal and not real executives, for example, in Great Britain, Italy and Belgium. In Great Britain, particularly, the hereditary principle rests on the will of the people. The Great War showed in a most remarkable way how deeply rooted the hereditary principle is in the English constitutional system. Whereas the War was responsible for the fall of the hereditary executives in Russia, Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and German states, and Bulgaria, it established the English Crown more firmly both in the English constitutional system and in the hearts of the people.

Another merit of the hereditary principle is that it gives a certain amount of national and international glory to the executive. There is something more dazzling and more impressive in the ceremonies surrounding royalty than there is in the simplicity surrounding an elected executive. In the case of the king of England this is particularly true, for the king is not only the executive head of Great Britain, but ultimately the supreme executive in the largest Empire the world has ever known.

The general argument against the hereditary principle in the executive is that heredity provides no criterion for the choice of an able executive. History abounds with examples where hereditary executives have ruined their governments. The recent examples of both Russia and Germany show how the hereditary head of an executive may be either incapable of conducting the affairs of government or may pursue a policy which is destructive of the very foundations of government. In both these cases, it is to be noted that the hereditary executive was not responsible to the legislature. Where, as in Great Britain, the executive is responsible to the legislature, the danger of revolution is at a minimum. The hereditary executive is nominal, not real. It combines in itself the merits of the hereditary principle with those of an elected or a selected executive, i.e., responsibility to the legislature or, ultimately, to the people.

(a) In several governments the executives are elected directly. For example, in Brazil the president and the vice-president are elected by direct popular vote. History also gives examples of elective monarchies. There are elective executives of this type in the United States of America. The idea underlying popular election is that the executive

should have the confidence of the people. An elected president or governor must feel a certain amount of responsibility, even though when once elected he may have very full powers. Supporters of the principle of election hold that the exercise of the vote for the executive, just as for the legislature, creates an interest in public affairs on the part of the masses. No doubt the people do receive a certain amount of political education by electing the executive, but experience has proved the disadvantages of election to be far greater than its advantages. In the first place, the people, unless the area of choice is small, are not as a rule fit to judge the executive capabilities of a candidate. In the second place, the elective system involves intrigue, corruption and ill-feeling, not only during the period of election, but at all times. As soon as one candidate is elected those who aspire to succeed him proceed to canvass the people. Party feeling is perpetuated, and at election times it often becomes very bitter; it may lead even to foreign intrigue. Because of the evil of popular election, and the power brought to bear on the election by foreign governments, in France in 1804, hereditary monarchy was reinstituted; and it is well known that during the Great War, German intrigue was rampant in America during the presidential elections.

2. Elective Executives
(a) Direct Election

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When election applies to the lower as well as to the higher executive posts the evils of election are more marked. In the state governments in America, where election is common, it sometimes happens that technical skill and personal capacity, the chief qualities necessary in an executive officer, are completely obscured by party feeling. The party system in America, with its complete organization, combined with the short periods of tenure of office, has done a great deal of harm.

(b) Indirect election is common. In the United States of America, the president is elected by an electoral college

(b) Indirect Election in which every state has as many representatives as it has in Congress. In the Argentine Republic, the procedure is similar. In Chile, the president is elected by delegates nominated by ballot by the people. The aim of indirect election is to restrict the choice to persons who are better qualified to judge than are

the masses, and to a certain extent this prevents the rancour and ill-feeling which accompany direct election. In theory there is little to be said against indirect election. But in practice the delegates or electors tend to become mere party puppets with no independence of judgment. The elections are indirect only in name. In the United States of America, for example, election for the presidency is nominally indirect but really direct. In the early days of the presidential election the delegates acted independently, but now they vote as members of a party. The party system thus combines the principles of direct and of indirect election.

(c) Election by the legislature is a type of indirect election. The National Assembly, consisting of the two Houses of the Legislature sitting together at Versailles, elects the French President. The idea underlying this type of election is that the legislature is the best qualified body of electors. In most modern democracies, election of all types, direct or indirect, tends to become a matter of party organization. Legislatures are divided into parties, and their elections are party elections. The chief point in favour of this system is that the executive so elected is of the same party as the majority in the legislature and will thus be able to work smoothly with it. According to the theory of the separation of powers, the legislative and the executive functions in the United States were so sharply cut off from each other as to endanger the smooth working of government. The party system with its almost direct method of election of the president grew up to secure harmony, for in actual practice government is very difficult if the legislature and the executive do not agree. The same is true in Britain, and in other countries with Cabinet governments, where the head of the real executive, the Prime Minister, although technically appointed by the King, is virtually elected by the party in power in the House of Commons, for he must be the recognized leader of that party.

Selection for or nomination to executive posts is applicable particularly to subordinate officers. It applies to all the subordinate governments in the British Empire. The Governors-General of India, Canada, Australia, etc., are selected by the British Government. The value of selection

is that personal qualities can be taken into account. Before appointment, the record of work and qualifications

3. Selection or Nomination

of officers fitted for the post are carefully examined: the appointment takes place in a judicial manner. Past work and personal qualities are judged in relation to the work to be done.

Selection is particularly necessary for lower executive or administrative posts. Different offices require different qualifications. Some require general administrative ability ; some require special or technical qualifications. For making such appointments men who have passed through the offices themselves, or who have a definite knowledge of the work to be done, are the fittest judges. The official superiors of executive officers are best qualified to judge the abilities of their inferior officers, and, therefore, to recommend or withhold appointments.

2. PLURAL AND SINGLE EXECUTIVES

A distinction is often made between single and plural executives. In a single executive, the final control belongs to one individual. In a plural executive the control lies with two individuals or with a council of several.

There are many historical examples of plural executives. In Sparta there was double kingship ; in Rome there were two consuls. In France, at the time of the

Examples and Working of Plural Executives

Revolution, the Directory was a plural executive. Several of the revolutionary executives of France were plural. Plurality, it was reckoned, prevented tyranny. France had a long history of

despotism, and not unnaturally the French people thought that the chief safeguard against despotism was the abolition of a single executive head. Experience has proved that where plural executives have succeeded, the cause of success has been either personal or due to the fact that the functions of government were so subdivided that each function had practically a single executive head. In other words, plural executives have succeeded where they have adopted the underlying principle of the single executive. In Switzerland, at the present time, there is a plural executive. The chief executive in Switzerland is a board of

seven persons called the Federal Council. This board is elected for three years by the two legislative houses sitting together. One of the seven members is elected president, but his powers are only the powers of a chairman of a meeting. In practice, the members of the council divide their work into departments; each member is in charge of a department. Thus the Swiss executive indirectly adopts the principle of the single executive. The existence of plural executives in Switzerland is due mainly to the history of the Swiss people. They have been used to this type of government for generations in both central and local government. Another noteworthy point in connection with the Swiss plural executives is the control of the executive by the legislature. In a responsible government, the executive is responsible to the legislature, not only because their duty is to carry out the laws passed by the legislature, but also because by questions and interpellations the legislature exercises a continual supervision over the executive. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why the manifest advantages of single executive government should be sacrificed in responsible government to the dubious advantage of the plural executive. The unity, directness and swiftness of action which is possible in a single executive is impossible in a plural executive, save where the executive adopts the underlying principle of a single executive.

The plural executive must not be confused with the sub-division or delegation of powers. In modern government no man can carry out all the executive work by himself. Work must be divided. This division of work may be made in various ways. The work may be sub-divided amongst subordinate officials but the ultimate responsibility rests on the man at the top. Or the work may be delegated to subordinate officials. Final powers of decision may be given to subordinate officials according to their position and to the importance of the question. Where work is subdivided in such a way that ultimately every matter must be referred to the head, there is little distinction between this and a plural executive. In fact this method has often more evils than the plural executives, because of the enormous waste of time it involves. In the system of government in India the decentralization of powers to subordinate governments and subordinate

Delegation of Powers

officers is not yet sufficiently complete to prevent the very cumbrous process by which even minor questions have to be referred to higher officials before they can finally be decided. The process by which colleges used to be affiliated to the University of Calcutta, when the University was under the jurisdiction of the Government of India, illustrates the evil of multiple authorities. The process started by an application from an individual college to the University. The University inspected the college, and if it recommended affiliation, it sent its recommendation to the Government of India. The recommendation had to proceed first from the Government of Bengal and in its process through the Government of Bengal, the case had to pass through three or four distinct authorities—(1) the office of the Director of Public Instruction, (2) the General Secretary, (3) the Member of the Executive Council in charge of education, (4) the Governor. Finally, it went to the Government of India, to go through a similar process there. If any difficulty arose on its way, the process became even more intricate: the case had not only to be referred back to the original authorities, but it had to go through the same process all over again.

The delegation of powers, whereby powers of final decision are given to subordinate officers, is essential in all modern governments. Officials may have powers to regulate their work, within limits, by departmental orders. These orders are of the nature of bye-laws. In a responsible government, the actions of all officials, high and low, are liable to be questioned at any time by members of the legislature. In a plural executive the acts are the acts of no one individual, but of several. In government-by-council of this type the chairman is usually responsible for the conduct of the council, but the chairman may be compelled to accept a majority vote. In such a case it is impossible to hold the chairman responsible for the action of his council. In a single executive, responsibility can be definitely brought home to one individual, and this fact alone makes all officers careful in the conduct of their duties.

The plural executive is also to be distinguished from the system by which the chief executive officer has associated with him an advisory council or a board. This council or board, in many cases, is merely nominal, such as the Boards of Education and Agriculture, and the old Local Government

Board (now Ministry of Health) in England. Sometimes the board has certain powers of control over the executive. In Great Britain, the Prime Minister, **Advisory Councils** although he is head of the Cabinet, must really suit his views to the views of the Cabinet: he must act along with them. In the United States in matters such as the making of treaties and the appointment of judges and other high officers, the Senate shares the executive authority with the president. In France, the ministers have considerable control over the President—not as ministers but as a Cabinet. In the German Empire, the Bundesrath had certain executive powers.

In these cases the principles of the single and the plural executive are combined. The efficient working of the system has been evolved by experience. A single executive has the advantage of unity, decision, quickness and secrecy: a plural executive prevents arbitrariness, oppression and encroachment upon the rule of law. A combination of the merits of the two is the most advantageous system. The organization which does so, as a rule gives a single executive ultimate responsibility and at the same time provides it with an advisory council. It is to be noted that in the examples quoted the councils which work with the chief of the executive are not merely advisory: they share in executive control according to the constitution. In the British system, the Prime Minister *must* take into account the views of the Cabinet. An advisory council without powers of control gives strength to executive officers without impeding them. With modern specialization it is perfectly impossible for any man to be expert in every branch of administration. He must seek the advice of experts, and in receiving advice he is able to gauge not only the various bearings of particular problems, but to receive support when criticized. By an advisory council, the executive head is able better to interpret the temper of the people. The council also helps him to understand local conditions and to judge how proposed measures will affect the areas of which he himself has no knowledge. Thus the advantages of single and plural executive are combined.

In Great Britain nominally the chief executive council is the Privy Council. The Privy Council used to have wide executive, legislative and judicial powers. Its legislative

powers have passed to Parliament. Its judicial powers are now very much restricted, and its executive powers are only nominal. The nominal assent of the Privy Council is necessary for the issue of proclamations, ordinances or orders in council. The Cabinet is the real executive. The Cabinet is a non-legal body; the Privy Council is a legal body. The members of the Cabinet are created Privy Councillors and only as Privy Councillors can they issue ordinances, though the actual decisions are made in the Cabinet.

In France there is the Council of State which is appointed mainly by the President. This Council of State is divided into four administrative sections and each section acts as an advisory body to an administrative department. It has also a judicial section for the administration of administrative law. This Council of State gives advice to Cabinet ministers on proposed bills. It is thus partly advisory and partly executive.

In the United States of America the Senate has executive power in respect to (a) the making of treaties, and (b) the appointment of ambassadors and federal judges. In the state governments in the United States councils are common, and sometimes the executive government is conducted according to the majority vote in these councils.

In the German Empire the Bundesrath had extensive powers in connection with appointments, treaties, and finance. It was also chief executive for the enforcement of federal law among the individual states in Germany.

In India, associated with the Governor-General and with the provincial Governors, there are executive councils with definite constitutions, procedure and powers. These councils are composed of leading officials, each in charge of a department, and Indian non-service members, who also take charge of a department when appointed.

3. THE TENURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE

The period for which the executive holds office varies considerably from government to government. In hereditary executives, the tenure is for life. In the case of minors it is usual to appoint regents. In elected or nominated executives the term varies from one to seven years. In the majority of the states of

**Duration
of Office**

the United States of America the term is one or two years. In the case of the President of the United States it is four years, the Swiss President three years, the President of Brazil four years, the Presidents of France and Germany seven years. The tenure of cabinets depends on how long they can command the support of the majority in the lower house of the legislature. In the British dependencies the tenure of the head of the executive is usually five years, as in the case of the Governors-General and Governors of the Self-governing Dominions and of India. These Governors may be recalled by the British Government before the expiry of their term of office, or their period may be extended under special circumstances. The members of the Executive Councils, both in the Government of India and in the provincial governments, are appointed for five years. During their tenure of office they are subject to different rules from the rest of government servants.

There is very little to be said for the short tenure of office that prevails in the state governments of the United States of America. In the first place, it is obvious that if a man holds office for only one year he cannot carry out any policy, even if he had one. In the second place, it frequently happens that those appointed to the post have little experience, and the space of one year is not sufficient to enable a governor to acquire experience. In the third place, frequent elections for a governor are a very disturbing element in public life. They lead to abuse and corruption. In the fourth place, the governor, if he wishes re-election, must pander to the people. This leads to lack of independence in action and timidity in policy. The only argument in favour of the short tenure is the security against abuse of power. This security can be achieved by other methods. If an executive head is to be at all efficient, he must have not only adequate powers, but also adequate time in which to make his powers felt. No man can be efficient with a one or two years' tenure of office.

The question of re-eligibility for office is very frequently debated, especially in America, where short tenure is common. In some constitutions it is impossible for one individual to be re-elected to office. In other cases, though, there is no constitutional limit to re-election, there is an

unwritten rule; for example, no President of the United States may be re-elected more than once. Re-eligibility tends to make the executive head court popular favour, whereas the impossibility of re-election gives him strength and independence. For example, in his first term of office the President of the United States cannot be unaffected by the consideration that he may seek re-election and that his re-election depends on the popular vote. In his second term he need have no such fear and may pursue as vigorous a policy as he cares. Re-eligibility, of course, secures the continuance of good men and good policy. It also secures the responsible behaviour of the occupant of the executive office. It may well happen that if the executive head cannot be re-elected he may look upon the tenure of his office as a period in which he may do the maximum for his own interests. Re-eligibility, of course, depends largely upon the length of the term of office. In France, where the President continues in office for seven years, the question of re-eligibility scarcely arises. Seven years' occupancy of the Presidency of France usually satisfies the occupants. Not only so, but the President must take into consideration the fact that the honour must pass to others.

The executive work in modern states is wide and complex. It is sub-divided into various departments, and each department has its own organization. Various classifications of the departments of government are possible, but the following five show generally the sections into which modern governments are divided: (1) Foreign; (2) Internal, Home, or, as it is sometimes called, Administrative, which includes various financial, commercial and agricultural and educational subdivisions; (3) Military; (4) Judicial; and (5) Legislative.

These headings are general. They indicate only the functions of the executive, not the individual departments into which executives in modern governments are divided. In Britain and other countries with Cabinet government, at the head of the executive stands the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet. Besides the Prime Minister, the other executive officials in the British Cabinet are the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord President of the Council, the Chancellor of

Re-eligibility for Office

The Organization of the Executive

Examples of Organization in Modern Executives

the Exchequer, seven Secretaries of State (Home, War, Foreign, Dominions and Colonies, India, Scotland, and Air), the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Presidents of the Boards of Trade and of Education, the Ministers of Health, of Agriculture and Fisheries, and of Labour and the First Commissioner of Works. The Lord Chancellor, who is head of the judicial organization of the United Kingdom, is also included in the Cabinet. Several heads of departments (e.g., the Minister of Pensions and the Postmaster-General), although not included in the present Cabinet, have at times been regarded as of cabinet rank. The Cabinet usually includes several sinecure posts and one or two legal posts, the Lord Chancellor, and Attorney-General; but the actual construction of Cabinets varies from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. Better examples of the division of executive work are the governments of newer countries, such as the United States, or of newer organizations, such as India. In the United States the President is the head of the executive. He appoints his own officers, namely, the Secretary of State (who deals with foreign affairs); the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of War; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Interior, whose functions include the Census, Pensions, Education, Rail roads, Public Records, Public Lands, Patents and Indian affairs, each having its own office; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Labour; the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General. In India the Governor-General is the head of the executive and he is also in charge of foreign affairs. In his executive council are the Commander-in-Chief, who is in charge of the army, the members in charge of the Home, Finance, Commerce, Industries and Labour, Education, Health and Lands departments, and the Legal Member. In the provincial governments in India usually there are two to four members of the Executive Councils, the arrangement of whose functions depends on the individuals selected and the work to be done.

(1) *The Foreign Department.*—Every individual state has relations with other political communities and to regulate these relations there must be an executive department. This department draws up treaties, agreements, etc., and advises in all matters of foreign affairs.

Sometimes the legislature co-operates with the executive in foreign affairs. In the United States, for example, the Senate theoretically shares with the President the appointment of ambassadors. The conduct of foreign affairs requires high technical skill, accuracy of information, personal tact, and secrecy, all of which can best be achieved by the executive. It would be impossible to preserve the secrecy necessary in diplomatic matters, were they subject to discussion in a legislative assembly. Sometimes the legislature must pass special laws for the legal execution of measures recommended by the executive in foreign matters, but, as a rule, the departments of foreign affairs conduct their business as far as possible without the intervention of the legislature. Foreign politics, as a rule, are not party politics. Legislative bodies change with the change of political parties, but foreign politics must be continuous. Sudden changes in diplomatic matters would be disastrous.

In most modern constitutions the legislature has a voice in the ratification of treaties. The Senate in the United States may amend or reject treaties (as it did in the case of the Peace Treaty following the Great War), although the President has power to make certain treaties by himself. The French chambers can accept or reject but not amend treaties involving peace, commerce, or financial or territorial readjustment in the state, or the personal property of Frenchmen in foreign states. In Germany under the old system the Houses had the right of assent to treaties which embodied matters falling within the domain of legislation. As the lower houses in modern democracies control finance, treaties involving financial considerations must, to some extent, be influenced by them.

The appointing and receiving of diplomatic representatives usually lie with the executive. This is a most important matter, as much depends on the personality of ambassadors or envoys. Legislatures are not capable of selecting men for delicate posts of this kind, although, indeed, in the United States the technical consent of the Senate is necessary for diplomatic appointment, which, however, is made by the President.

(2) *Internal Administration* — The chief duty of the executive in internal administration is to carry out all laws. For this purpose there may be one or

2. Home

several departments, the executive heads of which must have considerable powers of appointment, dismissal and supervision, of issuing ordinances, and of making bye-laws.

(3) *Military and Naval*.—Under this head comes the supreme command of the army and navy. Sometimes, as in the United Kingdom, the power to declare war belongs to the executive. In France, Germany and the United States the legislature must concur in the declaration of war, except in the case of sudden attack. In war, the executive becomes practically supreme. The legislature, unless indeed there is a complete deadlock, must be subordinate to the executive and obey its directions. Unity and quickness of decision are of paramount importance, and demand one directing head which gives final orders. In the Great War the executive in all countries involved completely dominated the legislature, and nowhere was this more marked than in the United States where theoretically there is complete separation.

(4) *Judicial*.—Under this head comes the power of appointing judicial officers and the power of pardon. In the appointment of judges and judicial officials generally, the best method is appointment by the executive, although it is by no means the universal method. In the matter of pardon the judicial authorities, as a rule, advise the executive, but it is the executive which gives the final decision.

(5) *Legislative*.—The legislative powers of the executive include the right of assembling, dissolving and adjourning the legislature, the right of veto and the right to initiate legislation either directly or indirectly. Under this head also comes the duty of the executive of promulgating the law. Usually the legislative functions of the executive are regulated by statute or common law.

In Great Britain there is also the executive power known as the royal prerogative, which is, in the words of John Locke, “the power to act according to discretion for the public good without the prescription of law.” In other words, it is the discretionary authority left in the hands of the Crown. The prerogative applies to those things for which the law does not make provision. Such residuary powers, i.e., those powers the

exercise of which is not provided for in the constitution, are left in the United States to the state legislatures and the state executives. In France they are left to the legislature. In the United States, Germany and France, the head of the executive has definite statutory powers ; in England the Crown has general powers over all things not definitely regulated by statute or common law.

4. THE CIVIL SERVICE

The Civil Service consists of the paid officials serving in government administrative departments ; it does not include judges, officers of the army and navy and law-makers. Properly speaking, not all government officers are in the Civil Service, although the term is frequently used in a general way to designate all those paid from government funds. In India the term is used in a special sense : The Indian Civil Service, together with the provincial Civil Services, is used narrowly to designate the number of officers appointed on special terms of service for various functions. These functions are partly administrative in a general way (such as those of district magistrates), partly judicial, partly fiscal or financial, and partly political. In other governmental systems the Civil Service includes what in India compose the clerical establishments of the various departments. In most countries it is divided into two classes : (1) the higher or class I, which includes heads of departments, and those who may rise to be the heads of departments, and (2) the lower or class II, which includes the clerks and minor officials. All these are officers of the central government, but the system varies according to the type of executive machinery adopted. There are two systems of organization : (1) the centralized system where the chief official head is at the capital and his subordinates are spread over the districts ; (2) the system whereby local bodies may elect their own officers, but to a certain extent these bodies work under central supervision. Officers are responsible to the local bodies and are under the central government only in so far as the central government controls the local bodies. The officials of local bodies are not properly speaking civil servants, though they may be controlled by central Civil Service officials.

The Examination System The examination system has proved the most satisfactory method of selection for the Civil Service. The examination system is now almost universal. The type of examination system most commonly in use is the direct system, i.e. without nomination; but sometimes nomination is combined with examination. The pure nomination system has proved itself liable to abuse and is therefore unsatisfactory. This was particularly noticeable in America in the days before the reform of the Civil Service, when executive posts were given as rewards for help in elections. The whole executive department was liable to be changed after the periodical elections. No good work was possible under such a system. In most modern governments there is continuity and security of tenure in the Civil Service. In countries with responsible government the political heads of the departments change with the change of the cabinet. In the United Kingdom, the cabinet member for any department and his parliamentary under-secretary change with every change of government, but the permanent under-secretary, who is a civil servant, does not change nor do the officials under him, so that the continuity of action so necessary in executive work is secured in spite of party or political changes. In India the custom has grown up of high officials, such as secretaries to government, changing periodically—three years is the common length of tenure. The office staff of these officials is permanent.

B. THE JUDICIARY

1. MEANING OF JUDICIARY, AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT

The term "judiciary" is really an Americanism used to designate those officers of government whose function it is to apply the existing law to individual cases.

Functions of the Judiciary To a judge it is a matter of no importance whether in his opinion the law is good or bad: his duty is to apply it. He is primarily an interpreter of law. No law, however, when it is made, can possibly foresee all cases that may arise under it, and frequently judges have to decide cases in which no direct law is applicable. Such cases are decided on various principles, such as equity or common sense, and thus what is known as precedents are formed. These precedents are:

followed by other judges in similar cases. In this way judges are law-makers as well as interpreters of law.

Two qualifications are supremely necessary in a judge—
 (a) knowledge of law, (b) independence. He must be a fair-minded, reasonable man whose pecuniary prospects and personal comforts are not dependent on his judgments, and must, therefore, be free from any outside pressure or temptation to better his pecuniary circumstances by illicit means. The method of selection and the tenure of judges in every government are matters of the greatest importance.

There are three methods for the appointment of judges, and the goodness or badness of these methods is to be judged according to the amount of freedom and independence secured for the judge.

(1) Election by the legislature, which is not a common method. In fact, there is only one European example, Switzerland. Very little can be said for this method. In the first place, modern party government is so highly organized that election by the legislature usually means election of party candidates. This in its turn leads to the usual party intrigue and interest. In most cases the peculiar qualifications necessary in a judge take second place to party interests. To be a party candidate at all a judge must show strong bias in one direction. Such party election encourages a type of judge far removed from the ideal of fairness and reasonableness which judicial decision demands. Again, election by the legislature is not in accordance with the spirit of the separation of powers, particularly that part of it which demands the separation of the legislature and judiciary. After the American Revolution this method was actually employed by some of the American states, because the makers of the constitution feared that both executive appointment and popular election might fail to secure the proper type of judge. Except for one or two states, the system is now dead in America.

(2) Popular election, which prevails chiefly in the individual states of the United States of America. The executive appoints federal judges in the United States. Popular election is the worst method conceivable. In modern democracy popular

**Essential
Qualities
in a
Judge**

**Method of
Appointment**

**1. Election
by the
Legis-
lature**

**2. Popular
Election**

election means party election. Party election means the subservience of the individuals seeking election to a section of popular opinion. Candidates have to pander to the prevailing opinions. In no way can they show that independence of attitude or freedom from fear or favour which are essential in a good judge. Further, the electorate cannot possibly appraise the qualities necessary for judicial office. In the United States there are innumerable examples in which good candidates have been beaten at the elections. Popular election is still worse where the tenure is short and the judge is eligible for re-election. Where re-election depends on popular favour no judge can be independent.

(3) Appointment by the executive is the most common and most satisfactory method for the choice of judges. The executive government is the agency best able to judge the personal qualities necessary for judicial office. The executive can always ask for the advice of the highest experts as to the qualities required for a particular post, and they can search about until they find the proper type of man for it. It may be pointed out that where the executive is responsible to the legislature, freedom from party politics cannot be expected from the executive any more than from the legislature or the electorate. In actual practice, however, appointment by the executive is free from party politics. The appointments are made according to the recognized requirements of honest judicial work.

The tenure of judges is as important as the method of appointment. The almost universal rule for tenure is during good behaviour. In some of the American states where election by the people prevails, there are short periods of tenure with the possibility of re-election. Tenure of this kind is as vicious as the method of popular appointment. Independence in a judge demands security in his post. Removal must be a difficult process, but not impossible, as it would be intolerable to allow a corrupt judge to continue to hold office for life; it should be a process involving much consideration, and should pass through the hands of more than one person. The system which once prevailed in Great Britain, whereby the King could remove judges at will, proved very bad. By

removing judges he did not like and by appointing those he did like the King was able to have cases decided at his pleasure. In Great Britain now a judge can be removed by the King only on an address from both Houses of Parliament. In the United States of America, the method of removal by impeachment prevails, that is to say, the Lower House accuses the judge and the Upper House tries him. To prevent party trials, a large majority is necessary for conviction. In Germany, the court which tries a judge is one of which he himself is a member and the same court may recommend his dismissal. In India, Judges hold office during the pleasure of the Crown.

It is obvious that if judges are to be independent they must be made as free as possible from pecuniary temptation. They must be given good salaries and their salaries should not be alterable during their tenure of office. This rule is prevalent in most modern governments.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY

Certain features are common to the organization of courts of the world. In the first place, courts are arranged on an ascending scale with a right of appeal from the lower to the higher. Ultimately there is a supreme court with powers of final decision. The higher courts may review, revise or break the decision of the lower. In the second place, they are divided, although this division is not universal, into sections according to the work done. The most usual division is civil and criminal; but courts are frequently set up for particular purposes, such as land acquisition. In the third place, in federal governments there are usually two sets of courts, the federal and state courts. Thus in the United States of America, each state has its own judicial organization and its own law and procedure. The federal government also has a judicial organization. The state judges have to take an oath that they will faithfully follow the laws and treaties of the United States, and that they will enforce the greater law, i.e., the law of the United States, in cases of conflict. In Germany, there is only one system of courts, procedure and law. This system was organized by the Empire, with an imperial code. Although the government of Germany is a federal one, the

**Common
Features
in Judicial
Organ-
ization**

federal principle was not applied to the judicial organization. There is one central court, the Reichsgericht. There are state courts, with state officials, but the procedure and law are those of the central court and government.

(1) For a full description of the organization of the judicial system in England, the student must refer to the chapter on the constitution of the United Kingdom. From early days the administration of justice in England was centralized. The King was the source of both law and justice, but as no king possibly could carry out all the functions of a judiciary, his work was sub-divided. Judges went on circuit from London, and the Court of Chancery, which remained permanently in London, controlled the courts. During the nineteenth century, from 1873 to 1879, the jurisdiction of the courts was reorganized. A certain amount of decentralization was introduced, and county courts were established. These took upon themselves many of the duties of the old circuit judges. At the present time in England the House of Lords is the last court of appeal. Technically, the whole House of Lords is a judicial body, but in practice the judicial work is done by the Lord Chancellor, law-lords specially created because of their proficiency in law, and peers who have held high judicial office. Next to the House of Lords comes the Supreme Court of Justice, divided into two parts which are really two distinct courts, viz., the Court of Appeal, and the High Court of Justice, an appeal lying from the latter to the former. The High Court of Justice is sub-divided into three parts: (1) the Chancery division, consisting of five judges, and the Lord Chancellor; (2) the King's Bench division consisting of fifteen judges, of whom one, the Lord Chief Justice, is the President; (3) the Probate, Admiralty and Divorce division, with two judges of whom one presides over the other. Judges of these courts go on circuit to various parts of the country for what is known as assizes. Beneath these courts are the county courts and the justices of peace. The J. P. acts singly and conducts preliminary examinations or issues warrants. Two or more J. P.'s may hold what is known as petty sessions of the justices of the county, and may meet four times a year for more important judicial work in quarter-sessions.

**Judicial
Organ-
ization
in Modern
Govern-
ments
I. England**

The jury system is universal in England for all criminal cases, excepting petty offences. In civil cases the jury is not so common although any party may demand a jury.

The Lord Chancellor, who presides over the House of Lords, is the head of the legal system in England. He is a member of the Cabinet and is appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Lord Chief Justice, who presides over the King's Bench, is also appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, but all other judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor.

(2) In France there are two sets of courts: (*a*) ordinary, for the trial of private individuals; and (*b*) administrative, for the trial of officials. The Cassation Court
2. France at Paris is the final judicial authority in the case of the ordinary courts. Below this there are courts of appeal which hear cases brought from the lower local courts. There are also justices of peace who have certain powers in petty cases. The administrative courts are headed by the Council of State; below this Council of State is a number of courts all of which are directly subordinate to it. There is also a Tribunal of Conflicts to decide disputes as to whether the jurisdiction in a particular case belongs to the administrative or to the ordinary courts. The jury system in France is used for criminal cases only. An important official in the French judicial system is the examining magistrate, who conducts preliminary examinations in criminal cases. This examining magistrate (or *juge d'instruction*) may dismiss a case, or he may send it to the ordinary courts to be tried.

Judges in France are appointed by the President and the Minister of Justice. Their tenure is for life or during good behaviour.

(3) In Germany, the supreme court of appeal is the Reichsgericht, which sits at Leipzig, not at Berlin. Beyond this court there is no federal judiciary in Germany.
3. Germany The courts of the various states are subject to the states, but the procedure and law are those of the Reichsgericht. The judicial districts are determined by the judges, who are appointed by the individual states. The organization and procedure of the courts are decided by

federal statute, so that, in spite of the many states, there is uniformity of legal organization. Administrative courts, and a court of conflicts to decide the jurisdiction, also form part of the system. Juries are used only for serious criminal cases.

(4) In the United States there are two series of courts, federal and state. Each state has its own courts for both civil and criminal law. These are arranged in grades with appeal from the lower to the higher. The method of appointment of judges varies from state to state. Sometimes they are appointed by the executive, sometimes they are elected. In the federal courts, judges are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The Federal Court consists of a Supreme Court, two sets of circuit courts and several district courts.

4. The United States

(5) The judicial system in India is centred in the High Courts established at the capitals of provinces. Appeal may be made from a High Court to the Privy Council. The present system dates from the Indian High Courts Act of 1861. By this Act the Crown was empowered to create High Courts of Judicature for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and, later, for the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, Burma and the Punjab. The jurisdiction of these courts is fixed by the Crown. In Bengal the High Court is vested with ordinary original jurisdiction in regard to all suits except small cases within the presidency town. Appeal may be made from a judge on the original side to a bench on the appellate side. By its extraordinary original jurisdiction, the High Court may try any suit on the file of a subordinate court on the application of the parties or in the interests of justice. The High Court is also a court of appeal from all the lower civil courts. It has, in regard to the persons and estates of infants, idiots, and lunatics, the powers which had previously been invested in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was the result of the Regulating Act of 1773. It consisted of a chief justice and puisne judges, who were professional lawyers. The High Court also has jurisdiction over the relief of insolvents and cases between Christian subjects and the King. It also has the jurisdiction over admiralty, ecclesiastical, and testamentary matters which belonged to

5. India

the old Supreme Court. It has ordinary criminal jurisdiction within its own area, and extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction over all persons within the reach of what is known as the old *sadar adalat*, or court of the headquarters area. Trial by jury is the rule in original criminal cases before the High Court, but juries are not employed in civil suits.

After the creation of the High Courts, the Chief Court of the Punjab was established. It was recently abolished in favour of the Punjab High Court. The system of appointing Judicial Commissioners, who virtually take the place of High Courts in areas where High Courts do not exist, was also adopted.

The constitution of the inferior criminal courts is fixed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The courts are called sessions courts, and, outside a presidency town, magistrates' courts. Each province is divided into sessions divisions, which may comprise one or more administrative districts. For every sessions division there must be a sessions judge, and, if the work demands it, there may be an additional or an assistant sessions judge. The functions of these sessions courts are similar to those of the judges of the High Court in England when they go on circuit. They can try all persons duly committed for trial, and can inflict any punishment allowed by law. But every sentence of death must be confirmed by the higher court of criminal appeal in the province. Sessions judges are usually members of the Indian Civil Service, but, particularly in Bengal, additional and assistant sessions judges, and sometimes sessions judges, are recruited from the provincial service or the bar. Below these courts are the magistrates' courts, at the head of which is the district magistrate, who is a member of the Indian or Provincial Civil Service. The magistrate's courts are divided as a rule into three classes according to their jurisdiction. The local government has powers to invest magistrates with powers of the first, second or third class. There are also honorary magistrates with statutory powers both in urban and rural areas.

Beyond these courts are the presidency small cause courts, invested with power to try suits up to two thousand rupees in value. In Madras there is a city civil court with power to try suits up to two thousand five hundred rupees value.

Other judicial institutions are revenue courts, which deal with cases connected with the land revenue, courts for land acquisition, coroners' courts, and courts for special purposes, such as insolvency.

The supreme court of appeal for India is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which was constituted by Parliamentary statute in 1833. This statute requires that the Committee shall be composed of those privy councillors who are, for the time being, Lord President of the Privy Council and Lord Chancellor, those who fill or have filled high judicial offices, two other councillors specially designated by the Crown, and two councillors with Indian and colonial experience (of whom one is now an Indian). The members of this Committee are appointed as Privy Councillors by the Crown, and are subject to dismissal by the Crown and to impeachment by Parliament.

3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATURE AND BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXECUTIVE

The normal relation prevailing between the judiciary and the legislature is that the legislature makes the law and the judiciary interprets it in individual cases. In many states the legislature itself or one of the houses of the legislature retains judicial powers. In England the House of Lords is the highest court of appeal although in practice its legal work is performed by the law-lords and the Lord Chancellor, all of whom are highly qualified lawyers. In the United States of America, although the theory of the separation of powers prevented any considerable judicial power being given to the legislature, Congress has the power of impeachment. The German Bundesrath had, and the Reichsrath, the modern successor to the Bundesrath, still has, considerable judicial powers. The French Senate has the power of impeachment.

In states with rigid constitutions, courts exercise enormous powers over both the legislature and the executive, because they can declare any law unconstitutional. In England the only type of law which the courts can declare *ultra vires* or beyond the powers of a law-making body are those made by subordinate legislative bodies. In the United States of

**In Rigid
Constitution**

America, the courts may declare the laws made by the supreme law-making body unconstitutional. Thus the legislature must always keep in mind the fact that if the laws it makes clash with constitutional law the courts will declare them null and void. What actually happens in a case of conflict is that the courts simply declare the law inapplicable. In other countries with rigid constitutions the courts do not determine the constitutional character of law passed by the highest legislative authority. In Germany, which is a federal country with a written constitution, the Reichsgericht decides whether laws passed by the states are in harmony with the federal law, but it does not declare a federal law *ultra vires* if that law is not in harmony with the constitution. The German legislature decides for itself whether a law is constitutional or not. The same is true in France. The theory underlying this practice is that, if the representatives of the people wish to make a law, the constitution should not stand in the way.

In the English system parliament is its own judge. Every law passed by parliament in England is constitutional. In the British Colonies and India laws passed must be in harmony with the constitutions, which are based on parliamentary statutes.

The relation of the judiciary and the legislature is also seen in case-law or judge-made law. Judges not only interpret the law: they also make law. Every **Case Law** law is general, and in drafting a law, a law-maker cannot possibly foresee all the cases or circumstances that may arise under his law. Judges have to decide all disputes which arise under the law, and in cases where it does not give clear and adequate provision, the judge must fill in the gap. Such decisions are followed by other judges. Judges, both by their position and by their training, are the fittest people for such interpretation. The executive has often considerable powers of deciding and interpreting matters in which there is no definite rule, but in all important and final matters the duly constituted judges should be the deciding authorities.

The relations of the judiciary to the executive are various. In the first place, the executive itself has always considerable powers of adjudication. In the second place, the judiciary has considerable powers of administration, and

control over the executive. In the third place, the executive as a rule controls judicial appointments, and also is responsible for the carrying out of judicial decisions. In the fourth place, there are various kinds of executive courts, especially for government servants, e.g., the court-martial. There is now a tendency to give statutory powers to courts of this type in order to prevent the arbitrary use of power. In the fifth place, the pardoning power belongs to the executive.

**The
Judiciary
and
Executive**

4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The most important relation between the executive and the judicial exists on the continent of Europe in what is known as the system of administrative law. In Great Britain, the United States, and in India, every citizen of the state is subject to the same law and to the same process of law. The ordinary law courts deal with private individuals and public officials in both their private and their public capacities. Every one in England, from the Prime Minister to a police constable or to a pauper, is subject to the same law. Even soldiers are subject to the ordinary process of law although, for matters of military discipline, they are subject to military courts. On the continent of Europe the system of administrative law prevails. By this system special law and special machinery exist to deal with government officials in their relations both with private individuals and between themselves. All controversies arising from the public duties of these officers are settled in these administrative courts.

The existence of the administrative courts is partly explained by the theory of the separation of powers. Executive officers, according to the theory, should be free to carry out their duties without interference from the ordinary courts of the land. Expert courts, composed of men who have experience in civil administration, are the best courts for dealing with administrative cases. Courts of this type do not, like the ordinary courts, hamper, or mar the efficiency of the administration. Judges of the ordinary courts of the land have a bias in favour of private citizens against government officials, which means a lack of justice in official cases.

**Meaning of
Adminis-
trative
Law**

as well as less efficiency in administration. According to this theory, therefore, the administration possesses a special body of rights and privileges as against private citizens. Special rules and laws are made for officials. The law is made by government officials, and, as it is largely case-law, is very elastic. Ordinary tribunals have no concern with administrative law. Remedies can be exacted by administrative decisions, but these remedies can be obtained only through the administrative courts themselves.

The system of administrative law is contrary to the whole spirit and practice of the administrative system prevalent throughout the British Empire and in the United States. According to English ideas, the liberty of the individual is far more secure if the official as well as the ordinary person is subject to the ordinary courts of the land. The judges of the ordinary courts are looked on as capable of giving absolutely fair judgments in all cases. Their appointments are secure from interference by the executive. In France, on the other hand, the administrative judges have no security of tenure. They are appointed and removable by the executive itself, and not unnaturally their judgments are sometimes biased in favour of officials. To English ideas administrative courts are unjust and undemocratic: one law for all is better than one law for the privileged class of government servants and another for private individuals. It is true that in times of national crises, such as war, the administration may be more efficient if the executive officials are free from judicial interference; but in England, where parliament is supreme, it is easy to secure temporary immunities for such occasions by legislative enactments.

Where administrative courts exist alongside of the ordinary courts of the land, conflict of jurisdiction must arise.

Conflict of Jurisdiction In France a Tribunal of Conflicts determines whether cases belong to the ordinary or to the administrative courts. A great deal depends upon the constitution of this Tribunal of Conflicts. Professor Dicey, in surveying the French system of administrative law, concludes that the French Tribunal of Conflicts is more an official than a judicial body, and that its decisions as a rule are made in the interests of the administration. As Professor Dicey points out, the natural idea of Englishmen is that conflict should be tested by a normal

judicial court, a court composed of the ordinary judges of the land. This is directly opposed to the French principle that administrators should never be disturbed by the judicial power in the exercise of their own duties. In England the judiciary often interferes in executive matters, sometimes with far-reaching results. In some cases it actually has happened that the executive has been very seriously hampered by the courts in the execution of its duties, but this very principle is regarded by Englishmen as one of the chief guarantees of individual liberty. The independence of the judiciary in England thus is in accordance with the spirit of the Separation of Powers. Administrative courts, though in origin they may be explained by the theory of Separation of Powers, are really a negation of the theory.

CHAPTER XV

PARTY GOVERNMENT

1. THE MEANING OF POLITICAL PARTY, PARTY DIVISION, AND THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM .

One of the most notable developments of modern democratic government is the rise of political parties. So universal are they that it may fairly be said that parties are essential to democracy. In its widest sense party means a number of people joined by common opinions on a given subject. There are parties in a church, a municipality or a university. As a rule parties recognize someone as leader, who usually is the ablest exponent of the particular views held by the party. Behind party is the idea that union is strength. Whereas individuals acting alone cannot secure victory for their opinions in councils, they can do so when united. Often it is advisable for individuals to sacrifice their own opinions in order to join a party leader or organization.

General Meaning of Party

Political parties resemble in principle parties in municipalities or universities. People holding similar opinions on political questions form a party. In political matters often a great variety of opinions exists, and theoretically there may be as many parties as there are opinions. In actual practice, however, opinions tend to flow into a few more or less definitely marked channels. The necessity for organization in matters affecting government is even more marked than in smaller councils, and parties tend to be organized as broadly as possible. Each party tries to gain numbers, so that if there is a certain general agreement among members in important matters, disagreement in matters of detail does not count. A political party may thus be defined as an organized group of citizens who profess to share the same political views and who, by acting as a political unit, try to control the government.

Political Parties

The chief aim of a party is to make its own opinions and policy prevail. To do so it is necessary to control the legislature in the state. To control the legislature means that party representatives must be in a majority in the legislature. Parties, therefore, are highly organized in order to manage elections ; the more members they can command the more control they have over legislation. Sub-division in a party is disastrous ; introduction of any sort of cleavage immediately splits the vote and gives opposing parties an opportunity.

The best system to secure party ends is the minimum number of parties—or the two-party system. This is the type in the United States, and till recently, it was the type in Great Britain. In the United States there are the Republican and Democratic parties ; in Great Britain there are, or rather used to be, the Conservatives and Liberals. In both countries a new party, the Labour Party, has appeared in recent years. In Britain the Labour party at one time used to vote with the Liberal party. Now it is a strong independent party, and the Liberals are weak in numbers and disorganized. On the continent of Europe the two-party system does not prevail : the multiple-party system is the rule there. The lines of cleavage are too many to admit of a clear-cut division into two parties. Germany used to have about a dozen parties and France five to seven, with various sub-divisions.

The party system in all countries is an extra-legal growth. It has grown up gradually outside the legal system of democracies, but is as indispensable as law itself. It is not too much to say that the whole machinery of government depends on it. In America the election of the President and of the members of Congress depends on party organization. The party system is really the method whereby the too great rigidity of the American constitution has been broken down. In Great Britain the central fact of government, the Cabinet, depends on the party system.

It has been pointed out by some writers that party division is a natural outcome of government by discussion.

Party cleavage, it is said, is the result of the fact that there is a Yes and No to every question. This would be true were all parties divided on particular questions. What is found in practice is that

The Party System

The Origin of Parties

parties divide on various grounds. Some parties are formed to further class interests. The Labour parties of various modern countries exist to represent the interests of labour. Other parties are based on particular theories of the ends of the state. Socialists believe that a socialistic organization of society is better than the individualist type at present prevalent. Other parties exist for particular political purposes. The Irish Nationalist party existed to secure Home Rule for Ireland. Once the object of such parties is secured, they automatically cease to exist. Other parties, again, arise for the defence of a sect or branch of the church. Such parties, though many of them have lost their original character, are common in continental politics. Economic interests frequently lead to the formation, or alteration of existing parties in such a way as to make them practically new parties. The question of free trade *versus* protection in Britain, for example, materially altered the composition of the old Liberal and Conservative parties. Race is another basis of party division. This is common in countries where there are several antagonistic races—e.g., the late Austro-Hungarian Union, or where one race (e.g., the Jews in Germany) has to organize itself as a party in self-defence, or for the promotion of its interests.

Except where general tendencies are obscured by individual questions, it is generally possible to recognize at least four types of social or political thought:

Four General Types of Party (a) Radicals those who wish the present institutions to be altered root and branch (the word radical comes from the Latin word *radix*, which means a root); (b) Reactionaries, those who wish to return to the older state of things. These are the extremes; the means are—(c) Liberals, those who wish reform of present institutions, and (d) Conservatives, those who wish to “conserve” or keep existing institutions as they are. These four classes shade off into one another. In each class the same four classes might be detected. Thus in the Liberal party there are some who are very near to the Conservatives on the one hand, and some very near the Radicals on the other. There is also a number of Moderates, with leanings to one extreme or the other. The essence of political parties is organization to attain control of the government, and this necessity keeps minor differences of opinion in check. It

often happens that members of widely different opinions on all other matters will unite on particular questions. They agree to sink their other differences for the sake of unity on one question. Thus, when the Irish Home Rule question split Mr. Gladstone's Liberal party in 1886, several members of the Liberal party went over to the Conservatives (who after that were usually called Unionists) and, because of one important difference with the Liberals, cast in their lot for ever with the Conservatives.

In federal systems of government another line of distinction may be drawn, viz., centrifugal and centripetal, i.e., the parties which support concentration of authority in the central government, and the devolution of authority to the provincial or "state" governments.

In Federal Systems

Although the party system has become essential to modern democracy, it is not without its critics. Much may be said for it, and much against it. During the Great War, party differences were as a rule sunk to secure national unity in the struggle, but even before the end of the war the old party differences began to reappear. Many hoped that the war would kill the old party system, but it has been resuscitated in its pre-war vigour, though not on pre-war lines.

Merits and Demerits of Party Government

The most serious objection to party government, especially the two-party system, is that it destroys individuality. It tends to make the political life of a country machine-like or artificial. The party in opposition or, as it is sometimes called, the Outs, is always antagonistic to the party in power, or the Ins. It does not matter what the question may be: the proposed law may be perfectly good, but it must be opposed as a matter of party principle. On the other hand, it is claimed that this artificial antagonism always ensures every aspect of the question being taken into account. It is the business or the opposition party to criticize and to find as many faults as possible in any proposed law. This makes the party responsible for the law eager to avoid mistakes and to try as far as possible to meet every reasonable point of view.

The destruction of individuality follows really from party organization. For party government party unity is essential. There is therefore no room for the "independent" member.

The "independent" member, who prefers to hold his opinion even if it varies with party opinion, is a danger as he destroys its unity. It therefore must either pacify him by promising or giving him office when in power, or it must get rid of him. Parties are so highly organized that they can easily get rid of a recalcitrant member by refusing him recognition. Such refusal means that he cannot be adopted as the official party candidate at the elections, which is tantamount to his being unable to secure a seat.

It may also be said against the party system that it tends to pass into the hands of caucuses, or private cliques, which arrange matters to suit themselves. Thus frequently the best men of the country are excluded from the chief posts in government. This is true in two ways: first, as in America, where the party-machine is so powerful as to exclude all from power who do not work with it; and, secondly, because the best men of the party in opposition cannot be given office in a system of cabinet government. It is an open question, however, whether these men do not perform even a better function by being in opposition, that is, the function of responsible critics who may be called upon at any moment to shoulder the burdens of government. As critics their functions are not wholly destructive, and they undoubtedly secure carefulness in the constructive work of those in power. And the party in power must put its ablest men in office in order to survive against the opposition.

Party government, its enemies point out, means excessive pandering to the people. This results in popular legislation, not for the good of the country but to catch votes. Popular legislation is usually unscientific, bad legislation. But government really rests on public opinion, and to reflect that opinion in laws is really the aim of government. Party government therefore is really a powerful instrument for the fulfilment of the purposes of the state.

Electors, again, it is said, may be mis-educated by party organization. Parties try to impress on them the truth of their own views and the falsity of those of others. In this way parties are often guilty of the sins of *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. But each elector is well supplied with the views of all parties, however distorted they may be, and he is left to draw his own conclusions.

The party system, further, raises artificial difficulties for

the executive. In Britain, where the cabinet is formed from the party in power, and where it is the head of both the legislative and the executive branches of government, party feeling often raises difficulties for the executive departments which need not be raised. On the other hand, the party system means strict supervision of the executive, for the opposition is always on the alert for any executive blunder or scandal, a fact which cannot but have a good influence on the executive.

One of the oldest and most frequently quoted draw-backs of party government—that it encourages loyalty to party at the expense of loyalty to state—was partially disproved by the Great War. At the beginning of the war the leading parties immediately sank their peace-time differences and loyally co-operated to secure victory. This co-operation resulted ultimately in a coalition government, which was representative of all parties. In normal times, the party in opposition sometimes adopts means which are disloyal or dangerous to the public peace in order to embarrass and discredit those in power.

One of the worst features of party government is the bitterness of feeling, rancour, and spiteful, undignified speeches which result, especially at election times. Party elections excite people. It is not uncommon to find men who have never before seen each other, enter into the most heated arguments at meetings or on the streets. Among the lower classes, it is not an unusual thing to see a free fight result. Such incidents do not lend dignity to public life.

Summarily, it may be said that the dual party system tends to diminish the instability that attaches to parliamentary government, and to render the criticism of governmental measures more orderly and circumspect; but it also tends to make party spirit more comprehensive and absorbing, party criticism more systematically factious and the utterances of ordinary politicians more habitually disingenuous.

2. THE MODERN PARTY SYSTEM

No two countries have the same party system, but a general distinction can be drawn between those which have the two-party system, and those which have the multiple-

party system. Of the two-party system the chief example is the United States. In Britain till recently it was in vogue, but it is probable that in the future there may be more than two parties. It must be remembered that this system may exist even though more than two parties nominally exist. Thus in Great Britain the two main parties used to be the Liberals and Conservatives, and in pre-war days the Irish Nationalists and Labour party, really separate parties, voted with the Liberals.

A short analysis of the party systems prevailing in Great Britain, the United States, and on the Continent of Europe will illustrate the party systems of the modern world.

1. The party system of Great Britain dates back to the Elizabethan age, when the Puritans opposed the Crown. The

**The Party
System in
Britain**

Puritans represented the current desire to secure constitutional government as against the arbitrariness of the royal prerogative. With the increasing arbitrariness of the first two Stuart kings, James I. and Charles I., the Puritans gained in strength. They were united, and were able to secure seats in parliament. Their opposition to the Crown became very marked in the Long Parliament of 1641. In this parliament we have the first example of real parliamentary parties. The one party supported the Crown and prerogative, the other supported constitutional government. The opposition resulted in the Great Rebellion or Civil War, which ended in 1649 with the execution of Charles I. The parties were known as the Cavaliers, the supporters of the king, and Roundheads, the supporters of parliamentary government. These names, like the later names of Whig and Tory, were given in derision.

After the Restoration, in 1660, of Charles II, the Cavaliers were complete masters in political matters, but party divisions again became marked in the debates on the Exclusion Bill in 1679. The purpose of the Exclusion Bill was to prevent the King's brother (later James II.) from ascending the throne. The names "Abhorrrers", those who abhorred petitions sent to the Crown for the summoning of parliament, and "Petitioners", those who petitioned the King to summon parliament, were given to these parties. These names were soon supplanted by the well-known nicknames of Tory (an Irish word meaning

highwayman) and Whig (a word meaning whey-face). The Tories were the supporters of the royal prerogative; the Whigs were advocates of parliamentary sovereignty or constitutional government.

The names Whig and Tory continued for a century and a half, one of them indeed, Tory, still being used derisively for the present Conservative party. The present party system however did not take root till the reign of George I., when Walpole became the first Prime Minister and the modern cabinet system started. William III. had chosen his minister from the more numerous party, the Whigs, a ministry known in history as the Junto. This Junto did not resign, like a modern party ministry, when it was not in a majority in the House of Commons.

With the change in the political complexion of the country the views of the parties changed. After the Revolution of 1688, when the Stuart dynasty was ejected, many Tories who were supporters of the Crown became Jacobites, or supporters of the Stuarts, as against the Houses of Orange and Hanover. The death-blow was dealt to the Stuart cause in 1745, and, with the disappearance of the Jacobites as a political force, the Tories entered into the national life as it existed under the Hanoverian kings. The parties became divided on general principles of government. With parliamentary supremacy a realized fact, the old distinction no longer applied. The Tories came to be looked on as upholders of the present condition of things, of stability and order; the Whigs were regarded as the promoters of reform and progress. In the nineteenth century the party names changed to the more intelligible ones of Conservatives (Tories) and Liberals (Whigs). With the union, in 1801, of Great Britain and Ireland, there came another party element which grew in strength as the century advanced. These were the Irish Nationalists, who demanded "Home Rule" for Ireland. In Mr. Gladstone's ministry of 1886 a Home Rule Bill was introduced which completely broke up the Liberal party. Those who refused to accept the Bill went over to the Conservative party, which from then onwards was also called the Unionist party. The term Liberal-Unionist was used for many years to designate those who previously had been Liberals but who refused to continue in that party after the Home Rule Bill. With the creation of the Irish

Free State in 1922, the Irish Nationalists disappeared from British politics.

Another party—Labour—has come to the front in the present century. It came into existence to support the interests of the working classes. It is to be distinguished from the Socialists of whom there is also a party in England, which as yet has not secured appreciable representation in the House of Commons.

Thus, at present, the British system has three organized parties—the Conservatives (also known as Unionists, and sometimes derisively called Tories), the Liberals, and the Labour Party. Up to the beginning of the Great War the Liberal, Labour, and the now defunct Irish Nationalist parties worked together, and by so doing preserved the two-party system of government. Within these two there was considerable variation of opinion, especially marked among the Liberals, who were composed of two types—the less progressive (or Liberals proper) and the more progressive (or Radicals). Some of the less progressive Liberals have joined the Conservative and some of the Radicals the Labour party.

Though the general dividing line between Liberals and Conservatives is the desire for progress and reform and the desire for the continuance of the present scheme of things, it is to be noted that this line of division is somewhat illusory. Conservatives have been responsible for social and political reform as well as Liberals. The extension of the basis of suffrage, for example, in the Reform Acts, was mainly the work of the former.

The theory of parties in England is well stated by May in his *Constitutional History*: "The parties in which Englishmen have associated have represented cardinal principles of government—authority on the one side, popular rights and privileges on the other. The former principle, pressed to extremes, would tend to absolutism, the latter to a republic; but, controlled within proper limits, they are both necessary for the safe working of a balanced constitution. When the parties have lost sight of these principles, in pursuit of objects less worthy, they have degenerated into factions."

In Britain the organization of the party machinery is centred in the leaders in Parliament, particularly the House of Commons. One man is definitely recognized as the head

and his views form the prevailing views of the party. The leader does not act alone, but in conjunction with other leading men. The parliamentary organization is centred in an official known as the Whip, whose duty it is to secure the maximum vote possible for his party in the House of Commons. Each party has a central office (e.g., the Central Conservative Association and the Central Liberal Association), with an executive committee as the central organization. Its main object is to win seats at elections, and for this end it issues propagandist literature, such as Year Books [the Liberal Year Book and the Constitutional (Conservative) Year Book] and electioneering pamphlets. The central office also keeps a list of names of members who wish seats in Parliament. The actual choice of candidates for seats is left to local associations, but the central organization often asks (though it cannot compel) the local associations to adopt a candidate nominated by the Whip. The central organizations have also considerable command of funds which are spent in propaganda work and in paying the expenses or part expenses for the candidates who cannot afford to pay. The accounts of these organizations are kept strictly secret, but it is commonly believed that the funds are augmented by those who expect to receive either office or honours from the party when it is in power.

Besides the actual executive organizations there are many other party organizations. Most important among these are the great London social clubs—the Carlton (Conservative) and National Liberal—the membership of which is exclusively political. All party leaders belong to these clubs; thus the clubs are important centres of political opinion. Working men's clubs exist in constituencies where political meetings are held and where an active part in elections is taken. Other organizations, such as the Primrose League (Conservative) and the Eighty Club (Liberal), are important political bodies, though they are not so continuously active as the others.

2. The party system of the United States, like that in Britain, has passed through various phases. Before the American War of Independence the parties in America were similar to those in England. After the Declaration of Independence, a purely American type grew up. The first

line of division was between the Federalists and Anti-federalists. The basis of this division was the form of government. The Federal party desired the establishment of a strong central government ; the Anti-federalists wished to retain state rights. With the adoption of the Constitution, the Anti-federalists were beaten, and disappeared, but their place was taken by the Republicans, who favoured the restriction of the powers of the central government. The Republicans, basing their theories on the general theories of rights which were so popular at the time of the French Revolution, gradually conquered the Federalists, or supporters of centralization. They called themselves Democratic Republicans and were helped by dissensions among the Federalist leaders and by the passing into law of certain unpopular acts. Coming into power in 1801, the Republicans adopted the most popular of the Federalist doctrines, which led to the extinction of the Federalist party. For some time there were no distinct parties (from about 1816 to 1830)—a period known in American history as the era of good feeling. About 1830 new parties began to arise, one, the Democrats, led by Andrew Jackson, the other, the Whigs, led by Henry Clay. The Democrats, successors of the Democratic Republicans, held extreme individualistic views of the rights of the people, and strongly opposed the protective tariff, the national bank, and national improvements in roads and canals, all of which were supported by the Whigs.

The next party controversy was slavery. This, ending in the American Civil War, split up the Whigs. The holders of anti-slavery opinions came together as Republicans. After the Civil War, and the abolition of slavery, the party basis of slavery was destroyed, but the organizations continued. The present party organization, though the same in name, is not divided by any clearly marked difference of opinion. The chief element in the system is the party organization, which is all powerful. It is impossible to say clearly what doctrines a Republican or a Democrat holds. They are divided on questions as they arise. Thus while the Republican party favours protection, the Democrats do not oppose it. The gold standard is favoured chiefly by the Republicans, but

The Party System in the United States

Present Position

also by many of the Democrats. As a matter of practice each party seizes on the opinion that is likely to be popular, and the only way to distinguish them is by their organization.

In America there are several smaller parties such as the Prohibitionists, who are temperance reformers, and the Labour party. These, however, have as yet made no mark on American national life.

The organization of the American party system is the most thorough-going in the world. Several reasons have contributed to this. Firstly, the separation of the legislative and executive branches of government, and the difficulty of amending the constitution have necessitated some method of co-ordinating them, both in central and state governments. Secondly, the frequency of elections, and the large number of elected officials, have helped to strengthen organization. In America, also, re-election is unusual. Fourthly, the large area of the United States, as well as the existence of two governments, federal and state, makes it necessary for the expression of the popular will that the machinery of election be highly organized. Fifthly, in America there is no central authority like the cabinet which is representative of the party in power and acts as a focus of party opinion.

The central fact of American party organization is the convention or meeting of representatives to choose candidates for offices. These representatives are selected by the political parties. The actual working of the system starts at the primary election or caucus. This "primary" is a meeting of the qualified voters in the smallest electoral area. It selects a local party committee, makes nominations for the local offices open to election, and sends delegates to the next highest meeting. In the primary elections only a small number of electors as a rule take part. The main body of citizens stay away either from lack of interest, lack of technical qualifications to attend, or because of unfair means adopted by party leaders.

In the larger electoral areas it is physically impossible for all qualified voters to attend. The business of these areas is therefore done through bodies of delegates, or conventions. The duties of this convention are similar to those of the primary convention. It appoints a committee, nominates party candidates and sends delegates to the state convention, which,

in its turn, nominates the party candidates for the state governorship and sends delegates to the national convention.

The national convention is the head of the whole organization. It is composed of twice as many members for each state as the state has members of Congress. Two delegates are sent from each congressional electoral area, and from each state at large. Each territory sends six delegates. As a rule, reserve members, or "alternates", as they are called, are chosen to replace members falling out. The national convention makes the party nomination for the presidency and vice-presidency, and decides matters of policy. The national convention is held once in four years. There are differences in procedure in the two parties. In the Republican party the delegates sent from a state may vote as individuals for different candidates; in the Democratic the delegates must vote in a body for one person. For election the Republican party requires only a simple majority; in the Democratic party a two-thirds majority is necessary.

The party system in America, though complete and symmetrical in its organization, has unfortunately developed many abuses. The frequency of American elections has proved too severe a tax on both the time and interest of the electors, and the elections have passed into the hands of party organizations. Hence have arisen what are known in America as the party "machine," the party "ring," and the "boss." The "boss" is the party leader who manages the election for his own friends or his own particular interests; the "ring" is composed of his followers who help him in elections and expect to share in the benefits flowing from success in the elections. The "machine" is the party organization by which the "boss" is able to carry out his purposes. The "boss" is not primarily interested in general political issues. His business is to win elections, and to do so he must be a master of intrigue and persuasion. His chief enemies are those of his own party who try to weaken his power, as, particularly in municipal elections, he can often make a "deal" with the "bosses" of the opposite party to share in the final distribution of offices. Elections, from the "primaries" upwards, are, accordingly, more or less farcical. The voters, aware of the system, do not attend, and the selection of candidates takes place

at the bidding of an inside "clique" which prepares beforehand the names to be adopted (known in America as a "slate"). The very existence of the "machine" system keeps voters away; they know that their individual votes are of no avail against the machine. In the primary elections only a very small number of the qualified voters take the trouble to attend the meetings.

One of the evil results of the American system is known as the "spoils" system, by which government offices are given to party supporters. The close connexion of politics with industrial and commercial life results also in the evil of what is known as "graft", by which business bodies, by helping "bosses" or party leaders with money, are able to secure legislation favourable to their own interests.

During recent years many methods for the reform of the American system have been proposed. The fundamental difficulty is really the apathy of the electors themselves, but the "machine" is now so perfect that it is questionable even if increased interest in politics by the masses would be able to amend it. Another suggested reform is the abolition of elective administrative posts. For the "spoils" system reform in the civil service is necessary. Some states have drawn up laws to prevent abuse in primary elections. Another method, adopted in the state of Minnesota, is to allow every qualified voter to name his candidate, and, ultimately, by the double-ballot system, to elect the man who has the final majority.

3. Parties on the Continent of Europe. The system prevailing in Europe is the multiple-party system. Instead of two parties, there are several, not one of which, as a rule, is able to control the others. Where the party system co-exists with cabinet government, the multiplicity is particularly dangerous. The cabinet is liable to be beaten at any time, as it can never count on the support of any group or groups. To this the frequent changes of cabinet in continental countries possessing cabinet government are due.

In France after the 1928 elections there were no less than ten parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies, of which six had forty or more members. The French party divisions are by no means clearly marked, and the lack of organization has prevented unity. For long the

Parties in
Continental
Europe

divisions were decided by the questions of the form of government—monarchical or presidential. Among the monarchical party were sub-divisions representing the claims of different royal houses to the throne, the Bourbons and Buonapartes. The monarchical basis has died out and other theories of government have taken its place. The Conservatives are the successors of the old monarchists, while the Republicans, Socialists, and Radicals form other divisions, with sub-divisions of their own. The instability so characteristic of French political life is helped by the system of interpellations, by which a member of the Chamber of Deputies may ask a question of a member of cabinet, raise a debate, and demand a vote. This often results in unexpected defeats of the cabinet and consequent resignations.

The method most favoured in France to secure stability is the two-party organization. On the Continent party organization is not highly developed, and this lack of organization is largely accountable for the weakness of the system.

Italy, which used to have about six parties, has secured stability through the dominance of the Fascist party. In Germany, before the War, of about a dozen parties represented in the Reichstag, five were very strong. But as in Germany there was no cabinet government, the party system did not affect the stability of the executive government. In the National Assembly elected after the end of the Great War six parties were represented by twenty or more members. Under the new constitution Germany has adopted cabinet government, so that the executive now depends on party support. Eight parties (besides minor parties) were represented in the Reichstag after the 1928 elections.

It may be remarked in conclusion that the party system has been adopted in all the British Self-governing Dominions. In Canada the Conservative and Liberal, in Australia and New Zealand the Liberal and Labour, are the chief parties. In South Africa there are several parties, owing to the peculiar political complexion of the country: the chief parties are the South African, Unionist and Nationalist parties. In India no distinct party lines are yet discernible. The most general division is that of Moderates and Swarajists, but attempts have been made to found other parties, e.g., Liberals and Constitutionalists.

CHAPTER XVI

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF UNION BETWEEN STATES ; INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES, INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIONS, PERSONAL UNIONS, REAL UNIONS

The word federalism is derived from the Latin word *fœdus*, which means a treaty or agreement. The essential feature of a modern federal state is that two or more hitherto independent states agree to form a new state. Federal states are a species of a genus, the genus being unions, or states which exist in virtue of some form of governmental union or agreement. Before analysing federalism, it is necessary first to differentiate it from other types of union.

Union between states varies in completeness from international alliances (such as an agreement between independent states to guarantee certain rights or territory) on the one extreme, to federalism on the other. In the case of international alliances the individual states concerned have to carry out the agreement ; there is no organization to compel any of the states that may fail to fulfil its guarantee. Alliances entail no organization beyond the governments of the individual states themselves. They are the weakest type of union.

Most unions have some sort of organization definitely marking the union. These organized unions may be divided into (a) International Administrative Unions ; (b) Personal Unions ; (c) Real Unions ; (d) Confederations ; (e) Federations.

International administrative unions differ from interna-

tional alliances in having a definite organization for the carrying out of the purpose for which they are established. Such unions exist only for a definite administrative purpose—such as the management of the Suez Canal by Britain and France, or the joint administration, by the same powers, of certain Pacific islands.

**Inter-
national
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trative
Unions**

Personal Union and Real Union (both these terms are taken from the German language) are very much alike. In personal union two distinct states come under one ruler; the states are independent, each having its own constitutional laws and organization: the only bond of union is the common ruler. Choice, succession or any other casual circumstance may be the cause of personal union. Each state preserves its own identity, sends its own international representatives to other states, and receives theirs. The common ruler may have different functions in the several states of the union. He may be a constitutional ruler in one and absolute in another. He has different personalities for each unit. As soon as the ruler ceases to exist, the personal union ends. In a personal union, therefore, the only bond of union is the person of the ruler, and when it ceases to exist, either by death or by legal extinction, the union ceases. An example of such personal union was the Union of England and Hanover from 1714–1837. The Hanoverian kings of England were at one and the same time Kings of England and of Hanover. This relationship ceased with the accession of Queen Victoria, because the Hanoverian laws did not permit female succession to the throne.

Real Union goes further than Personal Union. In Real Union there is a common ruler but the individual states, while preserving their own constitutional laws and local institutions, create a common authority to secure certain common ends. The states are closely united, and act as one in international matters. The old Austro-Hungarian Union is an example. In Austria-Hungary there were two units—the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Emperor of Austria was also the King, or, as he was officially known, the Apostolic King of Hungary. The Compromise of 1867 settled that each state should preserve its institutions, with its own legislature and

**Real
Union**

executive departments. In foreign, military and naval affairs, and in financial matters relating to these common affairs, there were common administrative agencies. With certain small exceptions, the Union had entire control of these subjects, though the executive agency for the assessment and collection of the financial contributions of the units was the individual governments. In commercial matters there was an agreement, renewable at intervals of ten years, by which the two states were practically one in customs, coinage and weights and measures. The legislative power in common matters was vested in the parliaments of the states, but the Delegations, nominated from the Legislative Houses of each state, decided the requirements of the common services. These Delegations were summoned annually by the Emperor and King, and met alternately at the capital of Austria (Vienna), and the capital of Hungary (Buda-Pesth). The three common ministries (Foreign Affairs, War, Finance) were responsible to the Delegations, not to the Austrian and the Hungarian Parliaments.

Another modern example of Real Union was the union, from 1815 to 1905, of Norway and Sweden. This union was not so complete as the union of Austria and Hungary. Foreign affairs were managed by Sweden, not by a separate organization. Each country preserved its own parliament and flag. There was no joint legislature or joint ministry. The desire for separate foreign representation by Norway led to the disruption of the union in 1905.

2. CONFEDERATION

Though the words Confederation and Federation come from the same root, the two are distinct in meaning. Confederation both historically and logically is prior to federation; but the latter is the more complete form of union. In a federation states hitherto sovereign lose their statehood, they give up their sovereignty to another state, the federal state. In a confederation union is only partial. Each state preserves its original sovereignty, and only for certain common ends a new organization is established. The confederate organ of government binds each state with the consent of the state concerned. No new state is formed, though there is a new

organ of government. This new government is, as it were, the result of a treaty between independent states, except that the treaty has no definite duration and creates a separate organization merely to recommend or carry out certain common ends. Any state in a confederation can secede if it wishes. The only restraint is the fear that the other states of the confederation may enforce the original treaty from the idea that they have been endangered by the secession.

In a confederation the central organ of government deals with the individual governments, which it controls only so far as its statutory powers permit. A confederation does not deal with the citizens of the individual states. In a federation, however, a new citizenship is created. The federal government has direct relations with the citizens. In a confederation each citizen is a citizen of his own state ; in a federation he is a citizen in a double sense, of a " state " (which is only nominally a state in a federal union) and of *the* state, the federal state. To take a simple example, suppose India were united in a confederation, there would be a government, at Delhi, which would control Bengal, Bombay, Madras and the other provinces in certain matters agreed upon by all provinces. Yet the provinces would remain independent of each other. A Madrassi would remain a Madrassi, a Bengali a Bengali. Bengal or Madras could secede from the union if either felt that it could no longer consent to it. In a federal union, however, Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the others could not secede from the union. Each Bengali and Madrassi, in addition to being a Bengali or Madrassi, would be also an Indian. He would be a Madrassi-Indian or Bengali-Indian, for the state to which he owed his chief allegiance would be India. Bengal, Bombay, Madras, etc., would no longer be independent states, but provincial governments with certain guaranteed powers.

The distinction between confederations and federations may thus be summed up : first, a federation makes a new state ; a confederation is a union of existing states ; second, a federation has a body of federal law which is the law of the new state. This law represents the will of the federal community. In a confederation there is only a joint government for certain purposes. The continued existence of this

government depends on the consent of the states. Third, in a federation a new sovereignty is created. The sovereignty rests in the federation, not in the states, as in a confederation. Fourth, the states, or more correctly, provinces, of a federation, cannot secede, for a federation is perpetual; in a confederation, the consent of each state being essential to union, secession is possible. Fifth, in a federation a new nation is formed, the central government dealing with both provincial governments and citizens; in a confederation the common organ of government deals only with state governments.

In the German language the distinction is well brought out by the words *Staatenbund*, meaning union or system of states (confederation), and *Bundestaat*, a unified state (federation). Confederation is a weaker type of union than federation. It often precedes federation; the conditions leading to confederation may ultimately bring about a stronger form of union. In the modern world the United States, Switzerland and Germany are outstanding instances of federal states, and in each of these federation was preceded by confederation. Confederation, however, often results from a temporary emergency, and experience has proved that as soon as that emergency is past, the confederation may break down. Federalism must rest on something more secure than temporary exigencies.

There are many historical instances of confederations. Unions of this type (called "systems", "groups", "joint-states", or "commonwealths") were common

Examples of Confederation: amongst the Greeks. In ancient Greece there was a large number of independent cities, and from time to time the needs of defence or the demands of commerce led to leagues or confederations. Certain conditions favourable to union existed in Greece—common language, religion and culture. Every Greek was proud of the fact that he was a Greek, whether a Spartan, a Corinthian or an Athenian, as distinct from a foreigner, or barbarian, as the Greeks called non-Greeks. In spite of many all-Greek institutions, such as the religious festivals, the Hellenic games, and the Amphictyonic Council, the ancient Greeks never achieved unity. The mountainous nature of the country, the intensely local form of government, whether democratic or oligarchic, and local

jealousies, prevented complete fusion. The Bœotian, Delian, Lycian, Achæan and Ætolian Leagues all flourished for some time, but none achieved permanence. The most notable of these was the Achæan League.

The Achæan League was the result of the conquest of Greece by Alexander the Great. After Alexander's death, the Macedonian domination over Greece continued, but the ten cities of Achæa, taking advantage of the Macedonian pre-occupation with an invasion by a northern tribe, established their independence. They were soon joined by the whole of Greece, except Sparta and Athens. The government of the Achæan League was organized according to the type prevailing in the cities forming it. There was an assembly of all the citizens, which met half-yearly, and a senate, of 120 members, which was practically a committee of the assembly. The assembly elected magistrates to carry on the work of the League. These magistrates were responsible to the assembly. The citizens in the assembly voted by cities, not by head, each city having equal representation. The chief magistrate, or general was the equivalent of a modern president. The Achæan League was in many respects more like a federation than a confederation. Common laws, magistrates, coins, weights and measures, however, did not prevent disruption. Structurally the League was defective in the equal representation of unequal cities, and in the union of civil and military power in the generalship. The first led to local jealousies, the latter to defeat. Athens, moreover, and Sparta refused to join, and, though the name of the League existed long after the Macedonian yoke was cast off, its actual life ceased with the realization of the object which gave it being.

The Achæan League was the most thorough-going attempt at federation in the ancient world. The Lycian League, earlier historically than the Achæan, is notable inasmuch as, profiting later by the experience of the Achæan, it allowed proportional representation to the city-states forming it. The Lycian League, it may be noted, attracted the admiration of Montesquieu, and the American, Hamilton, and through their influence was a stimulus to the modern federal movement.

Before the rise of Rome there were in Italy leagues with,

certain federal characteristics. The chief was the league of the thirty cities of Latium, of which perhaps Rome was one. The rapid rise of Rome, however, prevented any confederations in Italy. Rome, as mistress of Italy, was too strong to join in any equal alliance and strong enough to prevent any union against her. Nevertheless, in the heyday of the Roman Empire certain principles of government were observed which have since been applied with great success in the British Empire. After her military conquests Rome usually tried to incorporate her provinces in the Empire by extending the privileges of Roman citizenship to the conquered peoples. The Roman dominions were allowed a large measure of self-government, as well as the franchise. The latter was a failure because of the physical impossibility of the conquered peoples taking a direct part in Roman elections ; and self-government really depended on the whims of the administrative chiefs at Rome. Though neither federalism nor representative government succeeded, Rome almost achieved success in both.

After the fall of Rome, political organization of all kinds became unstable. With the feudal system, the federal principle again emerged. Feudalism, the essence of which was a social classification based on ownership of land, was in a sense federal. The king was the social head and the vassals were his subordinates. Instead of producing union, this system produced disunion. The greater landlords tended to become independent kings. To the protest by the cities against feudalism, which was essentially a land system, modern federalism owes its birth. Commerce and industry were much hampered by the exactions of territorial magnates, and for long there were severe struggles between the industrial centres and the feudal landlords. Commerce and industry led to the formation of towns, the wealth of which attracted the greedy overlords. Defence, therefore, was the first task of the towns. Several leagues of towns sprang up, notably the Lombard League, the Rhenish League, the famous Hanseatic League and the Cinque Ports in England. These leagues, which sprang up throughout all western Europe, existed to oppose the rapacity of feudal chiefs. They were primarily commercial, and had common military organizations to guard them. They were not really

**The
Middle
Ages**

political unions, and in no case did the union outlive the commercial necessity which caused it.

In one case, however, the basis was laid for a later confederation and ultimately federation. In 1921 three mountain cantons in the Alps leagued together against the absolutism of the German king and the prevailing feudal lawlessness. The Swiss League gradually developed in strength and organization till the independence of the cantons was recognized by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The Holy Roman Empire, by a long process of decentralization, gradually became a loose confederation. The emperors were gradually forced to give concessions to the territorial magnates, many of whom ultimately became independent. Till 1806 the Emperor continued to be elected by the Diet of the German Empire, which represented some three hundred states and free cities. The dissolution of this was followed by a new confederation, and later by the federation of the German Empire.

One more historical confederation must be noticed, viz., the Netherlands. Feudalism, though there it had a firm hold, rapidly decayed with the rise of the towns. The natural industriousness of the people, coupled with a flat country which provided no baronial strongholds, enabled the people early to achieve liberty. This liberty was soon to be infringed by the passing of the Duchy of Burgundy, to which the provinces (roughly Holland and Belgium) owed allegiance, to Spain. The Reformation, which was supported particularly in Holland, led the Spanish Kings, Charles and Philip, to adopt severe repressive measures, the result of which was that all the hitherto independent trading republics lost their ancient charters and liberties and were made completely subservient to Spain. Both Catholic and Protestant provinces disliked Spanish interference, and in 1579, by the Union of Utrecht, five provinces united in eternal union to oppose the foreign power. The articles of union show that these provinces all but became a federal union. The provinces decided to defend one another by means of the "generality" of the union. The expenses of common action were to be met by equal levies. Peace and war were to be decided unani-

mously by the provinces, as also was the levy of the federal taxes. On other matters the majority was to decide. The central organ was the States-General, which represented governments, not individuals. No state could make separate treaties with a foreign power without the consent of the others, and any alterations in the articles of union required unanimous consent from the members. The States-General, it must be noted, represented states, not the people, and the votes were by states. No executive corresponding to the States-General was appointed till the Spanish yoke was definitely renounced.

The Dutch confederation lasted only during the Spanish menace. The union never went beyond a union of states : no new nation was formed. The individuals of the states were never affected by the central government. The death of the menace killed the spirit of unity for centuries, and, when it was revived, the idea of federalism was lost.

The two most notable modern confederations are the United States of America for the few years 1781-1789, and the German confederation from 1815-1866. The American confederation existed for mutual defence. Each state reserved its independence except so far as the common end of defence demanded its surrender. A congress of delegates was formed to make provision for defence, but no common executive or judiciary was instituted. The confederation passed ultimately into what is the chief example of a modern federal state.

The German confederation consisted of various types of states, kingdoms, free cities, grand duchies and principalities. The aim of the union was the external and internal security of the states. There was a central Diet, presided over by Austria. This Diet consisted of representatives of the states, who voted according to the instructions received from their own governments. The Diet had supreme control in foreign affairs, though the individual states could make treaties if these treaties did not endanger the union or any state of the union. War and peace alike were matters for the Diet, and machinery was created to settle inter-state disputes. No federal executive was established ; each state acted as the executor of the resolutions of the union.

This confederation, after various vicissitudes, including severance from Austria, became the federation of the German Empire.

3. FEDERALISM

No type of government organization occupies a larger place at the present time in the public mind than federalism. Not only is it regarded as the solution of many of the internal problems of states, but many political thinkers look upon it as the key to the organization of a world-state. With the United States of America as a model, many modern states have adopted the federal system and at the present moment even the most conservative of all constitutions, that of Britain, is in danger of losing its old flexibility to meet the ever-increasing demand for a federal empire.

One of the earliest definitions of federalism is in Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*, in which he says that federal government is "a convention by which several similar states agree to become members of a larger one." It is, as Hamilton says (in the *Federalist*, IX, though Hamilton did not draw an accurate distinction between federation and confederation), "an association of states that forms a new one." Federalism tries to reconcile the existence of hitherto independent states with the creation of a new state, to which alone sovereignty belongs. As Dicey says, it is "a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity with the maintenance of state rights." It represents a compromise between large states and small states; it combines small states which up to the time of union have been independent units, into a larger state. The small states preserve as much local autonomy as is consistent with the object of union. They lose sovereignty, for the sovereignty passes to the new state, and become units of provincial government with definitely guaranteed powers.

It is unfortunate that the language of ordinary life should so have overcome the more exact language of Political

Science that the word state is used for both the united federal state, and the units which compose it. In the United States of America there is, properly speaking, only one state, but Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, California, etc., are called

**Difficulty of
the Word
"State"**

"states." Scientifically speaking, they are states only by courtesy. It would be more correct to call them provinces (as in Canada), as they do not possess the essential characteristic of a state, which is sovereignty. Again in Germany there is only one state, though Prussia, Bavaria, etc., are called "states". In Switzerland the word *canton* is used, a use which prevents confusion. It must also be remembered that by the words "federal state" is really meant federal government. "Federal" applies to government, not to state. A federal state is not a compound state with divided or dual sovereignty. The state is one and sovereign; the form of government is federal. Both ordinary and scientific language are inconsistent and it is necessary to keep these caveats in mind.

Certain favourable conditions are necessary for the success of a federal union. The first is geographical contiguity. It is hopeless to make a federal system real if the component parts are widely separated by land or sea. Federal government demands that each province should take part not only in its own affairs but in the affairs of the central government. Distance leads to carelessness or callousness on the part of both central and local governments. National unity is difficult to attain where the people are too far apart. Thus, while federalism is possible in Australia, Canada, South Africa or India, it could never be real in the whole British Empire, where London would be the federal centre of countries so far apart as Canada, South Africa, India and New Zealand.

A second essential is community of language, culture, religion, interests and historical associations. These, it will be remembered, are the usual elements of nationality. The aim of federalism is to produce a unified nation, and complete unity demands that the boundaries of state and nationality coincide. Federalism makes a new state, and the new state, if it is to be successful, must have behind it the national force of the people. In Germany, Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, etc., became Germans; in the United States the American nationality co-exists with the local patriotism of the "states". Federalism implies two types of allegiance, a smaller and a greater, and the

**The Basis
of Federalism
(a) Geographical
Contiguity**

**(b) Community of
Language,
Culture
and
Interests**

smaller must never come before the greater. Discordant states, states that do not "pull with" the central government, weaken it. Success in federal union depends on agreement: discordant elements must, therefore, be excluded or won over. There should be opposition of will on the part of neither individuals nor governments to the union. Federal government is most likely to be successful where conditions are favourable to the development of a new nationality, or the resumption of an old one.

The third essential of federalism, viz., a sentiment of unity, flows from the second. This basis implies a common purpose, a purpose which finds its fulfilment in common political union. The sentiment of unity is the index of a common national mind. The first attempts at the organization of such national fellow-feeling may not always be successful, but the likelihood is that in the course of time the various local jealousies will be lost in a common loyalty.

To prevent local jealousy, as far as possible, there should be equality among the component parts, both between themselves and in relation to outside powers. A state "markedly larger or more powerful than the others may be too proud and domineering for smaller ones. Because of its strength, it may be selfish or regardless of the interests of the others. This, for example, was true of Prussia in Germany. A strong state may endanger the union by its ability to resume its own foreign relations. For an ideal federal union perfect equality of the states in size and power is desirable. Such exact equality is, of course, impossible. Only a rough equality is attainable. Proportionate representation on the federal organs does not eliminate the jealousy and envy which result from inequality.

Fifth, federal government requires a basis of political competence and general education among the people. Because of its structure, it is the most difficult of all systems of government, while the recognition and appreciation of the double allegiance to province and state require a high level of general intelligence among the people.

The federal process usually proceeds from the smaller to the greater, i.e., small "states" combine to form a single

large state. It is thus usually a process of centralization. Sometimes the federal form of government is used as an administrative instrument. A large state may sub-divide itself on federal principles to secure more efficient government. This is a process of devolution or decentralization. Mexico and Brazil are examples of this type, and at the present time there is much talk of federalizing the British Isles, if not the British Empire. It must also be noted that provinces or states should follow, as far as possible, historical boundaries. Germany did so, but the United States boundaries are matters largely of geographical and administrative convenience.

Given these conditions, federal government is likely to be adopted successfully.

Essential Elements in Federalism In federal government there are three essential elements :—

1. The supremacy of the constitution.
2. The demarcation of powers between the central and provincial governments.
3. The existence of a judicial power to decide disputes arising on the first and second heads.

A little consideration will show why these three elements are essential. A federal form of government is a type of contract between certain parties, viz., the

1. The Constitution " states " or provinces, and the new government.

The smaller units agree to form one state, which must be sovereign. At the same time they wish to preserve as much local autonomy as they can. Obviously there must be an agreement defining the positions of the central or new government and that of the provincial governments. This agreement is the constitution. The constitution is not a moral treaty; it is the fundamental expression of the will of the parties forming a new state: it is the basis of the new state. To this new state all provinces and citizens, whatever their former position, have the same relation. The provinces now become units of provincial government with their position guaranteed by the fundamental constitution. The citizens all owe allegiance to the same state: they have a new citizenship.

If the constitution is to be stable it should not be too easy of amendment. We have already seen the distinction

between flexible and rigid constitutions. A flexible constitution is one which can be amended by the normal law-making process: a rigid constitution is one in which amendment is possible in a way different from the ordinary law-making process. The nature of a federal constitution is such that it must be rigid. Were the constitution amendable by the normal process of law-making the states whose rights are guaranteed by the constitution would feel insecure: and such insecurity would inevitably prevent the welding process so essential to a successful federal union. If federalism were applied to the United Kingdom, the old flexibility of the British constitution would have to be surrendered. A new constitution with the rights of England, Scotland and Wales definitely guaranteed would have to be made, and made in such a way that the ordinary legislature could not alter its guarantees.

The second essential of federal Government, viz., the demarcation of powers between the states and central Government, arises from the first. Theoretically the constitution need go no further than the general delimitation of powers; actually all federal constitutions go into considerable detail in the matter of the division of powers. They not only indicate the scope of the various powers, but, as a rule, say how they are to be exercised. Once the general principles of division are laid down, there is no reason why the central and state governments should not work them out themselves according to their particular circumstances. In practice, however, federal constitutions give details for the guidance of the new governments.

In the actual division of powers there is considerable variation among existing federal governments. The fundamental division is between central and local: affairs of common concern must be under the common, i.e., federal government; affairs of local concern should be under the "state," or provincial government. In the earliest modern federations defence as a rule was the immediate cause of union. Common defence implies the federal management of the army and navy, of foreign relations, and of financial resources sufficient to pay common expenses. Foreign relations, war and peace, and the power to raise money for such purposes

**The
Division
of Powers**

must belong to the federal government. These functions are essential to the very existence of the federal government. All matters of common interest should also be under common management, e.g., coinage, patents, copyrights and the postal service. A large number of functions relating to commerce and trade require common regulation, e.g., transportation, including railways and tariffs. Common railway control is necessary, particularly for co-ordination of railway gauges. In Australia, for example, at present it is impossible to have a through railway service from Melbourne to Sydney, because the railway gauge differs in the two states of Victoria and New South Wales. Tariffs, both internal and external, must come within the powers of the central government. Inter-state tariffs are a serious bar to federal unity. In the German confederation of 1815 not only was each state a separate tariff area, but Prussia alone had over sixty separate tariff areas. Whatever the external tariff policy may be, free inter-state commerce is necessary. Such free commerce implies federal control.

In the national interest it is advisable that education, marriage and divorce should be under central supervision. There is, however, considerable variation in practice in this respect. The modern tendency is to bring more functions under the supervision or general control of the central government. The actual management of these affairs is left to provincial governments. Matters of purely local interest should be left to provincial governments.

In regard to the division of powers there are two general types of constitution: the United States or American type, and the Canadian. Before the union, in the United States, each government had its own three "powers"—legislative, executive and judicial. The creation of the federal constitution limited these powers in a two-fold way—first, by the federal constitution; second, by the new state constitutions. To the central government were given the minimum powers necessary for the working of a federal government; the residue of functions was left to the states themselves. The functions of the central government were definitely limited by the constitution. Thus, in the United States, the central government performs certain stated functions, with such other functions as are implied in these; everything else is,

**Types of
Federal
Unions**

left to the states. In Canada the opposite policy was adopted. Certain subjects or classes of subjects are definitely given to the states. The federal government legislates in all matters not definitely assigned to the states. The legislative powers of the Canadian central government are thus much wider than those of the American legislature.

In both Germany and Switzerland the central government has more powers than in the United States. Though the legislative power of the central government in Germany is wider, the executive is narrower, for the states largely execute the federal law for themselves. This is true of both the pre-war and post-war German government. The more recent federation of Australia (1900), though its model was the United States, is turning towards the Canadian model. The modern tendency is to give greater powers to the central government. In most of these federal governments, use is made of the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, whereby, if the constitution does not definitely exclude certain things from the states, the states are free to act for themselves, provided the central government does not act. Of course the law of a state or province must not be in opposition to any law of the central legislature, as the less cannot supersede the greater, just as no law of the central government itself can supersede any article in the constitution.

The third essential of a federal constitution is a body to decide disputes. Where there are two powers, local and central, each with stated powers, cases of conflict may arise. This not only makes a judicial body necessary but gives that body great power over both the legislature and executive. Thus, if either a state or central legislature passes a law which is not within its powers according to the constitution, that law becomes void because the courts will refuse to apply it in any given case. Such a law is *ultra vires*, or beyond the constitutional powers of the law making body, and, therefore, is inapplicable.

Federal governments show various types of judicial organization. The best provision is made in the United States and the Canadian (and other British-colonial) constitutions, where there is a definite federal judiciary which is constitutionally independent of the other branches of government. This

3. A Federal Judiciary

In Actual Practice

independence enables the courts fearlessly to enforce their decisions. In Canada the Governor-General also has the power of disallowing a bill as *ultra vires*, but his decision does not affect the right of the Supreme Court to pronounce a law unconstitutional.

On the continent, the courts have not the same power. In both Switzerland and Germany courts exist which might well exercise the function of deciding constitutional limits, yet they have no right to question the legality of federal laws. In Switzerland, where there is a near approach to direct popular government, the theory seems to be that the federal laws depend on the will of the people. Once passed, the laws must be accepted as such, whether they are constitutionally legal or not. On the continent, too, the prevalence of administrative law, whereby official acts are subject to a separate jurisdiction, rules constitutional disputes out of the sphere of the courts. They belong to the sphere of administrative law; the government itself decides on the constitutionality or non-constitutionality of any given law. In Germany the Imperial Court, or Reichsgericht, has pronounced laws passed by states as *ultra vires*, but it has never pronounced any Imperial law unconstitutional. The legislature itself decides whether or not a proposed law is within its own powers.

Some further points must be noted. In the first place, there is no such thing as a model system of federalism.

Other
Points.
There is
no Ideal
Federal
System

Experience has definitely proved that this or that element in federal government is good or bad, but in no case can it be said that any given organization will be successful. The best type of federal government is that which is best adapted to the people. Although the general spirit of federalism is the same all the world over,

the details must vary according to the type of institutions on which it is super-imposed. German federalism, for example, could not be produced elsewhere, because German federal government was founded on German institutions. When a federal system is established, local institutions should be utilized or adopted wherever possible. To impose new ideas or invent a new political machinery where the indigenous ideas or machinery can be used is to court failure. As far as is consistent with the objects to be attained, federalism

should mould old institutions to new ideas without violently breaking with tradition and established custom.

A secondary characteristic of federal unions is double representation. The bicameral principle finds here a natural method of division—one house for the people, one for state governments. The American principle of equality of citizens and equality of states has been widely followed in this respect.

Double Representation

Each citizen is equally represented in the citizens' house (the House of Representatives), and each state in the state-house, the Senate. In the German Empire, though the states were not equally represented, there was a rough proportionate equality.

It is also to be noted that a federation may exist in a subordinate government. The British colonial federations are theoretically subordinate to the Imperial Parliament, which can make or unmake their constitutions at will. Or, again, a federation may exist within a federation. Thus, if in the future there is a federal British Empire, the federal government will be supreme over the existing federal unions.

Federalism in a subordinate Government

The chief advantage of federalism is that union gives strength: it also gives dignity. To be a member of a great nation like the United States is more dignified than to continue a citizen of an independent Virginia or Texas. The loss of independence by small states is amply compensated by the fuller life and vigour which membership of a more powerful and richer state gives. Federalism gives this added dignity, but it preserves distinctive local features, and, in many cases, the existing nationality of the provinces. Economically, too, there is a distinct gain. To preserve their dignity, small states must keep up various expensive organs of government, particularly their foreign offices. If such small states unite, one foreign representative is sufficient for all. Some of the smaller German states found their foreign relations so costly before the unification of Germany that they were represented in foreign courts by others. Not only is there a saving in expenses of management, but there is also the saving that arises from the abolition of ruinous tariff wars, and the organization of free inter-state communications.

Advantages of Federalism

There are many other savings, similar to the savings of large scale production. Useless duplication is often avoided, though there is the inevitable duplication and delay which a double system of government entails. Then, again, the demarcation of powers between central and state governments makes for efficient government. The citizen can concentrate on local affairs. The central government cannot interfere with the individual beyond its constitutional powers. The individual has more freedom in moulding his own destiny; his voice in his own state is more powerful than it could be in the state as a whole, for the population is less and he counts for more. In the everyday matters of life he is concerned mainly with his own state or province. At certain times he is called on to give his vote in national matters, but his more intimate relations are with his local or state government.

Critics of federal government have pointed out many weaknesses. Particular forms of federalism have particular weaknesses. In the United States, for example, most citizens would prefer to see the regulation of marriage and divorce given to the central government. Weaknesses of this kind are remediable by amendment of the constitution. In the United States amendment of the constitution is a very difficult and complicated process. Experience is the best guide in federal organization, and as yet the experience of the world in modern federalism is limited.

There are, however, certain defects arising out of the very nature of federalism. They are three in number :—

- (a) Weakness arising from a double system of government.
- (b) Weakness arising from the fear of secession.
- (c) Weakness arising from the fear of combinations of states.

The expense of a double system, and the delay, irritation and trouble caused by two authorities come under the first heading. Promptness in public business as a rule is more easily attained in a unitary government. In a well drawn-up constitution, however, the powers of the central and state governments are clearly defined. In matters of extreme

**Disadvantages:
Particular
Defects**

**Inherent
Defects**

**(a) Double
System of
Govern-
ment**

urgency, such as war and peace, a federal government can act as promptly as a unitary government. A badly drafted or badly conceived federal constitution may lead to delay, but that is not the fault of the federal principle in itself. This weakness is often much exaggerated. The experience of both Germany and the United States in the Great War shows that promptness in action was even more easily attainable in a federal than in a unitary government. Not only so, but the other side of the question has to be reckoned—the saving effected by the absence of needless duplication of services.

The second weakness, fear of secession, always exists in federalism, though against this must be set the strength achieved by union. Secession is much easier in a federal state than in a unitary state. Each state has its own government ready made and a federal government would probably offer less resistance to secession than a unitary government. This, however, is more a theoretical than an actual weakness, for a recalcitrant state has to reckon with the other states. The southern states of America had to be forced by a war to remain in the union. But a state which wishes to secede shows that it is not comfortable in its surroundings. It should, therefore, be allowed to go, otherwise it may be a centre for the spread of disease. Secession may thus prove useful in national unification, and a desire for separation may show that the constitutional girdle with which the state is girt does not fit. It may show the necessity of amendment in the constitution, and constitutional amendment arising from such a cause may be very beneficial to the union. No federal union can be successful if not founded on the common will. Theoretically a federal union is perpetual, but it would be a mistake for a union to keep by force in its membership a chafing and troublesome unit.

The third weakness is really an aspect of the second. A combination of states may force others to act as they wish.

(c) **Fear of Combination** The combination in itself is based on the principle of union. Danger of revolt is a sign of maladjustment of areas, peoples, or governments, and demands either a re-arrangement of states or an amendment of the constitution.

Some writers hold that federalism is only a transient form

of government. It will be replaced, they say, by unitary government, either by further unification or by separation. Sidgwick, for example, says that
**Future
of Feder-
alism** "federalism is likely to be, in many cases, a transitional stage through which a society—or an aggregate of societies—passes on its way to completer union, since, as time goes on, and mutual intercourse grows, the narrower patriotic sentiments that were originally a bar to full political union tend to diminish, while the inconvenience of a diversity of laws is more likely to be felt especially in a continuous territory." History is no guide in this question. The Achæan League existed one hundred years and the United Netherlands over two hundred years; but these instances are no index to the possibilities of modern federalism. Not only are the examples of federation multiplying, but the existing federations are extremely vigorous governments. In several instances unitary governments have actually been replaced by federal governments for administrative convenience. If Great Britain, with her intense national unity, her unitary government and her flexible constitution, adopts federalism, it seems that federalism is more than a step towards unitary government. It is a definite form of government, not a transitional phase of organization. Many thinking men already visualize the whole world knit together in peace and friendship by a federal bond.

The subject of Imperial Federation is dealt with in the chapter on the Government of Dependencies.

CHAPTER XVII

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

General Considerations Most modern states are so large that the central government cannot possibly perform all the functions which normally may be expected from government. Even a small state like Monaco, the area of which is only eight square miles, is divided into three areas, each of which has an organization to manage local affairs. In each state the work of the central government, with its legislature, executive and judiciary, is concentrated in the town known as the capital. In this capital laws are made and partly executed, but for their proper administration officials are usually spread up and down the country. In India, the Imperial legislative bodies meet in Delhi, and the Executive Council does its work mainly there and in Simla, but there are provincial governments at Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and other capitals. In Bengal Calcutta is the centre where the Legislative Council meets, and where the secretariat and High Court do their work, but spread up and down the country are commissioners, judges, collectors, sub-divisional officers, policemen, excisemen, inspectors of schools, and others, who perform in their several localities their respective administrative duties.

Meaning of Local Government It is not to these, however, that the term local government applies. As Sidgwick says, the term "local government" in a unitary state means organs which, though completely subordinate to the central legislature, are independent of the central executive in appointment, and, to some extent, in their decisions, and, exercise a partially independent control over certain parts of public finance. Local officials of the central government do not form "local government." The term is applied to those organs which exist at the will of the central government, and which, while they exist, have

certain definite powers of making regulations, of controlling certain parts of public finance, and of executing their own laws, or the laws of the central legislature, over a given area. These organs are essentially subordinate bodies, but they have independence of action within certain stated limits. They represent a subdivision of the functions of government for the purpose of efficient administration. The sum total of government work is parcelled out to bodies, each of which has its own area of administration.

It is impossible to give any exact definition of local government. It can be described, but not defined, for a definition requires limits, and local government and central government very frequently cannot be marked off from each other. It is more easy to say what local government is *not* than what it is. It is *not* local officials of the central government. Nor, again, can a government like that of Bengal be said to be a "local government" in the strict sense of the term. The units of a federal state, such as Prussia and New York State, are not units of local government. They are provinces in a federal union, with local governments of their own. In a sense they are local governments, for they are subordinate law-making bodies with powers over a definite area. But while organs of local government exist at the will of the central government, these federal provinces have a position definitely guaranteed by the constitution of the state, which cannot be altered at the will of the central government. This distinction, indeed, is a useful one, but not universally applicable, for in some American states, organs which usually would be designated organs of local government are definitely provided for in the constitution. And there is no reason whatever why a state, in drawing up a new constitution, should not give in detail the constitution of bodies which admittedly might be organs of local government. This distinction of constitutional position is therefore not a universal criterion.

Neither the size of territory nor the number of population is of the slightest value in determining what local government is. The independent state of Monaco, with eight square miles of territory, is far smaller than the local area of Yorkshire in England, and its population of about 23,000 is as nothing compared with the hundreds of thousands which come under the London County Council or Calcutta Munici-

pality. The only real point of differentiation between local and central is the kind of work done.

A survey of the various activities of government shows two broad classes of work. In the first class are activities

**Distin-
guishing
Charac-
teristics
of Local
Govern-
ment:
Kinds of
Functions**

of general interest. It is in the general interest that the central government should conduct foreign relations, and matters of war and peace. These matters are of national importance, and all citizens benefit alike from them. Similarly it is in the general interest that the central government should control matters of criminal law, contract, tariffs, marriage and divorce. If these matters were managed by local bodies, the nation's law would be a medley. There is a second class of functions which benefit only a section of the community, and this section of the community may properly be regarded as responsible for them. The lighting or water-supply of a town, and the upkeep of certain roads and bridges are definitely local matters. The citizens of Bombay, for example, are not concerned with how the city of Calcutta receives its light or water, nor are the citizens of Calcutta concerned with the building of a culvert over a Krishnagar drain. In such cases the benefit resulting from the works is assignable definitely to the people of the area concerned.

Between these two types of functions, however, there is another, and very large class, which is partly of the first and partly of the second type. Take an example. Conceivably the schools of Krishnagar might be placed under the municipality of Krishnagar; and so with Calcutta, Dacca, Rajshahi, etc. This would mean that Krishnagar, Calcutta, Dacca and Rajshahi could have any educational systems they pleased. This, however, might result in all sorts of educational and social evils. One municipality might say that it could not afford education; another might say it could afford it, but only in a very inefficient way. Another might say that it was to have a thoroughly efficient system. It is a matter of general interest that the people be educated, and that they be educated on the same general plan. The central government, therefore, must assume control, though it may leave the municipalities or other local bodies to raise money, or spend grants given by the central government, according to rules and regulations approved by the central government.

An even more telling instance is that of sanitation. If there were no central control, then all the good done by an efficient local body might be undone by an inefficient neighbour. If, for example, bubonic plague were exterminated from Nadia by the efforts of the local District Board, and an inefficient District Board in Burdwan took no steps to exterminate it, the good results secured by the Nadia Board would be largely neutralized by the carelessness of the Burdwan Board. Central control, therefore, is essential to produce uniformity though the actual executive work may be done by the local government bodies. In such matters the organ representing the smaller area should manage the practical details, while the determination of principles and general supervision should be left to the government of the larger area, i.e., the central government.

It will thus be seen that it is impossible to bring local government within the limits of a definition. Some include within it not only local bodies such as we have mentioned, but local officials of the central government and of provincial governments in a federal state, or of governments such as that of Bengal. In India the term local self-government has gained wide currency, and this term might be well used in text books to designate what is usually meant by local government, leaving the term local government itself to cover all kinds of government which are not definitely central government.

The reasons for the existence, and the benefits of local government are many. Firstly, local government is necessary for efficiency. In an area where the people are most interested in certain acts of government, it is in the interests of the people to have these acts performed efficiently. For such efficient performance the people should be able to control those responsible for the work by being able to censure or dismiss them.

Secondly, economy is secured by local government. If certain acts of government benefit only a definite area, obviously the expense of these acts should be borne by that locality. Sometimes it may be necessary for the central government to give grants, on certain conditions; or the central government may grant power to the local body to raise a loan for certain specific

purposes ; or it may have to set a limit to which the local body can tax the residents in its area. Taxation, or rating, is the chief method of raising money in local areas. The people who pay rates are able to elect local boards or councils and thus largely control expenditure as well as management.

Thirdly, local government is an important educative agency in modern representative government. In normal modern states the citizen is called upon only occasionally to take a personal part in the direction of national affairs, usually to record a vote at intervals of three to five years. This may lead either to apathy or discontent ; but local government provides an actual representative system close at hand on the proper conduct of which the ordinary things of everyday life depend. The citizen thus becomes acquainted with public affairs. Local bodies provide an excellent school of training for the wider affairs of central government. A survey of any western ministry will show a considerable number of national leaders who first made their names as leaders in local government.

Fourthly, local government takes the burden of work off the central government. Were there no local governmental bodies, the central government would have to do everything through its own officials. By a system of local government the burden is distributed, and in these days when government interference in extending, the use of local bodies is all the more apparent.

Fifthly, local governing bodies are useful as members of the "deliberative" organ of government. They give advice on proposed legislation, and for making known local conditions and difficulties they are invaluable.

It must be remembered that local bodies exist within definite limits laid down by the central government. They may have full powers in some matters, but in others they may only have to carry out the orders of the central government. Local self-government must be circumscribed, for, in the first place, the narrower the area of government, the greater is the chance of one powerful interest swamping all

3. As an
Edu-
cative
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4. Distri-
bution of the
Work of
Govern-
ment

5. As Deli-
berative
Organs

Demar-
cation of
Powers and
Areas

others. In such cases the central government must step in, either as a vetoing power, or as regulating the local voting system so that all interests may be fairly represented. In the second place, many functions must be centrally controlled, though local bodies may have large executive powers. Education and sanitation are cases in point.

It is a matter of the greatest difficulty for both political scientists and practical administrators to demarcate where central control should end and local control should start. The same difficulty exists in the apportionment of functions between smaller and larger units of local government. In some cases it is advisable to have central control with its uniformity; in other cases local control is both fair and economical. Were all local bodies of the same moral standard, the apportionment of functions would be easier; but the central government is continually faced with the difficulty that local bodies are not equally efficient. Where, say, eight out of ten local bodies may be perfectly efficient, the remaining two may be so inefficient as to destroy the good work of the other eight.

One or two examples of such difficulties may be given. In a municipality, the management of street lighting and paving is a matter for the inhabitants of the town. Visitors and others benefit by good roads and a good lighting system, yet the actual townspeople are the chief beneficiaries. Though this is true generally, there are cases where inhabitants of areas outside the town benefit more than the townspeople themselves. Between the great commercial centres of Liverpool and Manchester there are smaller towns, the streets of which are largely highways for the traffic of the greater. The traffic passes through the towns without conferring any specific benefit upon them, yet the townspeople have to pay for the upkeep of the streets. Or suppose that there are five main roads leading into a town, and these five roads pass through rural areas, each with a different body for local government. The inhabitants of these areas benefit far less from the roads than the town itself or the inhabitants of remoter areas. The cost of the upkeep of such roads, therefore, must be apportioned by an authority wider than that of the district immediately surrounding the town. The most difficult case of all is poor-

relief. At first sight it may seem that each local area should be responsible for its own poor-relief. Poor-relief, however, means local taxation, and it would be in the interest of any area to make the taxation as small as possible in order to make the poor emigrate to other areas. The more public-spirited areas would suffer, and, therefore, some common control is necessary to give uniformity and prevent such unfairness. Central control should be as slight as possible; to place a large part of the burden on the local areas not only stimulates them to take means to avoid pauperism but has the additional advantage of enlisting the co-operation of private charity.

Experience shows that the greater the responsibility of a local body, the more likely it is that a better class of men will come forward to serve the community. Where a local body merely interprets and executes the will of the central government, it is difficult to secure public spirited men of the proper type. To give too much power to a body of less able men might cause the educative value of the experiment to be lost in bad results.

**Responsibility
and Public
Service**

Experience is the only sure guide in matters of local government, both in the apportionment of functions and in the delimitation of areas. As a rule central control is necessary at the outset, for the central government has more ability and more experience at its command than any local body. As Sidgwick points out, "The central government has the superior enlightenment derived from greater general knowledge, wider experience and more highly trained intellects." Gradually decentralization is possible to the limit where central and local requirements meet. For the decision of such a limit experience and the prevailing ideas of the day on governmental interference decide. No rule of thumb exists.

**Experience
as Guide**

The above general considerations help us to answer the question, "How far can legislation be decentralized or localized?" When we speak of local government we usually have administrative work in mind, but local bodies have also varying powers of legislation. All such is subordinate legislation, for all local bodies are subordinate to the central government. Their laws are really only bye-laws. In this respect they are

**Legislative
Decen-
tralization**

comparable exactly to provincial governments in a federal system. They have their constitutions which define their powers. They can make laws within limits, and anything done beyond these limits is *ultra vires*, or beyond their powers, and therefore void. The point of difference is that, whereas the provincial governments of a federal state are guaranteed by a fundamental constitution unalterable by the ordinary process of legislation, local bodies exist at the will of the central legislature.

The extent of powers granted depends on several factors
Types of —the nature of the subjects, the political ideas
Local Con- prevalent in the country, and historical condi-
trol tions. Generally speaking, there are three
 methods of control :—

1. Legislative centralization with administrative decentralization, in which, for the sake of uniformity, the central government passes laws, leaving the local bodies to administer them. In such a case the local bodies have certain powers of making bye-laws, which are really administrative rules. This system prevails generally in England and the United States, but, in certain types of activities, it may co-exist with complete centralization, both legislative and administrative.

2. Legislative decentralization and administrative centralization, in which large powers of legislation are given to local bodies, but the central government administers these laws through its own officials. This system prevails in France and Germany.

3. Part centralization and part decentralization in both the legislative and the administrative branches of government. This is a compromise between the first two types. The Prussian system is an example, and there is a marked tendency in England and the United States to follow in this direction.

It must be observed, however, that the central government is always in the background even although the powers it exerts are merely nominal, as in the case of provisional orders in the British legislature. A body like the London County Council requires only nominal control, but in cases where local interests conflict, the central government is the only court of appeal. The central government preserves the legal power to forbid any proposed legislation of the London

County Council, save where final powers are legally granted to that body. Such ultimate control of local bodies is necessary for two important reasons: first, the lack of statesmanship in local bodies. Naturally a Parliament has more brains than a Parish Council, or, to give a local instance, a Legislative Council has greater ability than a local board. Second, small areas tend to become the centres of factions or interests, and the central government must act as a moderating power. It must either provide means to secure the representation of minorities on local councils, or hear the protests of minorities against the decision of majorities.

Areas of local government vary from country to country. In England there are parishes, districts, counties; in France, communes, cantons, arrondissements, départements; in the United States, townships and counties; in India, districts, subdivisions, and unions. There is no rule for the demarcation of the boundaries of units of local governments. Several factors may be enumerated. (1) Historical conditions. Each locality should be as homogeneous as possible, therefore local traditions should be respected wherever possible. Organic unity is easier where historic unity exists. In Britain the limits of counties and parishes were really determined long before the modern system of local government was introduced. Natural areas were accepted, or only slightly modified, for the purposes of local government. (2) Geographical conditions. Often areas are marked off definitely by rivers or mountains. (3) Density of population. This applies particularly in the case in cities. Two opposite ideas must be reconciled in this respect. The smaller an area, the more is each citizen interested in it, and, therefore, the more active a member of the community he is. Small areas are thus the best schools of citizenship. But these have not the same command of able men as large areas, and they are more liable to be controlled by local interests or factions. (4) Functions. Functions may be arranged in an ascending scale of importance. The least important duties are given to the local bodies of the smallest areas; i.e., the bodies with the more circumscribed powers; the more important are given to the bodies of larger areas. The extent to which the functions are controlled by the central

government depends largely on the type of body to which local control is given. Where such bodies are capable of bearing large powers and responsibilities, the central government usually is ready to give them large powers. It may also be noted that the local bodies of a larger area frequently have considerable powers of control over local bodies of smaller areas, or sub-areas, within its own jurisdiction. (5) Deliberate creation by the central government. This is easily adopted in a new country ; but, as in France, it may be adopted as a solution to historical difficulties.

These bases by no means coincide. Though the parish is the unit in English local government because of its history, the density of the population varies from less than ten inhabitants to nearly 350,000. In France the commune, an historical unit, co-exists with the canton, which is the result of deliberate creation.

The more detailed analysis of local governments in the later chapters shows the working of these various principles.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES .

1. DEPENDENCIES AND COLONIES

A dependency is a country with a subordinate government, or, in John Stuart Mill's more lengthy definition, dependencies are "outlying territories of some size and population, which are subject more or less to acts of sovereign power on the part of the paramount country, without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its legislature." Independent states are sovereign; they owe allegiance to no other state. In a dependency, there is no such sovereignty. The government in a dependency owes its existence to some superior government. The degree of subordination varies greatly; but in every case there is subordination of some kind. In some cases it is more or less nominal, in other cases it is real. Dependencies are of two classes—dependencies which a country rules, and dependencies which it settles. The first class comprises those lands which either are unsuitable for settlement because of climate or are already thickly peopled. The second class includes the so-called "new" countries, which have plenty of room for immigrants and plenty of scope for development, as well as an auspicious climate and fertile soil.

The second type is the colony. The Latin word *colonia* originally meant a settlement for soldiers in some outlying province. Now-a-days the word colony is often used loosely to include all dependencies. India is sometimes called a colony. This use of the word is quite wrong. Colony is a species of the genus dependency. All colonies are dependencies, but only some

dependencies are colonies. A colony, properly speaking, is an area in which the ruling section of the inhabitants originally migrated from a parent country, which continues to control them in some definite way. The original Roman idea of settlement is essential to the word in its strict sense. The actual settlement may have taken place many years ago, or it may have been a process lasting over centuries ; usually there is a tendency towards continued settlement from the same parent country. The parent country is known to the colonists of any one area not only as their supreme head, but as the centre to which their fellow colonists in other areas look. The terms "Mother Country" or "Old Country" are frequently given to the parent state, indicating a certain filial bond existing between the two.

Other terms are gradually coming into use. The varieties of political dependence on the parent country are so numerous that the name colony is sometimes resented as indicating too much subservience. Thus the term self-governing dominion, or simply, dominion, has officially replaced colony as applying to Canada, Newfoundland, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. All these have now responsible government. Other colonies (e.g., Ceylon) used to be called Crown Colonies, but the name "Crown Colony" is now officially applied only to those colonies in which the crown retains control of the legislation. The word colony itself, in the official language of the English Colonial Office, is used as the abbreviation of the official longer designation, "Colony not possessing responsible government." But it must be kept in mind that, although Britain is the chief, she is not the only colonizer of the world, and the British classification is only an official classification of convenience.

Dependencies arise from a variety of causes. The earliest method of the acquisition of dependencies was conquest, accompanied by partial settlement. Roman colonies were of this type. When they were first conquered by Rome, dependent governments were established, but only sometimes was there permanent settlement. In this way Spain, by conquering Mexico and Peru, embarked on her colonial career in America.

Sometimes dependencies are acquired as a secondary

result of conquest. A country defeated in war in one part of the world may cede an outlying dependency as the price of peace. Canada was ceded by France to Britain in 1763, and as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1899 the Philippine Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States. Several of the smaller dependencies of Britain are due to the process of barter in peace treaties. Conquest and cession often go together. Mauritius, conquered in 1810, was ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1814. Hongkong was ceded by China in 1841; Newfoundland by France in 1713.

Dependencies are sometimes bought, or leased. The United States bought Alaska. Wei-hai-wei was ceded by China to Great Britain. The reasons for acquisition in such a way are various. Sometimes the reason is to complete national development by making territories compact. Such was the cause of the purchase by the United States of Louisiana, now a federal province. Sometimes defence is the motive. Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, Wei-hai-wei, acquired in different ways, exist for defence, or defence and commerce. Commercial and naval reasons demand coaling stations. Frequently the method of government is also decided because of these considerations. The island of Ascension in the Atlantic Ocean, for example, till 1923 was technically regarded as a man-of-war, and as such was directly under the Admiralty.

Colonies, in the proper sense, arise primarily from settlement. This settlement or occupation may take place in various ways. Sometimes it arises from discovery of a land hitherto unknown to the civilized countries of the world. The discoverer in this case claims the land for his own state, on the grounds of priority of settlement. In this way Portuguese, Dutch and English colonies were founded in the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. Priority of claim is still recognized as in the new lands discovered in the Arctic

and Antarctic regions, though, of course, these are unfit for settlement. Priority of claim may settle the fact of the country to which the newly discovered land is said to "belong," but it does not constitute a colony. Colonization, as we have seen, implies

**4. Settlement.
Colonies
Proper.**

**Causes of
Settlement.**

1. Discovery

settlement. India was "discovered," but it did not become a colony. To be a colony, the land discovered must be in an inferior state of civilization, and must not be permanently occupied. If the land is settled, and a fair measure of civilization exists, there may be conquest but not colonization. Colonization implies settlement on land where the existing population is in a rude state, where the land is unsettled and uncultivated, where, in short, there is an opportunity for the population of a more organized people to develop the resources of a country inhabited by a less organized people. Thus the British colonized America, Australia and New Zealand. In these countries, as a result of colonization, practically new peoples have grown up,—in Canada the Canadians, in Australia the Australians, etc. In the United States, the War of Independence terminated the colonial relationship with Britain, but even to-day large numbers of British subjects emigrate to the United States to profit by the larger chances in life which such a relatively undeveloped country gives.

Besides adventurers and discoverers, missionary enterprise has been a valuable factor in discovering and opening up new countries. Missionary enterprise first led the Portuguese to become discoverers and colonizers.

The chief impetus to colonization is economic, and foremost among the reasons of colonization must be placed the economic. This implies that the home country is highly developed, that competition is keen, and that conditions of life are becoming more difficult. Political reasons co-operate frequently with economic. The first exodus from England to America was due to religio-political causes. Before the Great War many from the oppressed nationalities of Europe went to America. These economic or politico-economic forces arising from great density of population and ever-growing competition, incite people to emigrate to lands where the chances are greater and the conditions of life more hopeful. Lite in these new circumstances often leads to the greatest hardship in the opening stages, and only the hardy, both in body and character, succeed. Where capital is available for the start, conditions are easier, but the most essential capital for the settler or colonist is vigour of mind and body.

An economic reason of another kind is the discovery of precious metals. The various "rushes"—Klondyke (in North-West America), the Australian gold fields, the South African diamond fields—all these led to settlement, though many who took part in the "rushes" made money quickly and returned to their own land.

Then, again, there is the impetus that arises from the desire of traders to open new areas of activity. Competition at home may be so keen as to make returns on capital small. Goods are therefore "pushed" in new areas, and the expansion of capital in this way leads to the influx of people to use the capital or develop it.

For successful colonization the mother country must give protection to colonists. The rude tribes of the new country may be troublesome, or the envious eyes of other nations may endanger the new gains. Military and naval vigilance is necessary for security to the colonists personally and to their trade. Successful colonization needs also adaptability, both physical and mental. Physical adaptability is required for new climate and conditions, and mental adaptability for the types and manners of people to be met in new countries. This has been the secret largely of British success. The adaptability has meant not only the import of capital and labour to new countries, but the establishing among natives of a new type of civilization, local customs and usages always being respected.

2. SURVEY OF COLONIAL POLICY

The first historical attempts at colonization were by the Phœnicians. They were a hardy maritime people who founded many commercial stations on the shores of the Mediterranean sea. These stations, however, were more than mere trading ports. In some places, notably Carthage, the Phœnicians formed permanent agricultural settlements, but of more importance was the spread of eastern civilization under the Phœnician auspices among the rude peoples of the West. The Phœnicians achieved their expansion in a peaceable way.

Greek colonization started about 1000 B.C., when a large number of the inhabitants of the Peloponesus left Greece after the Dorian invasion. Later invasions and internal strife led to further emigration. The Greek colonies,

however, were quite different from our modern colonies, inasmuch as the colonies, or cities, did not acknowledge any superior government. These so-called colonial Greek cities of Greece were almost literal copies of Athens and Sparta. They had the same type of government, the same religion and customs, the same attitude towards outsiders, or "barbarians". Though owing no political allegiance to another state, these colonies by religion, language, customs and traditions were united to Greece. But in no case, even though Athens received tribute from some of her colonies for naval aid, did these colonies become subordinate to the parent city. Leagues were made with other colonies or the mother city for mutual defence, but these did not involve any sacrifice of sovereignty.

The Romans were conquerors, and conquest often led to colonization. The Roman imperial theory of government was to give the conquered provinces as much home rule as was consistent with the supremacy of Rome. Roman officials were spread all over the world, and in many cases settled in the land where they administered laws. Wherever Romans went they took with them their civilization, and their chief contribution to the world was not the settlement of individuals in any definite areas, but the spread of western civilization. The word "colony" (Latin, *colonia*) had a peculiar meaning among them. It meant a settlement of soldiers on a definite area similar to the proposed settlement of soldiers, after the Great War, in Canada and Australia. After long and meritorious services, these soldiers were rewarded by the Roman government with grants of land where they and their families settled. The modern state of Roumania is descended from a "colony" of this kind.

In the middle ages there was no real colonization, though with the numberless wars waged there was much acquisition of dependencies. Modern colonization really begins with the discovery of the sea-routes to the East Indies and America. In this the Spanish and Portuguese were the leaders. The discovery of these routes was due partly to adventurous seamen, partly to the desire to propagate Christianity, and partly to commercial ambition. The Portuguese gradually worked their way to the Cape of Good Hope, India, the East

Indies, China and Japan, and started trading centres at various parts. They also founded plantations in Brazil. The Spaniards, after the discovery of America, directed their attention to the West Indies, Mexico and Central America. In 1493 the Pope, Alexander VI., divided the pagan world between Spain and Portugal. Spain was given the New World, Portugal the Old. Later, by treaty, the Portuguese obtained Brazil and Labrador in the New World. The Spaniards vigorously followed up the papal grant by armed force, so that at the end of the sixteenth century, the New World, from South America to Mexico, was in Spanish hands.

Great as was the extent of the Spanish colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, her policy towards them resulted in complete alienation, and when Spain was occupied with the Napoleonic wars, the colonies seized the opportunity to declare their independence. Spanish colonial policy may be summed up in one word—centralization. The colonies were ruled from Madrid. The colonial laws were made there and the officials appointed there. Trade, commerce, religion and laws regarding the treatment of natives all were centred in the home government. The trade in especial was regulated in the interest of Spaniards. The colonies were allowed to trade with Spain only. This policy had an evil effect on both Spain and the colonies. It alienated the sympathies of the former, and, by bringing great wealth into Spain, led to luxury, profligacy and corruption among the higher classes. The liberal principles adopted by Britain after the American War of Independence were recognized in the eighteenth century by Spain, but by that date the energies of the country had been totally sapped. The existence of huge vested interests in the old system prevented the new system from appealing to them. The more virile peoples of France and Britain outstripped Spain not only in their means of communication but also in their adaptability, and when Spain was fighting against France and Britain in the Napoleonic wars, the colonies slipped from her grasp.

During the period of Spain's prosperity three other European countries entered the arena of colonial enterprise, Holland, France and England. These were maritime peoples, whose more adventurous spirits discovered new sea

routes and countries. During Elizabethan times England was prolific in daring seamen, who received encouragement from government, not only for the discovery of new lands but for harassing the French and Spaniards. The main period of Dutch and English colonization belongs to the succeeding century—the seventeenth. In Holland, the Dutch East India Company, which received its charter in 1602, had the monopoly of trade in the East Indies. Their impetus to colonization was trade, but this Company, after an existence of nearly two centuries, during which it made vast fortunes for its members, declined because of corruption and trouble with the natives. The Company was dissolved in 1789, and the Dutch dependencies were taken over by the Crown. At the present time Holland, though one of the small European states, has dependencies with a population seven times greater than that of the motherland. The proportion of Dutchmen in these dependencies is very small.

The scene of the first colonial efforts of both France and England was North America. In 1603, the French settled on the St. Lawrence. The British soon followed. In 1606 the Virginia Company was given a charter for trading in the south of the present United States, and in 1620 the Pilgrim Fathers landed in New England. From that time settlers from both France and England went over to America in ever-increasing numbers. At first the home government paid little attention to the colonists. Charters were given to trading companies for their internal management, but beyond that the government of England did not concern itself with colonial affairs. France in the meantime took up the subject of colonization systematically and made plans for a vast New France. The French thought that the small English settlements on the seaboard could be circumvented by settlements on the two big rivers, the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. In marked contrast to the English government, the French government helped colonists with capital and ships. The English colonists themselves, however, made up in perseverance and strength of character what they lacked in official support, and before half a century had elapsed they forced themselves on the notice of England in more ways than one.

The growing wealth of the colonists led the government to adopt a policy very similar to that of Spain. Both France and England saw an opportunity of enriching exchequers that repeated wars had impoverished. During the reign of Charles II. the well-known Navigation Acts were passed, all of which were aimed at utilizing colonial commerce for English purposes. Foreign ships were forbidden to trade with English colonies ; foreign produce was to be sent only to England or English possessions ; aliens were not permitted to trade in English colonies. Only English-built ships were to trade with the colonies, and foreign goods could not proceed to the colonies without first being landed in England. Goods going from colony to colony were to have the same customs duty as if landed in England. These Acts, of the period 1610 to 1672, were obviously burdensome to the colonies. The colonists, however, by securing concessions on certain goods and by evading the laws, continued to prosper. Burdensome as the acts were, they certainly helped to develop the merchant navy of England and the colonies. Other stringent regulations followed, all of which aimed at making the colonies completely dependent on the home country. Similar rigorous restrictions were made on manufactures. The growth of manufactures, it was considered, would gradually make the colonies independent.

Selfish legislation of this kind gradually led to the alienation of the colonies from the mother country. The climax was reached in the American War of Independence. England, whose treasury had been impoverished by many wars, desired the colonies to contribute regularly for purposes of defence. The colonists held that there could be no taxation without representation. The colonists, indeed, did contribute, though irregularly, in men and money to various expeditions, but their man-power was more necessary for guarding their own possessions from the inroads of the Indians. Neither party would accept compromise : compromise was not seriously suggested. War resulted, in which the colonists defeated the mother country, which even in war did not realize the greatness of the issues. The struggle ended by the colonies declaring their independence.

**The
American
War of
Independ-
ence**

This war, the red-letter event of British colonial policy,

led to more stringent regulation of other colonies. The ministers of the day thought that not their shortsightedness but their laxity had caused the disaster. Certain colonies which already had partial self-government (Nova Scotia, Jamaica, the Barbados and Bermuda) continued as before. Canada, though it had some powers of election in each of two provinces, was placed under an executive council, with a governor nominated by the home executive. New acquisitions, such as Trinidad, were placed directly under the home government. Cape Colony, which came under British control in 1815, remained for twenty years under military control, and Australia, as a penal settlement, was directly controlled by the Crown. It must be remembered of course, that, at the period of which we speak, the number of colonists outside the eastern parts of North America was very small.

The growth of numbers in the colonies led to the spread of the idea of independence or responsible government. The doctrines of the economists were leading to new ideas of trade, in which freedom was held to be more profitable than restriction. These ideas were brought to the notice of government in a practical way by Lord Durham in his historic report, in 1839. Lord Durham was sent to report on the position of affairs in Canada, after a serious insurrection, and he strongly advocated responsible government as the only way to save both colonies and mother country from another American Revolution.

Lord Durham's Report of 1839 marked the beginning of a new era in the colonial policy of Great Britain. It led to the grant of self-government in the widest sense to the larger colonies, and it sowed the seeds of federation. It accorded with the more liberal ideas in both economic and political matters then coming into currency, and before many years were over, responsible government was introduced in Canada (in 1840), New Zealand (1852), Cape Colony (1853), and, from 1854 to 1859, in the various states which now constitute the Commonwealth of Australia. The main principles were the same in each—an act of the British Parliament which formed the constitution of the area concerned, a government on the model of the English parliamentary form of government, and

**Result
of the War**

**New .
Develop-
ments.
The Durham
Report**

**Result
of the
Report**

practically complete freedom in internal matters. The two chief difficulties then, as now, were tariff and defence. The prevalent free trade ideas current in the later nineteenth century were considered strong enough to guarantee a free-trade Empire. The problem of defence was left largely to solve itself. The main political idea current was that each colony was destined to be an independent state. How far the modern attitude differs will be seen in the section on Imperial Federation.

3. CLASSIFICATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

The British Dominions may be classified according to the type of government prevailing in each or according to the authority in the British Government which regulates them. Many of the British possessions cannot be classified with any certainty on the basis of their form of government. Particularly in the larger dominions, the form of government tends to change from time to time as the people of the territory are educated and are able to take part in governing their own country. The most complete dominions from that point of view of government are the Self-governing Dominions, such as Australia and Canada. The other dependencies are moving towards self-government so that their classifications at any particular period in history may not be suitable a generation hence. At the other extreme are a number of possessions of the British Crown which are occupied for military or naval purposes. These possessions must continue to be governed according to the purposes which they serve. The question of full self-government in them is subservient to their utility as military or naval stations.

Adopting the two-fold basis of the form of government and the authority which regulates the government in the British executive, the dependencies may be classified thus :

(I.) The self-governing Dominions or, simply, the Dominions. These are : (a) the Dominion of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia, (c) New Zealand, (d) Newfoundland, (e) the Union of South Africa, and (f) Southern Rhodesia.

(II.) Colonies which do not possess responsible govern-

ment, or, simply, in the official language of the Colonial Office, Colonies. According to a definition given in the House of Commons in May, 1920, these Colonies include all dependencies which do not possess responsible government whether or not they possess an elective legislature. This class does not include Protectorates or Protected States.

(III.) Crown Colonies form a sub-division of Colonies. The distinguishing feature of Crown Colonies is that the Crown retains control of legislation.

(IV.) Protectorates and Protected States. Many of these were originally under the Foreign office and later were transferred to the Colonial office, e.g., the East African Protectorate, Zanzibar, and Somaliland. The Protectorate of Uganda was taken over from the British East African Company.

The three classes—Colonies, Crown Colonies, and Protectorates or Protected States—may be classified also according to the development of their legislative bodies thus :—(a) Territories which possess an elected House of Assembly or representative assembly and a nominated Legislative Council or upper house, as in the Bahamas, Barbados and Bermuda. (b) Territories which possess a partly elected Legislative Council in which sometimes

there is an official and sometimes a non-official majority. This class includes Ceylon, in which there is a big non-official majority, British Guiana, Cyprus, Fiji, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Grenada, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya Colony (previously the East African Protectorate), and Mauritius. (c) Territories, both colonies and protectorates, which possess a legislative council which is entirely or almost entirely nominated by the Crown, as in British Honduras, the Falkland Islands, Gambia, the Gold Coast, Uganda, Hongkong, the Nyasaland Protectorate, St. Vincent, the Seychelles, and the Straits Settlements. (d) Territories, both colonies and protectorates, which have no legislative council. This includes Ashanti, Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Gibraltar, the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Somaliland, Swaziland, St. Helena, Wei-hai-wei, and various islands in the Western Pacific.

(V.) Territories controlled indirectly by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Some of these are practically independent; others are administered by chartered companies. This class includes North Borneo and Sarawak. The form of government varies similarly to that sketched in the previous paragraph.

(VI.) Various territories administered by other authorities than the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This class

VI. Various includes (1) the Channel Islands, which are under the Home Office; (2) a large number of small islands and rocks in the various parts of the world which technically come under the British Crown. Some of them are uninhabited. Others are inhabited only at certain periods of the year, perhaps by whalefishers. Others are used as light-house posts. Still others are leased by individuals or companies from the government for the collection of guano or copra, or for cocoanut growing. One, Tristan-da-Cunha, in the South Atlantic, is nominally British but its government is carried on by the inhabitants themselves under the oldest member. It has a permanent population of about one hundred and is rarely visited.

A special class of dependency has been created as the result of the Great War, viz., mandated territories. These territories are administered under mandates approved by the League of Nations, and include the Tanganyika Territory (late German East Africa), South-West Africa, the Cameroons, and Togoland. Some of the mandates are administered by the Responsible Dominions, e.g., Western Samoa and Nauru Island by New Zealand.

Recent changes which must be noted are (1) Egypt, which used to be a Protectorate under the Foreign Office, was proclaimed an independent state in February, 1922; (2) Malta, which used to be a territory with a partly elected Legislative Council, was granted responsible government, with certain reservations in 1921; (3) Rhodesia (Southern, North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia) which used to be administered by a chartered company. The southern part of Rhodesia was granted responsible government, and the northern part made a Crown Colony, in 1923; (4) Ascension Island, which

used to be regarded technically, as a man-of-war and was governed directly by the Admiralty, was joined to St. Helena in 1922, and thus came under the Colonial Office; (5) Aden, which used to be under the Government of Bombay, was, except for the municipality and settlement, transferred to the Home Government in 1927; (6) in 1925 a new Secretaryship of State for Dominion Affairs was created in the British Government. The new Dominions Office took over from the Colonial Office all business connected with the Self-governing Dominions, the Irish Free State, Southern Rhodesia, the South-African Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and business relating to the Imperial Conference. The new post is held by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

India is distinct. It is controlled by the Secretary of State for India, but it is not a colony, and is on a different plane from other dependencies. It is an **India** Empire, and has given the title Emperor to the King. India may therefore be placed in a class by itself.

The Self-governing Dominions, as the name implies, conduct their own business of government. They have all adopted the type of cabinet government prevailing in the United Kingdom. Some of them, **The Self-Governing Dominions** Australia, Canada and South Africa, are federal unions, and the "states" or provinces have the cabinet type of government too. Each has adopted a bicameral legislature, and in every case financial legislation is controlled by the popular or lower house. The number of ministers in the cabinets varies from time to time. Generally there are about ten ministers, although the number is smaller in the provinces of the federal governments. In Canada at the present moment the cabinet, or, as it is also called, the King's Privy Council, includes eighteen members. In these Dominions the function of the Crown in England is performed by the Governor or the Governor-General as the case may be; in the provinces the functions are carried out by the state Governors, who, as in Australia, are appointed by the Crown, or, as in the case of the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces of Canada, by the Governor-General.

The constitutions of all these countries are really acts

passed by the Imperial Parliament and by it alone they can be altered, except where powers are specifically conferred for the purpose on the Dominion legislatures themselves. Certain features are common to all these Self-governing Dominions in their relation to the United Kingdom :—

**Common
Features in
their Con-
stitutions**

(i) The Crown appoints the Governor or Governor-General. In Canada and the Union of South Africa the Crown does not appoint the heads of the "states" or provinces.

(ii) The Secretary of State for the Dominions controls no officials within the Self-governing Dominions except the Governor or Governor-General. In other words, the Secretary of State for the Dominions never interferes in the internal administration of the Self-governing Dominions.

(iii) The legislative powers of the Self-governing Dominions are governed by Acts of the Imperial Parliament. These Acts lay down the limits within which the legislatures may act, and within these limits the legislatures are all-powerful. The chief limits laid down are that the Acts passed by the Dominion parliaments shall apply only to their own territories and that these Acts must not conflict with the laws of England which are intended to affect the Dominions. Theoretically, of course, the British King-in-Parliament is legislative sovereign for all the British possessions, and as such has power to legislate in matters great or small affecting the Dominions. This power is never used.

(iv) All laws passed by the legislatures of the Self-governing Dominions are subject to the same procedure as laws passing through the Imperial Parliament. They pass through both houses and must be signed by the Governor as the representative of the King.

(v) The Governor is empowered by the constitutions of these Dominions to give his consent at once to a law passed by the legislature, or he may refuse it; or he may reserve the bill for the decision of the Colonial Secretary.

(vi) Certain types of bills must always be reserved for the decision of the Crown and the Colonial Secretary. The Governor cannot give his assent to these bills without first consulting the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The subjects included in this class of legislation are divorce, currency, the imposition of differential duties, laws affecting

imperial treaties, laws affecting the forces of the Crown, laws placing on non-European persons disabilities which are not placed on European subjects, laws making grants either of land, money or anything else to the Governor, certain laws affecting shipping and laws which contain matter to which sanction has already been refused by the Crown.

(vii) The Crown, through the Secretary of State for Colonies, can disallow legislation. This power must be exercised within one or two years after the law has reached the Colonial Office, even if the Governor has assented to it.

(viii) An appeal lies from the colonial courts to the King-in-Council, i.e., the Privy Council.

In regard to the Colonies a large number of restrictions and reservations have been laid down by the Imperial Government. Usually the Executive Councils consist of the principal officers of government, sometimes with, and sometimes without, a non-official member or members. The members of the Executive Councils are the holders of posts definitely specified in instructions to the Governor, or persons appointed by royal warrant or by instructions from the Crown issued through the Secretary of State. The Governor is usually empowered to make provisional appointments in the case of vacancies. The members of the Executive Council can be dismissed by the Crown alone, although they may be temporarily suspended by the Governor.

The Executive Council, according to the Colonial Regulations, assists the Governor with its advice. The Governor is required to consult the Council on all important matters except in cases of urgency (when he takes measures by himself and informs the Council), and in cases where the Governor considers it might be prejudicial to the public service to consult the Council. The Governor may act in opposition to the advice of the Council, unless he is definitely instructed to accept the majority vote of the Council. In the case of disagreement he must report his reasons to the Secretary of State as soon as he can.

4. IMPERIAL FEDERATION

For many years the problem of imperial unity has exercised the attention of practical politicians, but the Great War brought into more prominence than ever the necessity

of some kind of organization for the British Empire. The fact of imperial unity was proved in no uncertain way when the dependencies spontaneously rallied round the mother-country, contributing their full proportion of men and money to the common cause. The suddenness of the onset by the Central Powers, the ideals which they attacked, and their methods of fighting, all helped to direct the efforts of the Empire into the common channel. Each of its units seemed to vie with the other in its whole-hearted attempt to win the war. As the war progressed, statesmen began to consider how the future Empire was to be organized. The need as well as the fact of unity was evident. The common interests involved in the struggle for some time tended to blur the real questions of imperial policy, the two chief of which are—(1) the need for imperial defence. The dependencies of Britain, whether self-governing or not, are all liable to attack if Britain is involved in war. A scheme of imperial defence requires imperial co-operation, and such co-operation involves some organization to consider policy and make plans. (2) Imperial defence implies co-operation in foreign affairs. As the various dependencies grow in self-reliance, it can hardly be expected that they will enter a struggle the causes of which they disapprove. Some means must therefore be devised whereby the statesmen of Britain should co-operate with the statesmen of the various parts of the Empire.

Hitherto the most favoured scheme for organizing the Empire has been imperial federation. Federalism, as we have seen, is a form of government which reconciles local independence and central control. One of the most marked features of recent years has been the growth of national feeling in the various units of the Empire. In the Self-governing Dominions the populations are of the same race, language and religion as the people of Britain, but they have been drawn together by common economic and political interests into distinct groups, or what may be termed "colonial nationalities"—Australians, Canadians, etc. These "nationalities" have most of the normal characteristics of nationality, but they have at the same time a love and respect for the "old" or "mother" country, which urges them towards imperial unity. In the other dependencies,

**The Need
for Imperial
Unity**

**Imperial
Federation
and Nation-
alism**

where the populations differ in race, language, religion, history and traditions, national feeling is still more distinct, especially where the populations have been sufficiently educated to voice it. None the less, they value their imperial connexion for its security, if for nothing else. In India, for example, Indian nationalism has developed markedly ; but at the same time that nationalism normally does not demand any break from the Empire. The defence and good government of India are as much matters of imperial concern as are the defence and good government of Canada. The same is true of East and West Africa and other dependencies. As they develop in material resources and in education, they will follow a similar course. The two opposing tendencies will become apparent, the one towards self-government, the other towards imperial unity.

At the present time, beyond the sentiment of unity which exists in the Empire, there are certain definite institutions

Existing Institutions of Imperial Unity which bind the Empire together. These are—
(1) The King. The King is the supreme executive and legislative head of the Empire. All the executive acts of government are carried out in his name. Actually his powers are more nominal than real, both in the United Kingdom and in the Empire at large.

But his position as King, or King-Emperor (as he is in India) is all important. He is the focus of imperial loyalty. The King, of course, cannot be present in person in the dependencies ; but by periodical tours he himself, or the heir-apparent, makes the actuality of the kingship real to the peoples of the dependencies. The Governor-General, or in India the Viceroy (which literally means " in the place of the king "), acts in his name and to some extent shares the pomp which surrounds the royal house. The King is Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of the Empire ; through the Privy Council, which promulgates its legal decisions as " advice to the Crown ", he is the fount of justice. He also confers all titles.

(2) The King-in-Parliament. The British Parliament (technically the King-in-Parliament) is legislative sovereign

2. The King-in-Parliament for all the Empire. In virtue of its sovereign powers, Parliament has granted such measures of self-government to the various dependencies as it has considered advisable. The relation of

the Parliament to the dependencies is the most vital part of the whole imperial problem. While very full powers of local self-government have been granted to both the Self-governing Dominions and India, a large number of reservations have been made in subjects on which the action of local legislatures is restricted, e.g., divorce, coinage, and acts affecting the forces of the Crown. According to the party system prevailing in the United Kingdom, the dependencies, in matters outside their own powers, are really at the mercy of the party-in-power in the British Parliament. The same is also true of foreign policy, at least in those parts of foreign policy which come under party influence. The party divisions in the Self-governing Dominions do not correspond to the divisions in the United Kingdom, and even if they did, it is unlikely that the same parties would be in power all over the Empire at one time. From this arises the just claim of the Dominions to be represented in foreign affairs.

(3) Definite institutions such as the Colonial Conference, the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the High Commissioners or Agents-General of the Dominions and India. The official governing agencies—the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, for Foreign Affairs, for India, and, in exceptional cases, the Secretaries of State for War, Air, and Home Affairs, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as being the heads of departments which control the dependencies, represent their views to the British Government. The Colonial Conference has been held at indefinite intervals since 1897. Originally it was composed of delegates from the Self-governing Dominions, but later a representative of India was included. The Prime Minister or Secretary of State for the Colonies presides, and it has now become a definite institution, with a definite constitution and regular meetings. The Committee of Imperial Defence started in 1895 as a committee of the Cabinet. At first this committee was informal: it kept no minutes and had no regular meetings. In 1902, it was set on a more definite basis. It was to be composed henceforth of the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for War and for India, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the First Sea-Lord, and the Directors of Naval and of Military Intelligence. In 1904 the Committee was granted a permanent secretariat, and at the outbreak of the Great

War it at once assumed first-rate importance. Its executive powers were greatly increased, but in theory it still remained an advisory body under the Cabinet. In 1916 its functions were taken over by the Imperial War Cabinet.

With the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet during the war, there was a real attempt at imperial organization. In 1916, the Prime Minister of Britain invited the Prime Ministers of the Self-governing Dominions to attend a meeting of the British War Cabinet to consider the question of imperial policy. India also was asked to send representatives. At first the representatives were the Prime Ministers of the Self-governing Dominions and the Secretary of State for India, with three assessors, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who represented the Crown Colonies and protectorates. Further meetings were held and a more definite basis was laid down. The Prime Minister of each of the Self-governing Dominions was to be a member, and he was authorized to nominate a deputy to act for him at meetings held between the full sessions. India was represented by prominent Indians.

The last meeting of the War Cabinet was held after the war. The underlying idea of the War Cabinet, in Mr. Lloyd George's words, was "that the responsible heads of the government of the Empire, with those Ministers who are specially entrusted with the conduct of Imperial Policy, should meet together at regular intervals to confer about foreign policy and matters connected therewith, and come to decisions in regard to them which, subject to the control of their own Parliaments, they will then severally execute."

The Imperial War Cabinet was a peculiar body. Cabinet government in the proper sense means the responsibility of the cabinet to the lower house of legislature. In the Imperial Cabinet, however, the members were responsible to various legislatures. Each was responsible to his own government. This difficulty is fundamental in all schemes of imperial unity. No real type of responsible imperial government can be devised because of the existence of various governments to which the members are responsible.

The same objection applies to another method of imperial representation. Canadians, Australians and Indians have

been elected by British constituencies to the House of Commons, or have been made peers, thus becoming members of the House of Lords. Such representation is only nominal and personal; it is also purely adventitious. English constituencies cannot be depended on to secure regular and continuous Dominion or Indian representation, and even if they did secure it, the main obligations of the members would be to their own constituencies and their party.

At the present moment, no definite scheme for imperial organization has been either formulated or accepted. The Imperial Conference has been resumed, and the right has been conceded to the Prime Ministers of the Self-governing Dominions to correspond directly with the British Premier, and these Dominions may also be represented in the British Cabinet when matters affecting their interests are being discussed.

A closer examination of imperial federation will show that it is a much more complex method of organizing the Empire than is usually imagined. Superficially it seems an excellent method of co-ordinating imperial control with self-government in the dependencies. When examined, it appears in a much less favourable light.

In the first place, one of the normal requisites of federalism is geographical contiguity. To attempt to federalise dominions which lie so far apart from each other as Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa and England seems doomed to failure. Even in the Self-governing Dominions themselves the process of federation was difficult because of distance—as in the cases of British Columbia in Canada, and Western Australia in the Commonwealth of Australia.

In the second place, successful federal government requires a basis of community, in language, interests, tradition, etc. A successful federation demands the presence of those elements which constitute a normal nationality. At the present time it would be extremely dangerous to federalise dependencies which include so many racial and linguistic elements as the British Empire. The Great War was the occasion for bringing into prominence the common aims of the whole Empire. In a very definite way

**Critical
Examination of
Imperial
Federation**

**1. Geo-
graphical
Difficulties**

**2. Differ-
ences
within the
Empire**

it showed both the fact and the need of imperial partnership, but on the other hand, the no less definite ideas of responsible self-government in the dependencies show the elements of diversity within the Empire. Responsible self-government can only mean the development of local nationalities with their own desires, interests, pride and prejudices. The extent to which these ideas have had actual effect may be judged from the second article of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which practically grants nationhood to the Self-governing Dominions. Both they and India have the right to representation on the Assembly of the League of Nations.

In the third place, and this is the most difficult question of all, how is the federation of the Empire to be organized ?

3. The Organiza- tion

A federal organization requires a rigid constitution with definite powers allocated to the central government and to the component parts. How is the central government to be organized ? Is it to be organized with proportionate representation of the various dominions ? And if it is so organized, can we expect that countries so far apart in position, population and interests, as New Zealand, India and Jamaica, will all agree to contribute the same amount or proportionate amounts to imperial defence on a scheme in which the views of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and South Africa have been decisive ? Hitherto schemes of imperial federation have been formulated mainly for the Self governing Dominions, but such schemes are only partially imperial.

In the fourth place, any scheme of federation must inevitably lessen the importance of the Dominions as compared with their present position. In an

4. Loss of Prestige in a Federal Union

Imperial Parliament or Congress, presumably the representation would be on a proportional basis, at least as regards the Self-governing Dominions. This would mean that, as compared with the United Kingdom, the Self-governing Dominions would be overshadowed, while as regards the whole Empire they would have practically no place at all. At present each of the Self-governing Dominions is on an equality, whatever its size. The British Government listens to its views, as expressed by the High Commissioner, Agent-General, or Prime Minister, as the case may be. The same is true of

India and the other non-colonial dependencies. At present their position in relation to the British Government is more independent and powerful than it would be under a federal scheme.

In the fifth place, the effect of imperial federation inevitably must be to reduce the status of the present Imperial or British Parliament. In the place of the present Imperial Parliament would arise a subordinate law-making body in England, or, as has been suggested, separate subordinate law-making bodies for England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. The abolition of the Imperial Parliament as it at present stands and the adoption of a federal constitution of the United Kingdom, in the opinion of many, would be more destructive than favourable to imperial unity.

The future of imperial unity in the British Empire seems to depend more on custom and good feeling than on a definite constitution. Both foreign affairs and defence—the two chief subjects of imperial politics—may be amicably settled by conferences and correspondence. Economic relations may be guided in the same way. If those methods do not satisfy the dependencies, it is difficult to see how they could be satisfied under a federal government, which not only would create new difficulties but would actually lessen the importance and power of the dependencies. As Professor Dicey says, "My full belief is that an Imperial constitution based on good-will and fairness may within a few years come into real existence. The ground of my assurance is that the constitution of the Empire may, like the constitution of England, be found to rest far less on parliamentary statutes than on the growth of gradual and often unnoted customs."

**5. The
Position
of the
British
Parlia-
ment**

Conclusion

CHAPTER XIX

THE END OF THE STATE

1. INDIVIDUALISM

From the foregoing chapters we have seen that there are many kinds of government and many different ways in which similar types of government are organized. We must now proceed to examine various theories of the end of the state and the functions of government. Every government exists to carry out the purposes of the state, and in the modern world the working out of purpose depends on the particular theories prevailing at any moment or over a period of years. This is the age of democracy, of the rule of the people by the people, and according to the dictates of the people does the government work. The people decide how far it is to control their lives, whether it is to have general powers or particular powers, whether it is to interfere or not to interfere with their daily lives and activities, or, to put it in technical terms, whether it is to be socialistic, or individualistic, or partly socialistic and partly individualistic.

The general theories of the end of the state are inextricably bound up with the working of governments. Government, as the organization of the state, fulfils the purposes of the state; but it sometimes happens that it defeats the purposes of the state. In a perfect state, with a perfect organization, the government must be in complete harmony with the state. In a perfectly healthy body politic all the parts should be healthy and should function harmoniously with the whole. But in practice such harmony is difficult to secure. One or other of the parts is diseased, or fails in its functions. Some of the organs go out of joint, and the

General
State and
Government

effort of the whole body towards harmony results in frequent changes and renewal of parts, or in a general overhaul of the whole body. There is thus a continuous effort by the state to secure better government to carry out its purposes.

The individualistic theory is also known as the *laissez-faire* theory. *Laissez-faire* is a French phrase which is generally translated by "leave alone". Each individual, according to this theory, should be restrained as little as possible by government. Government in fact is an evil which is necessary for mankind. No social union at all is possible without the suppression of violence and fraud.

**Statement
of the
Individualist
Position**

The province of government therefore should be limited to the protection of citizens ; beyond this the individual should be left alone. "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." This passage, quoted from John Stuart Mill's *Liberty*, is a classical statement of the individualistic position.

According to this view every agency of government which is protective—e.g., the army and navy, police, law courts, is justifiable ; everything which is not directly protective—such as the post-office, telegraphs, railroads, education, is an unjustifiable sphere of Governmental activity. The functions of government according to the individualistic theory may be summarized thus :—

**Result of
this View**

1. Protection of the state and individuals from foreign aggression.
2. Protection of individuals against each other, that is, from physical injury, slander, personal restraint.
3. Protection of property from robbery or damage.

4. Protection of individuals against false contracts or breach of contract.
5. Protection of the unfit.
6. Protection of individuals against preventable evils such as plague or malaria.

The last two are not accepted by all individualists.

An extreme form of the individualistic theory is anarchism. The word anarchy literally means no rule. The ideal of both anarchism and individualism is the same. Each considers that the perfect stage of society is that in which no government exists except the self-government of every individual by himself. The individualists place great importance on the right of person and property, and recognize that owing to human frailty some form of organized government is necessary. They hold that this government should be the minimum consistent with protection, and that when the human race is more perfectly moralised the necessity for even that minimum will disappear. The ideals thus coincide ; only the means for reaching the ideals differ, for the anarchist believes in voluntary association with occasional coercion, while the individualist accepts government as an unfortunate necessity, although that necessity may be temporary.

The theory of individualism first became prominent as a political force towards the end of the eighteenth century.

Its origin may be traced to Locke. Bentham and the Utilitarians carried it on. The Economists, from Adam Smith to Cobden and Bright adopted it ; in fact many of the best known names in the history of both Political Economy and Political Science might be quoted in its support. Like most political theories it had its origin in actual historical conditions. Over-government, that is, interference by government in matters which many people regarded as the legitimate spheres of private life and endeavour, led to a theory which emphasized the importance of the individual as opposed to government. The theory was a great power in practical politics, though it never had a hold on the people as a whole. It led to the abolition of old laws of interference, especially in trade and commerce, and to new forms of governmental control. Evils arising from the practice of individualism led to the fall or at least severe modification of it, just as the

theory itself arose from evils which were universally admitted.

The theory has been advocated from three chief stand-
Bases of points : first, the ethical ; second, the economic ;
the Theory third, the scientific.

The essence of the ethical argument is that the end of man being the harmonious development of all his powers, each individual must have the freest possible scope for the realization of this end. A form of society in which every individual can compete freely with everyone else leads to the best results.

**1. The
Ethical
Basis**

If government interferes beyond a certain minimum the individual is cramped, his powers have no outlet, with the result of a loss of man-power to society as a whole. Government interference kills self-reliance. Self-assertion, the guiding principle of each individual, leads to the full development of the powers of each. Self-help, says the individualist, is the spring of human progress. Once government begins to interfere, the individual is tempted to be lazy. He expects others to do for him what he himself should do. In such a government-aided society the result is a uniform level of mediocrity ; there is no stimulus for the outgrowth of talent.

The end of the state, according to this theory, is to perfect or complete the individuality of its citizens. Perfect or complete individuality will mean that government is no longer necessary : each man will be a law to himself. The state is a contract, a " joint-stock-protection society," as Spencer called it, or a type of society due to aggression. The " natural right " of each individual is to develop his powers to the maximum, and government interference, so long as government is necessary for such development, should be a minimum.

The individualistic argument has been applied with far-reaching effects to the economic world. Everyone, according

to the individualist, seeks his own interests. If, without let or hindrance by government, he is allowed to do so, society as a whole will benefit.

**2. The
Economic
Basis**
 If each one is allowed to invest his capital in the way that will yield him the greatest return, if every labourer can freely accept the highest wage, the community will benefit. Free competition will bring the highest profit. Demand and supply will determine the channels in which

capital and labour will flow. Prices, too, should be unfettered. Increased demand means increased supply. Prices will rise and fall according to the usual laws. Foreign trade should be free, for every country will produce the goods that give it the best return, and will import those that other countries are in a better position to supply. In trade and commerce everything must adjust itself naturally, and this adjustment is in the best interests of all. Government interference in regulating prices, in setting up tariff duties, in giving bounties, in restricting conditions of labour hampers the working of a machine which, if left alone, remains in perfect order.

In no sphere of life has the individualistic theory had more effect than in this. The theory was almost universally accepted in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The name of Adam Smith in particular gave it great effect, supported also as it was by Economic Argument Ricardo, Bastiat and Malthus. The effect in England was soon felt by the repeal of a number of long-standing laws, all of which were anti-individualistic. The Elizabethan laws regulating labour, laws regarding combinations of working men, the Navigation Acts of Charles II., which controlled the relations of Britain and the colonies in matters of commerce, and, most important of all, the Corn Laws, which were repealed in 1846, leading to the system of free trade in the United Kingdom—all these were anti-individualistic. The *laissez-faire* theory had no place for government regulation in any of those departments. Artificial support to labour or commerce meant that the weaker benefited at the expense of the stronger, with consequent loss to the general well-being.

The scientific argument is based on analogy. The chief exponent of this side of the theory is Herbert Spencer, whose biological analogy we have noted in an earlier chapter in connection with the organic theory of the state. Evolution in the lower forms of life means the survival of the fittest, a law which should also apply to human society. The natural course of progress means that the poor, the weakly and the insane must go to the wall. However hard this may seem applied to individual cases, the interests of humanity demand it. Human interests as a whole are more important than the

3. The Scientific Basis

interests of individuals : the hardship in individual cases is the price paid to secure the general well-being.

Such, in outline, are the arguments of the three schools. Whatever their basis, they all lead in the same direction,

Summary namely, to show the essential evil of government interference. To support their arguments, individualists have not been slow to expose the undoubtedly bad results of government interference in particular cases. These results appear especially in the economic sphere, where examples abound of the hopeless failure of government as contrasted with private management. It is easy, too, to compile instances of bad laws, laws which have had to be either repealed or amended. The ever-recurring repeal and amendment of laws is, according to Spencer, a proof that the laws should never have been enacted. The administration of laws, again, is frequently irksome, due either to officials or to the nature of the law. Much contempt has been poured on the so-called "paternal" type of government, a government which stands in the same relation to a citizen as a father does to a child. Apart from the general argument that such a government does not allow the individual to develop in the proper way, it is frequently ridiculed as inconsistent with the normal dignity of man. "Grand-motherly" is another derisive epithet frequently applied to it.

2. CRITICISM OF THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY

The individualistic theory is an extreme representation of an important truth. Arising, as the theory did, at a time when governmental interference obviously injured trade and individual enterprise, it over-emphasised one aspect of social life at the expense of others. Excessive state regulation, particularly in England, led to much meddlesome legislation, and the individualistic theory arose from the general impatience of the time with the many petty laws which affected the everyday life of each citizen. An extreme in practice led to an extreme in theory. It is to be noted, however, that not everyone who may reasonably be termed individualistic in thought is an extremist. The writers of the individualistic school vary considerably both in the

**The
Theory is
Extreme**

general setting of the theory and in detail. Some, like Spencer, may well be called extremists, but there are many moderate writers whose ideas almost merge into those of socialists, though theoretically socialism is the opposite of individualism.

The outstanding truth of individualism is that governmental interference if carried too far does tend to lessen self-help. The mistake of the individualist lies in exaggerating this unduly. India as a whole and Bengal in particular provides an apt illustration. In this country government undertakes many functions which no individualistic theory of state functions could accept. The charge is often brought against both the government and people of India that the wide extent of government activities has sapped the self-reliance of the people. In industry, commerce, and in many other departments, personal initiative is said to be lacking because the people expect government to show the way. The example of the lack of industries is often given. Many Indians hold that only by government help or control can industries start or develop, despite the fact that the joint stock principle is so obviously successful in manifold instances. The attitude of the people in this respect has been ascribed to the fact that government undertakes in India the many functions it does.

The basis of individualism is unsound. It regards the individual as essentially self-centred or egoistic. Self-assertion is considered to be the central characteristic of man; seeking his self-interest is claimed to be the "natural" order of things. The state and government are therefore said to be "unnatural", for they stand in the way of self-assertion and self-interest. Such a view shows a misunderstanding of both "self" and "natural". Man is by nature social. Every individual is born into society, on which he is dependent for his mental and physical existence. He has no meaning apart from society. A non-social individual is a mere abstraction. The state, again, instead of being antagonistic to the individual, is part of the individual. The very being of the state depends on the individual. The state is not something separate. The state and government are a type of society of which

**Individual-
ism and
Self-help**

**The Basis
Unsound.
Meaning of
"Self" and
"Natural"**

the individual is a member. Man has instincts, interests, and powers which exist in a social medium, and from these arises the fundamental fact of his social life—the state.

To regard man as essentially self-centred is therefore wrong. Society involves others as well as the self, and the welfare of a self is integrally connected with the welfare of others. The welfare of the self *plus* others is as vitally connected with the welfare of the state. It is unsound to set the individual in opposition to the state or its organization, government. We may do so, indeed, to represent a certain point of view, as, when we speak of an individual resenting this or that act of government. This is quite a different thing from regarding the individual as essentially opposed to government. To say so is tantamount to saying that the individual is opposed to himself.

Individualists continually speak of the “natural” right of the individual to develop, or of the “natural” order of development. The misuse of the word “natural” we have already noted in connexion with the Social Contract theory and with liberty. The state is as “natural” as the right of the individual to self-assertion, for the state is the expression of the very nature of man. Man’s rights are bound up with the state. His rights exist in and through the state, to which by nature he is indissolubly bound. Realization of these rights is possible only through the state.

A proper understanding of man as a social being, and of the state as an expression of man’s nature thus completely changes the meaning of self-government and interference. The state exists for human purposes ; it exists to further the moral ends of man, and as such it must, through its organization, provide a suitable medium for the realization of moral ends. A society in which every one is at war with every one else on the principle of self-assertion, even though that self-assertion be limited by an “individualistic minimum” of protection of life and property, is not a medium for the realization of true moral ends. Liberty is a relative term. It means self-determination, but self-determination does not mean that the individual can do as he likes with what is recognized by society as his own. Each self must try to reach perfection, and as other selves are involved in the same

**“Natural
Rights”
Fallacy**

**What Inter-
ference
Implies**

process, the self must submit to control, a control which the state must exercise. The free exercise of the human mind and activity demands control in order to allow the individual to achieve moral perfection, and this control is not external to the individual but an essential part of his nature.

State control therefore is not an evil, but a positive good. Certain kinds of control or certain methods of control are bad. Laws which interfere with disinterested moral action, laws for example which weaken morality by interfering with religion, or those which take away individual self-respect or weaken family feeling—such laws are bad, and they are bad not because of and theory of *laissez faire* but because they are injurious to society, and do not create conditions of life suitable for the realization of the highest moral ends.

Governmental restraint may be exercised in irksome or disagreeable ways. Government and its officials may make mistakes, but to condemn all government restraint because of this is similar to condemning all education because we have a few bad schools. As evidence to support their theory, individualistic writers have pointed to the many mistakes governments have committed in the past. It would be as easy to compile lists of indubitably good actions done by government. Government is a public body, and this must be borne in mind when judgment is passed on its acts. Its mistakes are known to everybody, whereas the mistakes of private bodies or corporations are either not generally known or are lightly passed over. The good actions of government, too, rarely meet with praise such as similar acts by private individuals do. It seems that the normal expectation of the average citizen is that government, with its wide command of resources, should do things *better* than private individuals, hence arises the disproportionate blame for government in cases of failure, the failure often being relative, as the expectations are higher.

Condemnation of state-control on this score is in part based on a confusion between state and government. The failure of certain acts of government is by no means a condemnation of the state. The acts of government

are variable; the fact of the state is fixed and unchangeable. The end of the state at any given time may not coincide with the particular acts of government even though the determination of the province of government must ultimately depend on the prevailing idea of the end of the state.

**Confusion
of State
and
Govern-
ment**

Individualists find it extremely difficult to be consistent in their own theories. We have already seen how Mill finds in self-protection a working criterion of the goodness or badness of laws. Mill's simple criterion, however, completely breaks down when applied to individual questions. Mill himself says that large classes of individuals must be excepted from his rule. It applies only to individuals in the maturity of their faculties. Children are excluded, but, it might reasonably be asked, when do children cease to be children, and what rules apply to them, when they are under twenty-one years of age? Barbarians, he also excludes, but he gives no definition of a barbarian. Maturity of faculties is a phrase admitting of many interpretations, each of which will be unsatisfactory to some individuals.

**Further
Examina-
tion of
J. S. Mill's
Theory**

Still a greater difficulty emerges in Mill's theory when we come to interpret "self-protection." "If a man's conduct affects the interest of no person besides himself," says Mill, "the state has no right to interfere." This is the crux of the individualistic position. No act of an individual has reference to himself alone, so that on Mill's own principle any action of the state is justified. State control of education, sanitation, food-supply, conditions of labour—can all be justified on the ground of self-protection. The self must be guarded from itself as well as from other selves. To Mill the individual is a self-centred entity. He confuses individuality with eccentricity or oddity. It is true that any form of society is richer and more progressive if the differences among men are fully utilized. Genius, for example, is an exceptional thing and appears in an odd way; but Mill makes this oddity or difference among people an end to be pursued in itself. Any criterion of individualism is bound to break down in the same way for from the outset its basis is unsound.

The complexity of modern social organization has brought

into clearer light the inter-dependence of individuals, and the necessity for state control. At the time when individualism was at the height of its popularity, industrial and commercial life was undergoing a great change. The invention of machinery, particularly in the textile industries, and the application of steam-power, led to a revolution in industrial life, known to history as the Industrial Revolution. The improvement of methods of transportation, especially in railroads and steamships, facilitated the growth of international commerce and competition. Large-scale production replaced the old home industries. Huge towns sprang up; workers crowded into them from country districts. Old methods of government regulation, such as tolls, local duties and prohibitions on the mobility of labour, were all unsuited to these new conditions. Complete freedom seemed to be the solution of the difficulty. The current individualism led to the absence of restriction; but the result of the absence of restriction very soon led to the discrediting of the theory. No better argument exists against the theory of individualism than the practical results which followed its adoption in the political and industrial life of England. The evils which followed the growth of factories and big cities led to a new era of government control. Housing laws to prevent overcrowding and pestilence; labour laws to prevent child labour and "sweating"; factory laws to forbid unguarded machinery and undue danger to life—all these came into being and were universally acknowledged to be both necessary and salutary. The more complex the organization of modern life becomes, the more necessary is state control, and naturally so, for greater complexity of organization means that the individual is more than ever dependent on his fellows.

Individualism as a working theory for modern governments has been discredited. There is now a distinct swing of the pendulum to the other side, to socialism. Experience has proved that the individual is not the best judge of his own good. Were everyone able to know his own interests, individualism would be justified. Society, however, has to guard against ignorance and moral obliquity. The state has proved a better judge of both general and individual interests than has the

**Modern
Necessity
for Inter-
ference
or State
Control**

**Modern
Tendencies**

individual. Nowhere is this better shown than in matters of health and sanitation. One insanitary house in a neighbourhood may undo the good of a hundred perfectly clean ones. Good food, properly qualified doctors and chemists, these are matters of general concern, and here experience is a good guide. Dishonest traders are ever ready to profit by selling inferior food regardless of the consequences. Quacks are always ready to profit by ignorance. Only by government regulation can such deceit be met, and the end achieved is obviously for the general well-being.

With the development of democracy there is not the same reason to support individualism. Democracy gives the people the management of their own government.

Individualism and Democracy In a big state this may not amount to much. The direct interest of the citizen in government varies in inverse proportion to the size of the

state. But all modern governments are subdivided. Local government provides a medium whereby the citizen feels that he does manage his own affairs. This is particularly the case where there is considerable decentralization in local government. The line between socialism and individualism then tends to become less and less clear.

The biological argument of the individualists is inherently weak, because the very action of government which the individualists condemn may fairly be regarded as part of the evolutionary process. In any case the survival of the fittest may not mean the survival of the best. The theory forgets the essential difference between man and lower animals. Man

**The
Biological
Argument
Fallacious**

can to a large extent master his environment. He can utilize it for various ends ; in other words, moral ideas enter into the notion of the survival of the fittest as applied to man. Man can improve his environment, and mould the course of history according to definite moral ends. The moral element in man would never consent to the ruthless waste of the physically weak or to the cruelty to the unsuccessful in life that the survival of the fittest implies. Private as well as public charity is forbidden by the biological theory, but obviously charity is a natural enough manifestation of human nature. The very acts condemned by the theory, therefore, are really part of the sum-total of the process of which we are asked to accept a part.

To sum up, the theory of individualism brings into prominence certain valuable truths. In emphasizing self-reliance, in combating needless governmental interference, in urging the value of the individual in society, it has contributed much to the virility of modern thought. It deserves credit too, for its effect in destroying useless laws of petty interference, and in enabling our modern system to develop. But it exaggerates the evils of state control when it forgets that there are more instances of good state actions than of bad. It gives a fundamentally false conception of individuality, and finally, it has proved quite unfitted for the complexity of modern life.

CHAPTER XX

THE END OF THE STATE—(*continued*)

3. SOCIALISM

Socialism is the antithesis of individualism. Instead of opposing government control, socialism regards it as essential to the welfare of individuals and society. Far from being an evil, government is a positive good. The existing political machinery should be used for economic purposes. The means of production and distribution should be gradually taken over by government from the private capitalist. Capital, indeed, is necessary, but not the private capitalist. Private ownership in the production of goods the socialist condemns absolutely. Capital should be used for the good of all, not for the benefit of the few who are the lucky present possessors of it. As it is to be used for the good of all, the state, which exists to further the common well-being, should control it. Capital should be "socialized": in fact "socialization" indicates the main idea of socialism better than the word "socialism" itself. The essential ideas of modern socialism are simply the substitution of state ownership for private ownership. It aims at securing the good of all, instead of the benefit of a few by replacing the present by another economic system. It does not seek to abolish private property. The socialist regards private property as essential to the development of the individual, but he considers that the distribution of private property is at present inequitable.

Common ownership of the instruments of production for the general well-being implies common management. Individual ownership and management, according to the socialist, have led to a lack of proportion in the economic

world. Useless competition, shown in the multiplication of machinery used for the same purpose, and in advertising, can be abolished by the substitution of a power which is by nature co-ordinating. Government will prevent productive power going into the wrong channels: it will curb it in one direction and intensify it in another. Large savings will be effected, which will be used for further production of the proper type of article for the general good in some other way. Socialism, therefore, is an organization, which by substituting common or collective for private or individual ownership and management of the instruments of production and distribution, and by allowing the continuance of private property in other directions, aims at securing the general well-being as distinct from the benefit of a few. Under the socialistic system the individual is definitely subordinated to the community, in order that all may receive their proper reward. The measure of this reward is individual capacity and willingness to do work assigned by the common authority.

Socialism has often been confused with anarchism and communism, a confusion which has brought upon it great discredit among people not conversant with its doctrines. Collectivism or socialization more accurately connotes its central ideas and methods, and would prevent this unfortunate confusion. Anarchism is, as we have seen, the direct opposite of socialism; it proposes to destroy state control altogether. Communism, inasmuch as it shares some ideas with socialism, which make many casual readers identify the two, deserves further consideration.

Communism is one of the oldest conceptions of an ideal form of society. The modern theory is that the labour and income of society should be distributed equally by a common authority. No such institution as private property should be allowed. This may be called the economic theory of communism. The earliest communists regarded equal distribution not as an economic, but as a political and moral necessity. The most thoroughgoing of all communistic schemes is given in Plato's *Republic*, in which he says that the best form of society is that in which the words *mine* and *not-mine* are similarly applied to the same object. He supported equality of wealth only

among the upper or governing classes. Equality of wealth and labour among the whole population which modern communism demands, was wholly foreign to Plato's ideas.

The *Republic* provided a basis for many later idealistic writers: Sir Thomas More, in particular, in his *Utopia* gave (1515), a vivid representation of a communist state. More pictures a community of about three to four million persons. They have no private property, and live under the direction of elected officials. The duty of these officials is to measure out the work of the community and to guide production. Every one lives the simple life; ostentation is conspicuously absent. This, added to the fact that More provides abundance of food in his ideal state, makes distribution easy. As there is no want, no one clamours for more than his due share. Everyone must work, and, as agricultural labour is the hardest work of all, each one must take his turn at it. More, unlike Plato, who, in his *Republic* regards the family as a hindrance to unity, preserves it. Over-population, More says, will be solved by emigration. Families should be as equal in size as possible; adoption aids natural deficiencies. More allows slavery; the slaves consist of convicts, prisoners of war, and foreigners who voluntarily accept service in the Utopian community.

More's *Utopia* is the first modern presentation of the theory, but he did not regard his scheme as a practical possibility. The French Revolution first brought communistic theories into the realm of practical politics. In England these theories were popularized by Robert Owen (1771-1858). Owen was a manufacturer whose experience led him to draw up a new scheme of society for the relief of the labouring poor. He considered that poverty was mainly the result of evil environment. He accordingly tried to provide an environment such as would allow children to grow up apart from the polluted air of competition. Men would thus be brought into communities where combined interest replaced individual interest. Labour would become temperate and effective in such a community and could be easily superintended by a communal authority. Owen and others tried many experiments to prove their theories at Orbiston near Glasgow, and at New Harmony, in the United States of America. These and many other experiments were

complete failures, and Owen is now remembered not as a communist, but as the apostle of co-operation and labour exchanges.

Many attempts to found communistic societies have been made since Owen's time, chiefly in America. Religious societies, such as the Moravians, Essenes, and certain monastic orders, have for long observed the principles of equal labour and equal distribution. Many societies, of which the Shakers, Rappists, and Perfectionists may be mentioned, have existed for a shorter or longer period. The Perfectionists of Oneida, founded in 1849, were a manufacturing community who flourished for a considerable time, but broke up ultimately owing to the lack of faith on the part of the younger members. These communistic settlements were far removed from the ideal communism of Plato. All the members were hard-working and had little opportunity to enjoy the leisure so greatly esteemed by Plato. They were not, moreover, true political communities. They were mostly held together by a common religious bond. A true political society is joined together by definitely political ideals. Common purpose and common interests among a community lead to permanent political organization. These various societies, again, were possible only within a larger state. The larger state was essential to their security from external interference, and it also received those members who did not find the community to their liking. The dissentients, instead of being dangerous, simply left the community. Again, no political lesson can be gathered from them because they were too small. They were smaller than modern small municipalities. In a small community of a few thousand members, each individual can feel a certain amount of real personal responsibility for the community, and, where joint ownership exists, he can feel himself in some way an effective joint-owner. With the extension of the community, the power of individual members diminishes and the power of the common organization grows. The whole meaning of communism thus changes with the extension of the limits of the community.

The greatest objection to communism is that by the abolition of private property and the family (though some communists think the family may continue in a communistic society), the most essential instruments of man for the

realization of his moral ends are destroyed. Man cannot realize moral ends without the means to do so; property and the family are the means, therefore they are essential moral attributes. From the economic standpoint, the abolition of private property takes away the chief stimulus to personal exertion. Where no one can call anything his own, no one will work. If everything belongs to every one, the interest of any one individual will be very small. Whatever may be the future of mankind, it is evident that the normal man works in order to accumulate personal possessions. Co-operation, which has been so successful in recent years, is, as yet, a means towards the same end. It may be urged against communism that no form of government can be devised which will regulate production and distribution to the satisfaction of every one. Governments are not infallible; they are human material: only with an all-wise government could communism be successful.

Socialism shares several aims and methods with communism. The chief element of difference lies in private property, which the socialist accepts as essential. Socialistic Schools Socialists, however, vary much in their own opinions, and from these opinions certain definite schools of thought may be extracted.

1. The "Scientific" or Marxian Socialists.—The central figure in this school is Karl Marx, whose work, *Capital*, has been called the Bible of socialists. Marxian social-

1. Marxian or Scientific Socialism is essentially economic in character, though the state is regarded as necessary to achieve its goal. Society, according to this view, is gradually moving towards collective ownership. The old system is breaking down before new economic conditions. Collective ownership is the next stage in the evolution of society. Social structure is explained by economic conditions. Our whole life is in every aspect moulded by the economic conditions surrounding us. Up to the present the workers have been mere tools in the hands of the capitalists. Labour is the only measure of value, and what has happened in the past is that the capitalists, whose property is the result of the aggression of the strong against the weak, are able to exploit the working man. The working man is not able to compete with the

capitalist, for modern machinery, added to the possession of land by the capitalist, makes the latter stronger and stronger. The workman has to work longer and harder than the wages he receives warrant, and the surplus above what he actually receives is the source of the capitalist's income.

Marxian socialism thus draws a sharp distinction between the capitalist and the working man, a distinction which led to the idea of class antagonism. The massing of workers in factories was favourable to combined action, and this action, say the Marxians, should be exercised for securing parliamentary majorities. Marx himself regarded the victory of the worker to be a matter of evolution; others (revolutionary socialists) hold that workers should aim at the complete upsetting of the present system by a definite revolution.

2. The Fabian Socialists.—The Fabian socialists, led by the English Fabian Society, differ from the Marxians chiefly in their methods. Accepting the ordinary socialistic doctrine, they consider that the best way to bring the socialistic regime into practice is to secure on the part of the people the conviction that the socialistic type of society is the best. The Fabians abstain from political work and concentrate their efforts on literary propaganda work. The Fabian Society has as members several of the best known novelists and playwrights of the day, whose distinctly socialistic teachings have been either read or witnessed on the stage by hundreds of thousands. The pamphlets of the Fabian Society, written largely by the same men, have been most influential in spreading socialistic ideas among the thinking classes. The Fabians are particularly keen on municipal socialism.

3. The Christian Socialists.—The central idea of this school is that the doctrine of Christianity requires collective ownership. Christian socialism was started in the middle of last century (1849-53) by F. D. Maurice, whose chief aim was to encourage co-operative production of working-men's associations in order to improve the conditions of working men. Competition was regarded as the origin of most of the evils among that class. Charles Kingsley, the novelist, was a well-known Christian socialist.

4. **The State Socialists.**—State socialism originated in Germany, and only in Germany can a school of state socialism be said to exist, though in other countries the influence of its theories has been very great. State socialism represents a compromise theory; it believes in preserving existing class-relations but in using government to carry out certain parts of the socialistic ideal. It seeks particularly to save the weak from the strong ; in this lies its characteristic note. Socialism regards all citizens as coming under state control ; state socialism seeks to bring under the state control only those who cannot take care of themselves. Old-age pensions, workmen's insurance and factory legislation in general are types of the legislation advocated by state socialism.

5. **Socialists of the Chair.**—This term was given in 1872 to some young German professors of Political Economy who advocated state interference with property rights for the public welfare. Their theory was not really socialism but a protest against socialism. They are socialists only in name, not in fact ; the name was given to them in derision by socialist enemies.

6. **Guild Socialists.**—Guild socialism is a recent development, of which the chief exponent in England is Mr. G.D.H. Cole, whose theory was developed to counteract the current Fabian collectivistic ideas. Collectivism, he considers, means a vast government organization which will result in bureaucratic tyranny. The state must have no control over industry. As organized at present, it is the "corner-stone of the edifice of capitalism." Labour, therefore, must be organized in unions or aggregations of unions, called National Guilds. The chief function of these guilds will be to wage war with employers and the state. Non-unionists are to be rigorously persecuted in order to force unanimity among workers. Ultimately the National Guilds are to control all industries. The state is not to be abolished, but is to continue in some sort of equal partnership with the guilds. The main function of the state will be to direct consumption; the guilds will organize production. Guild Socialism, as expounded by Mr. Cole, is a further development of Marxian revolutionary socialism.

4. CRITICISM OF SOCIALISM

The main justification of socialism is that it protests against obvious evils in our present social system. Unrestricted competition has undoubtedly led to the rise of the capitalist or of capitalistic combinations and to the weakening of the working man as an individual. The growth of competition tends more and more to concentrate money and power in the hands of a few. The small competitor is crushed out, often in ways which are unfair. Duplication of machinery and services leads, as the socialists contend, to economic waste. Inequalities of wealth and opportunity also exist. Personal ability is subordinated to hereditary wealth and influence. It is difficult, in short, to see how any theory of the common good can be reconciled with the great inequalities and injustices which exist in the present system.

There is reason for socialism; but like most theories which arise as a protest against existing conditions or classes of individuals it tends to exaggeration. The working man has not been reduced to the state of complete powerlessness that many socialistic writers imagine. The growth of large-scale production has enabled workers by means of combinations, particularly trade unions, to become more powerful than they ever have been. Trade unions have become possible mainly owing to the congregation of large numbers of men in one place. Not only has the working man been strengthened against the capitalist in this way, but he has also by combination been able to exercise considerable influence on the legislatures of various countries. The socialistic attacks on capital, further, forget that labour is not the only instrument of production. Capital is as necessary as labour, though it is true that it could be organized in a different way.

One of the grievances of socialists is that land is in private hands. The sea, the air, and the land, they say, are Nature's gifts to mankind, not to this or that particular individual. Many, without calling themselves socialists, agree with this proposition. They consider that land should be nationalized; that present owners should be gradually ejected

The Justification of Socialism

Socialism tends to go to Extremes

Private Ownership of Land, etc.

as public funds admit of fair compensation being paid to them. On other individual questions, such as the nationalization of railways, socialists have many supporters outside their own school of thought. Their principle, too, has been accepted in the co-operation movement, though the organizations of co-operation are not necessarily socialistic.

Socialists point out in favour of their theory that it has been adopted in practice, with conspicuous success, in

Practical Socialism practically every country in the world. Competition has been eradicated in several directions by government action. Why, then, they ask, should this not extend? The postal service has eliminated competition among private carriers. In many countries government owns and manages railways. Telegraphs, telephones, and, in some cases, mines and steamships have been taken over by governments. Why should not the control of production and labour be similarly taken over? The governments, central and local, in India may be taken as an example. If, in addition to the army and police, government can manage directly schools and colleges, forests, cultivation of quinine, etc., why cannot jute, cotton, indigo, coal-mines, etc., be taken over and managed?

Several arguments against this may be brought forward. The abolition of private ownership and management from

Private Ownership and Production all production would lessen production because it would take away one of its chief stimuli. The capitalist gets better results than government because he is able to enjoy the fruits of his work. Supply and demand at present decide the course

of production: under government management production would decide demand. The capitalist is constantly on the outlook either to create or discover new wants and meet them. New wants under a government regime would not be stimulated. It may be argued that new wants may well lie dormant; on the other hand, diversification of wants adds considerably to the zest of life and is necessary for the progress of society. Thus, although the socialist would not, as the communist, abolish all private property, the argument applicable to the greater is true of the less.

The socialist is over-optimistic in the matter of government management. Experience of government-managed industrial concerns is not hopeful. It is universally admitted

that matters of general concern such as the postal service should be under government, and also certain monopolies.

Socialism and Governmental Management Though government management is usually accepted as efficient, it must be remembered that the standard of efficiency is set in the absence of competition. Where governments have actually started competitive agencies, failure has been as notable as success. Government management, it may reasonably be held, will never be so efficient as private management, as it cannot offer the same prizes. Government cannot offer anything equivalent to a partnership in a firm to a manager whereby the manager can enjoy a good part of the income made by his own efforts. Government, again, even though representative, is not answerable to shareholders and does not risk failure. In the case of failure in an enterprise government would simply close down, without having had the economic stimulus of fighting against failure. Besides, the very vastness of the organization of government means delays and lack of elasticity, known at present as "red tapeism", which might lead to a lessening of production far greater than the saving effected by collective control.

Most of the arguments against socialism belong to the sphere of economics, and cannot be dealt with here. One political argument, however, we must mention. Even if socialism were brought into practice, it would be an irksome and undesirable system. In the words of Herbert Spencer—"Each member of the community as an individual would be a slave of the community as a whole."

If all production and distribution were to be managed by government, a huge army of officials would be necessary.

The Extension of Governmental Activities The extension of governmental activities leads also to a large number of bye-laws and regulations which tend to bring about a uniform level of work. In a huge organization like government individuality has little scope. Routine replaces individuality; "red-tape" replaces elasticity.

Individual interests, both in government service and outside, are allowed play only in so far as they do not clash with the uniformity of the government system. Initiative would be repressed. Genius, to which progress owes so much, would be stifled, for genius is an exceptional thing, and finds little place in rules and regulations. Not only

so, but the attitude of the citizens would be that of lethargic acceptance of what government prescribed. It is here in particular that the individualist position is strong as contrasted with that of the socialist. The huge bureaucracy would sap individual spontaneity and responsibility. Self-help would be replaced by government help.

The loss of the buoyancy and resiliency which characterize the present system cannot be viewed lightly. But the huge new civil service would have other bad effects. There is no tyranny so grinding as that of government departmental formulæ. The effect on government servants themselves would be bad. Improvements, especially in petty necessary matters, are notoriously difficult to achieve. While government may readily grant lakhs of rupees for some general scheme, it may take months, if not years, to argue departmentally whether two extra menials are necessary at a given place. The effect of this is particularly bad on government officers in responsible posts. Impatience with the whole system often leads to wilful action in cases of necessary improvements, to avoid the irritation caused by departmental procedure. Departmentalism is nevertheless necessary, owing to the hugeness of the organization; and with the extension of the organization to all matters of production and distribution it would become infinitely worse.

The effect on the worker, too, is bad. The relative security of tenure which government servants enjoy is often translated by the worker to mean less work than under private management. In Australia, for example, the government labourer is said to have the "government swing" of the pickaxe, as contrasted to the more agile swing of the worker in private employment. The extension of the "government swing" to *all* production and distribution might ease muscles, but it certainly would not result in the saving which socialists predict.

In the bureaucracy, again, the officials would be continually acting for their own advancement. Departmental

**Bureau-
cracy** requirements do not always coincide with public desires, and promotion on these requirements may not lead to the best interests of the people.

The increasing officialization of the country, again, would lead to democracy becoming the servant of officials. It may be

said that in a democracy the officials of government are the officials of the people. This may be so in theory, indeed, but it is far from the case in practice. Officials in any government wield great power, as it is the officials who carry out the expressed will of the democracy. With increasing duties increased powers must be given to officials, with the result that officialdom would become an empire within an empire, ruled on a graded system like an army.

Such are a few arguments against socialism. It is the thorough-going application of the theory, however, which may give reasons for doubt. Many people, not professed socialists, are willing to accept parts of the socialistic doctrine. In recent years very considerable advances have been made all over the world towards the realization of parts of the socialistic programme. The tendency at present seems to be more and more in that direction, and the fact that vast enterprises during the great European war were placed directly on the shoulders of government, has proved a lever to socialists for demanding an extension of direct government activities.

The advance of socialism in recent years has been marked in Great Britain in two ways—social legislation and municipalization. Since the beginning of this century many laws have been passed for the bettering of the lot of the working man. Old Age Pension Acts, Employers' Liability Acts, Workmen's Compensation Acts, Housing, Health, Insurance, and Factory Acts—all these have come into operation. The chief socialistic measures, however, have been in municipalities, where lighting, both gas and electric, tramways, water and libraries are directly owned and managed by a large proportion of municipalities.

In the British colonies and India the advance of socialism has been more marked. It must be noted that socialistic measures have not, as a rule, been adopted in them because of any accepted theory of socialism. Usually some other reason has operated. In England, moral and social considerations, in Australia, the lack of private capital, in India the lack of capital and initiative on the part of the people, have been the main causes of government ownership and management.

In western countries socialists now form parties of considerable political strength. In Germany, socialists are

strong not only numerically but also because they are united. Socialism as a political force is relatively new, and in many countries it has not been able to unite its forces because of internal dissensions. In Germany, in 1917, there were in all 108 Socialists in the Reichstag in a total of 397 members.

In
Germany
and
France

In the German National Assembly, elected in 1920, there were 165 Majority Socialists and 22 Independent Socialists, together representing a national voting strength of nearly 47 per cent. In the Reichstag, after the 1928 elections, there were 153 Socialists and 54 Communists. In the Chamber of Deputies in France there is a large representation of socialists, who, in the multiple party system prevailing there, as in Germany, largely control government. In recent years the Radicals have often joined hands with the Socialists; after the 1928 elections, the Socialists, Radicals, and Radical-Socialists together formed nearly half the membership of the Chamber, and with other groups of Socialists and the Communists had a clear majority.

In the two party system of England and America socialists were not till quite recently able to secure any appreciable control in the lower houses, and even at present the Labour Party is in power in England only because the two party system has to some extent been broken up. In England, the Labour Party partly represents socialistic ideas, but is not a socialistic organization, though theoretically it is the political centre of the socialist movement in the United Kingdom. In 1908, it was affiliated to the International Socialist Bureau and thus was committed to socialist principles. Actually, however, it is controlled by the trade-unions, and in its constitution, adopted in 1918, the party did not openly accept socialism as an essential part of its doctrines. The chief socialist organization in Britain used to be the S. D. F., or Social Democratic Federation, which, in 1911, was amalgamated with some smaller organizations and became known as the British Socialist (now Communist) Party. The I.L.P. (Independent Labour Party) is another well-known organization. It has a fairly large membership, and publishes propagandist papers. Other British socialist organizations are the National Socialist Party, which was formed by seceders from the British Socialist Party, the Clarion

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States

Fellowship and the Herald League, named after the socialist papers the *Clarion* and *Daily Herald*, and the Fabian Society, a propagandist body, which conducts a Labour Research Department which carries out regular investigations into social and economic problems.

In America socialism has made little headway, owing to the American Federation of Labour hitherto having confined itself to industrial, as distinct from political agitation. On three occasions socialist candidates have stood for the Presidency, but their attempts were made mainly for propagandist purposes. In 1919 a National Labour Party was formed at Chicago with a moderate socialistic programme.

The various socialist organizations are usually very highly organized. They are missionary bodies as well as political, and the large accessions to their strength in recent years show how successful their missionary activities have been. They have speakers, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines: the *Vorwaerts* in Germany and the *Clarion* in England are good examples. In recent years the growth of socialism has been marked particularly by labour unrest shown in the many strikes that have taken place throughout the world. Before the outbreak of the Great War these strikes were growing rapidly. Some were only of local importance, but others were aimed at upsetting the whole industry of the country. This was particularly noteworthy in the railway strike in England (1911) and the strikes of the coal-miners and transport workers in 1912. Since the conclusion of the war, Labour unrest has been due mainly to unsettled economic conditions, but communistic agitation has also been at work.

The Internationale, or Internationalist Socialist Bureau, was created in 1900, with headquarters in Brussels. Its function was to carry out the decisions of triennial international socialist conferences, to summon international congresses in emergencies, and to maintain a central socialist office for propaganda. The organization was suspended during the first three years of the Great War. Its activities were resumed in 1918, but a proposed international conference was frustrated by the opposition of the British and French Governments. An

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inter-allied Labour and Socialist Conference took its place. Arrangements were made for an international conference to be held simultaneously with the meetings of peace delegates. This Conference met in February, 1919, at Berne, but several nations were unrepresented at the meeting, which is known as the third Internationale. The second Internationale took place at Amsterdam in April, 1919. It arose out of the Berne Conference and another international conference held in Berne at the same time—the International Trade Union Conference. The second Internationale created an Acting Commission, with headquarters at Amsterdam, which has replaced the original Bureau. Further congresses have been held since, but there has been a split between two "Internationales", one, the so-called "Third Internationale" with headquarters in Moscow, the other, "the Internationale" with headquarters in Amsterdam.

The plethora of strikes in the years before 1914 coincided with the growth of a new socialistic doctrine—syndicalism.

Syndicalism Syndicalism comes from the French word *syndicat*, which means a trade-union. Syndicalism is closely connected with socialism, but it considers that the older socialism has completely failed to bring about what it professed to do. The three main ideas of syndicalism are: (a) Labour is the only source of wealth and the one ground for its enjoyment; (b) Wage-earners have the right to own and control industrial concerns; (c) In order to do so, they should, through their trade-unions, continually strike. Strikes are of two kinds, "irritation" strikes and the "general" strike. The irritation strike, or *sabotage*, means scamping and spoiling work to ruin employers. The salient element of syndicalism is the ruthless antagonism of the worker to the employer. According to syndicalism not every one that works is a "worker"; worker means wage-earner or manual worker. All other workers, e.g., managers and professional men, are included in the classes which are regarded as the deadly enemies of the labourer. It is thus opposed to the fundamental principles of democracy. Not by persuasion, or by constitutional majority legislation, or by co-operation, is the ideal of syndicalism to be attained, but by ruthless ruin of the upper and middle classes. Disappointed with the results of socialism as seen in, say, the nationalization of the Post

Office or the municipalization of light and water, the syndicalist asks for a direct, immediate class war. Dogmas and socialistic formulæ are useless ; what is wanted is action.

It is needless to criticize syndicalism. The authors themselves admit that the theory may be unsound ; what they want is action. Action of the kind advocated would inevitably cause revolution. Wiser reformers among both employers and wage-earners recognize the community of interest that exists between labour and capital and this new sympathy is leading to new organizations. Syndicalism is destructive ; not constructive. The syndicalist has little idea of how the workers are to be organized after their victory over the middle and upper classes. The unfortunate thing is that syndicalism undoubtedly played a great part in instigating the extraordinary number of strikes which occurred in the decade before 1914.

5. THE TRUE END OF THE STATE

Why does the state exist ? This is one of the fundamental questions of Ethics and Political Science. The answers given to the question are manifold : each writer on the subject has his own solution. From the earliest days when thinkers began to speculate on civic life and conduct, attempts have been made to formulate a definite end for the state. Political Science is as old as Pericles, but the science of Pericles in most respects is very different from the science of to-day. History, the material of Political Science, is continually changing, and Political Science changes with it. Both the material of the science and the science itself are in a continuous process of evolution. History gives new experience and new experience implies new adaptations. The conditions of human life vary ; facts change and conflict. Political Science deals with what was, what is, and what ought to be. To the change of facts is added the change of ideals. Conflicting facts and ideals cannot but lead to occasional confusion in a science in which the subjects are often with very great difficulty reducible to a single formula.

To the ancients the state was an end in itself. Every detail of individual life was a matter of state control. The laws of the state related to the minutest particulars of everyday life. Individuals were not beings with separate personal rights ; they were mere parts of a state. The state

was the supreme fact of life, and the efforts and actions of individuals had to flow into it just as a river flows into the sea. It must be remembered that the Greeks

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Idea : the
State as
an End in
Itself**

made no distinction between state and society. Now we tend to regard the state more as a means towards the realization of an end than an end in itself ; this is based on a distinction latent in modern thought between state and society. Freedom again, to the Greeks, was not so much a political as a social matter. The political liberty of the Greeks made personal rights and interests completely subservient to the state, as exemplified by ostracism, an institution by which any one who was regarded as dangerous to the state was expelled from it. Such a political liberty is vastly different from modern political liberty. Aristotle, in distinguishing the various forms of government, divided them into normal and perverted, those with true ends, and those with false ends. Those with true ends existed, he said, for the well-being of the people as a whole ; those with perverted or false ends existed for the benefit of the governing class. False ends of this type have frequently been pursued in practice, though no state could exist with such a theory as its avowed basis. The whole course of history is marked by attempts of classes or sections to seize power for their own benefit. Up to modern times superior wealth or enlightenment has frequently enabled the higher classes, although relatively few in numbers, to guide the policy of the state to their own advantage. With the growth of democracy this tendency is rapidly disappearing ; in fact the lower classes, it is often said, are now seizing power for their own benefit.

Even when we have established a definite and satisfactory theory of the end of the state, it is by no means easy to decide how far any given policy is true to that end. Self-interest often blurs the good of the community in practice, even when the state is universally admitted to exist for the good of the whole, and not for any part or parts. The end of the state, again, has frequently been regarded as something with which the state is not itself concerned, at least not as an active agent. The end of the state is determined for it by an external power, such as the will of God or the forces of evolution. The state according to this view is an instrument in the hands of some

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Views**

force outside itself, in which the free-will of man has no determining power. The theocratic view of the state is an example. The Jewish theory was that the state existed to further the ends of the church, both being the creations of the will of God. Modern theory regards the state as a human institution, not an imposition of some external power. Its ends, therefore, are human ends.

Many theories of the end of the state are not so much false as partial. Writers, in their zeal to bring forward some essential ends of the state, have sometimes elevated partial into complete or final ends. This is particularly the case with writers of declared individualistic or socialistic tendencies.

Order or security we have already seen to be the central tenet of the individualistic school of thought. Though capable of a fairly wide interpretation, neither order nor security adequately represents the true end of the state. Security of person and property is indeed a primary essential for the well being of society, but as a complete end of the state the theory rests on an unsound basis. Some, indeed, hold that the preservation of order is essential to the continuance of the present scheme of things. To preserve the present, they say, at least guarantees that the future will be no worse than the present. On the other hand, however, we live in a world of imperfection where not even the most optimistic can find every arrangement satisfactory. To exclude the possibility of progress, as this view does, is not only a mistaken view of man and society, but opens the way to retrogression. Man as a moral agent works towards definite ends, but this theory regards man as static.

Progress cannot be regarded as an end. It is a process towards an end. We must determine the end in order to make progress possible.

Happiness has frequently been set down as the end of the state, particularly in the form of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The refutation of this theory belongs more properly to the realm of ethics. The theory is now discarded, but, although unsound, it had a profound influence on legislation, especially in breaking up the results of the laissez-faire theories. The theory itself, like the theory of laissez-faire, is individualistic. It regards society as merely an aggrega-

tion of units, each unit having so many feelings. Society, however, is an organic whole, not a mere sum of individuals. The theory again fails in the fact that although society is an organic unity, there is infinite diversity in the unity. No two individuals agree in their conception of happiness. There is no standard of happiness in the world, yet the theory would have the state judge what is greater or less happiness among the citizens. Happiness, further, is a very indefinite term. Happiness is not well-being. A pleasurable feeling in all the individuals of a given society is by no means a proof that that form of society is ideally perfect. Another objection to the theory is that the maximum happiness in any given society might coincide with a great deal of unhappiness for some—once granted that happiness can be measured.

As a rough expression of the ends of legislation this theory expresses valuable truths, and it deserves credit for the humanitarian legislation which it undoubtedly helped to bring about. Happiness is a natural aim: no one wishes to be unhappy. The theory is a common sense expression of the ends of legislation, but as a complete expression of the end of the state it breaks down on closer examination.

Utility has also been given as the end of the state. According to this view, every action of the government must be useful. As a rule every action is of use, but it must be useful for some end. Usefulness, like progress, implies something further. Utility confuses end and means.

Justice, which has frequently been given as an end of the state, is too narrow. Abstract justice excludes other departments of human life—such as the economic or intellectual life. Justice is more a condition dependent on the realization of the true end. Complete justice too involves absolute knowledge, which belongs only to God. If justice is too narrow, then morality, the Platonic notion of the end of the state, is too wide. The state can control only the overt actions of man. The dispositions and motives of the moral life are outside its scope. This theory is true inasmuch as the end of the state must be ethical.

It would be easy to compile other formulæ of the end of the state given by different writers or politicians. Many of them scarcely deserve consideration as they are frequently

no more than the casual statements of practical politicians. In the modern world, for example, democracy is sometimes held to be the end of the state. Others, followers of Plato, say that the rule of one, or ideal monarchy, is best. There is obviously confusion here between the end of the state and its organization : organization, whatever it may be, exists for a certain end ; to call the organization the end is to confuse means and end.

Other false or partial ends we have already dealt with. Liberty, a term with wide connotation, may be an end, but it is not the sole end. In other parts of this book we have seen how erroneous may be the ideas underlying certain aspects of liberty. The phrase Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, the watch-words of the French Revolution, has been given as an end, but its meaning is very indefinite. Equality we have dealt with in our analysis of Communism and Socialism. Fraternity, or brotherhood, is too vague a term to be of practical worth.

One other statement of the end of the state requires notice, viz., the nationalist. One of the best representatives of this view is the German political scientist, **The Nationalist View** Bluntschli. Not only does he clearly advance the nationalist view to the exclusion of all others, but, by reservations and qualifications, shows the inherent weakness of the theory. Let us examine Bluntschli's theory.

Bluntschli, after dismissing various theories as mistaken, gives his view in these words—"the development of the national capacities, the perfecting of the national life, and finally, its completion." He adds, as a qualification to his theory, "provided, of course, that the process of moral and political development shall not be opposed to the destiny of humanity." He goes on to say that "the life-task of every individual is to develop his capacities and manifest his essence. So, too, the duty of the state is to develop the latent powers of the nation and to manifest its capacities." The state has thus a double function, the maintenance of national powers, and their development : "it must secure the conquests of the past, and it must extend them in the future."

Bluntschli adopts this statement of the end of the state in preference to the public welfare, which was the Roman

view of the end of the state. He agrees that the Roman view is above criticism "if one regards the natural limits of the state, and especially the judicial order and administration, and if one avoids trespassing upon matters outside those limits, such as the free life of the individual and of religious communities." Public welfare is an indispensable element in the policy of every state, yet the expression is insufficient. In times of extraordinary crises the state has to risk its existence to save its honour. Belgium at the beginning of the Great War could have saved its citizens by accepting the conditions of Germany, yet Belgium preferred to fight for her honour. Bluntschli recognizes that certain states by weakness or corruption have no right to continue in independent existence. No unprejudiced German or Italian, he says, can regret the destruction of the petty states which led to their fusion into more important wholes. Yet Bluntschli does not consider that public welfare covers such cases, and he enunciates his nationalistic theory to cover the defects of the other.

The chief difficulty of Bluntschli's theory is contained in his proviso "provided that the process of moral and political development shall not be opposed to the destiny of humanity." The destiny of humanity is therefore a necessary condition of his state end. The development of national capacities is justifiable only in so far as it does not oppose the destiny of humanity. Obviously therefore the national end is not a final end, but only a relative or conditional end. The destiny of humanity is the end.

In Bluntschli's theory it is evident that there is a narrower end and a wider end. This division really depends on the distinction between state and society, a distinction which is becoming more and more marked in the modern world. In the Great War, when one might have expected the nationalist theory to be at its maximum, it was the wider end of humanity about which we heard most. The fight of Germany *versus* the rest of the world was a fight of social and ethical, as well as of political ideals. The future of humanity was regarded as more important than the future of any state. This brings out the objection to the individualistic tendency of the nationalistic theory. We have seen already that a proper view of the individual implies others as well as the

self. The state, regarded, as in the nationalistic theory, as the individual writ large, is open to the same objections as John Stuart Mill's theory of individuality. National individuality may develop selfishly to the detriment of society as a whole. The nation state may become self-centred or eccentric to the exclusion of more universal principles of development. This does not imply that national characteristics—such as we understand by "Americanism"—are bad; national diversity like individual diversity gives a fuller meaning to the social whole; but national development which endangers the whole of society, as seen in the pre-war German development, is undoubtedly bad.

In the modern world we are more and more tending to look beyond the boundaries of states for an ideal. International-

Professor Burgess's View is gradually replacing nationalism. The distinction of the state and society as a whole is becoming more and more marked. The Greeks

regarded the state as an end in itself: the ends of individuals or society had no place by themselves. The tendency in the modern world is the opposite, viz., to regard the state as a means. The state, however, is a necessary factor in social organization, and as such it has essential functions. Professor Burgess, of Columbia University, New York, definitely separates the ends of the state into three distinct parts—primary, secondary, and ultimate. This division is very largely accepted in modern Political Science as giving the most satisfactory solution to a vexed question.

Strictly speaking there can be only one *end*, the ultimate end, but for purposes of exposition the tripartite division of Professor Burgess is most useful.

The primary ends of the state are simply to secure the primary conditions of the ultimate end, which is the perfection of individuals and mankind as a whole, or simply, the free and full development of human life. This end may be realized in a world-state or among a humanity so perfect that state-forms are not necessary. As the human race is at present, individual states are necessary. The area of states is determined largely by the area which experience shows is compatible with self-government. The nation state must maintain order and security of person and property. This is essential before any progress to a higher end is possible. Stable government, giving security from external

attacks and internal disorder, is a pre-requisite of moral advancement.

Once stable government is secured, progress is possible. This progress must first take place in the nation, where the state, while securing the primary essentials, must remove all barriers which stand in the way of the realization of the highest type of life. The sphere of government in relation to the individual must be marked out. This will vary from state to state according as the primary ends have been achieved. The state will make room for the full and free development of the individual. The individual must be understood as the social individual living with others in a social whole. The independence of the state, leading often to much sacrifice of individual life, is justified from this point of view. It preserves its independence for the good of its subjects.

Any expression of the end of the state, to meet such various conditions, must be very general. No better expression has yet been formulated than Aristotle's dictum, "The state comes into being for the sake of mere life : it continues to exist for the sake of the good life."

6. CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

The enunciation of a vague formula of state ends is a very indefinite guide to giving a list of governmental functions. Government action means government interference, and we have seen the widely divergent views held by different thinkers on that point. To the divergence of theory is added divergence in practice. The extent and the effect of government action varies with the social and economic condition of different peoples. The growing complexity of political and economic relations makes it extremely difficult to say what government activity is justified and what is not. Not only in the world as a whole, but in each state, conditions are changing rapidly, and political regulation is apt to follow the line of least resistance more than any preconceived theory of state ends. The tendency is for government to take over more and more control—to be more collectivist than individualist. It is difficult to foretell the direction and result of many modern movements. Modern governments work on

the principle that interference is justified where government can predict the effects of governmental action, and where it can also predict the likely effects if no government interference takes place.

In classifying state functions certain broad lines of distinction are obvious, these lines being determined partly by a survey of the actual practice of existing civilized governments, and partly from the nature of the state itself.

First, there are the fundamental functions, necessary or indispensable, normal or constituent (for all these names have been used to designate them).

These are functions which each government must undertake to ensure the existence of the state. They include the maintenance of security, external and internal, of person and property. They have been variously termed fundamental, primary, original, necessary, essential, indispensable or normal functions.

Dr. Woodrow Wilson summarizes these as follow :—

President Wilson's Classification (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.

(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.

(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.

(5) The definition and punishment of crime.

(6) The administration of justice in civil causes.

(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.

Secondly, there is the vast number of functions which, though not necessary to the existence of the state, are

actually undertaken by the majority of modern civilized governments. Dr. Woodrow Wilson lumps them together under the term ministrant. These ministrant functions vary from state to state according to the prevailing opinions and conditions of the people. Dr. Woodrow Wilson sums them up under the following heads:—

President Wilson's Classification (1) The regulation of trade and industry. Under this head he includes the coinage of money and the establishment of standard weights and measures, laws against forestalling and engrossing, the licensing of trades, etc., as well as the great matters of tariffs, navigation laws, and such like.

(2) The regulation of labour.

(3) The maintenance of thoroughfares,—including state management of railways and that group of undertakings which we embrace within the comprehensive term “internal improvement”.

(4) The maintenance of postal and telegraph systems, which is very similar in principle to (3).

(5) The manufacture and distribution of gas, the maintenance of water-works, etc.

(6) Sanitation, including the regulation of trades for sanitary purposes.

(7) Education.

(8) Care of the poor and incapable.

(9) Care and cultivation of forests and like matters, such as the stocking of rivers with fish.

(10) Sumptuary laws, such as “prohibition” laws.

The extent to which the above list of functions is undertaken by government varies from country to country. So also does the type of control. State-railways, for example, are directly managed by the government; but government may control railways by letting them to private companies on stipulated terms or by stringent regulation. Only a detailed analysis of all modern institutions would give a satisfactory answer to this question.

To sum up, it is clear that it is impossible to fix any

definite line of interference over which government should not step. Circumstances vary so much from one country to another that what is regarded as justifiable interference in one might be justly resented in another. National exigencies, again, may lead to government interference in a way which few would approve of in normal times. In the Great European War, for example, government was accepted as the one managing agent in the vast complex of military, economic and intellectual life by individualist and socialist alike.

Some of the theories examined above, however unsound, have served their day and generation well, for example, the individualistic theory; but the police duty, as the chief function of the state, is now generally rejected. The furtherance of literature, the encouragement of art and invention are now regarded as normal government functions; while the increasing complexity of social and economic life is demanding more and more a moderating authority. In spite of this, liberty is not diminishing, but growing. An increase in legislation does not involve a decrease of freedom; experience has amply demonstrated in the last century that legislation is necessary to remove barriers to progress. With the extension of the powers of the people in both local and central government, legislation merely expresses their will. Laws are largely self-imposed, a fact which surely is the realization in large part of the ideal of liberty.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN

1. HISTORICAL

To understand the present form of government in the United Kingdom, the student must have a grasp of the historical conditions and institutions which have preceded it. No modern government has had a more continuous development than the British.

**General
Remarks**

At the present time, when dynasties have been driven out or have fled, when sudden revolutions have upset both political and social structures, the British constitution stands secure. Amid the shifting sands of reconstruction following the Great War, the British kingship has remained as firm as a rock. The explanation of this lies in the gradual evolution of British political institutions and in the firm basis which these institutions have given to individual freedom. Modern British political institutions, therefore, can be appreciated only by a study of the relations they bear to their historical antecedents.

The first noteworthy stage of development is the Anglo-Saxon period, prior to the Norman conquest. During this period England was divided into several independent kingdoms. After the Romans withdrew from Britain, the new conquerors, the Jutes, Angles, and Saxons established their own forms of government. The Roman organization did not last as it did in France. The Teutonic invaders gathered together in communities similar to those they had left in Germany. But their life was largely a life of war. Not only had they to defeat the indigenous Britons, but the kingdoms had a long struggle for supremacy among themselves. From this arises the characteristic nature of the Anglo-Saxon kingship. The king originally was a war leader. He was both king and general. At first there were as many kings as there were armies; or rather war-bands. As the stronger armies

**The Anglo-Saxon
Period**

subdued the weaker many of the smaller "kingdoms" disappeared, till at last one of the kingdoms, Wessex, the kingdom of Alfred the Great, became supreme over England. As far as we can judge, the Anglo-Saxon kingship was partly hereditary and partly elective. It was also sacred and patriarchal. Kings were elected by the chief men of the tribe or kingdom, but election was confined as a rule to one family, which was looked on as sacred. As the king was also war leader, the king elected had to be an able general, so that the eldest son was not necessarily elected to succeed his father. The king acted in consultation with the elders. He was military leader, final executive authority, and also final judge. His judgments, or "dooms", were both laws and judicial decisions.

Associated with the king was the Council of Wise Men or Witenagemot. This Witenagemot is the ultimate origin of the modern Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Witenagemot had no regular constitution. It was summoned at the king's will, and, as far as we can judge, it was composed of the chief men of the time—the king's relations, the chief officers of the government, the leaders of the army, the church dignitaries, and the greater landed proprietors, or thegns. There was no election: the members were summoned by the king. The Witenagemot met at irregular intervals, about three or four times a year. It made laws, imposed taxes, made appointments, and also heard cases. It elected the king and could also depose him, so that from the earliest days in English constitutional history the head of the executive was to some extent responsible to the legislature. The actual powers exercised by the Witenagemot depended largely on the king. A strong king acted largely by himself; but the formal meetings of the Council of the Wise Men kept alive at least the idea of constitutional government.

Another permanent contribution of the pre-Norman days to the English government was the system of local administration. The early communities were organized in townships, boroughs, hundreds, and shires. The township was the smallest unit of administration. It comprised the village, with its arable lands, woods, etc. Its central organization was the town-moot, or town meeting, which was attended by all freemen.

**Local
Adminis-
tration**

in the area. The chief officer of the town-moot was the reeve. The borough was similar to the township, only its area was wider. The hundred was a collection of townships. There was a hundred-moot, which is important historically as it contained the germs of representative government. It was composed of the reeve, some clergy, and the "four best men" of each township and borough. The chief official of the hundred was the hundred man, who was sometimes elected and sometimes nominated by the chief local landowner. The hundred-moot met once a month, and transacted civil, criminal, and ecclesiastical business. Above the hundred was the shire, the head of which was the ealdorman, who was appointed by the king and Witenagemot. Under him was the shire-reeve (sheriff), who later became the chief official. The shire-moot was presided over by the ealdorman, or by the bishop, the bishop's diocese or area being the same as that of the shire. The shire-moot theoretically was composed of all the freemen of the shire, but they usually acted through representatives. The reeves as a rule acted as the representatives. The shire-moot was really a mixed assembly—partly representative, partly primary. It transacted shire business, civil, criminal and ecclesiastical.

With the Norman Conquest a complete change came over the administrative system in England. The feudal system had developed during the earlier period and now the feudalization of England was complete. The king became supreme. Local liberties and privileges were abolished. All the administration was centralized in the king. The ealdorman of the shire was abolished and his place taken by the shire-reeve or sheriff, who was the direct agent of the king. William the Conqueror confiscated large tracts of land, and gave them to Norman nobles on the feudal basis. The local feudal landlords or barons administered their own areas. The townships, boroughs, and hundreds lost their previous powers. Baronial courts took their place.

The centralization of authority in the king made a more complete organization of the central government necessary. William organized two great departments—the department of justice and the department of finance. These were presided over by members of the royal family, who had the services

of expert officials. The head of the department of justice was the Lord Chancellor; the head of the finance department, or Exchequer, was the Treasurer. The principal officials of these departments formed one body of officials, viz., the Permanent Council. They were known as barons of the Exchequer or as Justices, according to their duties. These departments form the foundation of the modern departments.

King William claimed to be king not by conquest, but by succession and natural right. Accordingly, he tried to follow the customs of the people. He was elected king in accordance with ancient custom. He continued the Witenagemot but under a new name and with a completely altered character. The new council was known as the *magnum* or *commune concilium* (Great, or Common Council). The membership was regulated according to feudal usage. The tenants-in-chief of the king, along with the chief ecclesiastics (archbishops, bishops, and abbots) were entitled to attend. Latterly the ecclesiastics attended not because of their position in the church, but because of their tenure of land. Land ownership was the basis on which the Great Council was constituted. From the Great Council, in the course of time, developed the modern Parliament, Cabinet and Courts of Law.

The Great Council is the direct forerunner of Parliament. It met three times a year, but, as the work of administration is continuous, the king found it necessary to choose an inner council of permanent officials—**The Permanent Council** leading ecclesiastics and barons: this was the Permanent Council. It had no fixed composition. The king chose those whom he considered most fitted to give advice and carry on the work of the realm. The Council was smaller than the Great Council, and was always at hand to advise and to perform administrative work. Its powers were practically the powers of the king: it was the central legislative, executive and judicial body of the realm. It was the instrument for carrying out the king's will.

The Permanent Council gradually split up into smaller bodies, and these ultimately superseded the parent body. In course of time it became the Privy Council, and ultimately the Cabinet. The king used to summon to the Council lawyers, and others specially qualified for particular kinds

of work. The lawyers and those whose duties were mainly financial gradually split off from the rest of the Council and formed distinct courts, according to the particular type of function they performed. Thus there arose: (a) The Court of the Exchequer, which had jurisdiction over Crown finances; (b) The Court of Common Pleas, which dealt with civil cases between subject and subject; (c) The Court of the King's Bench, the nominal president of which was the king. This court had jurisdiction over cases not assigned to other courts; (d) The Court of Chancery, the president of which was the Chancellor. It dealt with equity cases. These judicial committees were co-ordinate in authority. Appeal lay from them to the King in Council.

In the meantime the Great Council was slowly developing into what it finally became, viz., the English legislature.

Development of the Permanent Council After the reign of William the Conqueror the course of constitutional growth was marked by only minor incidents till the Great Charter of 1215. The first incident of note was the guarantee of the liberties of his subjects in 1100 by King Henry I. This proclamation was issued as a result of the arbitrary and unjust administration of his brother, William II. (Rufus). In it he promised to observe the laws of King Edward (the Confessor), as amended by William the Conqueror, and to give justice to all. Henry I. reorganized and strengthened the administrative system of his father: hence he has been called the father of the English bureaucracy. But he also gave liberal charters of self-government to towns such as London; thus also he is the father of English municipal government. Henry I.'s organization was still further developed by Henry II., who had to clear up the legacy of anarchy left by King Stephen. Henry II. is notable for having introduced the jury system, for having appointed professional administrators instead of landowners as sheriffs, for his introduction of scutage or money payment in place of military service, and for his frequent summoning of, and the definite position he gave to, the Great Council. His successor, Richard I., still further strengthened the monarchy, but the next king, John, represents the extreme limit of royal power. Unpopular with all classes because of his territorial losses in France,

and especially unpopular with the barons and clergy for his high-handed treatment of them, he had to concede to these barons and clergy, who also represented popular feeling, the famous Great Charter of 1215.

The Great Charter contained sixty-three clauses, many of which were demands for the redress of temporary and minor grievances. Many of its clauses recount the feudal rights of the barons and demand redress for wrongful exactions. One clause, for example, demands that the king's court shall not encroach on the baronial courts. The clauses which are of first importance in English constitutional history are those dealing with the general government of England. There is to be no taxation without the consent of the Great Council, which is to consist of all barons, who are to be summoned by individual writs, and of all smaller tenants-in-chief who are to be called by a general summons by the sheriff. The Great Council thus is a purely feudal body, for the sub-tenants and townspeople were not taken into account. A large number of clauses deal with the administration of justice. The royal courts are to be permanently situated in Westminster; no man is to be tried or punished more than once for the same offence; no one can be kept in prison without trial, and the trial must be within a reasonable time, before a jury of his equals. Other clauses deal with the freedom of the church and the means proposed to make King John observe the Charter.

King John, in 1213, had tried to secure the support of the middle classes by summoning four "discreet men" from every shire to a Council (which never met) at Oxford. The interest of this attempt of John is that it revived the representative idea which had existed in the old shire-moot, but had been lost in the centralized feudal monarchy of the Normans. The practice of electing assessors for property valuation prior to tax assessments, and of electing jurors for criminal cases before the King's Court had kept the idea alive, but it was the affirmation of the principle of taxation-by-consent in the Charter that gave the first real impetus to representative government. The historical stages of development are marked by (1) Simon de Montfort's Parliament, in 1265, and (2) Edward I.'s Parlia-

The Great Charter

**The Representative Idea :
The Rise of Parliament**

ment of 1295. In Montfort's Parliament the barons, clergy, and four knights from each shire were summoned. He also summoned two citizens from each city and two burgesses from each borough. This was the first time that the representatives of towns were brought into touch with the old feudal nobility. To Edward I.'s "Model" Parliament of 1295, about 400 members were summoned. Along with the high ecclesiastics, the earls, barons and knights, citizens and burgesses were summoned as in Montfort's Parliament, and the lesser clergy were represented by proctors. Both Montfort and Edward I. summoned these parliaments as temporary political expedients, but after Edward's time the system became a normal one, and in the next century Parliament assumed its modern form. As in contemporary France, there were three distinct "Estates" or classes—the nobles, clergy, and commons. In France these Estates deliberated separately, in three houses. In England the Estates originally decided their respective amounts of subsidy separately; but they never definitely split into three chambers. Gradually the lesser clergy withdrew from Parliament and formed a separate ecclesiastical body of their own, known as Convocation. The greater clergy and the greater barons combined and formed a single House, the House of Lords. The lesser barons, the knights, citizens of the towns and burgesses joined and formed the House of Commons. Thus, by the middle of the fourteenth century, Parliament was divided into the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the form that it still preserves.

During the century following the Model Parliament, the fourteenth, the powers of Parliament became more definite. Two things in particular were established—first, the principle that the crown could not impose taxes without its consent, and second, that Parliament had the actual power of imposing taxes. These financial powers are important, as from them grew the definitely legislative powers of Parliament. As a legislative assembly, Parliament was at first only advisory. Laws were made by the king with the *assent* of the magnates, and at the *request* of the commoners. But Parliament seized the financial power, and the assertion of its power in course of time secured for it the initiative in legislation, leaving the power of veto or assent with the king. In

**Growth of
Power of
Parliament**

Edward II.'s reign, the king, earls, barons, and commons (i.e., king, lords, and commons) were theoretically looked on as equal in legislative power; but as yet actually the Commons had no power of initiation. They were only "petitioners". In Henry VI.'s reign the Commons secured the right of initiating legislation equally with the Lords.

During the Tudor and Stuart periods England passed from absolutism to constitutional government. The process was marked by a severe struggle, culminating in the death of one king and the expulsion of another. But, in spite of the Great Rebellion and the Revolution, the continuity of development was not broken. There was no sudden and complete change as in the French Revolution. There were many notable events and notable laws and documents, but, gradually and securely, the actual machinery of government moulded itself according to the needs of the nation, without any sudden break.

**Tudor and
Stuart
Periods**

The Tudor period, from 1485-1603, was a period of absolute rule. The absolutism was both necessary and popular. The many wars of the time required strong executive government, and they also raised the national spirit. The Tudor monarchs were strong; they acted at times in the most absolute manner, but they were popular. Their executive government prevented the rapid development of Parliament. Nevertheless much internal legislation was passed, and the general progress of that age is marked by the fact that the Elizabethan period was the most prolific in literature in the whole range of English history.

**The Tudor
Period**

The Tudor tradition of executive government, with disregard for Parliament, was carried on by the first two Stuart Kings—James I. and Charles I.—but the struggle between the royal power and Parliament now became acute. James I. came from Scotland and did not understand the spirit of the Tudor monarchy or of the English people. He was a believer in the "divine right" of kings. Moreover, the need for strong central government had passed. During his reign he had five Parliaments with each of which he quarrelled. He disregarded the legislative power of Parliament by issuing royal proclamations which had the force of law. He exacted taxes without the consent

**The Stuart
Period**

of Parliament, which had come to regard itself as the source of supply, and during his reign it insisted on the formula "Redress before Supply." James laid the basis for the troubles of his son, Charles I., who dissolved his first Parliament for being over-critical and the second because it threatened to impeach his minister, Buckingham. His third Parliament presented the famous Petition of Right, one of the most important of English constitutional documents. For a long period—eleven years—Charles ruled without a Parliament. In 1640, he summoned, and dissolved, the Short Parliament. The Short Parliament was followed in the same year by the Long Parliament, which drew up the Grand Remonstrance. In 1642, civil war started, and in 1649 Charles I. was beheaded. After the Rebellion came the Commonwealth, with the Instrument of Government as a written constitution, the earliest constitution of its kind in Europe. From parliamentary government England passed again to absolutism under Cromwell. From the Cromwellian system the country gladly reverted to monarchy. Charles II. did not revive the unpopular institutions of his father and grandfather, but towards the end of his reign, he felt himself more powerful, and in many cases acted on his own initiative, without the consent of Parliament. The culmination of the struggle was the Revolution, which caused the abdication of Charles's brother and successor, James II. The Revolution was followed by the Declaration of Right and the Bill of Rights, two of the fundamental documents of the English constitution.

During this long period the House of Lords and House of Commons were gradually assuming their present form. In the fourteenth century the composition of neither house was clearly defined. At first, only the lords spiritual and lords temporal who received a writ could attend the House of Lords. The issuing of the writ depended on the royal will. Gradually the principle came to be recognized that a lord once summoned was always summoned, and that on his death his eldest son was summoned in his stead. In the course of time the temporal lords became more important than the spiritual lords (archbishops, bishops, and abbots). They were superior in numbers, and the principle of heredity (which of course did not apply to the spiritual lords) kept

**Develop-
ment of
Parliament**

up their numbers. By the closing of the monasteries, too, the abbots were excluded. At the beginning of the Tudor period there were about three hundred members of the House of Commons. By a statute of 1430 the privilege of election was confined to freeholders in counties whose land had a yearly rental of forty shillings (now equal to about sixty pounds). This system continued till the Reform Act of 1832. In the towns or burghs there was no uniform system. In some, all ratepayers had the right to vote; in others, only a few could vote; in others, election was by guilds or by landholders. The representation in the House of Commons increased largely. In Elizabeth's reign above sixty-two new boroughs were added. Wales was also added to England for purposes of representation. The number of sittings became more frequent, and the permanence of Parliament was more fully recognized. Parliamentary Journals were started. The most marked feature of all was the independence of sentiment shown by the House of Commons.

In spite of these developments in its constitution, the Tudor and Stuart kings exercised a very effective control over Parliament. By the issue of proclamations, nominally with the advice of the Privy Council, they were able to command a source of legislation independent of Parliament. Some of them also claimed the rights to dispense with or to suspend laws (the Dispensing and Suspending Powers). Parliament voted supplies, i.e., provided money for the Crown, but the Crown had large independent sources of revenue in the Crown revenues and the taxes which were voted permanently at the beginning of a reign. Parliament was also at a disadvantage by having irregular meetings, by the Crown managing the elections in its own interest, and by the domination of its business by the chief officials.

But the most notable of all features of government during the Tudor and Stuart periods was the government by Council—in fact, this period has been called the period of government by Council. The chief of these Councils was the Privy Council, which, as we have seen, was an inner body of the Permanent Council. The Permanent Council became too large for its purpose, and the king chose a few members of the Council

for private advice. The members of the Privy Council originally were members of Parliament, but they were not responsible to Parliament. The members of the Council were mainly laymen. At first the Council was advisory, but with the first two Stuart kings it came to control all the administration; it represented the king. It supervised and controlled administration, and issued proclamations and ordinances. With the king as president it was also the supreme tribunal. As such, it was mainly appellate in character, though it could assume original powers if it so wished. Its judicial functions were the direct outcome, through the Permanent Council, of the judicial prerogatives which belonged to the earlier kings when sitting in their Great Council. The judicial functions of the Privy Council have remained to the present day; its executive functions have long since passed to the Cabinet or become purely nominal.

Many other Councils arose from the Privy Council. Two of them became notorious in the struggles of Crown *versus* Parliament—the Court of the Star Chamber, which arrogated to itself the judicial functions of the Privy Council, chiefly for the trial of important persons, whose trials could not be entrusted to the ordinary courts, and the Court of High Commission. These Courts or Councils gave considerable impetus to the anti-royal movement. Other Councils were the Council of the North and the Council of Wales.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the English Parliament was structurally the same as it is to-day. Some of the fundamental principles of the modern constitutional system had also been established. The chief of these was the legislative supremacy of the King, House of Lords and House of Commons, or, technically, the King-in-Parliament. The gradual loss of power by the Crown, the gradual rise in importance of the House of Commons as compared with the House of Lords, were the chief developments of the succeeding centuries. The chief landmarks in the rise of the House of Commons were the Septennial Act of 1716, which ensured long and regular sessions; the complete financial control of the House, culminating in the Parliament Act of 1911; the extension of the franchise, which made the House of Commons a real

**Early 17th
Century**

organ of the popular will; the predominance of Walpole, the first Prime Minister, and the rise of the Cabinet with its responsibility to the House of Commons alone; the Union of Parliaments between England and Scotland in 1707; and the Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. The scope of each of the Houses was extended, but these unions made no material difference to their constitutional position.

Till 1832, when the First Reform Act was passed, the House of Commons represented only the higher classes. As yet it was not a popular house. By the five Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, 1885, 1918 and 1928 the whole basis of representation was changed, so that now the British Parliament rests on an electoral basis very near to general adult suffrage. The general system of the franchise is mentioned later.

We have seen how from the Great Council arose an inner council, the Permanent Council, and how from that inner council arose another inner council, the Privy Council. These smaller or inner councils arose from the same cause—the need of unity and privacy in the despatch of public business. Large councils are useless for executive work. They lack unity and quickness. As soon as the councils became too large, inner councils were formed. The Privy Council, like the other councils, became too large to serve its purpose. Its membership was not only indefinite, but the title “Privy Councillor” was conferred on individuals as a mark of distinction. From the Privy Council arose another inner council, which in course of time became the central fact of English political life. That body was the Cabinet.

The immediate predecessor of the cabinet was the “Cabal” of Charles II. Charles found the Privy Council too large for the conduct of public business, and selected a few leading men, usually called his “favourites”, as an inner secret council. As far back as Henry III.’s time there had been similar favourites, but Charles II. definitely chose the “Cabal” as his Council for the sake of “secrecy and despatch” in public business. The name “Cabal” was taken from the first letters of the names of the favourites (Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale). They met in a small room, or

“ cabinet ” ; hence the name cabinet, which was given at first in derision. At first the cabinet was chosen by the Crown and had no authority apart from the Privy Council, but latterly it completely superseded the Privy Council save for its judicial functions.

The growth of real power of the cabinet dates from the rise of political parties in England. This subject has already been discussed in connection with party government. Under William III., the cabinet contained members of both the political parties of the time (Whigs and Tories). William found that he could not rule with such a cabinet ; so he chose a cabinet composed of the leading members of only one party, the Whigs. This was the first cabinet of the modern type. The development of the present cabinet was furthered by the system which grew up under the first Hanoverian king, George I. Knowing no English and being unacquainted with English political life, George I. left matters largely in the hands of Walpole, who may be called the first English Prime Minister. At the end of the eighteenth century the following principles of cabinet government had been established : (a) that the members of the cabinet should be members of either the House of Lords or House of Commons ; (b) that they should hold the same political views, i.e., be members of the same political party ; (c) that they should command a majority in the House of Commons, i.e., be members of the party-in-power ; (d) that they should have a common policy ; (e) that they should be responsible to the House of Commons as a body, i.e., that they should resign in a body if the policy of any minister were defeated in the House of Commons ; (f) that they should all be subordinate to the Prime Minister.

These are substantially the principles of modern cabinet government. During the Great War the size of the cabinet brought about a repetition of the process by which the cabinet itself was formed. An inner “ War Cabinet ” of three or four members was formed. During the war party differences largely disappeared, and a Coalition ministry was formed representative of all parties. The supporters of the Coalition practically became a party by themselves, so that the system of a party-in-power continued. The Prime Minister, too, went outside the Houses of Parliament for members of his war ministry, but these ministers sought election as members of the House of Commons as soon as

opportunity offered. With the disappearance of the Coalition government after the dissolution of Parliament in 1922, the normal working of the cabinet was resumed.

The cabinet, it must be noted, is unknown to the law of England. It is an extra-legal body; none the less it is the pivot of both the legislative and the executive branches of English administration.

2. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The British constitution, as we have already seen in the chapter on the Constitution, is flexible and is the only example of its kind now in existence. There is no definite document known as the British constitution; nevertheless the constitution exists.

The British Constitution

It is made up of many elements. First, there are documents, some of which have been passed as laws by the ordinary legislative processes, such as the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Libel Act, the Reform Acts, the Septennial and Quinquennial Acts, the Elections Acts, the Parliament Act of 1911, the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922. There are also summaries or statements of constitutional practice, such as *Magna Charta* and the *Petition of Right*. Second, there is a vast amount of Common law material, matters of legal precept or of custom, written or unwritten. Third, there are treaties and international agreements which are binding on the British government. Fourth, there are the conventions of the constitution, that is, understandings or practices which have grown up gradually, but which have never been embodied in statute law. As a flexible constitution, the constitution can be amended by the ordinary process of legislation. There is no distinction, save in content, between constitutional and ordinary laws.

The supreme legislative power in Great Britain, indeed in the British Empire, is vested in the King-in-Parliament, that is, the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons. Parliament is summoned by the writ of the Sovereign issued on the advice of the Privy Council, at least twenty days before its assembling.

The Legislature

Parliament consists of two Houses, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The House of Lords is one of the oldest second chambers in existence. It has changed very little in its constitution since its origin, though several attempts have been made in recent years to alter it. Its composition and numbers have changed. There are at present five groups of members—1. Princes of the Blood Royal. They have technically the right to attend; actually they do not attend. 2. Peers who sit by hereditary right. These include three types—(a) English peers, the creation of whose peerage dates before 1707 (the Union of Parliaments between England and Scotland); (b) Peers of Great Britain, created between 1707 and 1801 (the date of the union with Ireland); and (c) Peers of the United Kingdom. Peers are created by the King, on the advice of the Prime Minister. Peerages, save law peerages, are hereditary. Every peer can sit in the House of Lords in virtue of his peerage, whether he be British born, colonial born, or Indian born. Peers are of five grades—duke, marquis, earl, viscount, and baron. 3. Scottish peers, of whom sixteen are elected for the duration of Parliament. 4. Irish peers, twenty-eight of whom are elected for life. Irish peers may sit for English (not Irish or Scottish) constituencies as members of the House of Commons, whereas Scottish peers or peers of the United Kingdom cannot become members for any constituency. 5. Peers who sit by right of office. These are not hereditary. Of these there are two classes—(a) The Law Lords. The House of Lords is the highest court of appeal in England, and by special Acts provision is made for the creation of a number of Law Lords. These are always eminent lawyers. They are presided over by the Chancellor for the conduct of legal business. (b) The Lords Spiritual—the archbishops and certain bishops of the church of England. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester are always members. Twenty-one other bishops are members, in order of seniority.

Members must be at least twenty-one years of age; they must not be aliens, felons, or bankrupts. If a peer dies, his successor must become a member of the House of Lords. If he happens to be a member of the House of Commons before he succeeds to the peerage, he becomes a member of

the House of Lords when he succeeds to his peerage, whether he wishes or not.

The House of Commons consists of members representing county, borough, and university constituencies in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The franchise arrangements used to be very complicated, but they have been simplified by the Representation of the People Act, 1918, and the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, 1928. The Act of 1918 revised and extended the previous franchise law; several millions of new voters were added, and women were first admitted to the franchise by it. The 1928 Act, which covered local government as well as Parliamentary elections, amended and extended the provisions of the 1918 Act, its special feature being the admission of women to the franchise on the same terms as men. The qualifications for the franchise are now as follows:—Any person is entitled to be registered as a Parliamentary elector who is twenty-one years of age, and is not subject to any legal incapacity. Every elector must have a residential or business qualification, or must be the husband or wife of a person having a business-premises qualification. To have a residential qualification, a person must actually inhabit the premises; in other words, he must have his regular home in the constituency, and a person is not registrable as an elector unless he has resided in the constituency for a qualifying period of three months. The business-premises qualification arises from the occupancy of business-premises of the annual value of not less than ten pounds. There is also a university franchise, the qualification for which is that, before registration as an elector, a person must be of full age, and have received a university degree, or, in the case of women, the equivalent of a degree.

Every voter must be registered, and every registered elector may vote at an election. No person may vote at a general election for more than two constituencies. The "plural vote" used to be allowed, that is, an individual could vote in as many constituencies as he wished, provided he held the necessary electoral qualifications. According to the 1928 Act, if a person votes in two constituencies, in one of those he must have a residential qualification; in the other he must have a different qualification, and each vote must be recorded in a different constituency.

Two registers of electors are prepared every year (one only in Northern Ireland), the expenses being met half by the central government, and half by local funds. University registers are kept by the universities and a fee not exceeding one pound may be charged for registration. In university constituencies having more than one member, proportional representation (each elector having one transferable vote) holds. All elections, at a general election, are held on the same day, save in certain scattered constituencies. Previously, elections were on different days, a fact which enabled plural voters to vote in various constituencies. Absent voters are allowed, under certain conditions, to vote by proxy.

The basis of representation in Great Britain is one representative for every 70,000 of the population, and one for 43,000 in Ireland. The total membership of the House of Commons is 615, including thirteen members from Northern Ireland. By the Representation of the People Act, 1918, the numbers were raised from 670, as established in 1885, to 707. The reduction in numbers was due to the establishment of separate legislatures in Ireland.

No one under twenty-one years of age can be a member of Parliament. Ministers of the Church of England, the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church are ineligible for membership. Government contractors, sheriffs, returning officers in the localities in which they act, are also ineligible. English peers and Scottish peers cannot become members, though non-representative Irish peers are eligible. Aliens, bankrupts, lunatics, felons, idiots and persons under age have no vote. Peers also have no vote. Members of the House of Commons, other than those who have paid posts as Ministers or as officers of the King's household, are paid £400 per annum. Members of the House of Lords are not paid.

A new parliament means a new House of Commons. Dissolving parliament means dissolving the House of Commons and holding new elections. The abbreviation **Electoral Procedure** M.P. (Member of Parliament) applies only to members of the House of Commons. Elections do not apply to the House of Lords. Parliaments are dissolved and summoned by the King. Election writs are issued by the Chancellor of Great Britain to returning officers, who conduct the elections according to the Ballot

Act of 1872. The returning officer gives notice of the day and place of election. On the election day candidates are nominated, and, if there is no contest, are declared elected. If there is a contest a polling or voting day is fixed. The voting is by secret ballot. All elections are now on the same day, save in constituencies where it is physically impossible for the people to vote on one day. After the counting of the votes the writ of election is endorsed with a certificate of election by the returning officer and sent to the clerk of the Crown in Chancery.

The expenses of election to candidates are usually heavy. Sometimes they are borne by party funds; sometimes the candidate has to pay them himself. At one time a candidate could expend as much as he wished during the election: but elections are now regulated by the Ballot Act and the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. These Acts prevent as far as possible bribery and the exercise of wrong influences over voters. Seven kinds of bribery are set forth, with heavy penalties. A sliding scale of election expenses, according to the type of constituency, is laid down, and candidates must have a responsible agent who keeps an account of all the candidate's expenditure, and sends it within a given period to the returning officer.

Till 1911 the maximum duration of a parliament was seven years. The Parliament Act of 1911 fixed the period at five years. Parliament as legislative sovereign could extend itself as long as it pleased, but only during the War, when it was not considered advisable to hold elections, did it extend the period.

The quorum of the House is forty and is decided by a curious procedure. If there is no quorum, an hour glass on the clerk's table is allowed to run its course (two minutes), and if at the expiry of the two minutes there still is no quorum, the sitting adjourns.

To help in the transaction of business, there are Committees of five kinds—(1) A committee of the Whole, (2) Select Committees on Public Bills, (3) Sessional Committees, (4) Standing Committees on Public Bills, and (5) Committees on Private Bills. A Committee of the Whole is simply the whole House presided over by the Chairman of Committees instead of by the Speaker, with special, less formal rules for discussion.

**Duration
of Parlia-
ment**

**Com-
mittees**

When the subject is the provision of revenue, the Committee of the whole is known as the Committee of Ways and Means ; when the subject is appropriations of revenue to the heads of expenditure, it is known as the Committee of Supply. Select Committees consist of fifteen members, selected by the House, or, more usually, by a Committee of Selection representative of all parties. Select Committees investigate, and report on given subjects. They take evidence, keep proceedings, and make their report, after which they automatically cease. When Select Committees are appointed for the whole session, such as the Committee of Selection, and the Committee on Public Accounts, they are known as Sessional Committees. Standing Committees are appointed to save the time of the House. They consist of some sixty to eighty members, nominated by the Committee of Selection. The Chairman is appointed by a smaller committee, or "panel," nominated by the Committee of Selection. All bills, save money bills, private bills and bills for confirming provisional orders must pass through Standing Committees, unless the House otherwise directs. The Standing Committees are approximately of the same party composition as the House. Committees on private Bills are appointed in a similar way to consider private bills. They usually consist of four members of the House and a disinterested referee as chairman.

The Houses of Parliament are situated in Westminster, London. The annual session of Parliament used to extend from the middle of February to about the middle of August, but since the War, owing to the pressure of business, the session has sometimes been longer. Both Houses are summoned together, but they may adjourn separately. The Crown cannot compel either to adjourn. Each session ends with a prorogation to a specified date.

**Organi-
zation of
Parlia-
ment** The opening of Parliament is accompanied with great ceremonial, much of which is unintelligible save on historical grounds. The members assemble first in their own House. Then the members of the Commons proceed to the House of Lords, where the Lord Chancellor informs them that they may proceed to the election of a Speaker. They elect a Speaker, then return to the Lords, where the Speaker's appointment is sanctioned by the Crown through the Lord

Chancellor. The ancient privileges of the Commons are affirmed, after which the Commons return to their own House. Then the oaths are administered, and next day comes the King's speech. The real business of the House begins after the King's speech.

The chief officials of the House of Commons are the Speaker, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (of Committees), the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms and Chaplain. The last three are permanent officials. The Clerk, with his assistants, records the proceedings of the House, signs all orders, and generally conducts the secretarial work of the House. The Sergeant-at-Arms, with his deputies, attends the Speaker, enforces the orders of the House, and performs other such duties.

The Speaker, whose name comes from the days when the House of Commons was a petitioning body, acting through a spokesman or "Speaker," is elected by the House for the duration of Parliament. He is not a party official. The man chosen is usually a member of experience who commands the respect in the House irrespective of his party ties. He presides over the House, and, as president, interprets the rules of the House, guides debates, announces the result of decisions, decides on points of order, and advises the House, or members, on matters not covered by law or precedent. He gives advice to members of any party on procedure. He votes in the case of a tie only. By the Parliament Act of 1911 he decides whether a bill is a money bill. He is paid £5,000 per annum, with an official house. As a rule a man elected Speaker continues in his post as long as he wishes, and on retiral he usually receives a peerage.

The House of Lords does not meet so frequently, nor does it sit so long as the House of Commons. Its sessions run concurrently with those of the House of Commons. The legal quorum of the House of Lords is three: actually no business is done unless at least thirty members are present. The president of the House is the Lord Chancellor, who is a member of the Cabinet and the head of the judiciary. He is a party official, but, unlike the Speaker, he does not guide debates. The Lords regulate their own debates. This is shown by the prefatory "My Lords" at the begin-

**Organi-
zation of the
House of
Commons**

**The House
of Lords**

ning of every speech in the House. In the House of Commons the members address the Speaker—"Mr. Speaker, Sir," being the formal beginning of all speeches. The Lord Chancellor may vote in ordinary divisions. He has no casting vote. The Lord Chancellor need not even be a peer, though in practice he usually is. The theory is that the "woolsack" is not in the House proper, so that the Lord Chancellor sits outside. In the case of the trial of a peer, a Lord High Steward appointed by the Crown presides. The House of Lords has also a Lord Chairman of Committees who presides in the Committee of the Whole, which is similar to the Committee of the Whole in the House of Commons. The permanent staff (Clerk of Parliament, Sergeant-at-Arms, Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, who summons the House of Commons) are nominated by the Crown.

Certain general principles in the legislative process must be borne in mind. In the first place, any measure may be brought before Parliament. Second, the normal process of a bill is that it passes through each House, and is signed by the King, after which a bill becomes an Act of Parliament. Third, bills (except money bills), may be introduced in either House by ministers or private members. Money bills must originate in the House of Commons, and bills of attainder must originate in the House of Lords. Private members' bills are presented by private members, but, unless adopted as government measures, their chances of becoming law are small. Priority in presenting private bills is decided by ballot. Fourth, the same procedure applies in both Houses, except that in the House of Lords amendments may be introduced at any stage, and in the House of Commons at given stages.

Normally a public bill goes through five stages in each House—first reading, second reading, committee stage, report, and third reading. The first reading is purely formal. The minister introducing the bill asks permission to present it. Except in the case of very important bills, there is no speech or discussion. The debate on the measure starts with the second reading. The debate at this stage is on general principles. Sometimes a motion is made that the bill be read six months hence, and if this is carried the bill is withdrawn. After the second reading, money bills and bills for the confirmation of provisional orders go to the

**The
Legislative
Process**

Committee of the Whole. Other bills may also go to the Committee of the Whole, if the House so directs, but as a rule they go to one of the Standing Committees, as assigned by the Speaker, where they are discussed in detail. Then these bills are "reported" back to the House. Sometimes between the Standing Committee and Report stage, an extra step is added—a Select Committee stage. If the bill is reported by a Standing Committee, or amended by a Committee of the Whole, the House considers it in detail; if not, the report stage is omitted. Then comes the third reading, when the measure is discussed as a whole, not in detail. The readings are usually spread over several days, but in urgent measures they may take only a few hours. When the bill passes the third reading, it goes to the other House, where it passes through a similar process. If it is not amended, it proceeds direct to the King for signature. If amended, it goes back to the originating House for consideration of the amendments. Once signed by the King it becomes law.

Financial legislation is subject to a special process. The main principles governing financial legislation are :
Financial Legislation (1) Finance bills must be presented in the House of Commons; (2) They must be proceeded on in a Committee of the whole; (3) they must proceed from the Crown, which means the Cabinet. Private members can make general motions only in favour of some particular kind of expenditure. They can also make motions to repeal or modify taxes which the cabinet does not propose to modify. Every year there are two measures—the Appropriation Act, which deals with the grants to the public services for the year, and the Finance Act, or Budget, which (a) reviews the income and expenditure of the past year, (b) gives estimates for the coming year, and (c) contains proposals for raising the necessary revenue.

The financial year officially ends on the 31st of March. Before that date the Chancellor of the Exchequer submits to the House of Commons the departmental estimates for the public services. The Committee of the Whole on Supply considers them and passes resolutions. These resolutions are later consolidated into a single Act. Discrepancies are rectified by supplementary grants.

The Budget is presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Committee of Ways and Means, where his

proposals for raising revenue are considered. The Committee reports to the House, which passes a bill embodying the proposals as accepted. According to the Parliament Act of 1911 all money bills (the Speaker in cases of doubt decides which are money bills) become law with the royal consent without the consent of the House of Lords, if the Lords amend the bills.

Private bills, that is, bills which affect persons or localities, e.g., bills relating to railways and harbours, are subject to special procedure. Private bills originate in petitions, and must be submitted before the session in which they are to be taken opens. The promoters of bills have to pay special fees. The bills are first examined by officials, and then introduced, in either House, and read a first time. If there is a debate at the second reading and opposition is offered to a private bill it is sent to a Private Bills Committee. If the bill is not opposed the Committee consists of two members and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means. The Speaker's Counsel also attends. The Committee stage of a contested bill is really a judicial enquiry, after this stage, private bills proceed like public bills.

A provisional order is an order issued by a government department authorizing provisionally the commencement of an undertaking. The provision is the sanction of or confirmation by Parliament of the undertaking, which is obtained through a process similar to that of private bill legislation. Both private bills and the confirmation of provisional orders are mainly departmental. The parliamentary processes are usually formal; only in the case of serious opposition is the parliamentary process evident.

By the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Commons is practically supreme in all legislation. It is completely master of financial legislation. According to the Act, public bills, other than money bills or a bill extending the maximum duration of Parliament, if passed by the House of Commons in three successive sessions, whether of the same Parliament or not, and rejected by the House of Lords, may, with the royal assent, become law without the concurrence of the Lords, provided that two years have elapsed between

**Private
Bill
Procedure**

**Provisional
Orders**

**House of
Lords and
House of
Commons**

the second reading in the first session in the House of Commons, and the third reading in the third session. The Act directs that all bills under the Act must reach the House of Lords at least one month before the end of the session. The Act thus establishes the ultimate legislative supremacy of the House of Commons, though adequate precautions are taken to prevent hasty legislation by the House acting singly.

The rules governing the conduct of business in the House of Commons are extremely complicated. The ordinary member knows only the general rules. For details he has to depend on the expert advice of the Speaker or of the permanent staff of the House. The rules are of three kinds—standing orders, which are permanent; sessional orders, which apply for the session only; and general orders, which may be temporary or may become permanent. The Speaker regulates all business. He decides who may speak. He may stop any member from speaking for unnecessary repetition or irrelevance. He may ask a member to withdraw for unruly or uncivil conduct—a process technically known as “naming” a member. A member may speak only once, save in Committee where he may speak as often as he wishes to, and on points of personal explanation and points of order.

There are two methods of closing a debate—(1) The closure, which, when carried, brings the debate to a close. It was introduced originally against obstructionist members who tried to prevent bills from passing by prolonging the debate indefinitely. To carry the closure one hundred members must support it in the House, and twenty members in Standing Committee. It takes the form of a motion in the words “That the question be now put.” (2) The guillotine, or closure by compartments, according to which a time is fixed for the debate.

When the time expires the debate automatically ceases. When the debate is finished the vote is taken. The Speaker asks the *Ayes* and *Noes* to signify their wishes. The members call out *Aye* or *No* in chorus, but the result is usually challenged. Then it is repeated, after which a division is usually called for. The members proceed to the lobbies, where they are counted individually by tellers—the *Ayes* going to one lobby, the *Noes* to another. The result is finally announced by the Speaker.

The House of Lords has a similar procedure, but there is less obstructionism and more dignity in the conduct of business in that House.

The members of each House have certain privileges. These privileges are guaranteed partly by ancient custom and partly by statute law. They apply to the House of Lords, the House of Commons, as Houses of Parliament, and to individual members.

At the commencement of each parliament these privileges are granted to the Commons by the Crown at the request of the Speaker. The main privileges are:—
 (a) Freedom from arrest which is enjoyed during the session and for forty days before and after it. It does not protect members from arrest for indictable offences, or from any process in civil actions save arrest. (b) Freedom of speech. This means that a member is not responsible outside Parliament for anything said inside. (c) The right of access to the Sovereign, individually for the Lords and collectively for the Commons. (d) That a "favourable construction" be given to the proceedings of the House. This is an old-standing privilege which is now extinct, because it is not required. Members are also exempt from jury duty, but not (as they once were) from acting as witnesses. Each House has the right to regulate its own proceedings: each also has the right to commit persons for contempt. The House of Commons used to have the right to settle disputed elections, but this it has given to the courts. All cases of treason and felony in the case of a member of the House of Lords must be tried by the House of Lords under the presidency of a Lord High Steward appointed by the Crown. Members of the House of Lords are exempt from arrest in civil causes. They are also entitled to enjoy the various privileges, dignities and rights inherent in their dignities.

As we have seen, the successor of a peer must be a member of the House of Lords. A member of the House of Commons cannot resign. When he wishes to be relieved of his duties, he must apply for the sinecure office known as the Chiltern Hundreds. Tenure of this office disqualifies him from acting as a member.

The mainspring of the whole legislative and executive system of the United Kingdom is the Cabinet. The Cabinet

controls the whole course of legislation as well as the administration. Thus in one body are combined the two "powers," the legislative and the executive. Theoretically

the King is head of both the legislature and the executive, but all real power lies with the Cabinet. The Cabinet is chosen from members of the party-in-power. The members are chosen from both Houses, but the party-in-power is decided by the elections to the House of Commons. The head of the Cabinet is the Prime

Minister, who can continue in office only so long as he commands the confidence of the House of Commons. The normal procedure for the formation of a Cabinet is as follows:—The King sends for the leader of the most powerful party in the House of Commons, and asks him to form a ministry. If the leader of the party thinks he can form a Cabinet which will command the confidence of the House of Commons he will accept office, and forthwith proceed to select the members of Cabinet from his own party. He chooses the leading men of the party, having due regard to their abilities as future ministers, to their debating powers, and to their services to the party. He submits the names chosen to the Sovereign, by whom they are formally appointed to their offices. The number of members varies from time to time. Before the War the Cabinet used to be composed of the Prime Minister, who is usually First Lord of the Treasury, the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, five Secretaries of State, the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord President of the Council, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the President of the Local Government Board, the President of the Board of Education, the President of the Board of Agriculture, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the First Commissioner of Works, the Postmaster-General, the Secretary for Scotland, and the Chief Secretary for Ireland—in all about nineteen members, but the Prime Minister could expand or contract it as he thought fit. The Great War made a complete alteration in the Cabinet system. For the conduct of the War, the Prime Minister found the Cabinet far too large, and he formed a War Cabinet, a smaller body, of five members. This War Cabinet became later the Imperial War Cabinet, to which representatives of the Dominions were added. During, and

immediately after the War, a large number of new departments or ministries were created—the ministries of Labour, of Pensions, of Supply (Munitions), of Food Control, of Ways and Communications, of Shipping, of National Service and Reconstruction and of Health. The expansion of the administration made it impossible to include the heads of all departments in the Cabinet.

The War Cabinet, which started at the end of 1916, was a small body of five members, only one of whom was a department head. The others were “ministers with portfolio,” i.e., they had no specific post in the administration. They were able to devote their whole attention to war affairs without being burdened with a department. Likewise the previous members of Cabinet who were departmental heads were free to manage their departments without the burden of Cabinet meetings. A separation was made between policy and actual administration. One body devised the policy: the other carried it out. The War Cabinet was a miniature legislative body, and its power was enhanced in this respect by the servility of the House of Commons. In the conduct of war the executive is supreme, hence the Cabinet, and the later War Cabinet, was able to dictate to the House of Commons. The House had the right and power to refuse to pass measures, but as a matter of fact it never exercised the right: it could not have done so without risking internal revolution. The people were not in a mood for discussion or delay. What they wanted was swift and decisive action. Another result of the War Cabinet system was that the Prime Minister ceased to be leader of the House of Commons. He delegated the function of leadership to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

After the general election of 1918—held immediately on the conclusion of the War—the War Cabinet continued.

Recent Development The new House of Commons at first was as subservient to the Cabinet as its predecessor, but gradually it reasserted its powers. The Government was defeated on more than one occasion, but no resignation followed. The Prime Minister, however, deemed it wise to end the War Cabinet and a new Cabinet on the old lines was created. Most of the pre-war offices were represented in this Cabinet, with the addition of the Minister of Ways and Communications (Transport), the

Minister of Health and the Minister of Labour. One Minister without portfolio was included. The total number was nineteen.

In the second half of 1922 the Lloyd George Coalition Government resigned, and was succeeded by a Conservative Government formed by Mr. Bonar Law, who resigned owing to ill-health in 1923 and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Mr. Baldwin.

With the break up of the Lloyd George ministry the pre-war party type of government was re-established, and has continued since. The present (Labour) Cabinet consists of nineteen members—the Prime Minister, who is also the First Lord of the Treasury, the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, seven Secretaries of State, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, the President of the Board of Education, the Minister of Labour and the First Commissioner of Works. Other offices, e.g., the Attorney-General, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Postmaster-General, which used to be of cabinet rank, are not at present included. The post of Chief Secretary for Ireland was abolished as the result of the constitution of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.

In 1918 a committee called the Machinery of Government committee, the president of which was Lord Haldane, presented a report in which are given the most modern views of the functions of the Cabinet. The main conclusions of the committee were that the Cabinet, "the mainspring of all the mechanism of government," (1) should be small in number, with ten or twelve members; (2) that it should meet frequently; (3) that it should be supplied with all the material necessary to enable it to reach rapid decisions; (4) that it should take into consultation all ministers whose departments are likely to be affected by its decisions; and (5) that it should have a systematic method of seeing that its decisions are carried out by the executive departments. These things are necessary, according to the Committee, to enable the Cabinet to fulfil its functions, which are, in the words of the report—" (1) the final determination of the

policy to be submitted to Parliament; (2) the supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy prescribed by Parliament; and (3) the continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the activities of the several departments of state."

The Cabinet controls the course of legislation through its power of initiating measures. Every important measure is proposed in Parliament by the member of Cabinet within whose province the subject lies. The Cabinet is jointly responsible for the measure. As a rule a Cabinet measure goes through the House of Commons safely, because the Cabinet, being composed of members of the party-in-power, controls the majority of votes. It also controls the business of the House. If, however, it does not control the majority, the Prime Minister must recommend a dissolution of Parliament to test the feeling of the nation, for without a majority he can do nothing. If his party is beaten at the elections, the Prime Minister must lay his resignation before the King, who summons the leader of the party which now can command a majority in the House, and asks him to form a ministry.

The Cabinet is thus completely responsible to the House of Commons. A majority in that House is absolutely essential to the life of the Cabinet. There are parties also in the House of Lords, but their power over the Cabinet may be judged from the fact that from 1905 to 1922 every Prime Minister and Cabinet was of the opposite political party to the majority in the House of Lords. The Prime Minister usually so arranges the ministerial appointments that a number of posts are given to peers. It must be noted that all ministers of the Crown do not serve in the Cabinet: only the heads of *some* of the ministries are included. There are many minor ministerial offices which are filled by selection by the Prime Minister from the Houses of Parliament, such as Under-Secretaryships of State and Parliamentary Secretaryships.

Through the Cabinet the House of Commons controls the legislature and the executive in one body. Parliament in itself does not govern: it controls the government, which is the Cabinet. The Cabinet in its turn dominates Parliament, for it is composed of the leaders of the party which has the

majority of votes in the House of Commons. Thus the Cabinet really is the centre of the whole legislative and administrative system of the United Kingdom. Apart from voting power, the members of the Commons exercise control in administrative matters by means of questions. Members may ask questions of ministers provided due notice is given and the question can be answered without detriment to the public good. No debates follow questions, as in the French interpellations, but the question system is a useful instrument for the prevention of jobbery and maladministration.

The Cabinet is not known to the law. Legally its members have power as members of the Privy Council. The Prime Minister's post was legally recognized in 1905, when special precedence was granted to the holder. No salary is attached to the post of Prime Minister, but he normally holds a paid office, the most usual being that of First Lord of the Treasury.

The Cabinet conducts its proceedings in private. Before the War no minutes of its meetings were kept. The War, however, compelled it to keep regular proceedings. Outsiders were brought in for consultation, agenda papers were issued and minutes kept. In 1918 a *Report for the year 1917* was issued. A regular secretariat was also established. Some of these departures from old custom by the War Cabinet have become regular features.

We have already noted the fact that the executive and legislative are combined in one body. Parliament also exercises certain judicial functions. The chief judicial functions of the High Court of Parliament, as it is technically called, are—(a) the power of each House to deal with its membership and constitution; (b) the power of the two Houses to impeach public officers and enact Bills of Attainder. This is purely theoretical. The responsibility of the Cabinet to the House of Commons has made impeachment obsolete. (c) The power of Parliament, by means of an address of both Houses to the Crown, to remove certain officers, such as judges; (d) powers of the House of Lords only, (i) as the final court of appeal, and (ii) as the court to try peers for treason and felony.

Parliamentary Control Questions

Its Legal Position

Its Proceedings

The High Court of Parliament

In theory the whole House of Lords can act as a court. In practice the judicial functions are exercised by the Lord Chancellor and the "Law-lords"—who are eminent lawyers specially created life-peers for this judicial purpose. These are sometimes helped by other lawyers specially called to serve, e.g., in cases coming from India, an Indian lawyer or English lawyer versed in Indian law is usually summoned. The House of Lords is the final court of appeal from all courts (save ecclesiastical) in the United Kingdom.

In theory the King is head of the whole constitutional system in the British Empire. He has the initial and final word in legislation; he is the head of the executive; all executive acts being done in his name; he is also the "fountain of justice", for technically all judgments are given through the courts in his name. In practice Parliament controls legislation. The King's power of initiating legislation belongs to the Cabinet, and his veto power is never exercised. Were it exercised, it would be exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister, with the Cabinet, controls the legislation, so the veto is not necessary. His executive powers are exercised by the Cabinet, and his judicial powers by the courts, which are free from royal interference.

The nominal and actual powers of the Sovereign in legislation really sum up the constitutional practice of Britain. Theoretically, Parliament exists at the will of the King, and transacts business at his pleasure. He summons and prorogues the Houses: he can dissolve them at any time. No Bill can become an Act without his signature. He can issue proclamations and ordinances, a power now used only for the Crown colonies. Actually all these acts are done on the advice of his ministers. The ordinances he issues are really orders passed under statutory law. The Cabinet controls the whole field.

Nominally, his executive powers are enormous. He has to see to the execution of all laws and to the proper working of the administrative services. He has the appointing, with a few exceptions, of all the highest public officers, and he can remove all officers, save judges, members of the Council of India, the

Comptroller and Auditor-General. In his hands lies the expenditure of all public money according to the Appropriation Act. He has the power of pardon. He creates peers and grants honours. He orders the coining of money. He grants charters of incorporation. He is the commander-in-chief of both the army and the navy. He also raises them, according to the conditions laid down by Parliament. He represents the nation in its dealings with the foreign powers. He appoints all ambassadors. He supervises the whole field of local government. He is also head of the churches, and as such summons Convocation and appoints the chief church dignitaries.

Actually, the Cabinet is responsible for all the acts of the King. "The King can do wrong" is an English constitutional maxim, which means that ministers are responsible for all executive work done in the King's name. "The King reigns, but does not govern." He has only nominal, not actual powers.

Even the so-called powers of the King's prerogative are dead. The prerogative, as defined by Professor Dicey, is the "residue of discretionary and arbitrary authority which at any time is legally left in the hands of the Crown." This residue is now merely nominal. Certain privileges still belong to the King. The civil list is at his disposal. He can buy and sell property like a private individual. At one time vast landed properties were attached to the Crown. Now they are managed by government, a lump sum of money having been given in exchange. The King enjoys immunity from political responsibility. He is free from restraint, i.e., he cannot be arrested nor can his goods be seized. He is also free from the chief taxes—save taxes on land bought by himself.

His real authority nowadays lies in his right to be consulted—a most important right—and the personality of the King has had most important effects in many cases. He can discuss public matters with his ministers, and offer advice, encouragement or warning.

One of the most remarkable phenomena of modern political development has been the security of the British kingship. While the Great War destroyed several dynasties, the English kingship seems more firmly grounded than ever.

The reasons are many. In the first place, the King is the constitutional head of a constitution which has never known a serious break ; in the second place, the monarchy is the pivot on which the machinery of government turns. All acts

of government are done in the King's name, and the very constitutional practices (e.g., cabinet government), which have taken the real power from the King, really depend on the kingship, which is the pivot of the system. In the

third place, the parliamentary system of government in Britain has taken from the King those powers which might have endangered his position, and, by his position in that system, he has become as "popular" an institution as Parliament itself. In the fourth place, the King can, and does, make himself really useful in national difficulties. He can suggest methods, or use his influence to persuade. In the fifth place, from his exalted position he can encourage, warn, and set an example. The work of King George in the Great War is ample evidence of this. In the sixth place, the kingship is the greatest institutional bond of union in the Empire. Through the King more than any other agency the Empire is held together. Parliaments and other institutions differ, but the King is the King from one end of the Empire to the other. Visits of the King, or the Heir-apparent, to the dependencies beyond the sea are the seals of imperial unity. In the seventh place, the kingship, or royalty, is deeply ingrained in the English heart. Save for one short period (during the Commonwealth), there has been a regular succession of Kings and Queens in England since England was England. Finally, the Royal house is the centre and example for the whole of the social life of England. The King is supreme in dignities and precedence, and the "pomp and circumstance" of royalty appeal in England, as in India, much more than the austerity, simplicity and newness of other types of constitutional chiefs.

The various departments of governments are conducted by ministers and a permanent civil service, which is recruited under the examination system. Some of the posts usually included in the Cabinet (e.g., Lord Privy Seal, and Lord President of the Council) are sinecures. Their utility lies in the fact that the Prime Minister is able to give them to

**The
Stability
of the
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outstanding men of his party who do not wish to have the cares of important administrative posts.

The Lord Chancellor, originally called Lord High Chancellor, occupies one of the oldest offices in the British Government. His duties are partly equivalent to those of the Minister of Justice in other governments. He is the chief judge of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal, and he presides over the House of Lords, which, as we have seen, is also a judicial body. He is in charge of the Great Seal. Justices of the Peace and county court judges are appointed and removed by him. He has also extensive ecclesiastical patronage.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer is head of the Treasury, though in theory the Exchequer is only a branch of the Treasury. Originally he was known as the Lord High Treasurer, but in 1714 the functions of the treasury were put into commission, i.e., placed under a board called the Lords of the Treasury. This board, the First Lord of which is usually the Prime Minister, is renewed with every Parliament, but does not meet. The Chancellor of the Exchequer controls the Treasury by himself.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, who used to be known as the Lord High Admiral, is head of all naval affairs. Associated with him is the Board of the Admiralty, which is composed of himself (First Lord), four naval lords, who are professional experts (captains or admirals), a first and a second civil lord, with a parliamentary and a permanent secretary. The Board of the Admiralty meets regularly.

The seven Secretaries of State are really holders of the same office, the Secretaryship of State, and in theory each secretary is competent to perform the duties of the others. Originally there was only one Secretary of State, but with the expansion of government business ultimately six more were created.

Each has his special duties, as indicated by the names:—
(a) The Secretary of State for Home Affairs. He deals with matters usually dealt with by the Minister of the Interior in other governments, save in so far as some of the functions

have been given to other ministries. Generally speaking, he deals with affairs not dealt with by other departments. (b) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He deals with foreign affairs. Protectorates used to be under his department, but now they are usually placed under the Secretary of State for the Colonies. (c) The Secretary of State for the Dominions and Colonies. This office is really a double one. It used to be the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies, but in 1925 a new Secretaryship of State for Dominion Affairs was created. A new Dominions Office was set up which took over from the Colonial Office all business connected with the Self-governing Dominions, including the Irish Free State, Southern Rhodesia, and some South African territories, and also business relating to the Imperial Conference. The Secretary of State occupies the two offices. (d) The Secretary of State for War. (e) The Secretary of State for India. (f) The Secretary of State for Air. (g) The Secretary of State for Scotland. This post was raised to the status of a Secretaryship of State in 1926.

There are several administrative boards, or commissions, the head of which is the president. He alone is the executive chief. The boards are nominal. One of these boards, the Board of Trade, was originally a committee of the Privy Council. Others, the Boards of Education and of Works, are purely administrative creations (the head of the Board of Works is called the First Commissioner of Works). Two Boards, the Local Government Board and the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, were abolished in 1919, and replaced by ministries. The Ministry of Health, which was established by the Ministry of Health Act, 1919, absorbed the duties of the Local Government Board; and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, established by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Act, 1919, replaced the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries. Both these ministries cover England and Wales only; separate authorities have been constituted for Scotland. The newer ministries—Labour and Pensions—are all administrative creations.

There is also a number of legal appointments, the holders of which rank as ministers. Sometimes they are included in the Cabinet. The Attorney-General,

**Adminis-
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Boards**

**Legal Ap-
pointments**

the Solicitor-General, the Lord Advocate (Scotland), and the Solicitor-General for Scotland are the chief legal officials.

Up to 1925, if a member of the House of Commons became a minister he had to seek re-election in his constituency.

The theory underlying this constitutional usage was that the member had again to secure the confidence of his constituents. The practice was more vexatious than useful; indeed it was sometimes positively baneful, for if the Prime Minister was not certain of public support, he had to choose not the best man for a vacant post, but a man who secured a large and safe majority at the last elections.

The Privy Council still retains a nominal importance in executive matters. Its chief importance actually lies in its judicial position. Theoretically, and legally, the Privy Council is still the advisory body of the King. All members of the Cabinet are made privy councillors. The Council never meets as a whole. One or two members can fulfil the legal forms necessary for its actions. Technically proclamations and "orders-in-council" are issued by it; actually they are issued by the Cabinet, whose members are also privy councillors. Privy councillors are appointed for life by the Crown, and can be dismissed by the Crown. The conferment of the title "Privy Councillor" gives the councillors the right to use the phrase "The Right Honourable." There are three classes of privy councillors—cabinet ministers; holders of important posts, such as ambassadors; and persons eminent in law, literature, and science. The dignity of privy councillor ranks officially next to that of a peerage.

The courts of Great Britain arose originally from the Permanent Council. The system of judicial administration thus was centralized. The king originally was the final judge, but with the growth of his judicial work he had to organize courts to administer justice throughout the realm. The first attempt at organization was the judicial circuits, when the judges of the King's Court went from place to place to hear cases. The court of the King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer all used to send out circuit judges. The Court of Chancery remained centralized in London. In 1873, the Judicature Act organized the courts, giving fixed areas of

jurisdiction to each. This Act, with subsequent amending Acts, is the basis of the modern English system. Before 1873 a certain amount of decentralization had begun by the creation, in 1840, of county courts, with a purely local jurisdiction.

The outlines of the modern judicial organization are as follows. At the base are the county courts, for civil cases, and the courts of the Justices of the Peace and the borough criminal courts, for criminal cases. At the top there is the Supreme Court of Judicature, which has two branches, the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal. Above these, as final Courts of appeal, are the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The County Courts cover certain areas of jurisdiction (not co-terminous with the administrative county) for civil cases. A judge, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, goes on circuit to each area. The judge usually sits alone, though litigants may demand a jury of eight members. The County Courts have exclusive jurisdiction within certain limits. In some cases litigants at their own option may go to the County Courts or to the High Court of Justice. Appeals lie from the County Courts to the High Court of Justice.

Justices of the Peace are appointed, and removable by the Lord Chancellor, on the recommendation of the Lord-Lieutenants of the Counties. Justices used to have administrative functions, which were abolished by the Local Government Act of 1888. They are appointed by county areas, each county has its Commission of the Peace, which includes the judges of the Supreme Court, members of the Privy Council and the Justices of the Peace. Justices may act singly, or in petty sessions and quarter sessions. Most of their important work is done in quarter sessions, where all the Justices meet. The Justice of the Peace acts as a police magistrate: he orders arrests, examines, and tries cases. At Petty Sessions, where two justices constitute a court, minor criminal cases are tried, appeal lying to the Quarter Sessions. Quarter Sessions are held four times yearly, but similar courts may be held at other times, called "general sessions." The Quarter Sessions Court has both original

**Outline of
Organiz-
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**County
Courts**

**Justices
of the
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Petty
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and appellate functions. Appeals may be made from the Quarter Sessions to the High Court of Justice. The Quarter Sessions may also commit cases to the assizes. The assize courts are held four times a year throughout the country by Commissioners nominated by the Crown. These Commissioners are, as a rule, Judges of the King's Bench Division of the High Court, though occasionally senior King's Counsel are nominated. Trials take place before one Commissioner only. All criminal trials except those which come before a court of summary jurisdiction are conducted before a jury of twelve.

The High Court of Justice has both civil and criminal jurisdiction, and it is both original and appellate. It has three divisions—Chancery, King's Bench (including the old Court of Common Pleas and Court of Exchequer), and Probate, Admiralty and Divorce. Any high court judge may sit in any of the three divisions. The Lord Chancellor presides in the Chancery Division, the Lord Chief Justice in the King's Bench Division. A president is appointed by the Crown for the Probate, Admiralty and Divorce Division. Judges sit singly and in groups; the High Court never sits as a body.

The Court of Appeal is composed of the Master of the Rolls, and the Lord Justices of Appeal. The presidents of the three divisions of the High Court and all ex-lord chancellors are members of the Court. The court is divided into two groups of three (or two) for the hearing of appeals and hears all appeals, civil and criminal. The Court of Criminal Appeal has a special composition—the Lord Chief Justice and a number of judges of the King's Bench Division appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor.

Nominally all judges are appointed by the Crown for life, or good behaviour, on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor himself, who is a member of the Cabinet, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lords of Appeal, who sit in the House of Lords and on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the Lord Justice of Appeal are nominated by the Prime Minister. Judges are removable by the Crown on an address of both Houses of Parliament.

The final courts of appeal are the House of Lords and the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The House of Lords is the final court of appeal from all save ecclesiastical courts in the United Kingdom. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is practically the same body, as the four "Law Lords" are members of the Privy Council. Other members of the Privy Council who are lawyers, as well as two members nominated by the Crown, and one or two nominated to represent India and the Colonies, may attend. Only four members need be present to hear a case. Nominally the business of the Judicial Committee is to hear all cases referred to it by the Crown, but in practice it is the final court of appeal for all cases from the ecclesiastical courts, the courts of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the colonies and dependencies, including India, and from courts established by treaty in foreign countries. All decisions are given as "advice to the Crown."

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The English system of local government is the most complex in existence. Its complexity arises from its combination of old historical units of government with modern attempts at symmetrical organization. The first modern attempt at the systematization of local government in England was the Reform Act of 1832. Before that local administration was carried on under a number of more or less haphazard statutes and commissions. In the counties the work was done by the county gentlemen or landowners, and the clergy; the former acted as Justices of the Peace, the latter as the Vestry. Both the Petty Sessions and the Quarter Sessions, which are now purely judicial, were administrative bodies. The Vestry, presided over by the church rector, and composed of him and his church wardens, was responsible for the administration of the civil or poor-law parish. In 1782 an Act was passed grouping parishes together for poor law purposes. These were administered by guardians, appointed by the Justices of the Peace. In 1834, by the Poor Law Amendment Act, parishes were grouped into Unions. A central Poor Law authority was set up in London, and the local boards of guardians were made

elective. The municipalities, or municipal boroughs, too, were reconstituted. In 1832 they were governed by a mayor, aldermen, councillors and freemen, who were only a fraction of the population. By the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 all rate-payers were given the franchise. In 1848 a Public Health Board was established, which gave way in 1871 to the Local Government Board. By the Education Act of 1870, and the Public Health Act of 1875 more duties fell to local bodies, till in 1888 an attempt was made in the Local Government Act to organize the system. The multiplication of functions and of bodies, the overlapping of functions and of areas made the system so complex that only a few trained administrators could understand it. By the Act of 1888, and another similar Act in 1894 the system, though not simplified, was made workable. In 1929, by the Local Government Act, the functions of the Poor Law authorities, or Boards of Guardians, were transferred to county and county borough councils.

At present England and Wales are divided into sixty-two administrative counties. These administrative counties are different from the geographical counties, which now only exist for historical purposes. The administrative county is administered by a County Council. For purposes of election the county is divided into areas similar to wards in a municipality. The County Council consists of ordinary councillors, elected for three years, and aldermen elected by the councillors for six years. Half the aldermen retire every three years. The powers of councillors and aldermen are similar. Women are equally eligible with men for election and appointment. The County Council elects its own chairman, and appoints its own administrative officials. Its duties are wide. They include all the administrative work done by the Justices, with all the functions conferred by recent Acts of Parliament. Its financial powers include the assessment and levying of the county and police rates, and their expenditure. With the consent of and under conditions laid down by the central government, the County Council can also borrow money for certain purposes, such as the erection of public works on the security of the County Fund. The Council grants licences for guns and levies duties on dogs, carriages, armorial

**The Admin-
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bearings, etc. Its other duties include the licensing of race courses and of houses for music and dancing (liquor licensing is left to the Justices); the management of main roads and bridges; the administration of the Poor Law; the maintenance and management of pauper lunatic asylums; the maintenance of reformatories and industrial schools; the regulation of fees of inspectors, analysts and other public officers; the payment of the coroner's salary; control of contagious diseases of animals; certain functions connected with parliamentary registration and polling districts; a measure of control over the sale of foods and drugs; and the registration of places of worship. The control of the county police is vested in a Standing Joint Committee of Justices and County Councillors, in equal numbers. Under Acts of 1902, 1903, and 1918 the County Councils are also the local education authorities.

The administrative counties, with the exception of the County of London, are divided into "county districts," of two kinds—urban and rural. Urban districts comprise towns and small areas more densely populated than purely rural areas. A rural district is composed of a union of parishes. These areas are both administered by councils, which have their own permanent officials. They administer their areas according to limits prescribed by statute and enforced by the central government. The district councils administer the Public Health and Highway Acts. Urban district councils are also empowered to take over from the County Councils the administration of main roads. These councils exercise certain powers under the various Housing Acts and under provisional orders or private Acts relating to gas works, electric power, and tramways. They provide burial grounds, open spaces, libraries, isolation hospitals, museums, wash-houses, allotments, etc. Urban districts with 20,000 inhabitants or over may also be local education authorities. The councils also levy the district rates. Rural district councils exercise similar functions to the urban district councils. Rural district councils, by the Act of 1894, took the place of the old Boards of Guardians in poor law administration.

Rural districts are further sub-divided into parishes. Rural Districts Parishes with under three hundred of a population have a Parish Meeting, which every parish

elector may attend, and they may have a Parish Council, if authorized by the County Council. Two or more parishes, if the parish meetings consent, may be grouped together under the Parish Council by order of the County Council. Larger rural parishes have a Parish Council as well as a Parish Meeting. These Parish Councils exercise the powers of the old vestries. Where there is no Parish Council, the Parish Meeting exercises many of the powers of the Parish Council. The County Council determines the size of the parish councils: the number varies from five to fifteen. Women, married and unmarried, are eligible for both election and office. The Parish Council provides open spaces, and may acquire property and make allotments on rental. It controls the water supply and is the local sanitary authority. It maintains local rights of way, the local roads, cemeteries, etc., and assesses the local rates. It also appoints the overseers and assistant overseers of the poor.

The distinction between rural and urban was also applied to parishes. Parishes lying within the limits of boroughs or **Parishes** within more thickly populated areas are still known as urban parishes. Their organization was not affected by the law of 1894, which reorganized the rural parishes. These urban parishes preserve the old ecclesiastical organization of vestries. They are unimportant units in local government.

Within the administrative county there are the boroughs—which, according to the Act of 1888, are of three classes:—

County Boroughs 1. The County Borough. A number of boroughs, which either were counties in themselves, or, according to the Census of 1881, had a population of not less than 50,000, were made counties independent of the County Councils and were freed from the county rates. Such boroughs were constituted under the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, and, in addition, were given the powers of a County Council under the Local Government Act. They originally were sixty-one in number, but have been increased from time to time. They pay certain dues, for example, a share of the expenses of the assizes (where the borough has no separate assizes of its own) to the administrative county, but are otherwise free from county taxes.

2. The larger Quarter Sessions boroughs, i.e., boroughs with a minimum population according to the census of

1881 of 10,000. For certain purposes these boroughs are subject to the County Council, e.g., for the maintenance of main roads, for the assizes, and in some cases, for the care of pauper lunatics. In other matters—such as those relating to the contagious disease of animals, destructive insects, explosives, fish conservancy, reformatories and industrial schools, police, sale of food and drugs, and weights and measures—the Quarter Sessions borough has its own powers. County councillors elected for these boroughs cannot vote on matters not assessed by the county.

3. The smaller Quarter Sessions boroughs i.e., boroughs with a population according to the census of 1881 of under 10,000, which have a separate court of Quarter Sessions. These boroughs by the Act of 1888 were made part of the area of the county for administrative purposes, and are assessed at the county rate for most purposes, e.g., the maintenance of pauper asylums, the control of coroners, the appointment of analysts, the control of reformatories and industrial schools, the administration of main roads, fish conservation, explosives and locomotives.

To sum up, for some purposes, (general county purposes), the entire country, including all boroughs except county boroughs, is assessed at the county rate. For other purposes (special county purposes), certain boroughs are assessed independently.

The borough is the standard type of municipal unit. The constitution of municipalities depends on the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, and, partly, on the Local Government Act of 1888. If the inhabitants of an area wish to be incorporated in a municipality, they must address the Privy Council to that effect, sending at the same time a copy of the petition to the Ministry of Health and to the County Council in which the proposed borough or municipality is situated. After a careful enquiry the Privy Council decides the case. If the decision is favourable, a charter of incorporation is granted in which the municipal limits and organization are laid down. The constitution of corporations is laid down in the Municipal Corporations Act. According to this Act, the borough must be governed by a mayor, aldermen and councillors. The councillors are elected for three years, one-third retiring

by rotation every year. One-third as many aldermen as there are councillors are elected by the councillors for six years, one-half retiring by rotation every three years. The mayor is elected by the Council, for one year, and is paid. The councillors are elected by the rate-payers of the borough.

Such powers as are not granted to county boroughs remain with the previously constituted authorities. Thus, in the matter of justice, unless special provision is made, a borough remains part of the county for judicial administration. It may, however, on petition be organized separately, that is, it may be given its own Commission of the Peace, or its own Quarter Sessions. If it obtains only its own Commission of the Peace, its Justices also belong to the County Commission and can hold no separate Quarter Sessions. If it secures the right to a separate Quarter Sessions, a Recorder, or professional lawyer, is appointed, to whom the power of two Justices acting together is given, along with the exclusive right to hold Quarter Sessions.

Under the Education Act of 1918, County Councils, County Borough Councils and non-County Borough Councils are constituted authorities for higher **Education** education in England and Wales. With the approval of the Board of Education and in co-operation with other educational authorities, County and County Borough Councils must make provision for the development and organization of education. They are directed to see that children and young persons (under eighteen years of age) are not debarred because of expense from the benefits of any education provided by the Councils. Continuation schools are to be established for persons under sixteen years of age, and ultimately for those under eighteen years of age. They must provide for the supply and training of teachers. The County and Borough Councils are also responsible for the medical inspection of scholars in secondary, continuation, and certain other non-elementary schools or institutions. Local education authorities also must see to the provision of play-grounds and provide physical training. The authorities are empowered to raise money by taxes and loans. The Board of Education contributes not less than half the net expenditure recognized by the Board. The Councils have power to provide scholarships or maintenance grants and to pay fees. They must not pay for religious instruction in

their own schools, but in schools not provided by them they can neither impose nor prevent religious instruction.

The Local Government Act of 1888 made special provision for London. Before 1888 the area covered by London was governed by a large number of bodies. London now comprises the City of London proper, a compact area of about a square mile in area, and twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs, which cover about 118 square miles beyond the city. The whole area by the Act of 1888 was made an administrative county, with its own Council (usually known as the L.C.C., London County Council). The metropolitan boroughs have each their own organization of mayor, aldermen, and councillors. They have statutory powers in relation to housing, public health, streets and roads, education, rating, etc., but are not constituted with the same powers as other boroughs. The London County Council has certain powers of control over them in respect to the sanction of loans, the construction of sewers, and other matters where central control is desirable to secure uniformity throughout the area. The Corporation of the City of London preserves many of its mediæval forms and organizations, as well as certain constitutional privileges. It maintains its own police, and has the monopoly of all markets within seven miles of the city boundary. It administers Corporation property and maintains several bridges across the Thames.

Other boards or authorities set up specially for the London area are the Metropolitan Water Board, created in 1902, the Metropolitan Asylums Board, created in 1867, and the Port of London Authority, which controls the lower reaches of the Thames. The Metropolitan Police are controlled directly by the Home Office.

The relations existing between central and local control in England, like many features of the English system show contradictions between practice and theory. Theoretically, the centralization of authority in legislation is great. The central government, however, leaves the actual administration to local authorities. The chief offices concerned with local government—the Home Office, the Boards of Education and of Trade, and the Ministry of Health—have wide powers of control, sanction, appointment and examination, but these powers are seldom

used. In normal times the Ministry of Health infrequently interferes in the local choice of officials. The Ministry is more ready to advise than to interfere. The gradual release from all but theoretical control is of course due to the seriousness and efficiency by which local authorities do their work. The interference of the central government varies according to the efficiency or inefficiency of the local authorities.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND

With the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 and the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, the content of the term "United Kingdom" was somewhat changed. Previously it meant the British Isles, including England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, united under a common King and Parliament. With the creation of two separate governments in Ireland—those of Northern Ireland and of the Irish Free State—the British Parliament contains representatives of only England, Wales and Scotland (Great Britain) and Northern Ireland. Although represented in the House of Commons, Northern Ireland has a separate government and the Irish Free State ranks as a dependency of Great Britain with a status similar to that of the Self-governing Dominions. At its widest the term United Kingdom now includes Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, but for all practical purposes it may be taken to be synonymous with Great Britain. The old term will remain, but the change in its meaning was brought up at the Imperial Conference in 1926, and legislation making the necessary change in the King's title was passed in 1927.

Since the union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, the relations between the two countries have been almost continuously unhappy, till the recent settlement. **Historical** Early in the nineteenth century, the desire for Irish Home Rule became apparent. It was first voiced by an Irish party under Isaac Butt, who was succeeded by Charles Stewart Parnell, whose activities made the question one of the leading political problems of the second half of the century. Parnell, who made the Irish Nationalist party a power in British politics, was succeeded by other leaders, who carried on the agitation for Home Rule till it reached its culmination during, and immediately after the termin-

ation of the Great War. The Irish Nationalist party received a large measure of support in Southern Ireland at each election and its numbers were at times sufficient to make or break the governments of the day. The Nationalists did not identify themselves with the political parties of Great Britain, but gave their support to the party willing to favour their views. Their cause was taken up by the Liberal party under Mr. Gladstone, whose attempt to pass an Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886 led to the disruption of his party. In 1914, Mr. Asquith's government passed an Irish Home Rule Bill, with a suspensory clause for the duration of the War. During the War the agitation for separation from Great Britain reached a crisis. At Easter 1916 a rebellion broke out in Dublin, which, though quickly suppressed, led to far-reaching political results. The old Irish Home Rule party practically disappeared. Its place was taken by the Sinn Fein ("Ourselves Alone") party. The extremists adopted more direct methods. They organized an army, and for some time kept up irregular warfare against the constituted authorities. At the general election in 1918 the nominees of the Sinn Feiners carried practically all the Irish seats with the exception of those of the Ulster or Northern Ireland counties.

Ulster, or Northern Ireland, had steadfastly adhered to its previous allegiance. Ulster is predominantly Protestant, and, in political sentiment, has always been at one with Great Britain, whereas Southern Ireland is predominantly Roman Catholic. The divergence of sect and political leanings made a single government for Ireland impossible, and the problem was ultimately solved by constituting two governments. In 1920 was passed the Government of Ireland Act, which superseded the Home Rule Act of 1914, and set up two separate Parliaments, one for Southern Ireland (26 counties) and one for Northern Ireland (6 counties). This settlement was accepted by Ulster and the first Northern Parliament was elected in May, 1921, and opened by the King in June of the same year.

Southern Ireland repudiated the settlement. The country drifted more and more into lawlessness till, after many negotiations with the British Government, a so-called "Peace Treaty" was signed in December, 1921. This "treaty" was the basis of the Irish Free State (Agreement)

Act, 1922, which constituted the Irish Free State, or as it is known in Irish, the Saorstát Éireann.

Northern Ireland, which includes the parliamentary counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone, and the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry has a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons. The Senate is composed of 2 ex-officio members and 24 members elected by the members of the Northern Irish House of Commons; the House of Commons is composed of 52 elected members. The term of the House of Commons (five years maximum) and the qualifications for membership are similar to those prevailing in Great Britain. The legislature has power to make laws on all subjects affecting its area, save a number of reserved subjects, e.g., subjects relating to the Crown or the succession thereto, the making of war or peace, the navy, the army, air force or territorial armies, treaties, dignities, titles of honour, wireless telegraphy, coinage, trade marks, copyright, and trade out of Northern Ireland. The executive is vested in the King-Emperor, who is represented by a Governor appointed for six years. There is a responsible ministry composed at present of seven ministers—the Prime Minister, and Ministers of Finance, Home Affairs, Labour, Education, Commerce and Agriculture. The judicature consists of a High Court of Justice and a Court of Appeal. Northern Ireland continues to be represented in the Imperial House of Commons by 13 members. The channel of communication between Northern Ireland and the British Government is the Home Office.

The constitution of the Irish Free State declares that state to be a co-equal member of the Community of Nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations. It says that all powers of government and all authority, legislative, executive and judicial in Ireland are derived from the people of Ireland. Every person domiciled within its area, at the time of the proclamation of the Free State, who was born in Ireland and who was of Irish parentage on either side or who had Irish domicile for seven years, is declared to be a citizen of the new state, unless he or she decides otherwise. Irish is declared to be the national language, and

**The Irish
Free State :
The Con-
stitution**

English is equally recognized as an official language. Liberty of the person and the dwelling of the citizens are declared to be inviolable. Freedom of conscience and of the profession and practice of religion is laid down, and no law establishing or prohibiting a religion may be passed. The constitution also prescribes free education for all citizens, and enjoins freedom of speech and the right of lawful assembly, and also the inalienability of the natural resources of the state.

The legislature (Oireachtas) consists of the King and two Houses—a Chamber of Deputies (Dail Eireann) and a Senate (Seanad Eireann). The Chamber of Deputies is elected by secret ballot by the direct vote of all citizens above the age of 21 years who comply with the existing electoral laws. There must be one member for each thirty thousand of the population, and not more than one member for each twenty thousand. Election is based on proportional representation. The present number of deputies is 153. Elections must be conducted on the same day throughout the country, and the Chamber of Deputies continues for four years unless it is sooner dissolved. The Senate consists of 60 members elected by all citizens of the age of above 30 years who comply with the existing electoral laws. Citizens who have reached the age of 21 are eligible for the Chamber of Deputies, but they must reach the age of 35 years and have done honour to the nation by reason of useful public services or must be specially qualified as representing important aspects of the nation's life before they are eligible for membership of the Senate. The legislature must have at least one session every year. The Chamber of Deputies controls financial legislation, although the Senate may make recommendations. Other bills must normally be passed by both Houses. Certain constitutional means are provided for cases of deadlock between the two Houses. The position of the representative of the Crown (Governor-General) in relation to legislation is regulated in accordance with the constitutional usages governing such cases in the Dominion of Canada. Provision is also made in the constitution for the "initiative" of proposals for laws or constitutional amendments on a petition of fifty thousand voters, and for a referendum on demand by a certain proportion of members of either House.

Amendments of the constitution made after eight years from the date of its first operation can only become law after submission to the people by a referendum. The executive authority is vested in the King, and is exercised in accordance with the law, practice and constitutional usages regarding the exercise of executive authority in the Dominion of Canada by the representative of the Crown. The Executive Council is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, and may consist of not more than 12 ministers appointed by the Governor-General; four ministers must be members of the Chamber, and a number not exceeding eight must be chosen from all citizens eligible for election to the Chamber, who cannot be members of Parliament during their term of office, except by the special permission of the Chamber itself.

The judiciary consists of Courts of First Instance, and a Court of Final Appeal, or the Supreme Court. The Courts of First Instance include a High Court, which is vested with full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal, and also courts of local or limited jurisdiction. The decision of the Supreme Court is final in all cases, but every person has the right to petition the King for special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.

CHAPTER XXII

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

1. HISTORICAL

The present Government of India is regulated by the Government of India Acts of 1915, 1916 and 1919. The measure of 1919 is transitional; it represents a stage of development towards complete responsible government in India as part of the British Empire. While it marks the definite beginning of responsible self-government in India, it is also the end of a period of executive government. A little over half a century ago that executive government was itself a complete departure from the system then prevailing. The present Government of India is the result of a series of processes and attempts. In the earliest days of the English in India their functions were mainly commercial. They came to India as members of trading companies with or without charters granted by the English executive government of their time. They had no territorial dominion. They acted under the duly constituted power in India. With the spread of English commercial enterprise came struggles not only with the Indians but with other European powers, especially the Dutch and the French. In their struggle with other European powers in India, the English depended very largely upon Indian help. Partly by accident, partly as the result of systematic schemes, the whole of India ultimately passed into the hands of the English. The legislative supremacy of the British parliament was established in India, just as it was in what are now known as the Self-governing Dominions.

The connection of the English with India dates back to the times of Elizabeth. Fired by stories of wealth brought to the West through Venice by eastern traders, and from Portugal by Portuguese mariners, in 1600 a number of Englishmen of good birth petitioned Queen Elizabeth to grant them a charter of incorporation as a company to trade in the East Indies. The task undertaken by these merchant

**General
Remarks**

**Early
Connection
of England
with India**

adventurers was no light one. The East was practically unknown to the English people of that time ; the sea routes were only partially known and what was known of them was due largely to Portuguese sailors. Ships were slow and small, and their utility for trading in the East was problematical. But those were the days of Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh. The venturesome merchants pressed their claims hard before the government of Queen Elizabeth, and on the last day of the sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth granted the first charter to an English company for the purpose of trading in the East.

This charter was similar to the charters granted to other companies of that time. The Company, it declared, was to elect each year one governor and twenty-four committees. These committees were individuals, not bodies. They were the forerunners of the Company Directors. The charter also granted a considerable number of privileges provided that the trade proved profitable to England. Should it prove unprofitable, the charter could be terminated on two years' notice. The Company was given practically a monopoly of trade with the East Indies. It had power to grant licences to other traders and to forfeit the property of unlicensed traders, or (as afterwards called) interlopers. It received power to lay down laws for the good government of the Company, provided those laws were not contrary to the greater laws of England. It was also empowered to impose penalties to secure obedience to the laws.

In the early days of the Elizabethan company trade was carried on by individual members subscribing to the expense of each voyage. The profits were divided out proportionately at the end of the voyage. Some years later, instead of each member contributing to each separate voyage, the contributions were lumped together and the Company was managed on a joint-stock basis.

During practically the whole of the seventeenth century the relations of England and India were purely commercial.

In 1609 James I. renewed the charter of Elizabeth, with such additions or alterations as the Company found necessary for the enforcement of discipline on long voyages. During the reign of Charles I. and during the Commonwealth, the Company was

engaged in competition with Dutch merchants and English interlopers. In 1657 it was in such great distress because of competition that it actually contemplated giving up its factories. Cromwell, however, granted a new charter to the Company, which was renewed at the Restoration by Charles II. in 1661.

Charles II. was the direct cause of the first territorial sovereignty of the English in India. In 1661, the year after his accession to the throne, the port and island of **Charles II.'s Bombay** were granted to him as part of his dowry **Dowry :** on his marriage with the Infanta of Portugal. **The** marriage dowry of this type was of little use to the **Growth** English king. He had no direct method either **of the** of governing or of utilizing his property. **Company** The most reasonable course was to lease it to the **Company** which had established trading connections with India. Thus, in 1669, his dowry was handed over to the Company in return for an annual rental of ten pounds. The Company by this time had established many trading centres in various parts of India, particularly on the west coast. Gradually its activities extended to Madras and to Bengal. Trading posts, or, as they were called, factories, comprised a few acres of land, the rights to which were given by the ruling authorities in India. As the commercial posts increased, the Company found it necessary to organize the stations on a definite scheme. At Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, principal stations were established, to which the others in the various areas of India were made definitely subordinate. From these three trading head stations arose ultimately the three presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Bengal.

Charles II. also granted to the Company by royal charter the right of coining money. The money was to be current in India, but not in England. In 1683 a charter **Charters for Money-** was granted for the creation of courts of judi- **coining** cature at such places as the Company might **and** decide. These courts were to consist of a lawyer **Courts** and two merchants nominated by the Company. Their law was to be according to the rules of equity and good conscience. The development of Indian and European law side by side from this time onwards we have already seen.

In 1687 King James II. granted a charter to the East India Company for the creation of municipal government at Madras. The charter provided for the creation of a municipality with a mayor, twelve aldermen and sixty or more burgesses. At this time the officials of the Company began to realize that, if they were to compete successfully with the Dutch, they would have to take more upon themselves than mere commercial organization. Not only was the Company persecuted by English interloper merchants and Dutch competitors, but they had considerable difficulties

Charter for Municipal Government and Beginning of Parliamentary Intervention

with the Mahratta and Moghul powers. Their first intention was to establish territorial supremacy only where their factories had been established, and just so far as it was necessary to give their commercial undertakings a sound political basis. The struggle with English interlopers led to what was really the beginning of parliamentary intervention in Indian affairs. In 1691 the interlopers formed a new East India Company and attempted to upset the monopoly of the original one. In spite of the decision of the Lord Chief Justice in favour of the old East India Company, the House of Commons, in 1694, declared that, unless prohibited by definite Act of Parliament, all English subjects had a right to trade with the East Indies. This decision arose out of a legal case. At the instance of the old Company a ship had been detained in the Thames on the suspicion that it was to trade with the East Indies. The monopoly of the old Company had been renewed on the decision of the Lord Chief Justice, but the detention of ships brought the matter before Parliament, which laid down a maxim that only the legislature could give a trading monopoly to any part of the world.

In 1698 Parliament again occupied itself with Indian affairs. The rights of the old East India Company were due to expire in the course of three years, and Parliament passed an Act which constituted a new association for the conduct of East Indian trade. This association or General Society was incorporated as a joint-stock company called "The English Company Trading to the East Indies." The other company was known as the Old or

The New Company and Amalgamation

London Company. The Old Company subscribed a large sum of money to the funds of the new joint-stock society. At the end of the seventeenth century there were several types of merchants who had a statutory right to trade with the East Indies: (1) there was the new company incorporated in 1698, (2) the original old Company, (3) a small number of subscribers to the General Society who had not subscribed to the new joint-stock company which arose out of the General Society, and (4) a number of interlopers. In 1702 the two companies, the old and the new, entered into negotiation for union. These negotiations were carried through in 1708 by an Act of Parliament. The new company was called "The United Company of the Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies." The London Company's charter expired finally in 1709.

Once the Company was definitely established, it proceeded to organize itself on an efficient basis. One of the first needs was the creation of suitable courts for both civil and criminal cases. The Company presented a petition to King George I. for the establishment of mayors' courts at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, or Fort William; in 1726 courts were established. Each court was presided over by the mayor and nine aldermen, seven of whom had to be British subjects. Appeal lay from these courts in some cases to the Governor-in-Council and in others to the British Government. Later, in 1753, a Court of Requests was established for the trial of petty cases. The 1753 Charter also limited the jurisdiction of these courts to suits between persons who were not natives of the towns over which the courts had jurisdiction. Suits arising between Indians, the charter declared, were to be decided by the Indians themselves.

During the eighteenth century the territorial power of the Company extended rapidly. Factories multiplied and were strengthened. In addition to ordinary commercial undertakings the Company was compelled more and more to become both a civil and a military power. The break-up of the Moghul power after the death of Aurangzeb created so much unrest in India that the Company was not sure of protection in any one of its stations. The distance of Delhi, the Moghul capital, from the factories, and the difficulties of

communication compelled them to adopt such means as would guarantee immunity from wanton attacks and from the rapacious levies of the lieutenant-governor of the Moghul Empire. In addition, the gradual dissolution of Akbar's scheme of administration and the weakness of the powers at Delhi encouraged the French. Seeing an opportunity of conquest the French established possessions in various parts of India, particularly in Madras. In Madras started a series of struggles between the French and English which ultimately led to the beginning of English territorial supremacy in India. In Bengal this struggle was many-sided: sometimes it was with the Dutch, sometimes it was with the French and sometimes it was with the local powers. After the subjugation of Serajudulla by Clive at the battle of Plassey, 1757, the *de facto* sovereignty of the English was established in Bengal. Theoretically the actual powers of government were exercised by the Nawab of Murshidabad in the name of the Moghul Emperor. Clive decided to establish more than a *de facto* power. He obtained the grant of the *dewani* from the Emperor. In the *firman* granting the *dewani* to the Company the Emperor, Shah Alam, placed the whole of the revenue administration in the hands of the Company. Revenue administration implies the administration of civil justice. The Company thus combined the possession of military force with the administration of civil justice, a fact which still further strengthened its actual and legal position.

For many years the English Government did not interfere in the Company's affairs. With the growth of the

Interference of Parliament Company's prosperity and the extension of its dominion the authorities in England gradually became alive to the fact that India was the scene of unusual events as well as a field of infinite prosperity. The wealth and overbearing attitude

of the East India Company's merchants seemed to create considerable envy in the hearts of their stay-at-home countrymen, who began to search about for evidence to discredit the administration of the Company which had given them their wealth. From this envy, or, rather, from the interest caused by the envy of a few Englishmen, arose a large series of legislative enactments and celebrated cases, such as that of Warren Hastings, the sum total of which was

later to bring about the sovereignty not of the Company but of the British Parliament itself.

The first real legislative Act governing the East India Company was the Act "for establishing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe." This Act, which is better known as Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773, contained

**The
Regulating
Act of 1773**

a fairly complete scheme of government for the Company's territories in India. It laid down that the Government of Bengal should be composed of a Governor-General-in-Council. The Council was to consist of four members. In the case of differences of opinion the majority was to decide. If there was an equal division of votes the Governor-General, or, in his absence, the presiding member of council, was to have a casting vote. Madras and Bombay were to have separate Governors or Presidents, and Councils, which were to be subordinate to the Governor-General and Council in Bengal as regards the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. This Act nominated the first Governor-General in India, Warren Hastings, and his four councillors, General Clavering, George Monson, Richard Barwell and Philip Francis. The appointment of subsequent governors and councils was left to the Court of Directors of the Company. The home management of the Company's affairs also remained in the hands of the Directors.

The Regulating Act contained certain legislative matters. It empowered the Governor-General and his Council to issue such rules and ordinances as were necessary for self-government at Fort William and other factories, and to levy such punishment as was necessary to enforce obedience to the rules and orders issued. The Act laid down the unusual provision that none of the legislative regulations of the Council was to be valid unless it were registered by the Supreme Court with the consent and approbation of the Court. An appeal lay from the regulation registered by the Court to the King-in-Council.

The Act also constituted the Supreme Court, which was not only to be independent of the executive government, but was to act as a check upon its actions. While the executive government consisted of the Company's servants, the Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice

and three judges appointed by the King. It was to have jurisdiction over the King's subjects in the province of Bengal. The Court was a King's Court, not a Company Court. Rules were laid down regarding appeals to the Privy Council and the power of the Government of Bengal to alter any of the provisions of the Act.

The Regulating Act is a most unfortunate example of parliamentary interference in Indian affairs. It set up a two-fold authority, the executive government and the Supreme Court, the former responsible to the Company, the latter to the Crown. This double authority soon proved unworkable. The Governor-General was also practically powerless before his own Council. The wording of the Regulating Act, moreover, was not sufficiently clear to mark off the affairs of the one authority from those of the other. The Supreme Court completely dominated the executive government. Not only did it hamper its work by the issue of its writs but it exercised a considerable jurisdiction independent of the executive government. In 1781 an Amending Act was passed, which removed the worst of the anomalies of the Regulating Act. It exempted the Governor-General and his Council jointly and individually from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to their public work. The Governor-General and his Council were also empowered to draw up regulations for the creation of the local courts of justice without reference to the Supreme Court.

The Amending Act of 1781 was followed by Pitt's India Act of 1784. The frequency of Indian legislation in the

The India Act, 1784 House of Commons was an index of the growing power of the Company. Committees had been appointed from time to time to report on the

administration, and on their reports motions were made in Parliament for the recall of Warren Hastings and for a closer limitation of the Governor-General's power. The Directors of the Company refused to recall Hastings. In 1783, the Prime Minister, Fox, introduced a Bill into the House of Commons to transfer the authority from the Court of Directors to a new body to be appointed by the Crown. This Bill was passed in the House of Commons but was defeated in the House of Lords. Fox resigned, and was succeeded by Pitt. In the new Parliament of 1784, Pitt introduced and carried through his own India Act. This

Act set up as the supreme authority six parliamentary "Commissioners for the affairs of India," a body which became known as the Board of Control. The Act also made changes in the Council in India. It reduced the number of members in Bengal to three, of which the Commander-in-Chief had to be one. It also remodelled the constitution of the Councils of Madras and Bombay. The Parliamentary Commissioners, or the Board of Control, were to consist of five members of the Privy Council, three of whom should be Chancellor of the Exchequer and the two Secretaries of State. The President of the Board was given a casting vote in all matters of dispute; in fact the idea behind the Act of 1784 was to give as complete power as possible to the President of the Board of Control. The first president of the Board was Lord Melville (Henry Dundas), who held office from 1784 to 1801. Pitt's Act thus started a system of government by two authorities, viz., the Company and the Board of Control. This lasted till the complete reform of the government took place after the Mutiny. From the time of Lord Cornwallis all administrative acts of the Governor-General-in-Council were subject to the sanction of the British Government. The Directors continued to exercise powers of patronage; they also conducted the home business of the Company, but Parliament more and more scrutinized their administration. Periodical enquiries were held, the most famous of which produced the Fifth Report of 1812.

The charters of the Company were renewed from time to time, but with each renewal the control of Parliament was more strict. In 1793 the Court of Directors was required to appoint a Secret Committee of three of their own members through whom the Board of Control was to issue its decisions to the Governors in India in times of war and peace. The Councils were also remodelled on a basis of three members each and the Commander-in-Chief. The Court of Directors was still given the power of appointment of the Governors and the Commander-in-Chief, with the approval of the Crown. The Court had also the power of removal. The Governor-General was given power to over-ride his Council in matters of great importance. Similar powers were given to the Governors of Madras and of Bombay. The Act continued the Company's monopoly for twenty years. Other Acts

**Renewal
of the
Charters**

followed regulating the organization of the government and granting new legislative powers to the Madras and Bombay Councils. Supreme Courts were created for Madras (in 1800) and Bombay (1823).

In 1813 Parliament confirmed the Company in the tenure of its Indian territories, but abolished its monopoly of Indian trade. It confirmed its monopoly of trade with China. This Act authorized the expenditure of a considerable sum of money for education. In 1833 the Charter Act declared that all the territories of the Company in India were held in trust for the Crown, and abolished the monopoly of trade which the Company had held with China: it ended the career of the Company as a mercantile corporation. No official communication was to be sent by the Directors to India until it had been examined and approved by the Board of Control. The Governor-General of Bengal was now called Governor-General of India. Another, a fourth or extraordinary member, was added to his Council but he was to attend and vote only at meetings for the making of laws and regulations. Like the others he was to be appointed by the Directors on the approval of the Crown but from outside the servants of the Company. This was the so-called legal member. The first legal member was Macaulay. The Governor-General-in-Council was empowered to make laws, or, as they were called in the Act, "laws and regulations" for the whole of India. The power of legislation was withdrawn at the same time from the Governors of Madras and Bombay, although they were allowed to place draft schemes before the Governor-General-in-Council. Acts passed by the Governor-General-in-Council could be disallowed by the Directors. Such Acts had also to be laid before Parliament. An important result of the 1833 Act was the appointment of the Law Commission, composed of the legal member of the Governor-General's Council, another member from England and one servant of the Company from each of the three Presidencies. This Commission drafted the Penal Code which, however, did not become law till 1860. The Act created a new presidency, the centre of which was to be at Agra. This provision was modified two years later by the creation and appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor for the North-Western Province. The Act also empowered the Governor-

General to appoint a Deputy Governor for Bengal, and, like the Charter Act of 1813, it contained certain ecclesiastical provisions regarding the creation of bishoprics. It also declared that "No native of India shall, by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent or colour, be disabled from holding any office under the Company."

At the next Charter stage, in 1853, the right of patronage was taken from the Directors and placed under the Board of Control. The President of the Board of Control thus practically completely supplanted the Directors in the ruling power. The Act of 1853 is particularly memorable as having established what was really the first Indian Legislative Council. The Council of the Governor-General was again expanded and reconstituted. The legal member was now to be regarded as an ordinary member for both legislative and executive action. Six special members were added for the purpose of legislation alone. These members were nominated from the presidencies and lieutenant-governorships. The Council thus consisted of twelve members: the Governor-General and the four members of his Council, the Commander-in-Chief and six special members. The Act also empowered the Governor-General to appoint two additional civil members, but this power was never used. The Council's sittings were made public and official proceedings were regularly published.

The Act of 1853 made several other alterations in the constitution and control of India. The Governor-General was no longer to be Governor of Bengal. A new Governor of Bengal was to be appointed similar in position to the Governors of Madras and Bombay. Power was given to the Board of Control to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor until a Governor was appointed. Peculiarly enough the power to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor was exercised till 1912, when the first Governor was appointed. The Act also said that six members of the Court of Directors should be appointed by the Crown. It declared the Commander-in-Chief of the Queen's Army to be the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Company.

The Act of 1853 was largely the work of Lord Dalhousie. To him, therefore, belongs the credit of the first attempt to differentiate the legislative and the executive functions of the

Government of India. The Governor-General's Council was the only Council which could legislate for India as a whole. The principle of local representation was admitted by the appointment of four official representatives of the governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Northern India. The actual position of the Government of India in the Council was that if one member were absent, there was a majority against the officials of the Government of India. Another innovation was the oral discussion of questions in full Council. The business of the Council henceforth was public. Thus was laid the basis of the future Legislative Councils of India, for it was now recognized that legislation in India required special machinery.

The Government of India Act 1854 In 1854 the Government of India Act was passed which enabled the Governor-General of India in Council, with the sanction of the Directors and the Board of Control, to take under his immediate authority and management by proclamation all the territories of that time belonging to the East India Company and to make provision for their administration. Under this Act the various Chief Commissionerships were established. The Act enjoined the Government of India to lay down the limits of the several provinces, and it also officially declared that the Governor-General of India was no longer to be known as the Governor of the Presidency of Bengal.

The next important constitutional document in the history of India was the "Act for the better Government of India" passed in 1858. The Indian Mutiny led to the complete reorganization of the government. **The India Act of 1858** The East India Company came to an end and the powers previously held by the Directors and the Board of Control passed to the Secretary of State for India. With him was associated a council, known as the Council of the Secretary of State. The members of this council were originally fifteen in number. According to the Regulations, in force before the new Act of 1919, it consisted of such a number of members, not less than ten and not more than fourteen, as the Secretary of State from time to time might determine. Nine at least of the members must have had long and recent service or residence in India. Ten years were laid down as a minimum of service and no member

could be appointed who had left India more than five years previous to his appointment. Originally the conditions of appointment were similar to those of a judge of the High Court, viz., good behaviour, but the term was later reduced to ten years' maximum, and still later to seven. The Secretary of State had power to fill vacancies. No member of the Council could sit in Parliament. The Secretary of State, as President of the Council, could divide the Council into committees and could appoint one of the members vice-president. As the Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet of Great Britain and thus responsible to Parliament, he could not be bound by the decision of the Council; but in over-riding its decision he had to state his reasons in writing. In cases of urgency he could act without consulting the Council and in certain matters he was authorized to act alone. The whole of the revenues of India were placed under him, but he could not sanction any grant without the concurrence of the majority of the Council. In this matter Parliament completely gave up its control to the Secretary of State and his Council, but it safe-guarded the revenues of India against arbitrary disposal by insisting on a majority vote in the Council. Even if it wished, Parliament could not order any expenditure to be incurred from Indian revenues without first amending the Act of 1858. The accounts of the Secretary of State were to be audited in England and placed before Parliament. Except in the case of invasion, no revenues could be applied for military purposes without the consent of both Houses of Parliament. The Act also declared that all naval and military forces hitherto belonging to the Company were thenceforth to belong to the Crown. The servants of the Company were now to become government servants and future appointments would be made by the Crown. The Governor-General, Governors, Advocates-General, and Members of Council in India were to be appointed by the Crown; other appointments to high offices, Lieutenant-Governorships, Chief Commissioner-ships, etc., were to be made by the Governor-General, subject to the approval of the Crown.

The Act of 1858 was accompanied by the well-known Queen's Proclamation, which has been called the Magna Charta of India.

In 1861 was passed the Indian Councils Act, many of the

provisions of which formed the basis of the internal government of India till 1920. The Council established by the Act of 1853 had not proved satisfactory. For one thing it abolished the legislative powers of the presidencies. It centralized legislation for India in the hands of one Council with local representatives. It soon became apparent that local legislatures would have to be created in Madras, Bombay and Northern India. Again, the opinion that the Councils could not fulfil their proper functions without some direct representation of the Indians themselves was finding favour. Certain local difficulties had arisen in connection with the jurisdiction of the Council. The Council, too, had tended to depart from its original intention : it began to assume the characteristics of Parliament. Instead of being purely legislative it took up its attention with enquiries into grievances. The Act of 1861 was passed in order to remedy these defects. The power of legislation was restored to Madras and Bombay. A Legislative Council was also established for Bengal, and the Act empowered the Governor-General to establish councils for the North-West Provinces and the Punjab. These two bodies came into being in 1886 and 1897, respectively. The Governor-General's Legislative Council was increased by additional members, not less than six and not more than twelve, nominated for two years by the Governor-General himself. At least half of these members were to be non-official and actually some of them were always Indian. The legislative power of the Governor-General in Council was increased by the Act. It was to cover all persons whether British or Indian, foreigners or others, all courts of justice, all places and things within Indian territories and all British subjects within the dominions of the Indian princes and the states in alliance with the British Crown. Certain subjects were reserved for the sanction of Parliament—such as the statutes governing the constitution of the Government of India, statutes affecting the raising of money in England, any future statutes affecting India, the Mutiny Act, and the unwritten laws and constitution of England. The Act gave the force of law to the miscellaneous rules and orders which had been issued in the non-regulation provinces, (i.e., the newly acquired territories of the Company) either by extending them or adapting to

them regulations which had been made for the older provinces, or by issuing them directly from the executive authority of the Governor-General-in-Council. The Governor-General in case of emergency was empowered to make temporary ordinances without the consent of the Council, but these ordinances could not remain in force for more than six months.

The local legislatures established by the Act for Madras and Bombay were each to consist of the Advocate-General with a number of other persons varying in number from four to eight, of whom half were to be non-officials nominated by the Governors. Local legislatures were forbidden to legislate in matters forbidden to the Governor-General-in-Council and also in matters affecting general taxation, currency, post offices, telegraphs, penal codes, patents and copyright. The Governor-General's sanction was necessary before certain measures could be introduced in the local Councils; for all measures his final assent was necessary. He thus directly controlled the legislation of the local Councils.

As yet there was no real attempt to separate central and local subjects for purposes of legislation. The Governor-General-in-Council could legislate for the whole of India and he retained considerable powers in respect of local legislation. The new Councils were purely legislative. They could not, like the Councils of the 1853 Act, enquire into or redress grievances: that was left to the executive government.

In 1861 one of the most important Acts in the history of the development of Indian administration of justice was passed—the Indian High Courts Act, according to which the Crown was empowered to establish by letters patent High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The Supreme Courts, the Sadar Dewani Adalat and the Sadar Nizamat Adalat were merged in the new High Court. Each of the High Courts was to be composed of a Chief Justice and Judges not exceeding fifteen in number; of these not less than one-third were to be members of the Indian Civil Service. All the judges were to be appointed by, and to hold office during the pleasure of, the Crown. The High Courts were given superintendence of all courts from which appeals might come to them.

**The Indian
High Courts
Act, 1861**

The next important stage in the development of the Indian institutions of government was the Indian Councils Act of 1892. In the interval between 1861 and 1892 only Acts of minor import were passed. By the Government of India Act of 1865 the legislative power of the Governor-General-in-Council was extended to British subjects in Native, or, as they are now known, Indian States. The same Act enabled the Governor-General-in-Council by proclamation to define and alter the territorial limits of the presidencies and other administrative units in India. In 1869, by the Indian Councils Act, the Governor-General-in-Council was empowered to make laws for native Indian subjects of the Crown in any part of the world. In 1874, another Indian Councils Act made provision for the appointment of a sixth member (for public works) to the Governor-General's Council; but by the Indian Councils Act of 1904 the sixth member's place was made general, not necessarily for public works purposes. In 1876, by the Royal Titles Act, the Queen adopted the title of Empress of India in addition to her other titles. The official Indian equivalent adopted was *Kaiser-i-Hind*.

The Indian Councils Act of 1892 marks a distinct advance on that of 1861; it increased the size of the Legislative Councils and also changed the method of nomination. The members to be nominated for the Council were fixed at ten to sixteen for the Governor-General's Council, from eight to twenty for the Councils of Madras and Bombay, not more than twenty for Bengal, and not more than fifteen for the United Provinces. The Governor-General-in-Council with the approval of the Secretary of State in Council was enabled to make regulations to govern the nomination of members of his own and the provincial councils. Under the regulations introduced, the principle of election was really started for the Legislative Councils. Thus, ten non-officials were included in the Governor-General's Council. Of these one each was nominated by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, and the Legislative Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces. In the provincial Councils the non-officials were nominated on the recommendation of various bodies, such as the corporations, universities, district boards, landlords, chambers of commerce and trades associations.

"This "nomination" was really election, though the name election was not officially used. No nomination made by these various bodies was rejected.

The Act of 1892 made considerable advance in the conduct of business in the Councils. The most important departure was the privilege of official criticism granted both to the supreme and the provincial Councils. By the Act of 1861 discussion on financial matters was limited to those occasions on which the Financial Member introduced new taxes. Now the whole Council was given the right freely to criticize the financial policy of the Government, with the reservation that they could not question the budget item by item as is done in the House of Commons, where each item is passed separately. The concession of financial criticism was important not only to the non-official members but to the Government. The records of the Councils show much painstaking criticism by non-official members both Indian and European. Many of the leading business men of India were nominated under the Act, and, in particular, the Finance Member derived considerable benefit from their presence, both officially, by public discussion in the Council, and privately, by personal discussion.

The Act also granted the right to ask questions. This right was really given in the interest of the Government, because by means of answering questions they were able to explain their policy or individual actions. The Council was also empowered to draw up rules for questions and discussion.

Five years after the Act was passed, the Secretary of State ordered the working of the new system to be reviewed, particularly to find out how far the various classes in India were represented on the legislative bodies. In Madras and Bombay it was shown that district boards and municipalities, which nominate members for rural areas, were disposed to elect lawyers as their members. No change was made in these provinces, but in Bengal a seat was transferred from the rural municipalities to the landlords or zemindars, who as a class hitherto were unrepresented. The numbers and proportions of non-official members were still small. In the provincial Councils only eight non-official members were admitted. In the Indian Legislative Council, a maximum of sixteen additional members was allowed, but to keep an

official majority, not more than ten could be non-officials. Of these, four were "recommended" by the non-official members of the provincial Legislative Councils and one by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. As it was impossible to represent the whole of India by the remaining seats on a basis of election, the Governor-General nominated the other five members himself.

The next important event in the constitutional development in India is the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. These reforms mark a great advance in the legislative powers of the Councils. Many reasons contributed to bring about this. In the first place, the spread of education amongst the people of India had raised a class which demanded an outlet for its political feelings. In the second place, a number of events, internal and external—the Universities Act of 1904, the partition of Bengal, and the Russo-Japanese war—had stirred the political feelings of the people of India. In the third place, experience of council government had been favourable. The government had derived definite benefit from the non-official members. The non-official members on their part continued to press for an extension on the principle of the Councils Act of 1892.

A committee was appointed to consider the advisability and methods of increasing the representative element in the various councils. The problem which the committee had to face was the conjunction in some sort of constitutional machinery of the principle of official executive control with the principle of constitutional parliamentary government. After discussions extending from 1906 to 1909 the reforms of 1909, known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, were introduced. Lord Morley was Secretary of State and Lord Minto Viceroy at the time. In the meantime two Indians had been nominated as members of the Secretary of State's Council, and at the time of the introduction of his Bill into Parliament Lord Morley announced his intention of appointing an Indian member to the Viceroy's Council. Mr. S. P. Sinha (afterwards Lord Sinha) was appointed as law-member of the Governor-General's Council in March, 1909. Later an Indian was appointed to the executive council in each provincial government.

The Indian Councils Bill was passed in 1909 and the new

Indian Councils Act, 1909 legislative councils came together in 1910. The Act was worded in wide and general terms. All details were to be made by the local authorities. The Act laid down that the members of the legislative councils should include members mentioned as in the previous council and also elected in accordance with regulations laid down in the Act. The maximum number of members was more than doubled and the scope of discussion extended from financial matters to all subjects of general interest. The right to ask questions was continued. The Act left to the Government of India the decision of the actual number of members to be nominated within the maximum limits given in the Act. Other details, such as the term of office and the conditions of tenure, the quorum, and the regulations governing the conduct of business were left to the local authorities. Generally speaking, the result of the various rules and regulations drawn up and of the general principles laid down by the Act were these. In the Governor-General's Council, members were elected by the non-official members of the provincial Councils, by landlords, and by Mahommedan communities in the provinces. Representation was also given to the chambers of commerce of Bombay and Bengal, and to the district councils and municipal committees of the Central Provinces. In the provincial Councils, the landlords, municipalities, district boards, Mahommedan communities, chambers of commerce and the universities were given seats. Special arrangement was made from province to province to give representation of special interests, for example, the planting communities in Madras and in Bengal, the Corporations of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay, the Indian commercial communities, and the mill-owners in Bombay.

A number of non-official seats in each council was filled by nomination. Nomination was used to represent such smaller communities or particular interests as from time to time might fairly demand representation.

The Indian Legislative Council was forbidden to make laws repugnant to Acts of the Imperial Parliament. As in the Dominion legislatures, the principal heads of legislation on which the legislature could not introduce laws without the previous consent of the Governor-General were specified. In the case of the Governor-General's Council, bills affecting

religion, public debts or revenues, the army and navy, or foreign affairs, in the case of the provincial Councils, bills affecting currency, the Indian Penal Code, patents, copyrights or the transmission of postal and telegraphic messages came under this category. The local legislatures could legislate for subjects that fell within their territorial limits. The Governor-General's Council could pass laws of interest or importance to all India.

The discussion of financial matters allowed under the old Act of 1892 was expanded. The subject-matter was extended by the inclusion of debts. The discussion also took place before the budget was finally settled. Members had the right to propose resolutions and to take the vote of the Councils on the resolutions. The actual procedure on financial legislation was as follows:—First came the financial statement—a general outline of the financial estimates for the coming year, with explanations. On a day later this statement was discussed, and it was open to any member to move a resolution with regard to any proposed alteration in the taxes or a new loan or an additional grant to a local government. Then came discussion of the financial statement by heads of expenditure. Members might move a resolution in regard to any question covered by a head of expenditure as the head came up for discussion. Certain subjects in the financial statement, including foreign relations and the relations of the Government of India with the Indian states were excluded from discussion, as also were certain particular heads of revenue and expenditure. After the financial statement was finally settled, the finance member of the Viceroy's Executive Council presented the "budget" and explained his reasons for not accepting any of the resolutions that had been moved. Discussion followed, but no new resolution was allowed at that state nor was any vote taken.

In the provincial Councils financial procedure was the same, save in one important respect, namely, that a committee of the Council, consisting of not more than twelve members, six nominated by the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, and six elected by the non-official members, first examined the financial statement before it was presented in the Council.

Rules were laid down for the conduct of all matters of public interest. All resolutions had to be couched in the

form of specific recommendations addressed to the Governor-General-in-Council or Governor-in-Council as the case might be.

For the other Legislative Councils a large number of rules and regulations for the conduct of public business, such as time limit for speeches, were drawn up. Supplementary questions were also allowed in the Morley-Minto Councils.

The main results of Morley-Minto Reforms may thus be summed up :

(a) Numerically, the Councils were greatly increased.

**Results of
Morley-
Minto
Reforms**

The previous maximum was 126 : it was increased to 370. Whereas there used to be 39 elected members, there were now 135. All classes and interests of importance were represented.

Election was now definite : candidates were no longer "recommended."

(b) The official majority in the provincial councils was replaced by a non-official majority.

(c) The functions of the Councils were extended in several ways and all matters of public interest could be discussed. Supplementary questions were allowed. Free discussion was allowed on financial matters and on almost every question of administration, and resolutions could be moved incorporating suggestions, advice, or new policy.

The system started in 1909 by Lords Morley and Minto continued till the reforms of 1919-20. Although the Morley-

**Subse-
quent
Develop-
ment**

Minto Reforms represented a big advance in the constitutional development of India, their utility was short-lived. Many circumstances combined to make them merely a stepping stone to parliamentary government. Both Lord Morley and Lord Minto had insisted that they were not meant to lead to parliamentary government in India. Their aim in instituting the enlarged Councils was to improve the existing machinery of government. The admission of Indians into the Councils had proved so successful that an extension of the principle was both desirable and necessary. But the authors of the reforms thought that the nature of the Indian social structure was opposed to responsible government. They did not foresee the intense interest with which Indians actually entered into the spirit of the new type of government ; nor did they consider that what they called the "natural

aspirations " of the people would require a more substantial outlet than the new system allowed. The negative statement of the authors of the reforms simply whetted the Indian appetite for some type of real parliamentary government.

The new Councils achieved their purpose from the point of view not only of government, but of the educated classes in India. According to Lord Morley, the purpose of the Councils was " to enlist fresh support in common opinion on the one hand, and on the other to bring government into closer touch with that opinion, and all the currents of need and feeling pervading it, to give new confidence and a wider range of knowledge, ideas and sympathies to the holders of executive power." The Government derived much benefit from its association with Indian representatives, while the Councils stimulated the political life of India. In this way they really compassed their own destruction, for once the Indians were sufficiently prepared the only course open was for expansion, and the only avenue of expansion was towards responsible government.

Several circumstances helped to prepare the way for responsible government. The very rapid advance of education, particularly in its higher branches, created a body of Indian opinion with definite political leanings and ideals. The advance of education had been one of the arguments for the Morley-Minto Reforms. Not only did education advance more rapidly after these reforms, but the part played by educated Indians in administration greatly increased. Indians occupied most of the posts in the various provincial and subordinate services of government, and a considerable number entered the Imperial services. Education meant the development of individuality on the part of Indians, and this individuality called for expression. Not only did the constitutional restrictions of the system of government require alteration, but so also did the terms of the government services. A large number of chafing racial discriminations annoyed Indian opinion and made the demand for representative government more insistent than it otherwise might have been. Thousands of Indians, too for educational or other purposes, had visited Great Britain, America or Japan, and had studied the political and social organizations of those countries.

**Circumstances
Favouring
Responsible
Government**

The political consciousness of India was manifested in several ways. Large numbers of societies or associations sprang up to further social and political reform. Recognizing the difficulties of representative government in a land with such a mixed population, and with such distinctive anti-national institutions as caste and opposed religions, many Indians set themselves the task of social reform and of laying the basis of common political institutions for India as a whole. The existence of the two chief religious systems, Hinduism and Mahommedanism, had always presented difficulty in the unification of India, and Indians themselves, recognizing this, hastened to create a basis of common understanding which might remove the barriers in the way of Indian unity.

One political institution in particular deserves notice—the Indian National Congress. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, by the late Mr. A. O. Hume, a retired member of the Indian Civil Service, and has had regular sessions ever since. Its objects are set forth in the following statement which every member of the Congress had to accept: “The objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire, and a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those members. These objects are to be achieved by constitutional means by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration, and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit, and developing and organizing the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country ”

The Congress has a regular constitution. It meets every year, and is composed of delegates from every part of India. There is an All-India Committee, which nominates the office-bearers and provincial committees, and which makes arrangements for the election of delegates. There is also a Reception Committee. The Congress also used to support a British Committee.

Till 1907 the Congress worked harmoniously. In that year, however, there was a split, at the meeting at Surat; one party, the Extremists, refused to act with the other, the

Moderates. In 1916 the Congress was re-united, but in 1918 the Congress again broke up on the subject of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. The Extremists proposed to reject the proposals altogether; the Moderates supported qualified acceptance of them. The result was that the Moderates abstained from the National Congress and formed a conference of their own. In December, 1920, the Congress, at Nagpur, altered the fundamental article of its constitution, the "British connection" being omitted. The Moderates founded a new all-India institution—the National Liberal Federation.

In the National Congress all communities were represented. The Mahomedans, as a community, largely abstained from political agitation, under the leadership of Sir Syed Ahmed. In 1906, however, they determined to create an organization to look after their own interests. Ideas of representation were in the air, and the Mahomedan leaders saw that they would have to press for separate representation. The Moslem League was the result. Its original objects were to protect the political and other rights of Indian Moslems, and to promote friendship and union between the Mahomedan and other communities of India. In 1912-13, the original constitution of the League was altered to include the attainment of self-government in India under the British Crown; and from 1919-20 onwards the League identified itself with the activities of the National Congress.

One more influence must be noted—the development of local self-government. Although this development was not so marked as many had hoped, nevertheless it showed the growing interest of Indians in representative self-government on a small scale. It also proved the fact that Indian national feeling could not be satisfied with local self-government alone. Everything went to show that the unity of India was at last being realized. A common medium of speech had been given in the English language; a basis of common rights had been secured; common interests were being realized; a common organization knit India together: in short, in spite of the vast differences of race, language, religion, and social customs among the Indian people, the foundation of an Indian nationality had been laid.

Apart from these general considerations, the Morley-Minto Councils themselves showed great defects. In the first place, the electorate was not so arranged as either to stimulate the interest of the people as a whole in political matters, or to give satisfaction to those who actually were voters. The members of the various Legislative Councils were elected indirectly. Thus, the representatives of local Councils were elected by electors who were themselves elected. For the Imperial Council the election of members by the provincial legislatures was three times removed from the primary voters. There was very little connection between the representative and the primary voter. Constituencies were very small in voting numbers—usually only a few hundreds. The franchise was thus very restricted, and the actual number of representatives was small. In a country of the size of India, or even the size of its individual provinces, it is extremely difficult to find a mean between perfect representation and a good working number on a legislative council, but in all cases the representative system was on a minimum scale. Additional difficulties arose through the existence of various communities and interests, who either elected members separately or were represented by means of nomination. This difficulty remains under the new system, for, with the present composition of the Indian population, representation by communities or interests (communal representation) seems the only possible method of securing fairness.

Another, but minor, difficulty in the representative system under the Morely-Minto scheme was the large proportion of lawyers returned. The majority of members returned by the provincial legislative councils to the Imperial Legislative Council belonged to the legal profession. The same was true of provincial Councils. Except for seats specially reserved for landowners, or others, the proportion of lawyers returned by the more general constituencies was 70 per cent. The return of lawyers as members is accounted for largely by the fact that they are the class most interested in politics and most able to give the time and money necessary for political work. A large proportion of members of the House of Commons is business men, but as yet Indians have not made the necessary progress in industrial and commercial life to provide members from this class for the legislatures. Outside

the legal profession, the abler Indians are mainly in government service, which disqualifies them from holding seats. Landowners are represented separately. The predominance of lawyers in the Councils led Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, in their Report on Constitutional Reforms, to suggest that such qualifications should be prescribed for rural seats as would disqualify lawyers from holding them.

The chief drawback of the Morley-Minto Councils was their failure to give any real legislative outlet to Indian members. In both the Indian and provincial Councils, though in the latter there was an elected majority, the Government was able to secure an official majority. In the Imperial Legislative Council the official majority, or, as it has been called, "bloc", was absolute. The non-official European members in all the Councils usually voted with the official members, a fact which sometimes encouraged racial feeling. The official majority in the Indian Legislative Council theoretically was justified inasmuch as the responsibility of the Government to the Secretary of State had to be maintained. Official members were rarely free to speak or vote as they chose. They voted together, in a body, in favour of all government measures. The Indian members were reduced to the position of critics, whose opinions were recorded in the proceedings. The debates were to some extent unreal. Under such a system the best qualities of the Indian members could not be extracted. That the Indian members were both useful and interested in legislation and administration was shown by their good work in the committees of the Council, where they exerted more influence than in the Council itself, by their moving of resolutions, and by the asking of questions. It may be added that many of the official members also disliked the officialization of the Council. In the provincial Councils the Government usually had a majority, though in some instances bills were much modified either in committee or in Council because of non-official influence, and sometimes contemplated bills were not even introduced by Government to avoid the possibility of defeat by the non-Government majority. Another difficulty of the Morley-Minto system—and this difficulty was common to both official and non-official members—was the fact that the legislative powers of the Councils were very restricted.

Parliamentary control over the Government of India had not been relaxed, nor the control of the Government of India over provincial governments. A large number of subjects was outside the scope of the powers of both types of council. The financial restrictions in particular were stringent, and, as all legislation implies financial considerations, the spheres of influence of the various councils were closely circumscribed.

Such work as the Indian members could effectively do was done in the committee room or as the result of private interviews with the heads of governments and officials. Neither were the councils satisfactory to the officials or the governments as a whole. All the same they prepared the way for further advance. By their very nature they were unsatisfactory to Indians, for they were of a parliamentary nature without being parliamentary. They pointed the way to something better, but, so long as this existed, they also barred that way.

The immediate cause of the dissolution of the Morley-Minto system was the Great War. The war was fought very largely on the principle of small European nationalities being able to decide for themselves with whom they should associate in political life. This principle—the principle of self-determination—became one of the most fundamental principles of the war. It was given an additional impetus by the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson after the entry of the United States into the war. The principle was extended to India, but the many difficulties of the political and social structure of India stood in the way of its full application. The best Indian political opinion demanded responsible government for India within the Empire on the parallel of the Self-governing Dominions.

The adoption of the new principle was signaled by the following announcement made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on the 20th of August, 1917—according to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report “the most momentous utterance ever made in India’s chequered history” :—

“ The policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the

administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . . I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by progressive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and the measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility."

The announcement was followed by an enquiry made in India in 1917-18 by the late Mr. E. S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy. The result of their enquiries was published in July, 1918, in their *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, or, as it is usually known, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The Report gives a historical and critical analysis of the existing system of government in India, and makes a large number of recommendations for reform. The province of Burma was left for separate consideration. The Report was considered by the various governments in India, and the Government of India, in their despatch of March, 1919, submitted their views, suggesting certain modifications. Committees presided over by Lord Southborough made recommendations on the franchise and division of subjects as recommended in the Report, and the Government of India likewise expressed their views on these. In some respects there was considerable divergence of opinion, and ultimately the whole subject was referred in July, 1919, to a Joint-Committee of both Houses of Parliament. Lord Selborne presided over this Committee, which took evidence from representatives of all shades of opinion. Its report, with a draft bill, was issued in November, and the bill, as amended by the committee, was passed. His Majesty the King, in giving the Royal Assent, issued a Royal Proclamation to the Government, Princes and people of India to mark the new epoch of government. In 1922 the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919, were, with some modifications, extended to the province of Burma.

2. THE CROWN AND SECRETARY OF STATE

The present system of government in India is regulated by the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended by the Government of India Act, 1916, and the Government of India Act, 1919, and subsequent minor amendments. The Government of India Act of 1915 is really an Act consolidating the previous Acts affecting the Government of India, and as such it is really the basic law of the Indian constitution. The Government of India Act of 1919, though it contains the most important constitutional reforms India has known, is more of the nature of an amending Act than an original Act by itself.

To these Acts the ordinary constitutional categories of flexible and rigid do not apply. Like the constitutions of the Self-governing Dominions, they have been granted by a superior to a subordinate government. Their actual nature as constitutional law depends largely on the attitude adopted towards them by the governments constituted by them, particularly the judiciary. The Acts may be interpreted either as ordinary acts of the British Parliament, or as the fundamental constitutional law of the countries concerned. In the case of Canada, the Privy Council has interpreted the Canadian constitutional Acts as ordinary statutes of the British Parliament, but in Australia the High Court, through which all appeals to the Privy Council must come has interpreted the constitution as a constitutional law of the American type. The High Court of Australia has not only regarded the constitution as a constitutional Act amendable only by the special process of the referendum, but has extended it by doctrines adopted in American constitutional interpretation such as implied powers or the immunity of instrumentalities. Yet the Australian constitution, like the Canadian constitution, is really only an ordinary statute of the British Parliament.

The constitutional Acts of India are likewise Acts of Parliament. As constitutional Acts they contain much more than is usually laid down in constitutions. A typical constitution contains the fundamental principles on which government is to be conducted and an outline of its organization.

The Acts of 1915, 1916 and 1919 contain very few general theories or principles. They deal purely with organization, and this they deal with in great detail. They give the general outlines of government, it is true, but they go into such details as the method of correspondence between the Governor-General and the Secretary of State, budgetary procedure in the Indian and provincial legislatures, the rights and liabilities of the Secretary of State in Council, rules for admission to the Indian Civil Service, questions of salary, leave, temporary vacancies, offences, procedure and penalties. The Acts are not only constitutional in the ordinary sense : they are also administrative guides.

These Acts may be amended in two ways : (a) by Parliament ; (b) by the Governor-General in Legislative Council.

**Amend-
ment
of the
Constitutional
Acts**

Parliament is the final source of legislation, repeal, or amendment, but in certain subjects, such as the extension of the limits of presidency towns, the alteration of the jurisdiction of High Courts, and the law to be administered in cases of inheritance, succession, contract, and dealings between party and party, the power to amend or repeal has been conferred on the Governor-General in Legislative Council. Thus the constitution of India, if we may apply the terms flexible and rigid to it, is partly flexible and partly rigid. It may be amended by the ordinary legislative process, both of Parliament and the Indian legislature. So far it is flexible. In so far as Parliament is ultimately the legal sovereign in India and as the constitution may be amended by the ordinary legal process, it is also flexible. But inasmuch as Parliament is not the normal legislature of India, the constitution is rigid. The process of parliamentary amendment may be looked on as exceptional : the process of amendment is not the normal legislative process of India. To this extent, therefore, the constitution may be looked on as rigid.

The head of the constitutional system in India, as in all the dependencies, is the King, or as he is known officially in India, the King-Emperor. As the India Act of 1915 says : " All the territories for the time being vested in His Majesty in India are governed by and in the name of His Majesty the King, Emperor of India." All official acts are done in his name and all revenues theoretically are received for him. The

**The King-
Emperor**

actual powers of the Crown in India in many respects are the same as in the British constitution, e.g., in relation to the army and navy. In addition to these a large number of executive functions by various statutes (consolidated in the Act of 1915) have been given to the Crown. The Crown, through the Secretary of State, may disallow any Act passed by the Governor-General in Legislative Council even after the Governor-General has assented to it, or any Act passed by the provincial legislature after the head of the province and the Governor-General have assented to it. The Crown can also veto any order of the Governor-General altering the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The approval of the Crown is necessary for the creation of a new province under a governor, which, with such approval, may be done by notification. The approval of the Crown is also necessary for the demarcation of the authority of a governor, for the creation of local legislatures under governors, or for the transference of a district from one province to another. The Crown has also considerable powers in granting pensions and gratuities. The Crown also determines the ecclesiastical jurisdictions of India. By letters patent the Crown can establish a High Court in any territory in British India, whether it be within the jurisdiction of any existing High Court or not. The Crown appoints the Governor-General of India, the Governors of the provinces, and the members of the Governor-General's and the Governors' Executive Councils. The Crown appoints also the Chief Justices and Judges of the High Courts (who hold office during the royal pleasure) and the Advocates-General of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. On an address from both Houses of Parliament the Crown can remove from office any member of the Council of India. The Crown appoints the bishops and archdeacons of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. By an Order in Council the Crown may also make provision for the appointment of the High Commissioner for India, a power which was exercised in 1920, and, by royal warrant countersigned by the Chancellor of Exchequer, appoint an auditor for the accounts of the Secretary of State in Council.

The Secretary of State for India is the real head of the executive of the Indian Government. In the words of the Act of 1915, he "may superintend, direct and control all acts, operations and concerns which relate to the government

or revenues of India, and all grants of salaries, gratuities and allowances and all other payment and charges, out of or on the revenues of India." The legal designation of the Secretary of State is simply Secretary of State, not Secretary of State for India. The office of Secretary of State is one, though actually there are seven occupants, each with his own duties (Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, War, Air, Dominions and Colonies, India and Scotland). In theory one Secretary of State may perform the functions of another, and, in actual practice this was done when the late Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, was touring in India. The Secretary of State for the Colonies performed his functions so far as they could not be performed by the Vice-President of the Council of India in Council.

The Secretary of State is assisted by a Parliamentary Under-Secretary (paid), who is a member of one of the Houses and changes with a change in the Government, and a Permanent Under-Secretary, a member of the permanent Civil Service. According to the Act of 1915 the salary of the Secretary of State (£5,000 a year), and the salaries of his Under-Secretaries were paid from Indian revenues. By the Act of 1919, the salaries of the Secretary of State *must*, and any other expenses of the Secretary of State's Department *may*, be paid out of British revenues. This places the Secretary of State for India on the same footing as the Secretary of State for the Dominions and Colonies. The fact that the Secretary of State's salary must be included in the British estimates gives Parliament an opportunity of discussing or censuring his work, as well as of altering the estimates if it thinks fit.

Associated with the Secretary of State is the Council of India, or, as it is usually called, the Secretary of State's Council. This Council consists of a number of members, not less than eight and not more than twelve, as the Secretary of State may decide. The Secretary of State has the right of filling vacancies, and members may be removed by the Crown on an address of both Houses of Parliament. At least one-half of the members must have served or resided in India for at least ten years, and must not have left India more than five years before their appointment. The term

**The
Secretary
of State
for India**

**The Council
of the
Secretary
of State**

of office of each member is five years. A member may be re-appointed for a second term of five years by the Secretary of State, in which case he must state the reasons of the re-appointment in a Minute which must be laid before both Houses of Parliament. No member of the Council may be a member of either House of Parliament. Members are paid a salary of £1,200, and Indian members receive in addition £600 as subsistence allowance. The salaries or allowances may be paid either from Indian or British revenues.

The Act of 1919 made several alterations in the Act of 1915. It altered the method of payment of the Secretary of State, the number and duration of the tenure of the members of the Council of India, which used to be ten, to fourteen and seven, respectively, and the statutory number of meetings, which used to be once a week. It made several minor changes, such as in the quorum of five, which used to be necessary, and the proportion of members of the Council who must have resided in India, which used to be nine. The whole of the system prescribed in the Act of 1915 for the conduct of orders and communications between the Secretary of State and Governor-General was cancelled.

The Secretary of State is president of the Council of India. He is empowered to appoint a vice-president, and to remove him. In the absence of both the president and vice-president the members present may choose a president. Meetings are held when the Secretary of State so directs, but there must be at least one meeting per month (by the 1915 Act it was one meeting per week). The statutory quorum up to 1919 was five, but the fixing of the quorum is now left to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, or the person presiding at the Council, has both an ordinary, and, if necessary, a casting vote. Except in cases where a statutory majority of votes in the Council is necessary, the decision of the Secretary of State is final where opinion is divided. All acts done by the Council in the absence of the Secretary of State require his written approval. In the case of differences of opinion the Secretary of State or any member of the Council may record his opinion and his reasons in the proceedings of the Council.

The Secretary of State is empowered to constitute such committees as he may deem expedient for the better

transaction of public business ; and he may direct what business these committees may transact by order of the Secretary of State in Council. Usually there are seven such committees.

The composition of the Council varies from time to time. Normally it is composed of retired members of the Indian

Composition of the Council Services who have occupied high posts in India, leading bankers, business men, distinguished soldiers or soldier administrators, and Indians.

The number of Indians is usually two or three, and they are now so chosen as to be representative of the whole of India, not of British India alone.

The Secretary of State wields very wide powers. Some of these he exercises by himself : others he exercises with his Council. The wide nature of his powers is

Powers of the Secretary of State.

(a) Acting by Himself

explained partly on historical and partly on political grounds. Historically, he inherited all the powers and duties which before 1858 were vested in the President of the Board of Control, the Board itself, the Company, the Directors and the Secret Committee. Politically, the Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet. With the other members of the Cabinet he is responsible to the House of Commons, and must resign if the Cabinet resigns.

By the Act of 1915 the Secretary of State may act without the Council in cases which he considers to be urgent. In the case of making war or peace, or in making negotiations with, or in matters of policy concerning, Indian States, he may act without the knowledge of the Council and communicate his orders direct to any officer in India. The correspondence coming from Indian States may also be kept from the Council. In urgent cases the Secretary of State may act independently of the Council, but he must record his reasons and notify the members of Council. Except in these urgent and secret cases and matters of war or peace, the Secretary of State must act with his Council, but he is obliged to act according to the majority vote of the Council only in those cases which are defined by statute. In other matters he may override the decision of the Council. By the Act of 1915 every order or communication which he proposes to send to India, unless it has already been submitted to the Council of India, must be deposited in the Council room for the

perusal of all members of the Council during seven days before either the sending or the making of the order. Any member of the Council may record his opinion on such an order, and the Secretary of State, if he differs from the majority of the Council, must record his reasons for acting in opposition to them. By the Act of 1919 the whole of these statutory obligations are made non-statutory. The powers are regulated by rules in such a way that the Secretary of State's powers may be exercised in harmony with the new type of responsible government. In relation to transferred subjects (subjects under Indian ministers in the various Indian legislatures), the superintendence, direction, and control of the Secretary of State have been largely with-drawn. They are now summed up in his power to advise the Crown in the use of the royal veto. In relation to re-served subjects (e.g., those under the control of the executive in India), his powers, though now regulated not by statute but by rules made under the Act of 1919, are also restricted. The Secretary of State must always be in such a position as to give full information to Parliament about Indian affairs, but the spirit of the new government requires less direct sanction on his part. Powers of sanction hitherto vested in him are transferred to the Government of India, which provides him with full information. Rules made under the Act in relation to both reserved and transferred subjects are subject to be laid before, and approved by, Parliament.

By the Act of 1915 the powers of the Secretary of State exercised with the Council of India are very extensive. It depends partly on the personality of individual Secretaries of State whether they are able or unable to make their own views prevail against the views of the majority of the Council, and partly on the extent to which the Secretary of State cares to use his position as a member of the Cabinet. Ultimately his position as a Cabinet minister is decisive, for the Cabinet is not only the chief executive power, but the deciding factor in legislation.

The powers exercised by the Secretary of State in Council may be enumerated thus. (1) Powers which he exercises in virtue of his position as constitutional adviser to the Crown. These powers are co-extensive with the powers already enumerated as belonging to the Crown. He

(b) Powers
of the
Secretary
of State in
Council

advises the Crown in regard to the use of the royal vote on laws passed by the Indian legislatures; he recommends the issue of proclamations for the alteration of provincial boundaries or the creation of new provincial legislative councils; he sanctions legislation regarding the areas of jurisdiction and powers of High Courts; and he recommends appointments. (2) He has the powers, already noted, of issuing direct orders in certain cases to officials in India without the Council's knowledge or consent, or of overriding the Council subject to certain statutory powers which must be exercised according to the vote of the Council. The chief of these powers is in financial control. According to the Act of 1915, "The expenditure of the revenues of India, both in British India and elsewhere, shall be subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council; and appropriation of any part of these revenues, or of any other property coming into the possession of the Secretary of State in Council by virtue of the Government of India Act, 1858, or this Act, shall be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council of India." (3) Similarly the making of contracts under the Act, and the selling or mortgaging of real or personal estate vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Government of India, are subject to a Council majority. The Secretary of State in Council is thus a legal entity, with powers as a body corporate of suing or of being sued. His powers in respect to provisional appointments and appointments of persons born of parents permanently domiciled in India to the Indian Civil Service are also subject to a Council majority. (4) The many powers which are usually exercised in Council, but in respect to which the Secretary of State may override the majority of the Council, at the same time stating his reasons in writing, as in promotions and dismissals from the India Office, and regulations for admission to the various Imperial Services in India.

The Act of 1919 amends the Act of 1915 by making most of these powers subject to the provisions of the Act of 1919 and rules made under it. Many of the powers possessed by the Secretary of State have been relaxed in favour of the various governments in India.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—(*continued*)

3. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The head of the Government of India is the Viceroy and Governor-General, who is appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. According to the Act of 1915 "The superintendence, direction and control of the civil and military government of India is vested in the Governor-General in Council who is required to pay due obedience to all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State." The powers of the Governor-General are doubly limited—by the Secretary of State and by his own Council. The Governor-General is the personal representative (*Viceroy*) of the King, and as such is entitled to the honours and privileges befitting his position. He enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of any High Court in relation to his official actions; he cannot be arrested or imprisoned in connection with any suit in a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, nor, save in case of treason or felony, is he subject to the original criminal jurisdiction of any High Court.

As representative of the King he is the repository of the royal prerogatives and powers, but the delegation of these powers to him does not supersede their original exercise by the Crown. In particular he possesses the power of pardon, which is conferred on him in his warrant of appointment. He also enjoys the various dignities which his office confers in salutes, precedence, etc. He also enjoys the powers which arise from the prestige of his position—powers of advising, persuading, recommending, requesting and directing.

Most of his powers are exercised subject to the control

of the Secretary of State and his own Executive Council. **Powers of the Governor-General** With them he is responsible for the whole administration of India, of making treaties or agreements with other states in Asia, of ceding territory from or incorporating territory in India, and of exercising jurisdiction in foreign states. In cases of emergency he may legislate without his Council, but such laws can be in force for six months only and may be annulled by Parliament. He has also certain statutory powers of overruling his Council.

By the Act of 1919 he has wide powers of assenting to, of voting, of reserving for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, and of returning for further consideration bills passed by the Indian Legislature. He also may exercise similar powers in relation to bills passed by provincial legislatures. He may stop proceedings in the Indian Legislature on any subject on which he considers further action to be dangerous to the peace of India. He may convene a joint-meeting of the Council of State and Legislative Assembly. He may dissolve both Houses or extend the sessions. He also convenes them subject to statutory limits. He may address either House. In the case of the Houses failing to pass legislation which in his opinion is necessary to the good government of India, subject to the subsequent consent of His Majesty in Council, he may act as if the bill had been passed. In financial legislation no proposal for the appropriation of any revenue or monies for any purpose may be made save on his recommendation, and, with the consent of his Council; in cases where demands necessary to the proper discharge of his responsibilities are refused, he may act as if the assent of the Legislative Assembly had been given. He is also the final judge as to whether proposed appropriations fall within the heads of expenditure which may or may not proceed to the vote of the Legislative Assembly. A large number of measures, enumerated below, may not be introduced into either chamber without his previous sanction.

The Governor-General has wide powers of appointment. With his Council he appoints temporary judges of the High Courts. On his own responsibility he appoints a vice-president of his own Executive Council. He appoints the president of the Council of State, and appointed the first president

of the Legislative Assembly and will approve of subsequent appointments made by the Legislative Assembly. His approval is necessary for the appointment of the deputy-president of the Legislative Assembly. At his discretion he may appoint council secretaries from among the members of the Legislative Assembly. He also possesses wide powers of recommending appointments to the Secretary of State or to the Crown through the Secretary of State.

The Viceroy's Council consists of ordinary members and extraordinary members, if any extraordinary members be appointed. The ordinary members are appointed by the Crown. By the Act of 1915 the number of members was limited to five, or if the Crown so decided, six, but the Act of 1919 removed these limits. Of the ordinary members of Council three must be persons who have been at least ten years in government service in India; one must be a barrister of England, or Ireland, a member of the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland, or a pleader of a High Court of not less than ten years' standing. No ordinary member of Council can hold a military command or be actually employed in military duties. The Secretary of State in Council, if he thinks fit, may appoint the Commander-in-Chief to be an extraordinary member of the Council. The provision that the Governor of the province in which the Council assembles should be an extraordinary member of the Executive Council, was cancelled by the Act of 1919.

In practice the ordinary members of the Viceroy's Council are in charge of the chief executive departments of government—Home, Finance, Law, Commerce and Railways, Industries and Labour, and Education, Health and Lands. Three of the six ordinary members usually are Indians. By the Act of 1919 the Governor-General is empowered at his own discretion to appoint council secretaries to discharge such duties in assisting the members of his Council as he may assign to them. These council secretaries cannot hold office for more than six months unless they are members of the Legislative Assembly. They may hold office during the Governor-General's pleasure and may be paid a salary voted by the Indian legislature.

The Governor-General is president of the Council, and he

must appoint one of the members as vice-president. The Council meets at such places in India as the Governor-General-in-Council directs. At any meeting of the Council the Governor-General or presiding member and one ordinary member of the Council may exercise all the functions of the Governor-General-in-Council. All orders are made, and proceedings carried out, in the name of the Governor-General-in-Council, and are usually signed by a Secretary to the Government of India. The Governor-General is empowered to make rules for the expeditious transaction of business in Council. These rules are treated as orders of the Governor-General in Council. Except in the case of measures affecting the safety or peace of India, when he may override the decision of the majority of his Council, the Governor-General is bound by a majority vote. The Governor-General, or person presiding, has a casting as well as an ordinary vote. When the Governor-General overrides his Council, any two members of the dissentient majority may require that the fact that he has not accepted the majority's decision be reported to the Secretary of State, with such minutes as the members of the Council may have recorded on the subject. In cases where the Governor-General is absent from his Council through illness or any other cause, and signifies his intended absence to the Council, the Vice-President, or other presiding member of the Council acts in his stead, with his powers. If the Governor-General is resident in the place where the Council meeting is held and is not prevented from signing because of illness, his signature is necessary to all acts thus made; but if he refuses to sign it, an act of Council is valid as if it had been passed by the Governor-General-in-Council. When the Governor-General is on tour without his Council, the Governor-General-in-Council may confer the full powers of the Governor-General-in-Council on him alone. When on tour, if he thinks fit, he may issue any order to a provincial government, or to officials of a local government without previously communicating it to the provincial government. Such an order is equivalent to an order of the Governor-General-in-Council, but it must, with reasons, be communicated to the Secretary of State, who may suspend such powers.

The Act of 1919 made a complete change in the

organization of the Indian legislature. By the Act of 1915 the Indian, or Governor-General's Legislative Council, consisted of the members of his Executive Council, and the head of the province in which the Council assembled (i.e., the Chief Commissioner of Delhi and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, for Delhi and Simla, respectively), with sixty additional members, thirty-three of whom were nominated and twenty-seven elected. Twenty-eight of the nominated members statutorily might be officials and three were non-officials nominated to represent the Indian commercial community, the Mahommedans of the Punjab, and the landholders of the Punjab. The elected portion of the Council was chosen by the non-officials in provincial legislative councils, landholders, Mahommedan communities and the Bombay and Bengal Chambers of Commerce. Aliens, officials, females, persons under twenty-five years of age, lunatics, bankrupts, persons dismissed from government services, persons debarred from practice as legal practitioners, criminals, or persons who in the opinion of the Governor-General-in-Council were undesirable, were ineligible for election. In some of these cases the Governor-General had power to remove the disqualification. The ordinary term of office was three years. On taking his seat, every member had to take the oath of allegiance to the Crown. As a rule, in all elections persons elected by a constituency had to belong to that constituency as a voter.

By the Act of 1919 the Indian legislature consists of the Governor-General and two Chambers, the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly. Normally a bill must be passed by both Chambers before it proceeds to receive the final signature of the Governor-General, which makes it a law.

The Council of State consists of not more than sixty members, nominated, officials, and elected. Not more than twenty of the members may be officials. Thirty-three members are elected. **The Council of State** The Governor-General may appoint a President of the Council of State from among the members of the Council, or a person to preside in such circumstances as he may direct. The Governor-General has also the right of addressing the Council, and for that purpose may require the presence of the members.

The Legislative Assembly by statute consists of one hundred and forty-four members, of whom one hundred and three are elected and forty-one nominated. The Twenty-six of the forty-one must be officials. The Legislative Assembly The statutory number of members is one hundred and forty, but power is given in the Act of 1919 to vary the number of members, provided that the proportions of elected and non-official members remain at five-sevenths of the total for the former, and one-third of the remainder (non-elected) for the latter. The Governor-General has the right of addressing the Legislative Assembly.

The President of the first Legislative Assembly was nominated by the Governor-General, but subsequent Presidents have been, and will be, elected by the Assembly from its own members, the election to be approved by the Governor-General. The Deputy-President of the Assembly presides in the absence of the President. He is elected by the Assembly, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. The President and Vice-President both cease to hold office if they cease to be members of the Assembly. Presidents may resign their office by signifying their intention to resign in writing to the Governor-General. The first President could be removed from office by the Governor-General. Subsequent Presidents may be removed by a vote of the Assembly with the concurrence by the Governor-General. The first President was paid a salary fixed by the Governor-General: the salaries of the Deputy-President and elected Presidents are decided by vote of the Indian Legislature. The Governor-General may fix such times and places for holding the sessions of the Houses as he thinks fit. He can also prorogue the sessions. The President may adjourn any meeting. All questions are decided by majority vote. The President has a casting, but not an ordinary vote. The powers of the chambers may be exercised notwithstanding any vacancy in the chambers.

The Council of State continues for five years, the Legislative Assembly for three. The Governor-General may dissolve either House sooner, or he may extend the duration of the House if he thinks fit. After the

dissolution of either chamber, the Governor-General must fix a date for the next session of that Chamber not more than six months, or with the sanction of the Secretary of State, not more than nine months after the date of dissolution.

Duration of the Council of State and Legislative Assembly No official can be elected a member of either House, and if a non-official member enters government service *ipso facto* he ceases to be a member of the legislature.

Membership of the Chambers In the case of an elected member of one House becoming a member of the other House, his seat becomes vacant, and if a member is elected for both Houses he must choose either one or the other. Every member of the Governor-General's Executive Council must be nominated a member of one of the Houses, and can attend and address the other House. He cannot be a member of both Houses.

The general qualifications for election to the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly, and the provincial legislatures are the same. A person shall not be eligible for election if such a person is (a) not a British subject; (b) a female, (c) a dismissed or suspended legal practitioner; (d) of unsound mind, (e) under twenty-five years of age; (f) an undischarged insolvent; (g) a discharged insolvent who has not obtained a certificate from the court stating that his insolvency was caused by misfortune and not by misconduct. No

Qualifications for Membership of the Indian and Provincial Legislatures person can be a member of two legislative bodies at the same time. The Governor-General may remove the disqualification (c). Persons convicted of certain criminal offences and sentenced to long periods of transportation or imprisonment, or persons guilty of corrupt practices are disqualified for specified periods, ranging from three to five years. Special qualifications in regard to domicile, or the electoral roll in which a candidate's name is entered, are laid down for constituencies which exist for communal representation, or representation of special interests.

The qualifications for the franchise vary from province to province, and from constituency to constituency. Generally speaking, the conditions of registration on the electoral roll for both the Indian and the provincial registers are

that every person who is (a) not a British subject, (b) a female, (c) of unsound mind, (d) under twenty-one years of age, and (e) has not been convicted of certain offences, in which case a time limit for registration is laid down, may be registered as a voter, if he fulfils the other qualifications. These qualifications are based on (a) community, (b) residence, (c) occupation of a house, (d) assessment to property tax, profession tax or tax on companies, (e) assessment to income-tax, (f) receipt of a military pension, and (g) holding of land. Under the electoral rules, it is open to the provincial legislatures by a Resolution to give the franchise to women, and this has been done in several provinces, including Bengal. For special constituencies the qualifications depend on the type of constituency—e.g., Anglo-Indian, European, University, Mahommedan, depressed class, or any other communal constituency. In each of these special constituencies there are special rules. For the Indian legislative bodies membership of a local body is a qualification for the franchise.

The membership of both the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly is divided between the provinces, and between communities and interests in provinces. Thus, for the Council of State, six seats are assigned to Bengal, three of which are general or non-Mahommedan seats; two are Mahommedan and one is for European commerce. The seats assigned to other provinces are arranged in a similar way. The qualifications of the electors of each province are prescribed in detail. For the Legislative Assembly, seventeen seats are assigned to Bengal, on a communal basis. Other provinces are represented on a similar plan, and, as in the Council of State, the qualifications of electors in each province are separately prescribed in detail. For Berar there are special arrangements.

The Act of 1919 makes provision for the making of regulations for the conduct of business in the Indian legislature. The rules provide for the general course of business, for the preservation of order, for the number of the quorum and the asking of questions. Provision is also made for the drawing up of standing orders to regulate procedure.

The Act provides that if a bill which has been passed by one chamber is not passed by the other chamber within six months, either without amendments or with such amendments as may be agreed to by the two chambers, the Governor-General may refer the bill to a joint sitting of both Houses. Before such a meeting takes place, members of both Houses appointed for the purpose must, under the standing orders, meet to discuss the differences of opinion that have arisen between the two Chambers.

When a bill has been passed by the chambers, the Governor-General may assent to it, or withhold his assent from it, or reserve it for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure. No bill can become an Act till the Governor-General has assented to it, or, in case of a bill reserved for the signification of the royal pleasure, till His Majesty has signified his assent to it through the Secretary of State in Council. The Governor-General, after a bill has been passed by both chambers, may return the bill for reconsideration by either chamber. Subject to the rules and standing orders, there is freedom of speech in both chambers. No member is liable to any proceedings in any court because of his speeches or votes in the chamber, or because of anything contained in the official reports of the proceedings of the chambers.

The procedure to be adopted in regard to the Indian Budget is given in the Act of 1919. A statement of the estimated annual expenditure and revenue of the Government of India is laid every year before both chambers. No appropriation of any revenue or monies for any purpose can be made save on the recommendation of the Governor-General. Appropriations relating to certain heads of expenditure are not submitted to the vote of the chambers, nor can they be discussed by either chamber unless the Governor-General directs otherwise. These heads are :—

- (1) interest and sinking fund charges on loans ;
- (2) expenditure on which the amount is prescribed by or under any law ;
- (3) salaries and pensions of persons appointed by or with the approval of His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Council ;

- (4) salaries of Chief Commissioners and Judicial Commissioners ;
- (5) expenditure classified by the order of the Governor-General-in-Council as (a) ecclesiastical, (b) political, and (c) defence.

In case of any questions arising as to whether any proposed appropriation does or does not come under these heads the decision of the Governor-General is final.

As regards other heads of expenditure, the proposals of the Governor-General in Council are submitted to the vote of the Legislative Assembly in the form of demands for grants. The Legislative Assembly may assent to or refuse any demand, or may reduce the amount referred to in any demand by a reduction of the whole grant. Demands, as voted by the Legislative Assembly, are submitted to the Governor-General in Council. If he thinks that any demand which has been refused or altered by the Assembly is essential to the proper discharge of his duties, he may act as if the demand had been granted, or assented to by the Legislative Assembly. In cases of emergency the Governor-General may authorize such expenditure as he may consider necessary for the safety and tranquillity of British India.

By the Acts of 1915 and 1919 the Indian Legislature is empowered to make laws—

Powers of the Indian Legislature 1. For all persons, and all things, within British India ;

2. For all subjects of His Majesty and servants of the Crown within other parts of India ;
3. For all native Indian subjects of His Majesty, without and beyond as well as within British India ;
4. For the government officers, soldiers and followers in His Majesty's Indian forces, wherever they are serving, in so far as they are not subject to the Army Act ;
5. For all persons employed or serving in or belonging to the Royal Indian Marine Service ;
6. For repealing or amending any laws which for the time being are in force in any part of British India or apply to persons for whom the Governor-General in Legislative Council has power to make laws.

Unless expressly authorized by Act of Parliament, the Indian Legislature cannot make or repeal a law affecting—

1. Any Act of Parliament passed after the year 1860

extending to British India, including the Army Act and any amending Acts to it.

2. Any Act of Parliament enabling the Secretary of State in Council to raise money in the United Kingdom for the Government of India.

The Indian Legislature cannot make any law affecting the authority of Parliament, or any of the unwritten laws, or constitution of the United Kingdom on which may depend the allegiance of any person to the Crown, or which may affect the sovereignty or dominion of the Crown over any part of British India. Without the previous sanction of the Secretary of State in Council the Governor-General in Legislative Council cannot empower any court other than a High Court to sentence any European British subject, or his children, to death, or abolish any High Court. Laws passed for the Royal Indian Marine Service apply only if the vessel in which an offence is committed is in Indian waters at the time of the commission of the offence.

The previous sanction of the Governor-General is necessary for the introduction of any measure—

(a) affecting the public debt or public revenues of India, or imposing any charge on the revenues of India ;

(b) affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India ;

(c) affecting the discipline or maintenance of any part of His Majesty's naval or military forces ;

(d) affecting the relations of the Government with foreign princes and states ;

(e) regulating any provincial subject (i.e., a subject under the control of the provincial legislatures, according to the classification adopted under the Act of 1919) or any part of a provincial subject which has not been declared to be subject to legislation by the Indian legislature ;

(f) repealing or amending any Act of a provincial legislature ;

(g) repealing or amending any Act or Ordinance made by the Governor-General.

In the event of either chamber refusing to introduce, or to pass any bill in a form recommended by the Governor-General, the Governor-General may certify that the passage of the bill is necessary for the safety, peace or interests of India and may sign it, thus making it an

Act. Every such Act must be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and must receive His Majesty's assent. In a case of emergency the Governor-General may direct that an Act of this kind may come into operation immediately, subject to the possible disallowance of the Act later by His Majesty in Council.

The Governor-General has power to stop proceedings on a bill under consideration by either of the chambers if he certifies that the bill affects the safety or peace of British India or any part of it.

The Act of 1919 provides for the appointment by His Majesty (by an order in Council) of a High Commissioner for India in the United Kingdom. The Order in Council provides for his pay (£3,000 per annum, payable from Indian revenues) and that of his establishment, for the delegation to him of any of the powers of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in Council in relation to the making of contracts, and for the exercise of powers on behalf of the Governor-General in Council or any local government. The tenure of the post is for five years.

The same Act also enjoins that ten years after the passing of the Act, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of both Houses of Parliament, must submit for the approval of the Crown the names of persons to act as a Commission to enquire into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions in British India, and to report whether the principle of responsible government should be extended or retracted and whether a bicameral system should be created in local legislatures. This Commission, which also had power to enquire into any other matter affecting British India which might be referred to it by His Majesty, was presided over by Sir John Simon, and, after conducting enquiries in India in 1928-29, submitted its report in 1930.

The control of Parliament over Indian affairs is exercised in several ways :—(1) Direct Legislation. The King-in-Parliament is the legal sovereign in India, and theoretically may pass laws affecting India on any subject. Actually Parliament has

conferred the real powers of legislation on the various legislatures of India. Their constitutional position depends on Acts passed by Parliament, and, therefore, changes in the legal position of the constitutional bodies of India require the sanction of Parliament. (2) Indirectly Parliament thus controls the course of Indian legislation by prescribing the limits within which the Indian legislatures work. (3) Legislation and administration. Parliament by its own Acts has preserved a considerable amount of administrative and legislative control over India. A large number of matters in Indian administration require the formal assent of Parliament, for example, Acts passed by the Governor-General or provincial governors in cases where the Indian or provincial legislatures fail to pass legislation necessary to the peace and good government of India must be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Rules connected with the relaxation of the control of the Secretary of State in regard to both reserved and transferred subjects must be laid before Parliament. In the case of reserved subjects they must be approved by resolution in both Houses; in the case of transferred subjects the rules must be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and, unless a petition is presented to His Majesty in either House within thirty days of the date on which the House has sat after the rules have been laid before it, praying that the rules, or any of them, be annulled, then the rules are binding. Similar conditions apply in the case of the power to make rules in matters where no special provision has been already conferred on the Governor-General-in-Council, subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council. Rules for admission to the Indian Civil Service must be laid before Parliament within fourteen days after they are made. Similarly a large number of rules affecting the procedure of appointment of high officials and the constitution and powers of the various legislative and executive councils require parliamentary sanction. An order of the Secretary of State to the Governor-General directing the commencement of hostilities must be communicated to Parliament within three months of the sending of the order. (4) Financial. Parliamentary sanction is required for expenditure incurred on military operations outside the frontiers of India. The Indian Budget must also be presented annually to Parliament

with a report on the moral and material progress of India. All reports of the auditor must also be laid before Parliament.

The administrative control of Parliament is exercised by means of questions, resolutions, motions for papers, and motions for reduction of the Secretary of State's pay (which is granted from British revenues) at the annual debate on the Civil Service estimates. The key to the power of Parliament is the position of the Secretary of State. As a member of the Cabinet he is responsible to Parliament, and must answer questions and criticisms in the House of which he is a member. If the Secretary of State is a Peer, he replies to criticisms in the House of Lords, and his Under-Secretary (Parliamentary) replies to questions in the House of Commons. (If the Secretary of State is a Peer, the Under-Secretary is a Member of Parliament, and *vice versa*, so that the ministry is represented in both Houses). As a member of Cabinet, whether as a Peer or a Member of Parliament, he is a member of a party, and as such is liable to be questioned and criticized for party purposes apart altogether from the interest of the questioners in Indian affairs: a member of the opposition party may seize on some point of Indian administration in order to discredit not the Indian administration or the Secretary of State personally, but the party to which the Secretary of State belongs. Such party controversy on Indian affairs is exceptional, as the members of the House of Commons are neither sufficiently well versed nor deeply enough interested in Indian matters to make them subjects of heated party controversy. Nevertheless the Secretary of State as a member of the Cabinet is subject to party discipline, influences and policy. His position as a member of Cabinet, too, which is the ultimate executive and legislative head of Parliament, symbolizes the ultimate complete control of Parliament over India.

The modern trend of parliamentary control is towards devolution of power to the Government of India.

Devolution of Control After the assumption of the control of India in 1858 through the Secretary of State, who was given cabinet rank, Parliament became in a real sense legislative sovereign of India. As we have seen, the supremacy, while theoretically retained, has been commuted in practice in favour of a large measure of independence to the Indian Legislatures and administrations. As long as

the Secretary of State continues to be a member of Cabinet, he must be responsible to Parliament, but this responsibility may mean as little to the internal administration of India as does the similar responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Parliamentary debates on Indian affairs are tending now to become more academic than real, and since the passing of the 1919 Act, there has been a tacit agreement between the various political parties to discuss Indian affairs on a non-party basis. Transferred subjects are now controlled by the Indian legislatures, and the convention has been adopted in Parliament of having discussion on transferred subjects ruled out of order. The Act of 1919 makes provision for the new scheme of things by replacing the statutory powers of the Secretary of State by powers of issuing orders-in-council. This alteration makes the powers of the Secretary of State more elastic, and enables him to meet the new conditions more easily. The Act also contemplates the surrender by him of a large part of his direct powers of superintendence and control. Before the Reforms the financial control of the Secretary of State over the Government of India was enormous. All matters of general financial policy, as well as innumerable specific subjects, required his sanction. Thus any reduction or increase of taxation affecting Indian revenues, the construction of major public works from borrowed funds, the construction of larger railways, the creation of appointments in India of over Rs. 500 a month, the issuing of loans in excess of five lakhs of rupees to Indian States, and charges for state ceremonies, required the sanction of the Secretary of State. The lessening of the supervision in other directions has been followed in financial control, which, under the old system, was frequently not only unnecessary from the point of view of policy, but vexatious and wasteful of time.

The administrative work of the Government of India is conducted by its various departments, at the head of each of which is a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. The Governor-General himself is responsible for the Foreign and Political Department and his members of Council are in charge of the (a) Home; (b) Finance; (c) Legislative; (d) Commerce (and Railways); (e) Industries and Labour; and (f) Education, Health and Lands Departments.

The work of the departments is conducted by secretaries, deputy-secretaries, under-secretaries and assistant secretaries, with their permanent establishments.

Foreign and Political Department The Foreign and Political Department, of which the Governor-General is personally in charge, is organized with two branches, with a Foreign Secretary for foreign affairs, and a Political Secretary for matters concerning Indian States, the issue of titles, orders, etc.

Home Department The Home Department deals with general administration, internal politics, law, police, and many other subjects. Under the administrative control of this department is the Indian Public Service Commission, which regulates recruitment to the official services of the Government of India. This Commission is provided for in the 1919 Act, and was started in 1926.

The Finance Department The Finance Department is responsible for the examination of all matters from the point of view of finance. Inasmuch as all proposals require ways and means, the Finance Department is the most powerful and all pervading department in the Government of India. This department also administers the Mint and Assay Departments, and, through the Central Board of Revenue, controls the administration of customs, opium, stamps, and assessed taxes. Through the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Finance Department supervises the financial affairs of the Government of India and the provincial governments. A sub-division of the department is the Military Finance Branch, under the Financial Adviser.

The Legislative Department The Legislative Department is responsible for the preparation of drafts of bills, for the drafting of rules and regulations necessary for the constitution and conduct of business in the Indian legislature, for advising in all legal matters, and for the consideration of the legal aspects of Acts passed by provincial Governments. The Legal Member is a member of all the Select Committees to which such matters are referred.

The Department of Commerce The Department of Commerce deals with ports, shipping, trade statistics and intelligence, and cognate subjects. Railways are under this department, but in reality they are governed by a Railway Board, the head of which is the Chief Commissioner of Railways.

The Department of Industries and Labour deals with subjects appertaining to industrial development and labour legislation. The Department of Mines, the Geological Survey of India, the Indian Stores Department, and Printing and Stationery, come under it. It also deals with public works, and in it is vested the control of the Posts and Telegraphs, at the head of which is a Director-General.

The Department of Education, Health and Lands, which was created in 1923 by the amalgamation into one department of the former Departments of Revenue and Agriculture and of Education, deals with the central aspects of education, local self-government, public health, land revenue, agriculture, famine-relief, forests, co-operation, and a number of miscellaneous subjects. This Department is also responsible for the management of the Indian Museum, the Imperial Library, and the Archaeological, Zoological and Botanical Surveys.

Military affairs are under the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Department, which is organized similarly to other departments.

Besides these departments there are others which come under one or other of the Members of Council, e.g., the Survey Department. The Government of India administers directly a number of institutions, e.g., the Central Research Institute at Kasauli, the Imperial Library in Calcutta, and the Indian Museum in Calcutta. It also controls the Meteorological Department, with the various meteorological stations.

4. SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE PROVINCES

The Act of 1919 starts by making a distinction between 'central' and 'provincial' subjects, and 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects. The distinction of 'central' and 'provincial' is between the functions of the Governor-General in Council and the Indian legislature, and those of the provincial legislatures and provincial governments. The distinction between 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects we have already seen.

Rules have been made under the Act for the classification

of central and provincial subjects, for the devolution of authority in respect of provincial subjects to local governments, and for the allocation of funds to those governments. These rules also determine the powers of the provincial governments in relation to central subjects, and give the list of subjects transferred to the control of the provincial governors acting with ministers. They also define the scope of central and provincial finance, and make provision for all cases of doubt arising under the double system of government, or "dyarchy." One of the most notable features of the Act of 1919 is the very wide field it leaves for subsequent legislation by means of rules.

The list of central subjects includes all those that are the normal functions of central government, viz., foreign affairs, defence, major communications, shipping, coinage, customs, port and coast control, posts and telegraphs, copyright, civil law, criminal law, and certain all-India surveys (e.g., geological and archaeological). The Act does not make any material difference in the previous administrative system. Forty-four separate subjects are given to the Government of India, as well as all matters not expressly included in the provincial list. This provision is noteworthy, as it shows the acceptance of the principle of the Canadian type of federal government.

The list of provincial subjects includes some fifty-two items, the most important of which are local self-government, medical administration (hospitals and public health), education, public works, land revenue, famine relief, agriculture and fisheries, co-operative credit, forests, excise, the administration of justice, registration, factories, water-supply and religious endowments.

The subjects transferred to the control of the governor acting with ministers are numerous. They include local self-government, medical administration (with public health), education, public works, agriculture, fisheries, the veterinary department, forests, co-operative credit, excise, registration, the development of industries, and religious endowments. At the outset several exceptions are made—e.g., in some provinces, e.g., Assam some of the list are reserved. Some specific reservations are made in the larger subjects—e.g., European education and Chiefs' colleges.

Certain heads of revenue are allocated to the provincial governments—e.g., balances outstanding at the time when the new system started; receipts arising from provincial subjects; receipts from taxes imposed by provincial governments; proceeds from loans raised by provincial governments, and from recoveries of loans and proceeds from payments made by the Government of India for services rendered. A share of the income-tax is also given to the provincial governments by the Government of India. It is also provided that the provincial governments must pay contributions to the Government of India. These contributions, fixed by the Government of India for each province individually, have been the subject of much controversy, and have been remitted. Specific powers of taxation and of borrowing are also given to the provincial governments.

The Governor-General-in-Council decides all cases of dispute that may arise between central and provincial subjects. In cases of doubt as to whether any subject comes under the reserved or transferred headings, the governor has the power to decide. In important cases of dispute the governor must consult his Executive Council and ministers. Provincial governments are required to furnish to the Governor-General in Council information and returns regarding provincial subjects. The Governor-General in Council, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, may revoke the transfer of a subject.

The Act of 1919 makes many fundamental changes in the government of the provinces. According to the Act of 1915 the Legislative Council of a province consisted of the head of the province as a president, the members of the Executive Council, and nominated and elected members. In the presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay one half, in the other provinces one-third of the additional members were elected. The electorates were so arranged as to secure fair representation for the various interests in the provinces, e.g., landholders, municipalities and district boards, the Mahommedan communities, the chambers of commerce and universities. Nomination was used to secure representation for special minorities or interests, e.g., the corporations of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, the tea interests of Assam and Madras,

**Financial
Arrange-
ments**

**Cases of
Doubt, etc.**

**The New
System of
Government**

the mill-owners of Bombay, and, in Bengal, the commercial community outside Calcutta.

The present system of government depends on the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects made in the Act of 1919. The presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, the provinces of the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Oriss., Assam and Burma are governed, in relation to reserved subjects, by a Governor-in-Council, and in relation to transferred subjects, by the Governor acting with ministers. All these presidencies and provinces are technically known as 'governor's provinces.'

Governors are appointed by the Crown, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, and enjoy privileges and immunities similar to those enjoyed by the **The Governor** Viceroy. With each Governor is associated an Executive Council. The Secretary of State may revoke or suspend for such time as he thinks fit the appointment of a Governor's Council, in which case the Governor is able to exercise the powers exercised by the Governor-in-Council. The members of a Governor's Council are appointed by the Crown. The number must not exceed four. The Governor appoints one of the members of council as vice-president; he himself is president. The orders and proceedings of a provincial government are expressed as having been made by the government, but a distinction is made between orders issued regarding reserved and transferred subjects. The relations of the Governor with his Council and ministers are regulated by rules made under the Act of 1919.

The Governor appoints ministers to administer transferred subjects. These ministers must not be members of the **Ministers** executive council, or officials. Ministers hold office during the Governor's pleasure. They may be paid a salary equivalent to that paid to a member of the Governor's Executive Council, unless a smaller salary is voted by the Legislative Council of the province. Ministers must be members of the Legislative Council, otherwise they cannot hold office for longer than six months. In regard to transferred subjects, the Governor is guided by the advice of the ministers in charge of the subjects. If, however, he sees sufficient reason to dissent from their opinion, he may require action to be taken according to his own views. Rules

exist for the temporary administration of a transferred subject in case of a vacancy, i.e., when no minister is in charge of the subject. The personal consent of the Governor is necessary for the censure or change in the emoluments of an officer of an all-India or provincial service, as well as for the posting of an officer of an all-India service.

The Governor may also at his discretion appoint council secretaries on the same terms as the Governor-
Council Secretaries General can.

In every Governor's province there is a legislative council which consists of the members of the executive council and of nominated and elected members.

The The Governor is not a member of the Legislative
Legislative Council, but has the right to address it. The
Council

numbers of the councils by statute are : Madras, 118 ; Bombay, 111 ; Bengal, 125 ; the United Provinces, 118 ; the Punjab, 83 ; Bihar and Orissa, 98 ; the Central Provinces, 70 ; Assam, 53 ; Burma, 101. Not more than twenty per cent of the members may be officials. Seventy per cent must be elected. The numbers laid down in the Act may be altered and, in actual practice have been altered, subject to the preservation of these fixed proportions. The Governor may also nominate members (in Assam one, in other provinces not more than two) who have special knowledge of a bill as additional members of the Legislative Council, and, in regard to the bill, they have the same rights as ordinary members. Special provision is made in the case of the Legislative Council of the Central Provinces for the assigned districts of Berar, where the Governor nominates members as the result of the elections. These members are regarded as ordinary elected members of the Legislative Council. Officials cannot be elected to the Legislative Councils, and if a member becomes a government servant he vacates his seat. This does not apply to ministers.

As in the case of the Indian legislature, the Act of 1919 leaves the termination of such matters as the terms of office of nominated members, the filling of casual
Qualifi- vacancies, conditions of nomination, qualifications
cations, Con- of electors, methods of election, the number
stituencies, of representatives for special communities, and
etc. decisions in disputed elections to subsequent rules

made under the Act. Subject to the rules so made, a ruler or subject of any Indian State may be nominated as a member of a governor's legislative council.

It is impossible here to give in detail the composition of the various provincial councils, the various provincial qualifications for voting, and the rules regulating the tenure of nominated members. The system prevailing in Bengal may be taken as an example.

In Bengal constituencies are arranged by community (Mahommedan, non-Mahommedan, European, Anglo-Indian), and interests (landholders, commerce, universities). The territorial division of constituencies is into urban and rural, the number of seats varying according to population and community. The boundaries of rural constituencies coincide with those of the administrative district. In certain cases (e.g., for election to the central legislature, and for certain communities, such as the European) constituencies are arranged arbitrarily to suit the purposes of the election. Nomination is used to secure the representation of certain classes (e.g., the depressed classes and Indian Christians). Commerce and industry is separately represented according to individual interests (e.g., the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Bengal National Chamber of Commerce, the Indian Tea Association and the Indian Mining Association.) The total statutory number of the Bengal Council is 125: actually it is usually about 140.

The qualifications of electors vary from constituency to constituency. The qualifications, like the constituencies, depend on community (Mahommedan, non-Mahommedan, European, Anglo-Indian), and interests (landholders, universities, commerce, etc.). Beyond community, the chief qualifications are residence in the constituency, payment of taxes (municipal taxes, road and public works cesses, choukidari or union rates, income-tax), the holding of an Indian army pension, and the owning or occupying of land or buildings separately valued and assessed at a given figure (e.g., Rs. 300 per annum for Calcutta). The qualifications of landholders vary from district to district. In each case a minimum of land revenue or of road or public works cesses must be paid. Women have been admitted to the franchise in several provinces.

Duration of the Councils The statutory length and duration of legislative councils and the organization of the councils are substantially the same as those of the Legislative Assembly.

Powers of the Councils The general powers of the local legislatures are to make laws for the peace and good government of their respective provinces. Subject to the restrictions applying to the Indian legislature, and the additional restrictions named in the Act, the legislature of any province may repeal or amend, as far as affects the province, any law made either before or after the commencement of the Act of 1919 by any authority in British India other than the local legislature. The various restrictions are :—

- (1) The legislature of a province cannot make any law affecting an Act of Parliament ;
- (2) No law can be introduced into a provincial legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General which
 - (a) imposes or authorizes the imposition of any new tax, unless the tax is a tax scheduled as exempted by rules made under the Act of 1919 ;
 - (b) affects the public debt of India, or the customs duties of any other tax or duty imposed by the Governor-General in Council for the purposes of the Government of India, unless the imposition of such a tax does not affect such taxes or duties ;
 - (c) affects the discipline and maintenance of any part of His Majesty's military, naval, or air forces ;
 - (d) affects the relations of the government with foreign states ;
 - (e) regulates any central subject ;
 - (f) regulates such part of any provincial subject which in whole or part has been declared to be subject to legislation by the Indian legislature ;
 - (g) affects any power for the time being legally reserved to the Governor-General in Council ;
 - (h) alters or repeals the provisions of any law passed before the commencement of the Act of 1919 which by rules has been declared to be beyond the powers of provincial legislatures in respect of the repeals or amendment ;
 - (i) which alters or repeals any provision of an act of

the Indian legislature, which, by the provisions of the Act cannot be repealed or amended by the provincial legislature without previous sanction.

An Act, or provision of an Act made by a provincial legislature, and subsequently assented to by the Governor-General is not regarded as invalid by reason only of its requiring the previous sanction of the Governor-General.

The procedure in provincial budgets is much the same as that of the Indian legislature. The same laws apply to

Budgetary Legislation the presentation of the financial statement, the right of the legislative councils to reject or reduce the demands, the power of the local government to authorize expenditure in cases of emergency, and the necessity for all appropriations to be made on the recommendation of the Governor. The same law applies also to the Governor's power to act as if assent to a demand, which he considers essential to the proper discharge of his responsibilities, had been given, but this power applies only to reserved subjects.

The following heads of expenditure are not submitted to legislative councils :—

- (a) contributions payable by the local government to the Governor-General in Council ;
- (b) interest and sinking fund charges on loans ;
- (c) expenditure in which the amount is prescribed by or under any law ;
- (d) salaries and pensions of persons appointed by or with the approval of His Majesty or by the Secretary of State in Council ; and
- (e) salaries of judges of the High Court of the province and of the Advocate-General.

The Governor has the power of final decision in questions of dispute as to whether any proposed appropriation does or does not fall under any of these heads.

The laws that hold for the Indian legislature apply to provincial legislatures regarding the power of a governor

Other Provisions to stop proceedings on a bill which he certifies as affecting the safety or peace of his province ; to the creation of rules and standing orders for the conduct of business in the council ; and to freedom of speech. With the alterations necessary to suit a provincial council as distinct from the Indian legislature, similar rules.

to those applicable to the Indian legislature exist for the provincial legislatures in regard to the return and reservation of bills.

In the case of reservation, the reservation is for the consideration of the Governor-General. Where a bill is **Reservation of Bills** reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, the following procedure applies—

(1) The Governor may at any time within six months from the date of reservation, with the consent of the Governor-General, return the bill for further consideration with a recommendation that the council shall consider amendments to it.

(2) After any bill has been considered under those conditions, with the recommendations made by the head of the province, the bill, in its old or amended form, may again be presented to the head of the province.

(3) Any bill reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, if assented to by the Governor-General within a period of six months from the date of reservation, may become law on the publication of such assent.

(4) A bill assented to by the Governor, if not assented to by the Governor-General within six months, shall lapse and be of no effect, unless, before, the end of the six months, either—

- (a) The bill has been returned to the head of the province for further consideration by the council, or,
- (b) in the case of the council not being in session, a notification is issued that the bill will be returned at the beginning of the next session.

The Governor-General may reserve an Act passed by a provincial legislature for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure.

Similar provision as in the case of the Indian legislature is made for cases of failure to pass legislation.

The Governor-General in Council has power to constitute a new province, subject first to an expression of opinion from the local government and local legislature concerned, and second, to the sanction of the Crown signified through the Secretary of State in Council. Subject to the same restrictions, he may place part of a province under a deputy governor (to be appointed by the Governor-General) with

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such modifications of exceptions and exemptions from the Indian constitutional Acts as he may think fit.

In the same way the Governor-General may declare any territory in British India a backward tract, and, by notification, establish such a form of government as he thinks desirable, with similar modifications, exemptions and exceptions from both the constitutional Acts and the Acts of the Indian legislature. These backward tracts are similar to the old non-regulation provinces.

The Act of 1919 contains certain saving clauses regarding the possibility of disputes. The validity of any order made or any action taken after the commencement of the Act of 1919, by the Governor-General in Council or by a provincial government, which would have been within the powers of the Governor-General in Council if the Act had not been passed, is not open to legal proceedings on the ground that, because of the Act or rules made under it, such order or action is not within the powers of the Governor-General in Council or the Governor, as the case may be. Similarly disputes regarding the legal powers of the Government of India, regarding central and provincial, reserved and transferred subjects are not subject to legal proceedings. The validity of any order made or action taken by a Governor in Council, or by a Governor acting with his ministers is not open to question in legal proceedings on the ground that such orders or actions relate or do not relate to a transferred subject, or relate to a transferred subject of which a minister is in charge. In other words, most of the vexed questions of the demarcation of powers between central and provincial are made subject to the decision of the executive, not of the courts. It remains to be seen whether, in spite of the Act of 1919, the courts will interfere.

5. SYSTEM OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Up to 1834, the method of legislation of the East India Company was by Regulations issued by the Executive Councils of Calcutta (Fort William), Madras (Fort St. George), and Bombay. These Regulations, formed under the Charter Acts, were often complicated, and in course of time it was decided not to apply them to the less advanced provinces.

The old North-Western Provinces were included in the Presidency of Bengal and placed under the Bengal Code, and new rules based on existing regulations, but simplified, were applied to other territories. Thus the provinces which used to be known as "Regulation Provinces" were Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and the North-West Provinces (Agra); the others were known as "Non-regulation Provinces". With the progress of the Non-regulation provinces the old distinction long since has lost its force, but it has left certain traces in the administrative system. The modern equivalent of the Non-regulation province is the backward tract. The Act of 1919 places the old Regulation and Non-regulation provinces on an equality; each has a duly constituted Governor, Executive Council, and Legislative Council.

At the head of the provincial administrative system is the Governor and his Executive Council. They share between them the final responsibility for the work of the various departments. Each member of Council, the Governor included, is in charge of one or more departments; the division of work depends on the numbers in the Council and the capacities, training and tastes of the individual members. The heads of provinces and the members of the Executive Councils are appointed usually for five years. The Governors of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay are chosen from outside the government services of India, usually from the aristocracy of the United Kingdom. The Governors of the other provinces, who are the successors to the Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners of the old system, are members of the Indian Civil Service.

The actual work is carried on by the secretariat, the organization of which varies from province to province.

The number of departments depends on the type and volume of work to be done, e.g., in Bengal, there is a Chief Secretary, who is in charge of the type of work usually connected with a "Home" department, and appointments, and the Secretaries to the Finance, Commerce and Marine, Judicial, Local Self-Government, Education, Public Works, Irrigation, Agriculture and Industries and Revenue Departments. In the old Chief Commissionerships of Assam and the Central Provinces, a chief

secretary, a second secretary, and, if necessary, a third secretary share the work of the secretariat. The secretaries are assisted by deputy secretaries, under-secretaries and their permanent office establishments. Besides these government departments there are the various departments which come under one or other of the secretariat departments proper, e.g., the police, medical and prisons departments.

In all the provinces there are special organizations for revenue administration. In most of the "Regulation" provinces revenue administration is under a Board of Revenue, the members of which vary in number from province to province from one to three. In Bombay there is no Board of Revenue; the various revenue departments are directly under the provincial government. Boards of Revenue also act as Courts of Wards.

The general administration of the provinces is based on the principle of repeated sub-division of territory. Each area is in charge of an official who is subordinate to the official of the area above him, and who is superior to the official of the area, or areas, subordinate to him. The central unit of administration is the district, which in some provinces is part of a wider unit, the division, and in all provinces is subdivided into smaller areas.

The highest district official is the commissioner, except in Madras where the district is the supreme unit. The commissioner is in charge of a division, which ordinarily comprises from four to six districts. The commissioner supervises the whole work of his division. He is the intermediary between the district officials and the government or Board of Revenue. He acts as a court of appeal in revenue cases. The commissioner, in Regulation districts, is usually a senior member of the Indian Civil Service. He used to exercise judicial functions, but these have now been transferred to the district judge.

The collector is in charge of the district. He is a member of the Indian Civil Service, or sometimes of the Provincial Civil Service. The name "collector" arises from his duties as a revenue official. He is also a magistrate with judicial powers in criminal cases. The collector used also to be a civil judge, but civil judicial work has now been transferred to district

judges. The collector is the representative of the government in his district. A large part of his duty is concerned with revenue administration. In Bengal, where landlords contribute fixed amounts according to the Permanent Settlement, his work is not so heavy as in a province like Madras, where the revenue is paid by individual cultivators. In Bengal he is responsible for the management of government estates, and private estates administered by the Court of Wards. He is also responsible for all matters affecting the welfare of the cultivators, and, in some provinces, for the settlement of rent disputes, and for the arrangement of loans from government for agricultural purposes. He is also responsible for the administration of other sources of revenue, such as excise and stamps, and he is in charge of the district treasury. He gives regular returns of district crops and other statistics and prices. With the growing specialization of functions in administration the collector has less direct responsibility for several functions than he used to have. Education, sanitation, jails, forests, income-tax, public works and agriculture are now under separate departments, but his advice and co-operation are needed from time to time in all these. The growth of local self-government has also relieved the collector of much detailed administration in the case of municipalities and district boards. As time goes on, the functions of these bodies tend more and more to pass into non-official hands; nevertheless he is in constant touch with these bodies even though officially he may not be chairman. In all local elections he is responsible for nominations and general supervision. He is the returning officer for the district constituencies of the new legislative councils. He has almost literally hundreds of miscellaneous or contingent duties—such as famine relief, arrangements for ceremonial visits, reports on anything referred to him by government, recommendations for various branches of the provincial services, interviews with and advice to inhabitants of his district. He has many other functions which are semi-obligatory, such as taking a personal interest in the institutions of the district, especially new institutions, such as night or industrial schools. He is frequently *ex-officio* president of bodies, such as school committees. He is also a touring officer. On his tours he inspects the work and offices of his subordinates and generally acquaints himself, and shows

sympathy with the work of his district. He is also a magistrate. Magisterial powers are of three classes, first, second, and third. First class powers mean that the magistrate can imprison for two years and fine up to Rs. 1,000. As a rule the collector leaves much of the magisterial work to his subordinate officers, but he is responsible for the supervision of their work. As magistrate he is also responsible for the peace and good order of the district. The organization and internal management of the police of the district are under the police superintendent. In matters relating to crime and the peace of the district the superintendent of police is under the district magistrate. In regard to the internal management of the police force he is under the inspector-general of police, who is assisted by deputy inspectors-general, each of whom in the case of the district police is in charge of a "range" of districts.

Stationed at the district headquarters is usually a number of other officials who are responsible for specialized branches of administrative work—such as the civil surgeon, who controls or supervises government or public hospitals and dispensaries and acts as medical attendant to government officers; the public works officer (superintending or executive engineer, according to the type of district and organization) who supervises plans of, erects, and is responsible generally for government buildings; the forest officer and inspector of schools, the area of whose jurisdiction is usually wider than the district; the district engineer, who is a servant of the district board, and many assistants both to these officials and to the magistrate himself. The district and sessions judge is also stationed at the headquarters of the district. Of his functions we shall speak presently.

The district is subdivided into smaller areas or subdivisions each of which is in charge of an official of the Indian, or Provincial Civil Services. These officials act under the collector. Their powers and duties are similar to his own, but less wide. The number of subdivisions in a district varies within provinces and from province to province according to the size of the district. In Bengal five is a usual number of subdivisions in a district, though some districts have no subdivision at all. The headquarters, or *sadar*

**Other
District
Officials**

**The Sub-
divisional
Officer**

subdivision, is where the district headquarters, with the magistrate's residence, is situated. In subdivisions there are court houses, offices, treasuries and jails, as at the district headquarters. The subdivisional officers in Bengal and in Madras reside at the headquarters of their subdivisions, but in Bombay and the United Provinces they live at the district headquarters station. Subdivisional officers, like collectors, are touring officers. They inspect the smaller areas, or thanas (in Bengal). The thana is a unit of police administration, in charge of a sub-inspector. The lowest revenue unit is the subdivision, which usually is in charge of a deputy collector. The sub-deputy collector has no separate charge: he assists the collector or deputy collector in charge of a subdivision. In Madras, Bombay and the United Provinces there are smaller units, taluks or tahsils, administered by tahsildars, or, as they are called in Bombay, mamlatdars. These belong to the Subordinate Civil Service, and in larger areas are assisted by deputy or naib-tahsildars. Below these, in various provinces, are kanungoes or revenue inspectors, and the village officials, the karnam, karkum, or patwari (village accountant), the lumbaidar and chaukidar, or village watchman.

Though the distinction between Regulation and Non-regulation provinces has now lost its force, certain remnants of the old system remain in the nomenclature of officials in Non-regulation provinces. The body of superior officers in these provinces is usually known as the Commission, e.g., the Punjab and Burma Commissions. These Commissions are recruited not only from the Indian Civil Service but also from the Indian army. The higher posts are not, as in the other provinces, confined to the Indian Civil Service. The head of the district is called deputy commissioner, not collector. His assistants are called assistant commissioners, if members of the Commission; if members of the Provincial Service, they are called extra-assistant commissioners. The Financial Commissioner in Burma and the Punjab is the head of the revenue administration. The revenue administration of Oudh is under the Board of Revenue of the United Provinces. In the Central Provinces the divisional commissioners and district revenue officers are directly subordinate to the provincial government. Except that the

**Non-
regulation
Provinces**

district magistrate and his subordinates have wider magisterial powers, and that in some cases the executive and judicial functions are more fully combined, the district administration of these provinces is similar to that of the regulation provinces.

Certain minor provinces—the North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan, Coorg, Ajmer-Merwara, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—are not included in the Act of 1919 as coming under the new constitutional arrangements. Aden, which, up to 1918, was under the Government of Bombay, has now been transferred to the control of the British Government, except for the municipality and the settlement, which are still under the Government of Bombay.

The North-West Frontier Province is administered by a Chief Commissioner, who is also Agent to the Governor-General for political relations with the frontier tribes. He is assisted by a Secretary, a Revenue Commissioner and Revenue Secretary, a Judicial Commissioner, and two or three judges (two divisional and sessions judges and one additional).

The various departments—Police, Public Works, Education—are organized as in other provinces. District administration is modelled on that of the Punjab. The districts are under deputy commissioners, who are assisted by assistant or extra-assistant commissioners, tahsildars and naib-tahsildars. In this province the tribe is the unit equivalent to the village of the rest of India. Municipal government has been introduced in the larger towns. The revenue and expenditure of the province are under the Government of India. Under the Chief Commissioner are various agencies—Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana, of which two—Tochi valley and Kurram—pay land revenue to the Government of India. The revenue administration of the province is controlled by the Revenue Commissioner. For both criminal and civil justice there are two civil and sessions divisions, each presided over by a sessions judge. The head of the judicial administration is the Judicial Commissioner, whose court is the highest court of appeal in the province.

Baluchistan includes three main divisions: (a) British Baluchistan; (2) Agency Territories, acquired by lease and

otherwise; (3) the Native States of Kalat and Las Bela. **Baluchistan** The head of the administration is the Chief Commissioner, who is also the Agent to the Governor-General. He is assisted by a Revenue Commissioner, who advises him in financial and revenue administration, a first assistant and secretary (combined in one office), and other officials, including a number of political agents. The administration is based on the self-government of the tribes by jirgas or councils of elders. The district levies play an important part in the civil and criminal administration. The province receives large subsidies from the Government of India.

The district of Coorg is a petty province south of Mysore which was annexed in 1834 as the result of misgovernment.

Coorg It is administered direct for the Government of India by the Resident in Mysore who is also Chief and Judicial Commissioner of Coorg. The secretariat of Coorg is at Bangalore, where the Assistant Resident is styled Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Coorg.

Ajmer-Merwara is a part of British India situated in Rajputana. It consists of two districts, Ajmer and Merwara, and is administered by the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana, who is also Chief Commissioner of Ajmer-Merwara.

The Andaman and Nicobar islands derive their importance from Port Blair, the seat of the administration, which used to be the most important penal settlement in India. **The Andaman and Nicobar Islands** The head of the administration is known as the Superintendent of Port Blair, and he is assisted by a deputy superintendent, a commandant of military police, a medical superintendent of jails, and assistants.

The administration of India is carried on largely by various services. These services are subdivided into various grades. The highest grade is the imperial services, services which are recruited by the Secretary of State for India. Next come the provincial services, recruited provincially from persons who as a rule are domiciled in the province. Next come the subordinate services. The members of the imperial, and provincial services, and of the highest grades of the subordinate service are "gazetted" officers, and as such have certain rights and privileges.

The most important service in India is the Indian Civil Service, or, as it is usually known, the I.C.S. The genesis of the I.C.S. is to be found in the differentiation of functions necessary for the conduct of the work of the East India Company. As the Company became an administrative or governing body as well as a trading company, it became necessary to create a special body of administrators distinct from traders. Previously the work of administration was carried on by men who were paid very small salaries but who were allowed to trade on their own account. Not only was the work of administration indifferently performed, but corruption was common. Lord Cornwallis reorganized the administrative side of the work. He laid down three principles: (1) that every civil servant should covenant not to engage in private trade and not to receive presents; (2) that the Company should pay sufficiently liberal salaries to remove temptation from its officers; and (3) that the principal administrative posts under the Council should be reserved for members of the service or, as it was called, the Covenanted Civil Service. The members of the service had to sign a covenant in which they agreed not to trade or receive presents. Other civil services were known as the uncovenanted services. Members of the Indian Civil Service were at first nominated by the Board of Directors. In 1800 Lord Wellesley established a college at Fort William to train young civil servants, but in 1805 it was abolished in favour of a special college at Haileybury in England, where they received a two years' training prior to coming to India. In 1853 the nomination system ceased, and appointments were thrown open to competition. The first examination was held in 1855; Haileybury was closed in 1858. The competition is open to all natural born subjects of the Crown. After passing the examination, the successful candidates undergo a period of special training, usually at a university in England, after which a final examination must be passed. On passing this examination, the civilian comes to India, and is first posted to a headquarters station to learn his work. During his first two years he has to pass examinations in languages and departmental work. After that he is usually posted to a subdivision, whence by promotion he becomes a collector, or a district and sessions

judge. By statute a number of posts is always reserved for members of the service.

The other services are mainly the result of differentiation of functions in administrative work. In the early days of British administration, members of the Indian Civil Service were responsible for all branches of work. With the development of the country, other services were instituted on the model of the Civil Service. For medical work there is the Indian Medical Service, the organization of which as a distinct body dates back to 1764, when the various medical officers of the Company were organized. They were divided later into provincial cadres or establishments. In 1766 the service was divided into two branches, military and civil, a division which exists at present. Members of the service are recruited by a special examination open to all natural born subjects of His Majesty. The earlier years of an officer's service are spent in the army, and he retains army rank during the whole of his service. He is liable to recall to the army if necessary. The Indian Medical Service (or I.M.S., as it is usually known) provides civil surgeons, residency surgeons, directors of research institutes and other research workers, superintendents of jails and asylums and professors of medical colleges. Till recently I.M.S. officers administered the mints. They also administer public health work and, largely, the jail department. There are subordinate services of assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons, for both civil and military work.

The Indian Police Service is also recruited by examination. This service provides officers for all the higher posts of police administration. The Indian Educational Service, now abolished, had two main branches—administrative and collegiate or teaching—and was appointed by selection. Officers of other specialized services, the Geological Survey, the Public Works Department (usually called the P.W.D., now no longer an imperial service in the old sense), the State Railways, and the various ecclesiastical establishments, are also appointed by selection. There are special women's educational and medical services.

Indians are eligible for these services on equal terms with Europeans. The possibility of Indians entering the services used to depend on passing the necessary examinations in

England. Since 1919, however, the higher services have been filled partly by direct promotion in India and partly by competitive examinations which are now held in India.

France and Portugal hold possessions in India. The French possessions comprise five main settlements, with other insignificant plots. The five are Pondicherry on the Coromandel Coast, Chandernagore near Calcutta, Karikal, also on the Coromandel Coast, Mahé on the Malabar Coast, and Yanam, on the Coast of the Northern Circars. The administration is conducted by a governor, resident in Pondicherry, who is also commander of the French forces, a chief justice and heads of the various administrative departments. The territories are divided into communes, with communal boards. There is also a judicial system, with civil and criminal courts, and courts of appeal. The various French possessions are represented in the French legislature by one senator and one member of the Chamber of Deputies.

The chief Portuguese possession is Goa. Others are Daman and Diu, with Gogla and Simbor, on the south of the Kathiawar Peninsula. The administration is carried on by a governor-general and council, composed of official and elected members. In each district there is a district council. At Daman and Diu there are local governors under the governor-general. The governor-general resides in Goa.

6. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

At the head of the judicial system stands the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is the final court of appeal from Indian courts. Theoretically the Crown may refer any matter to the Committee for advice, but actually the conditions of appeal are regulated by the charters of the High Courts and the Code of Civil Procedure. In civil matters an appeal lies (a) from a final decree passed on appeal by a High Court or other court of final appellate jurisdiction; (b) from a final decree of a High Court passed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; and (c) from any other decree, if a High Court certifies it as a fit subject for appeal. Certain limits are laid down as

**The
Judicial
Committee
of the Privy
Council**

to the subject-matter of appeals. In the first two cases the amount involved in the original suit, i.e., in the court of first instance, must not be less than Rs. 10,000, as also must be the value of the subject-matter of the suit tried by the Judicial Committee, or it must involve property of the same value. If the decree in dispute affirms the judgment of an inferior court, the suit must involve a substantial case of law. In criminal cases an appeal lies from any judgment of a High Court on its original side, provided that High Court certifies the subject as a fit one for the appeal, and from any case where a point of law is reserved for the opinion of a High Court, special leave to appeal may be granted by the Crown.

After the Judicial Committee come the High Courts, which were established by the Indian High Courts Act of

The High Courts 1861. The present constitution, powers, etc., of the High Courts are regulated by the Government of India Act of 1915. High Courts in India are established by letters patent, and may be abolished by an Act of the Indian legislature, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State in Council. The number of judges in any High Court, including the Chief Justice and additional judges, cannot be more than twenty. Additional judges may be appointed by the Governor-General for a period of not more than two years. Of the total number one-third including the Chief Justice and excluding additional judges, must be barristers of England or Ireland or members of the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland of not less than five years' standing. At least one-third must be members of the Indian Civil Service of not less than ten years' standing, who for at least three years have exercised the powers of a district judge. The other third must be either pleaders of a High Court of not less than ten years' standing, or persons who have held judicial office not inferior to that of a subordinate judge or a judge of a small cause court for not less than five years. Judges are appointed by and hold office during the pleasure of the Crown.

The salaries, and other matters connected with the salaries of Chief Justices and judges of the High Courts are fixed by the Secretary of State in Council. Acting appointments are filled by the local Government concerned, or, in the case of the Calcutta High Court, by the Governor-General in Council.

The jurisdiction and powers of each High Court are fixed by the letters patent creating it. These letters patent may be altered at any time by His Majesty by further letters patent. The High Courts are forbidden to exercise original jurisdiction in any matter concerning revenue. Each of the High Courts is vested with powers of superintendence over subordinate courts, i.e., courts from which appeal lies to the High Court. They may call for returns from, transfer any suit or appeal from, make rules regulating the proceedings of, prescribe forms for, and settle fees for lawyers in, these courts. Each may make its own rules for the conduct of its original or appellate business, and every Chief Justice is vested with powers to determine which judge is to sit alone, or what judges are to sit together for judicial purposes.

The High Court of Calcutta has ordinary original jurisdiction in suits of all descriptions, except small causes, within Calcutta. An appeal lies from a judge on the original side to a bench on the appellate side. By its extraordinary original jurisdiction it may remove a suit from a subordinate court, either with the consent of the parties or to further the ends of justice. It is a court of appeal from all subordinate courts. It exercises its ordinary criminal jurisdiction in respect to persons within or without Bengal, and not within the jurisdiction of another High Court. It has also jurisdiction in marriage affairs between Christian subjects.

The High Courts of Bombay and Madras are similar, but High Courts not within presidency towns, e.g., at Lahore and Allahabad, are vested with ordinary original jurisdiction save as regards criminal proceedings against European British subjects.

The Governor-General-in-Council may alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts. Every such order is transmitted to the Secretary of State. The Crown may disallow such an order.

The power to create additional High Courts is vested in the Crown. It may establish such courts in any territories in British India, whether within the limits of the jurisdiction of an existing court or not. It may also alter these limits, and make such other changes as may be necessary.

Where High Courts have not been established, their places are taken by Chief Courts or Judicial Commissioners.

Thus in the Punjab, before a High Court was established, there was a Chief Court, established in 1866, composed of a chief judge and judges appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council.

In 1900, a similar court was established in Burma, where there is now also a High Court.

Where there is no High Court or Chief Court, its place is taken by Judicial Commissioners, who are appointed by the Governor-General, and exercise such authority as is conferred on them by various Indian enactments.

Below the High Courts, Chief Courts and courts of Judicial Commissioners are the sessions courts, for criminal work. Every province is divided into sessions districts, with a sessions judge, and, if necessary, additional and assistant sessions judges.

Sessions courts exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction. They may impose any punishment authorized by law, but death sentences are subject to confirmation by the High Court. District and sessions judges are members of the Indian or Provincial Civil or Judicial Services.

Below the sessions courts are the magistrates' courts. These courts are of three classes—invested with first class, second class and third class powers, respectively.

Magistrates' Courts A magistrate with first class powers may inflict punishments up to two years' imprisonment or fines up to Rs. 1,000; with second class powers, up to six months' imprisonment or Rs. 200 fine; with third class powers, up to one month's imprisonment or Rs. 50 fine. Appeal lies to a district magistrate from decisions of second and third class magistrates. The magistrate's powers are exercised within definite territorial limits. The Code of Criminal Procedure largely regulates the organization and direction of criminal work. First class magistrates may also commit for trial at the sessions courts offences for which they have not powers to inflict adequate punishment. Appeal lies from the magistrate's judgments to the sessions judge. Special arrangements may be made by the governments concerned for the trial of particular cases, e.g., they may nominate special magistrates or invest a magistrate with increased powers of punishment, except the power of death sentence.

District magistrates have as a rule little time for judicial work, which they delegate to their subordinates. In all districts and towns honorary magistrates are appointed, who try cases from time to time according to their powers. In the presidency towns there are presidency magistrates who try minor offences and commit major offences to the High Court. Magistrates are also empowered to prevent crime, e.g., by demanding security for good behaviour. They are also empowered to deal with unlawful assemblies and to prevent public nuisances. The judicial powers of magistrates extend from the district magistrate down to the village officials.

The jury system exists for the trial of graver criminal offences. Juries are not used in civil cases. If, as sometimes happens in less advanced districts, it is impossible to empanel a jury, assessors may be appointed. The assessors sit and assist the judge but do not control his decision. Juries consist of nine members (in High Court cases) or (in other courts) an uneven number not exceeding nine, as fixed by the provincial government. A judge must accept the opinion of the majority, but if he considers they have given a wrong verdict, he may refer the case to the High Court, which may alter or annul the finding of the jury.

The organization of the inferior civil courts varies from province to province. These courts have all been constituted by various enactments and rules.

Inferior Civil Courts Generally speaking, there are three grades of such courts—the district court, subordinate judge's court, and the munsiff's court. The district court has jurisdiction over an administrative district, and is presided over by the district and sessions judge, who is a member of the Indian or Provincial Civil Service. The district court is the chief civil court of original jurisdiction in the district. This court has jurisdiction in all original civil suits, save in so far as they must be instituted in lower courts if the lower courts are competent to try them. The district judge has control over all the lower civil courts in the district. The courts of subordinate judges have the same original jurisdiction as the district courts. The munsiff's courts, the lowest civil courts, have jurisdiction in suits not exceeding Rs. 1,000, or, in some cases, Rs. 2,000 in value. An appeal lies from the decisions of a munsiff to the district.

judge, who may give the case for disposal to the subordinate judge. The district judge also hears appeals from the decisions of the subordinate judge, save in suits exceeding Rs. 5,000 in value, when the appeal lies to the High Court. An appeal lies to the High Court from the decisions of district judges.

From province to province there are many other courts for special purposes, e.g., small cause courts, both in the presidency towns and districts, for the trial of petty money suits, with a limited right of appeal. This power may be conferred on subordinate judges and munsiffs. In the presidency towns the small cause courts try suits involving as much as Rs. 2,000 or Rs. 2,500 in value. In Bombay and Calcutta there are also coroner's courts to conduct inquests on bodies of persons who have been accidentally killed, etc. The functions of the coroner in country districts are exercised by the police officials and magistrates.

The chief law officers, besides officials such as the Law Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, with his secretariat, and the corresponding departments in the provincial governments, and secretaries to legislative councils, are the advocates-general for Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and government advocates and assistants in other provinces, who advise their respective governments in legal cases, and perform other duties as prescribed by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure. The Advocate-General of Bengal, who advises the Government of India as well as the Government of Bengal is assisted by a standing counsel. Provincial governments have also government solicitors, legal remembrancers (usually members of the judicial branch of the I.C.S.) and assistant legal remembrancers. In the districts the government pleader conducts government cases. In Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay there are semi-judicial sheriffs, attached to the original sides of the High Courts. They are responsible for the execution of processes, custody of persons and the calling of public meetings on certain conditions. Their posts are mainly honorary. They are appointed from year to year.

One of the most debated questions in recent years has been the union of executive and judicial powers in the organization of government. Before the advent of

the British such union of powers was common and accepted without murmur. But with the growth of **Executive and Judicial** education and the development of constitutional freedom, the union of executive and judicial has been held to be contrary to the theory of separation of powers, and, therefore, subversive of freedom. This union is seen at its maximum in the functions of the district magistrate or collector, or deputy commissioner, as the case may be, and his subordinate officers. His functions are mainly connected with revenue, and such other work as we have noted. He is also a magistrate with first class powers. Within these powers he may undertake what judicial work he pleases. He may transfer cases, call for records, send cases to the High Court for revision, and recommit accused persons for trial. He supervises the work of his subordinate officers who may have magisterial powers of the first, second or third class. As the careers of these subordinates depend partly on his recommendations, they are affected considerably by his opinion of them, and it is humanly impossible for them to be free from his influence in their general and judicial work. The magisterial work of the collector includes the prevention of crime, disturbances and nuisances. His judicial work is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of both the sessions judge and the High Court, so that, particularly in more serious cases, he cannot depart far from the ordinary legal processes and arguments. In practice few collectors have time for much judicial work.

Another instance of the union of executive and judicial powers is the revenue courts. The jurisdiction of the High Court is restricted in respect to revenue cases. **Revenue Courts** Such cases are decided in revenue courts, which are presided over by revenue officials. After the passing of the Regulating Act of 1773, which set up the dual authority of the Governor-General and his Council and the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court so hampered the executive government that the revenue administration was made extremely difficult, and in cases impossible. In 1781 the Amending Act took away some of the powers of the Supreme Court, and, in the time of Lord Cornwallis, collectors were given judicial powers for revenue purposes. Later Lord Cornwallis affirmed the principle that executive officers should not be empowered to interfere with the legal rights of

landholders. The acts of revenue officials were made subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. In the course of time the spheres of authority of the courts and collectors were gradually made clearer. The courts do not interfere now in purely fiscal matters, i.e., with the actual assessment and collection of revenue. Questions of title to land are now tried by the courts, as also, mainly, are rent suits. Where rent suits are tried by the revenue officials, the procedure is practically the same as that of a civil court.

7. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The system of local government in India is partly indigenous and partly the result of British administration.

The Village The most typical Indian unit of local government is the village, which is all but universal throughout India. The village is a small settlement with its houses usually more or less compactly situated in a central position on the village lands, and its groves and wells. The village has its own organization and its own laws—usually a number of customary rules. It is usually self-complete, with its own artisans, most of whom exercise their calling as a matter of caste. There are other functionaries, such as the accountant or writer, who keeps the village accounts and the *chaukidar*, or village watchman, who is the lowest of all the administrative officials in India.

According to the division of Baden-Powell the Indian village is of two types: (1) The “*ryotwari*” village, the chief type outside Northern India, where the revenue is assessed on individual cultivators. There is no joint responsibility in such a village.

Types of Village The headman—the *reddi*—is responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and for the collection of government revenue. (2) The “*joint-village*” of Northern India, where the revenue used to be assessed on the village as a whole by a body of superior proprietors, who own the village. The organ of government in this type of village originally was the *panchayat*, or committee of the heads of the chief families. To the *panchayat* was later added the *lambardar* or headman, who represents the village in its dealings with local authorities. The Indian village is the primary unit of administration in India, and, where possible, it has been used as a unit of a local self-government. The village headman

is usually an agent of the local government, with a fixed salary. He is responsible for the collection of the revenue, and in some provinces has powers to try petty cases. He is responsible also for the maintenance of law and order and for making reports to the higher authorities on the affairs of the village, such as health, the state of the crops, and crime. Sometimes there are separate headmen for revenue administration and for police purposes.

The village never really developed into an institution of local government such as we now know in either Hindu or Mahomedan times. There was always a tendency to place it under a local official directly responsible to local authorities. Representative self-government was unknown. With the advent of the British, and the development of local self-government, the village became not only a unit in the general administration, but a unit of representative self-government. Thus in Madras, the primary unit of local government is either the village or a group of villages; in Bengal there are unions, with union boards, which deal with groups of villages.

The scheme of local government over the whole of India varies according to the type of administrative units.

The General Scheme of Local Government Generally speaking, there is a series of local self-governing areas, arranged from lower to higher on a fairly uniform scale. Starting from the village or group of villages, with their panchayats or union boards, the scale ascends through the local board, the area of its jurisdiction being the sub-division or its equivalent, to the district board, the most important of local self-governing bodies in rural areas. Its area is the administrative district. This system prevails in Bengal, with its union boards, local boards and district boards; in Madras, with its panchayats, taluk boards, and district boards, and in the Central Provinces. In other provinces only two grades of board exist e.g., in Bombay, district and taluk boards, and in the United Provinces, district and sub-district boards. The creation of the various grades of local self-governing bodies under the district board rests with the discretion of the provincial governments. The actual numbers, the organization, and powers of these bodies vary from year to year.

The powers of these bodies, and the extent of their

functions, are also graded on a scale from lower to higher.

Powers and Functions Thus the panchayats and unions deal with local sanitation, roads, maintenance of order, dispensaries, wells and primary schools. They have very restricted powers of taxation to provide them with the funds necessary for carrying on their work. Local boards have wider powers of the same type. The widest duties and powers are possessed by the district boards, which represent the whole district. These boards have their own organizations and staffs to carry out their functions. The district board, which is responsible for roads, bridges, medical, veterinary, educational and other types of work, usually has a permanent district engineer, and a veterinary officer, with assistants and offices. In educational work they work in close co-operation with the Education Department.

The various boards have statutory powers of taxation. The main sources of revenue are the land cess, road tolls, fees from pounds and ferries, and grants from the provincial governments. The accounts are subject to audit by officials of the provincial government.

The constitution of the various boards may be said to vary with the educational development of the province. The policy of provincial governments is, wherever possible, to make these bodies as non-official as possible. The number of elected members varies from about one-half to three-fourths, of the total. Other members are nominated by the provincial government on the recommendation of the district magistrate, who, in his turn, receives nominations for the smaller boards from his sub-divisional officers. The local boards as a rule elect a large proportion of the members of the district boards.

Modern Policy in Local Self-Government In the early days of local self-government the chairmen of the various boards were usually local officials—the collector or sub-divisional officer as the case might be. As the boards grew in power and strength, official chairmen were largely replaced by non-officials. It is likely that in the course of time all local self-governing bodies will have non-official chairmen, and that the right of official nomination will be used to secure the representation on the local bodies only of interests or communities which otherwise would have no representation.

Municipal administration dates from 1687, when James II granted powers to the East India Company to establish a corporation and mayor's court in Madras. The **Municipal Government** corporation, with an organization on the English model, was created, but the opposition of the people to municipal taxation prevented it from becoming a reality. The only effective result of this effort in Madras was the creation of a mayor's court, the functions of which were more judicial than administrative. The Charter Act of 1793 empowered the Governor-General to appoint justices of the peace for the presidency towns, who, in addition to their judicial duties, were to have municipal duties such as the cleansing and repairing of the streets, and certain powers of local taxation. The municipal powers and duties were gradually widened, till, from 1856 onwards, corporate bodies of three paid nominated members were created. After the Councils Act of 1861 the basis of the present system was laid. Acts were passed between 1888 and 1904 for the creation of corporations in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. Municipalities are now of two types—district municipalities and presidency municipalities. District municipalities are created by provincial government under the various Local Government Acts. The presidency municipalities were incorporated by special Acts, the Bombay Act of 1888, the Calcutta Act of 1899, and the Madras Act of 1904.

Provincial governments have powers to create municipalities in areas where in their opinion municipal government will be beneficial. Such municipalities are created in towns with a sufficient number of inhabitants to justify self-government. The **Constitution of Municipalities** municipal government is vested in a body of commissioners or councillors, called the municipality or municipal council or municipal committee. In most municipalities the commissioners are partly elected and partly nominated. The proportions of elected to nominated members, varying from one-half to three-fourths, is usually fixed by law, though provincial governments have usually the power to vary the proportion. The proportion of salaried government officials who may be nominated is usually limited. Nomination is used mainly for the representation of minorities. Usually a number of posts is represented on an ex-officio basis. The rules of election are drawn up by the provincial

governments concerned. Voters must be male residents not below a specified age. Property or status qualifications are usually essential. For voting purposes municipalities are arranged into wards, though sometimes voting is by communities. In some cases both principles are adopted. Wards are used also as a basis of municipal supervision and general organization.

The maximum life of a municipal council is, as a rule, three years. A chairman and a vice-chairman are usually elected by the commissioners, sometimes though they are nominated by the provincial government on the advice of the collector or commissioner. The provincial government possesses large powers of control in cases of abuse of power or neglect of duty by a municipality. The government may provide for the carrying out of work which the municipality neglects, or, in extreme cases of neglect or abuse of power, it may suspend the municipality altogether. The local government may also restrain a municipality from performing an unlawful act or one which may cause annoyance to the public or endanger the public peace. The functions of the local government are exercised through the district or divisional officers (in Bengal, collectors and commissioners).

Each municipality has its own permanent staff, the chief of which is the secretary. With the growing work the staff is now increasing rapidly, especially in matters regarding public health, for which staffs of public health officers are maintained. The local government exercises considerable control over the more important municipal appointments. It also, through the commissioner or collector, sanctions the municipal budget, and sanction implies power of amendment.

The functions of municipalities include lighting, water supply, the construction, upkeep, cleansing, naming and watering of streets; the maintenance and control of hospitals, dispensaries, primary schools; the abatement and regulation of public nuisances and dangerous trades, drainage, the construction and maintenance of bazars, slaughter houses, wells, washing places, tanks, bathing places; the preservation of public health by the reclamation of unhealthy areas, prevention of epidemic disease, vaccination, protection from fire and dangerous buildings; and famine relief. They may also

Municipal Staff

Municipal Functions

establish public parks, libraries, museums, middle or secondary schools, colleges, rest houses, and conduct exhibitions. Powers are conferred on them to enable them to fulfil their duties. They may prosecute inhabitants of their area who fail to carry out their orders, and may enter on premises and carry out work on them when an owner or occupier fails to do so.

The income of municipalities is derived from various sources. About two-thirds of the total income is derived from rates. Provincial governments give contributions, chiefly for educational and medical purposes. The chief types of rates or taxes are the octroi (in Northern India), rates on houses, land, vehicles, horses, professions and trades. Tolls on roads and ferries, receipts from bazars and slaughter houses also form sources of revenue. In Bengal, conservancy or latrine taxes are common. Rates are levied also for special services, e.g., water and lighting rates. Municipalities are empowered to borrow money on the security of the municipal rates and property. Loans are usually granted by provincial governments, which fix the term of the loan, and interest.

The Presidency municipalities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and also that of Rangoon, are constituted on a separate basis. The common features of these are large proportion of elected members, a small number of members nominated by the provincial Governments, and also a small number elected by such bodies as chambers of commerce, trades associations, port authorities, and universities. The members nominated by Government represent, as a rule, minorities or special interests. These corporations have a very wide measure of autonomy. The general body of the councillors is responsible for the supervision of all municipal matters. The executive work is done mainly through committees, each of which supervises the work of the officials of its own department. The chief executive officer (chairman or mayor) is elected by the members themselves. In Calcutta, for example, the chief municipal officer is the Mayor, who is elected by the councillors. Under the Act of 1923, he replaced the Chairman of the Corporation who used to be a member of the Indian Civil Service nominated by Government. In addition to the Mayor in Calcutta, there are also

Municipal Finances

Presidency Municipal- ities

a Deputy Mayor, a Chief Executive Officer, and other executive officers elected by the Corporation. There are also five Aldermen elected by the councillors. The only appointment which is subject to the approval of Government is that of the Chief Executive Officer. The Corporations are fairly big bodies elected on a widely representative basis.

The functions and powers of the presidency municipalities are naturally far wider than those of smaller district municipalities. They possess extensive and valuable municipal property, and have large permanent staffs of secretaries, medical officers, engineers, etc., to carry on their work. Their incomes, derived principally from rates on lands and buildings, vehicles, trades and professions and special rates, such as water and lighting rates, are also very large.

In Calcutta and Bombay, Improvement Trusts have been organized on a municipal basis, to relieve over-crowding, develop undeveloped areas, make new roads, lay out public parks and generally "improve" the cities. The chairman is nominated by government. The board of trustees is nominated by various bodies, such as the local governments, the corporations, the elected commissioners of the corporations and the chambers of commerce.

In the larger ports, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Rangoon, Karachi and Chittagong, there are special bodies of port commissioners for the administration of all matters affecting the ports. They are mainly nominated by the governments concerned and the chambers of commerce and trades associations. The chairman is appointed by government. These authorities have their own staffs.

8. THE INDIAN STATES

Hitherto we have spoken only of British India. The whole of India is 1,773,168 square miles in extent, of which British India comprises only a part. The Indian states, or, as they were known till recently, the Native states, extend to 675,267 square miles, with a population of about 70,000,000 out of a total population of India of over 315,000,000.

These states vary in size from a few square miles, e.g., Lawa, in Rajputana, which is nineteen square miles, to vast

territories like Hyderabad and Kashmir, each over 80,000 square miles in extent. Similarly in population and resources there are vast differences. Many of the states lie in arid or unproductive places, such as Rajputana, Baluchistan, the mountainous areas of North and North-West India, and in the Ghats. Historically, these states were forced into these areas, and allowed to exist there, because they offered so little plunder to conquerors. Others are rich and thickly populated, e.g., Mysore and Hyderabad, both rich in agriculture, coal, iron and minerals, Kashmir, one of the most beautiful countries in the world, and Baroda, often called the garden of Central India.

According to the Interpretation Act of 1889, the following definition applies to British India and the Indian states :

Definition of "Indian States " "The expression British India shall mean all territories and places within Her Majesty's dominions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India, or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India. The expression India shall mean British India, together with any territories of any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of Her Majesty, exercised through the Governor-General of India or, through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India." The test of dominion is thus in the courts of law, which decide in whose name writs run and in whom the territorial jurisdiction is vested. In the absence of legal decision the Government of India must settle such questions.

At present five states—Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, and Kashmir and Jammu have direct political relations with the Government of India. A group of over a hundred states, including Indore, Bhopal and Rewah, forms the Central India Agency, under the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India. Twenty states, including Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaipur and Udaipur, form the Rajputana Agency, under the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana. A number of states, forming a compact area in Kathiawar and Cutch, is grouped under the Agent to the Governor-General in the States of Western India. These states were under the Government of Bombay till 1924 ;

they include Bhavnagar, Nawanagar, Cutch and the Palanpur states. The Punjab Agency, under the Agent to the Governor-General, Punjab States, includes thirteen states. These were brought under the direct charge of the Government of India in 1921. Two states, Kalat and Las Bela, are included in the Baluchistan Agency, under the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. Many states are under provincial governments. Under the Madras Government there are five, the largest of which is Travancore; under Bombay, 151; under Bengal, two, Cooch Behar and Hill Tippera; under Behar and Orissa, 26, including the 24 Orissa Feudatory States; under the United Provinces, three; while there are varying numbers under the Punjab, Burma, and the Central Provinces. There are 26 under Assam, viz., Manipur and the 25 States of the Khasi and Jainti Hills. Nepal and Bhutan, sometimes classed as Indian states, are independent in internal administration, but the Government of India controls their foreign relations according to treaty agreements.

The majority of the Indian states are of modern origin. Many, however, were in existence before the grant by the Moghul Emperor in 1765 of the dewani of Bengal, Behar and Orissa to the East India Company. **Historical** How these states came into the possession of the present ruling families is a matter of history. Most of them have passed through many vicissitudes during their history, and now they differ largely not only in the type of population, but in the racial antecedents of their rulers. During the pre-British period their fortunes varied according to the policy of the ruling powers in India or the military power of their neighbours. Some of the states themselves are the remnants of powers which once extended far beyond their present borders.

With the rise of the East India Company to power the policy of the British, like that of previous rulers, changed according to circumstances. At one time a distinction was drawn between ancient and modern states, i.e., between the states which either explicitly or implicitly were recognized as independent by the Moghul emperors, and those which came into existence later. This distinction has now lost its force. The states are now under the protection of the British *raj*, with definite powers. **British Policy**

and rights. In the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 their position is guaranteed in these words: "We shall respect the rights, dignity and honours of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government."

The policy of the British in India in regard to the Indian states may be divided into four periods. The first is that known as the policy of "ring-fence," or non-interference and non-intervention; the second, that of subordinate isolation; the third, that of subordinate alliance or co-operation; the fourth, and present, the federal policy.

The ring-fence policy prevailed during the early days of the Company. At first the Company tried to avoid entangling

1. Ring-Fence or Non-Intervention Policy

itself in alliances or wars. Wars were forced on it for self-defence against Indian rulers, or because of national enmity, e.g., against the French. When the Company was forced into war, as a rule it was satisfied when it had demonstrated its superior force. Thus it refused to annex Oudh after Buxar; it restored Mysore after the death of Tippu Sultan; and it reconstituted the kingdom of Lahore after the First Sikh War. The Company tried to live within a ring-fence. As long as it was free to carry on its commercial activities, it did not particularly care who ruled outside that fence. Such treaties as it did conclude it regarded as treaties made with sovereign powers; it acted for many years as if it were under the emperor at Delhi. But when the Moghul empire broke up, the Company was left helpless. The emperor himself, Shah Alam, under whom it exercised its activities, was seized by the Marathas. In the ensuing chaos it perforce had to enter the lists to save itself. It began to regard itself as a sovereign power among the other sovereign powers of India.

The policy of the ring-fence gradually gave way to that of subordinate isolation. Lord Wellesley from 1798 to 1805

2. Policy of Subordinate Isolation

formed alliances with some of the Rajput states, including "obedience" in his treaties as well as alliance. Lord Cornwallis dissolved some of Lord Wellesley's treaties, but from the time of Lord Hastings to the Mutiny (1813 to 1857-58) the policy of subordinate isolation became established. This

policy, like the previous policy, was dictated by the political circumstances of the two greatest powers in India—the Moghuls and Marathas. The Maratha power broke up into a number of units, with no unity. The Moghul empire had lost all its real power. The best organized power in India was the East India Company, and it was in its interests, as well as in the interests of India as a whole, to organize a stable government which could guarantee peace to the whole of India. The British Parliament, actuated by liberal principles, had supported the ring-fence policy, but the ravages of the Pindaris brought home to both the Company in India and the Government in England the necessity of settling the affairs of the Indian states.

Lord Hastings extended the sovereignty of the British government over the whole of India from east of the Punjab to west of Burma. Difficulties arose later in connection with the subdivision of states which had arisen as the result of the break-up of both the Maratha and Moghul powers. All states, small and large, lost their power of external independence, but the Company, even if it had the wish, had not the agency to control the domestic affairs of the states. A distinction was accordingly made between the larger states, which had revenues sufficient to bear the burden of internal administration, and the petty states, whose area and revenues were so small that they could not with any efficiency administer themselves. Full civil and criminal jurisdiction was given to the first class; in the second class, the jurisdiction was divided between the Company and the states. The main object of this policy was to secure peace and good government within the states. Such powers as were not exercised in the smaller states by the chiefs, or residual powers, were, and are exercised by the Government of India.

During this period another doctrine was carried into effect—annexation through lapse. In the earlier period the

Annexation through Lapse the Company had handed back conquered areas to the previous rulers. With the growth of the British power the need for consolidation became apparent; and in many cases consolidation was impossible because blocks of Indian states came between larger areas of British territory. In many cases the consent of the Company government was necessary to succession in Indian states. The Company used this legal.

instrument to take the territories into their own hands. In other words, the succession of the territories "lapsed" to the Company. The reasons behind this policy were two : first, the consolidation of the British territories ; second, the extension of the advantages of British rule to the inhabitants of the Indian states.

After the complete re-organization of the government following the Mutiny the policy towards the Indian states changed. The Government of India now passed to the Crown, so that the remnants of the Moghul royal power were finally dispersed. The legal supremacy of the British parliament became now an established fact over the whole of India. The old nominal distinction of "independent" lost its significance. Even the word "state" is a misnomer ; for the Indian "states" are only "states" by courtesy. Sanads of adoption and succession are conferred by the Government of India on the rulers of the larger states. The doctrine of lapse is now given up, and the rulers are confirmed in their positions and dignities. Co-operation is encouraged in administrative work of all kinds.

The present relations of the Government of India with Indian states are governed by written agreements, tacit consent, and usage. In most of the treaties made with the Indian states, custom or usage has played a considerable part. In fact, the case-law connected with these treaties has grown to such proportions as to raise doubts in the minds of some of the rulers as to the real value of the treaties. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report destroys these doubts by outlining the beginnings of a federal organization for India in which these states will play their proper part.

The rights of the Indian states are—

1. The Government of India acts for them in relation to foreign powers and other Indian states. Thus they are secured against danger from without. At the same time the chiefs are guaranteed that their rights as rulers will be respected.

2. The inhabitants of Indian states are subject to their own rulers. Except in the case of personal jurisdiction over British subjects and residuary legislation, the rulers of the states and their subjects are free from the laws of British India.

3. The Government of India intervenes if the internal peace of the states is seriously threatened.

4. The Indian states participate in all the benefits which the Government of India secures by its diplomatic action, and by its administration. They secure the benefits of the postal services, railways, commerce and trade of British India. They also enjoy free intercourse with British India both in commerce and in the normal relations of life. Their subjects, notwithstanding the fact that they technically are "foreigners", are admitted to most of the public offices in India. The rulers or inhabitants of Indian states are also eligible for nomination to both the Indian and provincial legislatures.

There are corresponding obligations on the part of the Indian states :---

Obligations of the Indian States	1. The non-interference of the Government of India in Indian states implies the corresponding obligation on their part of non-interference in the affairs of the Government of India or provincial governments.
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2. In foreign affairs the principle is recognized that the authority of an Indian state does not extend beyond its own boundaries. The rulers of the states cannot enter into diplomatic relations with foreign powers or other Indian states. The employment of subjects of foreign powers in Indian states is subject to the sanction of the Government of India. No ruler may receive a commercial agent of a foreign power. He can receive no title, honour or salute from foreign governments. He can issue no passports to his subjects for foreign travel. Commercial treaties and extradition must be arranged for Indian states by the Government of India. The Government of India is also responsible for the administration of justice to subjects of foreign states. The subjects of Indian states are, for external purposes, British subjects, and participate in the benefits accruing therefrom. The boundaries of the Indian states, for international purposes, are regarded as British, and, as they enjoy British protection, the chiefs have no admiralty rights where the boundary is maritime.

3. In their dealings with other Indian states the states are subject to the control of the Government of India. This course was made necessary by the likelihood of inter-state

quarrels arising through old animosities, and religious, caste- or family differences. This condition implies a corresponding obligation on the Government of India to adjust differences in such matters as boundaries, inter-state railways, the surrender of criminals by one state to another, and the punishment of breaches of engagements between states. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report suggests a semi-judicial commission, on which the parties are represented, for the settlement of inter-state disputes.

4. It follows that the states have no need for standing armies, save in so far as is required for police purposes, personal display, or for co-operation with the armies of the Crown. Most of the treaties with the Indian States lay down (a) that they must not embarrass the military defence of the Empire, which implies the limitation of the numbers, armament and equipment of the forces, that posts in the interior must not be fortified, and that there should be no arsenals in the states; (b) that the states must render active co-operation in securing the efficiency of the Imperial army, which implies the free access of Imperial forces to supplies, and the command of communications; (c) that, in times of emergency, they must take the part assigned to them. This duty rests partly upon treaties, partly on loyalty and good understanding. Before the Mutiny two types of forces—subsidiary and contingent—were maintained. Subsidiary forces were forces of the Company stationed in or near the territory of individual states, and supported by contributions paid by the chiefs. Contingent forces were troops raised in the states, for use, if necessary, in the preservation of internal order.

With the changes brought about by modern conditions of warfare, the troops of the states have been reorganized.

Greater efficiency, better equipment and armament, capacity for quick mobilization, and ability to act on a pre-arranged plan are now necessary.

To secure this many of the larger states now maintain Indian States Forces. These troops are equipped similarly to the troops of the Indian Army, and are inspected by officers of His Majesty's Army. They are recruited from the states, and belong to the states. They have frequently been placed at the disposal of His Majesty for service, as in the Great War.

**The
Indian
State
Forces.**

5. In internal administration, the Crown protects the states, grants *sanads* of adoption or succession, and, in theory, renounces any responsibility regarding a ruler's dependants or servants. In practice, however, the Crown holds itself responsible for the prevention of abuses or anarchy within the states. The Government of India may even assume temporary charge in a state; the Governor-General-in-Council, subject to the control of Parliament, is judge of the necessity of such a proceeding. The Government of India also holds itself responsible for the administration of a state as trustee for a minor ruler. The sub-division of states by inheritance, and rebellion due to disputed successions, are both prevented by the Government of India, as also is gross misrule. Thus arises the duty of each state to avoid the causes of interference.

6. The states are expected to co-operate with the Government of India in improvements of their administrative system or policy. Such co-operation depends mainly on the good relations prevailing between the states and the Government of India.

Special jurisdiction is exercised by the Government of India in respect to British subjects in Indian states, foreigners, and military cantonments. Where the law of British India confers jurisdiction over British subjects, or other persons, in foreign territory, that jurisdiction is exercised by the British courts which possess it. The subjects of European powers and the United States are on a similar footing. Where cantonments exist in Indian states, jurisdiction over both the cantonments and the civil stations is exercised by the Government of India.

The various powers which the Government of India exercises in the Indian states are exercised through its officials, or those of the provincial governments. In the larger states, the Government of India is represented by a Resident, who resides in the capital of the state and is in close touch with the government. In other cases, where the states can conveniently be grouped together, as in Central India and Rajputana, there is an Agent to the Governor-General, who is assisted by local Residents or political agents, according to the size and importance of the states. These officials are the sole

means of communication from the darbars of the Indian states to the Political Department of the Government of India, to other Indian states, and to officials of the Government of India throughout India. But they are not merely official channels of communication. They advise or assist in the general administration of the states in which they are posted. Where the Indian states are under provincial governments, agency duties are performed by political agents, if the states are large enough, or by the commissioner or collector of the division or district within whose territorial jurisdiction they lie, if the states are small. In such cases the commissioner or collector does not reside in the state, but he usually holds his court for state purposes within its boundaries. The states under provincial Governments are largely under the control and care of Governor-General at the same time.

The internal administration of the states varies according to the size of the state, and the development of the people. In the larger states the administration is conducted largely on the pattern of British India. The supreme power is vested in the ruler, who is assisted by an executive council. Legislative councils also exist, composed of elected and nominated members. The head of the administration is usually known as the dewan, or chief minister. These states have also a full judicial organization. The administration is conducted on the principle of British India (sub-division by districts, etc.). Frequently members of the services in British India are lent to the darbars of the Indian states to assist or advise in organization.

4. The period of subordinate alliance and co-operation is now in the process of giving way to a policy based on federal organization. This policy is recommended in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. The points of contact between British India and the Indian states have been many. The chief factor in bringing the states into closer union with British India, and the Empire as a whole, was the Great War. The Indian states co-operated with the Government of India in the giving of troops, money, material, and hospital ships. Their acceptance of an Imperial quarrel as their own has indissolubly bound them up with the Empire. Apart from the

**Internal
Adminis-
tration**

**4. The
Federal
Policy**

war, the Indian states have had many other connecting links with British India. In famine relief, in their general administration, in irrigation, etc., they have derived much benefit from British India. In many cases they have adopted its civil and criminal codes. They have copied the educational system, and in cases, such as Baroda, have extended it. They have secured the benefits of the Indian railways and telegraphs. They have co-operated with British India in matters of police and justice. They have likewise advanced in their own constitutional development with the similar development of British India, as shown by their legislative councils. They are likely still further to be affected in the direction of representative as responsible government, when the partially responsible government of India is in full working order. "Looking ahead to the future," says the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, "we can picture India to ourselves as presenting the external semblance of some form of 'federation.' The provinces will ultimately become self-governing units, held together by the central government, which will deal solely with matters of common concern to them all. But the matters common to the British provinces are also to a great extent those in which the Native States are interested—defence, tariffs, exchange, opium, salt, railways and posts and telegraphs. The gradual concentration of the Government of India upon such matters will therefore make it easier for the States, while retaining the autonomy which they cherish in internal matters, to enter into closer association with the central government if they wish to do so."

The beginnings of a federal union have existed for some years in the Chiefs' conferences, which used to be summoned every year by the Viceroy for the discussion of the general affairs of the states. In February 1921 the Chamber of Princes was inaugurated. This Chamber, which took the place of the previous conferences, meets annually, and the programme of work is prepared by a standing committee in consultation with the Government of India. The main function of the Chamber is to discuss matters affecting the states generally, and of common concern to the states, British India and the Empire; the internal affairs of individual states and the acts of individual rulers may not be discussed.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE

1. HISTORICAL

From the point of view of nationality France is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world. By the re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine in France after the Great War, the French national boundaries were made to coincide with the French population. The form of government in France is usually known as republican. The First Republic was established after the French Revolution, but by that time the national boundaries were complete. The unification of France into a nation was the work of kings. Like most western nations, France was welded together out of a number of independent or partly independent elements. The original "France" was a duchy situated round Paris. Surrounding it were many other duchies none of which owed allegiance to the Duke of Paris. Gradually, northwards, southwards, eastwards and westwards the Dukes of Paris extended their authority until "France" included Normandy, Anjou, Brittany, Flanders, Champagne, Burgundy, Aquitaine and other provinces.

The Roman name for France was Gaul. Under the Romans, Gaul had a unity of organization which she lost with the inrush of the barbarian conquerors (Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Vandals, Burgundians, Lombards and others). After the western empire of Rome ended (in A.D. 476), the Franks, a people of Germanic origin, became the most powerful of the invaders. Under Clovis they defeated several peoples who had settled in Gaul. Clovis accepted the Christian religion, and became a strong adherent of the orthodox Catholic Church. The other invaders had accepted Christianity, but not the creed of the Catholic Church. Clovis's acceptance of the orthodox Church

**The
Unification
of France**

**The Roman
and
Merovingian
Periods**

gave him the support of the Church, a fact which helped him even more than military force. The dynasty of Clovis is known in history as the Merovingian dynasty.

Despite the efforts of Clovis the Merovingian dynasty was not able to organize France strongly enough to secure stability. After Clovis's death France split into three main parts—the Burgundian kingdom, in the south, Austrasia in the north-east (from the Meuse to beyond the Rhine), and Neustria, in the south and west. Many bitter struggles took place among these kingdoms, and the Merovingian kings were too weak to cope with the troubles. They lost power and prestige, and ultimately the dynasty was replaced by the Carolingian, the founder of which was King Pepin (752–768). The earlier Carolingians were only “mayors” or court officials of the Merovingians, but as mayors they really ruled France, owing to the weakness of the Merovingians. These earlier mayors, the chief of whom were Pepin of Héristal and Charles Martel, unified France by beating the Neustrians, and the Mahommedan power in Spain. Charles the Great (Charlemagne), the son of King Pepin, extended his sway over practically the whole of Europe. He conquered the Lombards (hence his title “King of the Franks and Lombards”), Bavaria, the Avars of Hungary, and the Moslem kingdom in Spain. In 800 he was crowned by the Pope as “Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.” After his death his successors were unable to keep his empire together: in 843 it was divided into three—the West (France), the East (Germany), and the Middle Kingdom (Lorraine). From this time the name France came into being, but at first it was only one of several duchies.

The Carolingians suffered the same fate as the Merovingians. With the decay in power of the kings the feudal powers of the great territorial nobles advanced. In 987 the most powerful of these nobles, Hugh Capet, became king, thus founding the third French dynasty. Louis the Fat (1108–37) consolidated the work of the earlier Capetian kings by taking a definite stand against the great feudal lords. Feudalism had developed to such an extent that the country was a series of semi-sovereign feudal states. Each great noble surrounded himself with nobles. Personal freedom was

**The
Carloving-
ian Period**

**The
Capetian
Period**

synonymous with military service. The old Frankish free-men were swamped in the new privileged military classes, and it was the side of this class that Louis the Fat championed against the feudal chiefs.

Although the feudal system reached its highest perfection in France, certain non-feudal elements continued to live. It must be remembered that the

Non-Feudal Elements

Frankish people brought from Germany ideas of local self-government which could not easily be suppressed by the feudal system. These ideas, moreover, frequently suited the convenience of the great feudal overlords, who used to grant charters of local self-government to rural areas or communes lying within their dominions. These charters were similar to modern constitutions. They allowed the communes to administer their own affairs through their own officers, within certain limits. The feudal obligations of the commune, of course, were set in the forefront, but along with these went a certain amount of real self-government. A general assembly of the commune regulated its affairs. It gave authority to executive officers, who were responsible to it, and who, under the general assembly, administered communal property, police and taxes; they were also responsible for the communal feudal obligations.

More important were the privileges granted to the towns. Towards the end of the eleventh century many towns began to acquire privileges, which made them much more independent than the communes. The communes had been granted self-government

The Non- Feudal Towns

largely because their organizations carried out the wishes of the feudal overlord. The towns were of two types—Roman and non-Roman. The Roman municipalities were founded and organized by Rome but were conquered by the Franks, who did not however interfere with their form of government. They allowed the Roman organization to continue, but added elements which further strengthened the towns. The Roman organization was aristocratic; the Franks introduced the democratic spirit. The Christian religion, moreover, helped the democratic idea not only by its spirit but by the fact that many of the towns became the seats of bishops who courted popular favour in their struggles with the feudal magnates. These towns were non-feudal.

In the north, however, arose a class of feudal municipalities. The towns agitated for privileges, and, like the communes, received charters which gave them a considerable measure of self-government though they did not sever them from the control of the feudal barons. The charters, like those of the commune, insisted on the usual feudal duties, which were exercised through the provost (in French, *prévot*) who was the representative of the feudal baron. The forms of municipal government were not everywhere the same. Sometimes one body elected the magistrates which were responsible to it: sometimes there were two bodies—an assembly of citizens and an assembly of notables, the former a legislative, the latter an executive body. But their powers and privileges were much the same. They elected their officials, administered justice and the police, levied their own taxes as well as the taxes necessary to pay the feudal dues. The kings, in their struggles with the barons, courted the municipalities, and secured their support. With the growth of the kingly power the centralization of the monarchy ultimately led to the destruction of the self-government which had helped to support it.

Under Philip Augustus (1180–1223) the French monarchy was still further strengthened. France was consolidated by driving out the English from Brittany, Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, and part of Poitou. The king supported the towns against the feudal nobles, and materially strengthened the organization of the central government. Under King Louis IX, known as St. Louis (1226–70), the kingship became still stronger. St. Louis kept the nobles well under control, and devoted himself to internal reform, the most notable being the encouragement given to the Parliament (French, *Parlement*) of Paris, a legal corporation, which became his chief instrument for fighting the feudal nobles. He also laid the basis of the later centralized absolute monarchy, by establishing bailiffs and provosts throughout France as the direct agents of the central government. These officials were made subordinate to the Parliament (*Parlement*) of Paris. Under his grandson Philip the Fair, who came to the throne in 1285, the royal power of the Capetian house reached its zenith. Philip is famous in history chiefly for his struggle with the Pope. This struggle caused Philip not

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Monarchy**

only to lean on the Parliament of Paris but to call together, in 1302, the States-General.

The first States-General in many respects resembled Edward I.'s Parliament of 1295 in England. The name States-General arises from the three "estates" or classes which were represented—the nobles, clergy, and commons. In 1302 for the first time the "third estate" or commons was represented. But the States-General proved to be more an instrument of convenience than a vital and organic part of the machinery of government. When centralized royal authority against the feudal barons was established, the function of the States-General was over. The king summoned it irregularly, at his own pleasure, and while he listened to its advice he was not compelled to carry out its decisions. Each of the three estates deliberated separately; each gave its own grievances or advice. The only meeting they had in common was the opening meeting when they were formally addressed by the king. The States-General never achieved the power of the English Parliament. It was advisory, not legislative, but it served a useful function in giving the appearance, if not the reality, of constitutional government. For three centuries after 1302 France developed not towards constitutional or parliamentary government but towards absolutism.

The States-General of 1302 was preceded by the provincial Estates. These provincial Estates were originally feudal in character. They were in all probability summoned by the overlords to help them with advice and suggestions. The provinces which had such "Estates" were known as Estates-Provinces (French, *Pays d'Etats*). After the decay of feudalism these provincial estates were summoned at the king's will. They were given powers only in so far as it suited the central administration. They bought the right to collect and assess the taxes demanded by the central government, and they were allowed the right to levy taxes for local purposes. They had no definite function apart from the royal will. Like the States-General they kept alive the form of self-government.

The royal struggle against the feudal barons resulted in the centralization of all administrative agencies in Paris. In the days of the Capetian kings, the chief officers of government were feudal in name and character—the chancellor,

chamberlain, seneschal, great butler, and constable. Justice was dispensed by a feudal court, composed of the chief feudatories of the crown. This court was a taxing and administrative as well as a judicial body. With the growth of France the duties of this council increased. It was subdivided into sections, each section being responsible for a branch of administration. Philip the Fair separated its functions into committees. The political functions were assigned to the Council of State, the judicial functions to the Parliament of Paris, the financial functions to a chamber of accounts. The old feudal officials were merged in these new administrative agencies, according to their previous functions.

After Philip the Fair, the Capetian kings declined in power. Philip's three sons, each of whom became king, were not able to cope with either internal politics or external dangers. With Philip VI. (1328-1350) came the Valois house, the question of the succession leading to the Hundred Years War. It was not till Louis XI. (1461-1483), that the royal power again asserted its supremacy. Louis crushed the nobles, strengthened the Parliament of Paris, and, by subduing the powerful Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold, whose great territorial possessions made him a serious rival to the king, dealt the deathblow to feudalism. From the reign of Louis XI. to the time of the first two Bourbon kings, Henry IV (1589-1610) and Louis XIII. (1610-1643), France was torn between internal quarrels and external dangers. The struggles between the Churches, with the destructive religious wars, fell in this period. With Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. (1643-1715), the monarchy reached its summit of power.

During this period the States-General had a fitful existence. Two kings, Francis I. and Henry II. did not summon them, and, when summoned during the religious wars, they were so dominated by religious passion that they were not taken seriously. They ruined their position so much by internal dissensions that, after the death of Henry IV. (the first of the Bourbon dynasty) in 1610, they did not again reappear till 1789. The derelict functions of the States-General were to some extent assumed by the Parliaments or legal bodies. These Parliaments registered the laws of the country ;

**Central-
ization**

**The
Valois
Dynasty**

**Position
of the
States-
General**

and they took it upon themselves occasionally to refuse registration. Such refusal was accompanied by reasons, and as such was looked on by the kings as advice. But the Parliaments claimed to be lineal descendants of the Frankish assemblies, and demanded a voice in the government. Their claim was supported by the fact that they had been able to exercise powers during the minorities of kings or regencies. Louis XIV., however, suppressed these claims, and passed an ordinance making it compulsory for the Parliaments to register the laws sent to them without modification.

Under Louis XIII. and Louis XIV., with their famous ministers, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert the whole administrative system of France was changed. The central figure in the new system was the intendant. Before intendants were instituted, the provinces had been ruled by governors, whose authority was tempered by the provincial estates (where they existed), or the politico-legal parliaments. The intendant superseded these. He became the absolute master of the province, and, as he ruled directly from the central government, the system of government was a complete administrative centralization. The intendant was directly appointed by the king, and all provincial officials were directly under him. Local privileges were abolished; elections ceased. Even local tribunals of justice gave way to special tribunals called at the king's pleasure. The king's Council in Paris ruled France by orders-in-council. The chief agent of the council, the manager of France, was the Comptroller-General, through whose hands all affairs, great and small, had to pass.

From the reign of Louis XIV. to the Revolution there were two more kings, Louis XV. and Louis XVI. During the reign of Louis XV. the foundation was laid for the Revolution. The people were oppressed and impoverished; the King squandered the resources of the country in evil living; the nobility and clergy lost their hold on the people, and a school of thinkers arose which assailed the basis of the existing social and political structure. The theories of Rousseau, in particular, had great effect, particularly as the people were willing to listen to anyone who had a plan to relieve them from their woes. In spite of the prevailing discontent, no democratic institution was able to cope with the central authority. The

**The
Intendant**

**Position
before the
Revolution**

Parliament of Paris tried to regain its ascendancy by refusing to register the edicts of the king, but it was abolished in 1771. Louis XVI., after a series of fruitless struggles at re-organization, finally, in 1788, as a measure of desperation, summoned the long dormant States-General. The opening of this States-General in 1789 was the real beginning of the French Revolution.

The Revolution destroyed the whole of the previous system of government, but the revolutionaries found destruction more easy than construction. The States-General from 1789 to 1791 changed its name twice. First **The Revolution** it became the National Assembly; later the Constituent Assembly, and as such drew up a new constitution for France. With the new constitution and the re-organization of government the Revolution seemed over, but a series of events, concerned partly with internal and partly with foreign policy, led to still greater upheaval. From 1792-1795 the Convention ruled France. It beheaded the ex-king and ex-queen, abolished Christianity, the calendar and many other things. Through the Committee of Public Safety the popular revolution passed into the Reign of Terror, the most bloody despotism in history till the recent Russian Revolution. The Convention gave way to the Directory, which was succeeded by the Constitution of the year VIII. The head of the government was Napoleon, who, after a period as First Consul, in 1804 became Emperor.

To Napoleon belongs the credit of re-organizing France on a stable basis. The revolutionaries had not destroyed the centralized system of the kings. They failed to recognize that true popular government depends mainly on local self-government. Their attempts ended in despotism. This despotism Napoleon carried on, but he placed it on a plain, straightforward basis. In place of various councils and committees of the Revolution he set up single executive officials, with advisory councils. He divided the country into areas of government known as departments. These departments were first established by the Constituent Assembly, which tried to obliterate the old boundaries of feudalism and privileges, and which, in so doing, enabled Napoleon to work out the most logical and most simple system of government in the world.

In spite of the frequent changes in both the personnel and

the form of government, the advance of liberal forms of government was assured. Louis XVIII., who succeeded Napoleon, gave his assent to a bicameral legislature, and to the responsibility of his ministers to the legislature. Napoleon III. tried to revert to the old absolutism, but, coupled with the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, his attempt cost him his throne, and was the immediate cause of the present French constitution. Napoleon's fall led to the Third Republic. The leaders of the Revolution, in 1871, called a National Assembly, which was representative of all political parties; but the majority was monarchical. The monarchical party was divided within itself on the question as to which royal house should succeed to the throne. A compromise was the result, and the Assembly drew up a constitution for a republican form of government. The constitution was finally promulgated in 1875. It has been partially modified on four occasions, but is substantially the basis of the present system of government in France.

2. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE

In drawing up the constitution, the Assembly of 1871-76 made a distinction between *constitutional* and *organic* laws.

The Constitution Constitutional laws were to be subject to a special process of amendment; organic laws were left to the ordinary legislative process by the two houses of the legislature. The constitutional laws of 1875 gave the outline of the machinery of government. The legislature was to consist of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The executive was to be vested in a president. The relations of the houses to each other, the election and powers of the president, and his relation to the houses, were definitely stated; but the election of deputies and other matters were regarded as organic laws. In 1884 an amendment was passed which repealed the constitutional law affecting the Senate, and made its organization and authority a matter of organic law.

The legal sovereignty of France is vested in the National Assembly. The National Assembly is the joint meeting of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The Senate and Chamber for ordinary purposes meet in Paris. As a National Assembly they meet in Versailles. The National Assembly meets to transact the

business for which it is summoned, and at once adjourns. It cannot sit for longer than an ordinary legislative session, which is five months. It is forbidden by the constitution to repeal the republican form of government, but by the constitution it has power to repeal the law which forbids it.

The National Assembly has two functions: (a) the revision or amendment of the constitution, and (b) the election of the President. A revision of the constitution takes place when the two houses of the legislature are agreed that a revision is necessary. The houses separately consider the points of revision, and as far as possible, try to know each other's views. Once the houses agree, the suggested revision comes before the National Assembly. For constitutional amendment and the election of a President alike, an absolute majority vote is sufficient. The houses are the judges of their own constitutional powers. In this respect France is like England, and diametrically opposed to the United States, where the courts decide the constitutional powers of the legislatures.

The Senate is composed of three hundred and fourteen members. They are elected for nine years from citizens of forty years of age or above. One-third retires every three years. The system of election is indirect. The elections are made on a general ticket by an electoral college which is composed of (a) delegates chosen by the municipal council of each commune in proportion to the population, and (b) of the deputies, councillors-general and district (arrondissement) councillors of the department. In case of a vacancy, the department which elects the new senator is decided by lot. By the 1875 law seventy-five senators were to be elected by the united chambers, but the amendment of 1884 abolished this in favour of election by the electoral college. No member of the family of deposed French dynasties can sit in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies.

Legally the Senate has equal powers with the Chamber of Deputies, except in money bills. Money bills must originate in the Chamber of Deputies, though the Senate may amend them. In actual practice, as in most modern governments, the bulk of power lies with the Chamber of Deputies, or lower house.

The Chamber of Deputies is elected by universal manhood suffrage, for four years. Each citizen twenty-one years of age, not actually in military service, who can prove six months' residence in any one town or commune, and who is not otherwise disqualified has a vote. Deputies must be citizens not under twenty-five years of age. The system of election at present in force is the *scrutin d'arrondissement*, which replaced the general-ticket (*scrutin de liste*) method, combined with proportional representation, in 1927. The French manner of election is very unstable. Since 1871, it has been altered several times, the general-ticket method finding favour at one period, and the district method at another. The last *scrutin de liste* was introduced in favour of the district method, which had lasted thirty years, in 1919, and the district method was re-introduced in 1927.

The basis of election is that each *arrondissement* is given one Deputy, but if its population exceeds 100,000 it is divided into two or more constituencies. The principal dependencies are entitled to representation. Algiers has five seats: Cochinchina, Senegal, the French possessions in India, and others, have one each. The dates of elections are fixed by the President's decree. The President must order an election within sixty days, or (in the case of dissolution) within two months of the expiration of the Chamber. The new Chamber must assemble within ten days following the election. At least twenty days must separate the President's decree and the day of election.

The members of each house are paid for their duties, and, on payment of an annual sum, can travel free on all railways.

The President is the head of the executive. He is elected for seven years, by a majority of votes, in the National Assembly. No age limit is laid down: any French citizen may be elected, provided he is not a member of a French royal family. He promulgates the laws of the Chambers and ensures their execution. He selects his ministers from the Chambers, or sometimes from outside. He has the power of appointing and removing all officers in the public service. He has no veto on legislation, but can send a measure back to the houses for reconsideration. He can adjourn the Chambers at any time for a period

not exceeding one month, but he cannot adjourn them more than twice in the same session. He can close the regular sessions of the houses when he likes after they have sat five months. Extra sessions he can close at any time. With the consent of the Senate he can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. He must order new elections to be held within two months of the dissolution, and must convene the houses within ten days after the election. He has the right of pardon. He concludes treaties with foreign powers, though treaties affecting the area of France, or of French dependencies, require the approval of the legislature. He can declare war with the previous assent of both Chambers. He is responsible only in case of high treason, in which case he is impeached by the Chamber of Deputies and tried by the Senate.

The French Cabinet is composed of ministers. The same ministers also form the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet and Council of Ministers thus have the same personnel; but there is a sharp distinction between the one and the other. As a cabinet, the ministers are selected from the houses of the legislature. They represent the Chambers. Sometimes outsiders are chosen for cabinet positions; but whether members of the Chambers or not, they can attend the meetings and take a privileged part in debate. A minister can speak at any time, though he can vote only in the chamber of which he is a member. The ministers are responsible to the Chambers by law, not only by custom, as in England. They can hold office only so long as they command the support of the houses, or, more particularly, of the Chamber of Deputies.

As a Council of Ministers the ministers are the nominees of the President. They sit as a Council in the presence of the President, under a president of Council chosen by themselves. The duty of the Council is to exercise general supervision over the execution of the laws. In case of the death or resignation of the President, the Council acts till a successor is appointed. The Council is a definite legal body, whereas the Cabinet is not.

The twofold aspect of the same body is really the key to its relations with the President. As a Council of Ministers the body is the servant of a President. As a

cabinet, it is his master. The President must choose ministers who command the support of the legislature, else the administration could not be carried on.

The Relations of President, Cabinet and Council of Ministers Every decree of the President must be countersigned by the minister whose department it affects. Not only so, but most presidential decrees involve the expenditure of public money which brings them within the purview of the Chambers. Even the President's salary and allowances depend on the budget, which is presented by the Minister of Finance and passed by the Chambers.

The same is true of the official patronage of the President. Appointments to the public service require the countersignature of ministers, which practically means that appointments are in the hands of ministers. In France the number of appointments at the disposal of ministers is greater than in America, but the "spoils system" of America has not been repeated in France, though the temptation is greater, owing to the dependence of French ministers on the Chambers.

The number of ministries varies from time to time. At present there are fourteen—the Ministers of War; Justice; The Interior; Foreign Affairs (who is also the Prime Minister); Marine; Finance; Colonies; **The Ministries** Public Instruction and Fine Arts; Public Works; Commerce; Agriculture; Labour, Hygiene, Assistance and Social Prevision; Pensions; and Air.

Bills may be proposed either by ministers (in the name of the President) or by private members. They may be initiated in either chamber, but money bills must originate in the Chamber of Deputies. Once a bill is presented, it has to go to a special committee for consideration. A member of this committee is chosen to "report" on it to the chamber. Private members' bills go to a special committee called the monthly committee on Parliamentary Initiative, but an emergency vote can save ministers' bills from the committee stage or private members' bills from the Initiative committee. After report from the committees each bill must go through two readings before it is presented to the other chamber.

Committees are formed in a distinctive way. During the session every month the houses are divided into *bureaux*, or

sections (nineteen in the Senate and eleven in the Chamber of Deputies). From the Senate *bureaux* are selected the various committees to which bills are referred. The *bureaux* of the Chamber of Deputies examine the certificates of election. Other *bureaux* are chosen by the Chamber for electing special committees other than the standing committees. Committees used to be appointed temporarily, i.e., till they completed the work for which they were appointed. Now they are standing committees, elected for the whole year. In the Senate they are elected by the *bureaux*; in the Chamber their composition is determined by the parties, each party being represented proportionately. The budget committee of the Chamber of Deputies is the most important. It is elected for one year. It consists of forty-five members. Its equivalent in the Senate is the finance committee, which consists of eighteen members. These committees examine, criticize, and, in fact, control the whole course of financial legislation.

In France, as in other continental countries, the system of Administrative law prevails, by which public officers are free from interference by the ordinary courts. The laws, too, are carried out by the executive according to the spirit of the law. The legislature lays down the general principles; the executive fixes details, and makes all provision for carrying out the law. It may even supplement the law if it does not cover all the cases. The legality of such administrative action being free from the ordinary courts, the hand of the executive is greatly strengthened.

The French ministries are notoriously unstable. They change much more frequently than the English Cabinet.

The main reasons for the instability are two :
 (a) the existence of the multiple party system,
 and (b) interpellations. Ministers are subject to two types of question, first, the direct question, and second, the interpellation. Any member of either house on due notice may ask a direct question of a minister regarding his department, and, unless the question cannot be answered without detriment to the public good, he must receive an answer. An interpellation is a special type of question. It does not require notice and it is usually followed by a debate. The interpellation

**Instability
of French
Ministries :
Questions
and Inter-
pellations**

is a challenge to the policy of government on a definite point. A vote is as a rule taken to decide the issue. The result of this is that ministers are frequently taken by surprise, often on minor points, and by a mere chance or trick are defeated on the vote. Resignation follows, and the ministry is replaced by another, which is subject to the same procedure. Owing to the multiple party system, ministers as a rule have not a homogeneous party behind them, so that surprise votes are easily arranged by discontented members.

The judicial system of France has two distinct branches—the ordinary judicial system and the administrative law system. The ordinary judicial system has two classes of courts (*a*) civil and criminal, and (*b*) special, which includes courts dealing with purely commercial cases.

In the first class of the ordinary courts, the lowest tribunal is that of the Justice of the Peace. Justices of the Peace are appointed, and removable by the President. Each canton has a Justice of the Peace, whose jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, is exercised within definite limits. As a criminal magistrate, he presides over the police court, the lowest criminal court. Graver criminal cases are tried by the correctional courts which, consists of three judges, with no jury. Such cases are first secretly examined by an examining magistrate (*juge d'instruction*) who may either dismiss the case or commit it for trial. In civil cases involving small amounts, and in petty criminal cases, no appeal lies from the Justice of the Peace to the higher courts. In certain urgent cases, or cases requiring local knowledge, he has wider jurisdiction. In more important cases appeal lies from him to the courts of first instance, or *arrondissement* courts. Justices of the Peace have to try their best to reconcile parties: no suit can be brought before the next grade of court till the Justices have been unsuccessful in bringing disputants to an agreement.

The next grade of court is the courts of the first instance or *arrondissement* courts. These exist in practically every *arrondissement*. They are courts of appeal from the Justices of the Peace, and have original jurisdiction within certain prescribed limits. Appeal lies from them to the court of appeal. The courts of the first instance have a president, one or more vice-presidents, and a variable number of judges. A

public prosecutor is attached to each court. The next stage in the judicial organization is the court of appeal. In all there are twenty-six courts of appeal, each of which has jurisdiction over an area varying from one to five departments. Each appeal court is organized in sections. The head of the whole court is the president. These courts hear appeals from the lower courts, and have original jurisdiction in a few matters, such as the discharge of bankrupts. Another function of these courts is to decide whether criminal cases are to be tried by the lower courts or the assize courts.

Assize courts are held every three months in each department. The assizes are presided over by a judge or "councillor" of the courts of appeal. The assizes try the more serious criminal cases. At these courts there is a jury of twelve, as in the English system. Juries decide on facts only; the application of law is left to the judges.

The highest court in France is the Cassation Court, or the court for the reversal of appeals. It sits in Paris and is divided into three sections, the Court of Petitions, the Civil Court, and the Criminal Court. Each section is presided over by a sectional president, the head of the whole court being the first president. The Cassation Court hears appeals from all lower courts (except the administrative courts).

Commercial courts are established in large towns to hear commercial cases. The judges are chosen from the leading merchants. If there is no commercial court, commercial cases are heard by the ordinary courts of first instance. Other courts (courts of arbitrators) are sometimes established in industrial centres to deal with industrial disputes.

The judges in France are appointed by the President (which means the Minister of Justice) for good behaviour. They can be removed only by a decision of the Cassation Court constituted as the Superior Council (*Council Supérieur*) of the magistracy.

Administrative courts exist to try cases arising in the course of administration. The supreme court is the Council of State, which is presided over by the Minister of Justice. Its members are all nominated by the president, and its duty is to give an opinion on all questions referred to it by the government. It is the final court in administrative suits. This court also prepares rules for the public

administration. There are other administrative courts, the prefectural councils. Between the ordinary law and administrative law courts there is the Court of Conflicts. Its function is to determine the jurisdiction to which a given case belongs, and it is composed of members of each type of court.

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE

The French system of local government is the most symmetrical in the world. The administrative divisions were created by the Constituent Assembly at the Revolution. This Assembly swept away all the old divisions with their historical complexities and set up a new machinery based on administrative requirements.

For purposes of local government, France is divided into *départements*, *arrondissements*, *cantons* and *communes*. The department is the supreme division. The *arrondissements*, *cantons* and *communes* are only subdivisions of it. The chief official in the department is the prefect, who is appointed by the President and is the direct agent of the central government, and has very wide functions. He supervises the execution of the laws, issues police regulations, nominates subordinate officials and exercises a general control over all the officials in the department. He is the recruiting officer and also chief educational officer of the department. He is the agent of the local legislative body, the General Council of the department, but in reality he controls the work of the Council, as it is only through him that the Council can have its resolutions carried into effect. The acts of the prefect may be vetoed by a minister, but no minister can act independently of him. He must act through him.

The General Council of the department is elected by universal suffrage, each canton contributing one member.

The General Council of the Department Councillors are elected for six years; one-half of the membership is renewed every three years. The Council has two regular sessions every year; these sessions are limited by law to fifteen days for the first and one month for the second. Extra sessions of eight days each may be called by the President at the written request of two-thirds of the members. If the Council sits longer than it is legally entitled to, it may

be dissolved by the prefect: if it goes beyond its legal powers, its acts may be set aside by presidential decree. The members are not paid for attendance, but they are fined for absence.

The powers of the Council are strictly limited. Its main duty is to supervise the work of the department. It has little power of originating legislation, but its decisions on local matters are usually final. Its chief functions are to assign the quota of taxes (the amount and the source of taxes are determined by the Chamber of Deputies in Paris) to each arrondissement; it authorizes the sale, purchase, exchange, or renting of departmental property; it superintends such property; it authorizes the construction of new roads, railways, canals, and bridges, it votes the pay of the police, and generally gives advice on local matters to the central government. Political questions are rigorously excluded from its scope.

The next division, the arrondissement, is the electoral area for the Chamber of Deputies. The head of the arrondissement is the sub-prefect. His powers are more limited than those of the prefect, but, like the prefect, he is the representative of the central government. There is a district (arrondissement) council, to which each canton sends a member chosen by universal suffrage. The arrondissement has neither property nor a budget of its own, so its chief function is to allot to the communes the share of the direct taxes imposed on the arrondissement by the General Council.

The canton is purely an administrative division. It has no administrative organization of its own. It is the electoral district from which members are chosen for the general and district councils. It is the area of Jurisdiction for Justices of the Peace. It is also a muster district for the army.

The commune is the primary unit of French local government. Communes are both rural and urban. All towns are communes. The chief magistrate in the commune is the mayor. The mayor, unlike the officials of other local areas, is elected, not nominated. Mayors and deputy mayors are elected for four years from, and by, the members of the municipal council. Mayors are usually assisted by deputy mayors, the number of whom

varies according to the population of the commune. Thus in a commune of 2,500 inhabitants there is one deputy ; in a big city like Lyons seventeen deputies are allowed. The mayor is, first, the agent of the central government. Once he is elected, he becomes responsible not to the council which elected him but to the central government. He and his deputies may be suspended for one month by the prefect, or for three months by the Minister of the Interior. All his acts may be set aside by the prefect or Minister of the Interior. He may even be removed by the central government.

Second, the mayor is the executive head of the municipality, and as such he is responsible for the supervision of municipal work and services. The municipal council is elected by universal suffrage. Its numbers vary according to the size and population of the commune, and it decides on affairs affecting it. Its decisions become operative a month after they are passed, save in matters which transcend the interests of the commune, when the prefect, or general council, and, in cases, the President must approve. The council also chooses communal delegates for the election of senators, and draws up a list of assessors, from whom the sub-prefect selects ten, for the allocation of taxes among taxpayers. The meetings are presided over by the mayor, except when his own accounts are discussed, and then the meeting is open to the public. Sessions last fourteen days, with the exception of a financial session, which may last six weeks. It holds four regular sessions every year. The council may be suspended for one month by the prefect, or dissolved altogether by decree of the President, passed in the Council of Ministers. In the event of dissolution work is carried on temporarily by a small council nominated by the President till a new election takes place.

CHAPTER XXV

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. HISTORICAL

The government of the United States is the most complete and highly organized example of federalism in the modern world. The makers of the American constitution had to face none of the difficulties which confronted the makers of modern Germany. In Germany Bismarck had many historical questions to consider when he created the German Empire ; but the Americans were able from the beginning to make a government which suited the country and people. They had not to consider the claims of local princes or the jealousies of old-established dynasties. Once they achieved independence, they were free to experiment with forms of government and to find out what was best for them. The present form of government is based on the constitution of the 17th September, 1787, which was adopted after a series of experiments ; but it is noteworthy that from the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the adoption of the constitution a period of only eleven years elapsed, and the completeness of the new constitution may be judged by the fact that up to the present day only nineteen amendments have been made.

In the early days of America, the great majority of citizens were English colonists. Naturally, the early political institutions were English in character, though they were altered to suit the needs of a new country and to prevent the particular constitutional drawbacks which had forced the colonists to leave England. This English character of American

**General
Remarks**

**The
Early
Americans**

institutions is one of the fundamental facts of modern American political life. It is true that the American population is now very mixed—it contains large elements of practically every European nationality, as well as Japanese, Chinese, and Africans. But even to-day the main stock of the United States is British, either by descent or of the first generation, and the political institutions of the country were originally adaptations of English models to American conditions.

In the first days of English colonization there were of course no "states" or provinces as there are now. The

**Early Colon-
ization:
Three
Types**

colonists made homes for themselves, where opportunity offered. These homes or settlements gradually expanded as the population grew. When settlements became sufficiently large to require definite organs of government, the colonists adapted the English forms of local government to their needs. One settlement adopted one form: another, another form. There was no uniformity of pattern. The New England colonies had one type. Virginia another, while Pennsylvania and New Jersey had a special type with characteristics of both the previous types. Thus there were three types—the New England colonies, the Virginian, or southern colonies, and the middle colonies.

The characteristics of each type were mainly the result of the type of life led by the colonists. In New England, the colonies settled in townships. These townships

**The New
England
Colonies**

grew up in large numbers, often close by each other. The New Englanders were a trading population, and trade meant inter-communication between townships. The earlier colonists, too, had left England because of the prevailing religious intolerance. The church, therefore, was to them an organization of the highest importance, both spiritual and temporal. Each community had its church and school-house, and round the church in particular revolved the whole life of the inhabitants. The pastor of the church was the head of the community, and church membership was tantamount to citizenship. The townships were organized largely on the English pattern. The old English official designations were continued, but in all the townships the form of government was more democratic than in contemporary England. There was a general town meeting which all citizens (which usually meant all

church members) could attend. This meeting elected the township officials, who were responsible to the town meeting. As towns multiplied, a certain amount of union became essential, but it did not destroy either the organization or the independence of the townships. Through changes both great and small, the townships preserved their individuality, and to-day they are the basis of local government in the old New England states. With the growing population governmental machinery became more complex. Counties were formed, for judicial purposes, and gradually areas of government were created, with suitable organizations, which later became the "states" of the American federal union.

**The
Virginian
or Southern
Colonies** In Virginia, and the southern colonies, there was a very marked contrast to the New England colonies. The southern colonists, in the first place, did not emigrate to America because of religious disabilities. They emigrated to a land which held a fairer promise of livelihood. They were merchant adventurers, sent out under a merchant company, the Virginia Company, which had been granted certain privileges by the Crown. In the second place, the type of colonist and the type of life were both different. In the southern colonies vast areas were available for agriculture. Both the climate and the soil were different from those of New England, so that from the beginning the southern colonies resembled the counties, just as the northern colonies were like the towns, of England. In the south, therefore, the county type of life was reproduced. The organization of government was on the English county plan, with the lieutenant (the equivalent of the English lord-lieutenant), who was appointed by the governor (who, in his turn, was appointed by the Company), the sheriff, and the justices, the equivalent of the English J.P.'s. The settlers lived under an ordered government just as they did in England. They recognized an established or state church, in marked contrast to the "free" churchmen of New England. Not only so, but they reproduced the aristocratic tone of English country life, the survival of the old feudal system. Social gradations were as marked as in England; the owner of a plantation took the place of the English squire. The population was mixed. The settlers were of various social grades, but they continued in the same old English relationship. The ordinary routine

of English country life was observed as far as the new conditions would allow. Pride of family and descent—many noble families emigrated to Virginia, particularly after the Civil War—was as markedly present in Virginia as it was absent in New England. Later this difference led to the American Civil War. Theoretically the war was fought on the question of slavery—for the introduction of slavery in the south had led to still more social distinctions. Actually the war was the climax of a complete difference of outlook between the old aristocratic type of settler and the democratic settler of the north.

The southern colonies were all governed much on the same pattern. At first a governor was nominated by the Company, with a council which included the chief officials of the colony. The Company governor was afterwards replaced by a royal governor or governor nominated direct by the Crown. The chief representative organ of government was the assembly. The assembly at first represented the plantations, but as time went on and the population grew, a more complex system of counties, towns and hundreds, on the old English pattern, developed. In its early days the assembly was known as the House of Burgesses. The old name "assembly" has continued to the present day; in most of the states the two houses of the legislature collectively are known as the "General Assembly."

In the third class, or middle colonies, there was a mixture of the characteristic elements of the other two classes. These colonies were mixed in population. Although the English dominated in the colonies, before their arrival Swedes and Dutch had a fairly strong hold. The type of life, again, was partly trading, as in New England, and partly agricultural, as in Virginia. Thus, they settled in townships, as in the New England colonies, and in farms or plantations, as in Virginia. They were democratic in the towns, and partly democratic and partly aristocratic in the counties. They had the characteristics of both north and south in their government organizations, i.e., townships and counties.

Between the early days of the American colonies and the Declaration of Independence, many forms of government and control were tried by England. In these days America seemed a very distant land, and much of the English policy

was due either to ignorance or to a desire not to be troubled with the internal affairs of these far-off settlements. In all

three types of government were current in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, namely, **The Early Forms of Government** government by charters, proprietary government, and direct government by the Crown.

In each of these types necessarily the major share or power actually exercised rested in the colonies. Naturally the colonial organs of government increased in power as the population and importance of the colonies grew, but for many years the British Parliament almost completely neglected them, and during the long period of neglect the colonial assemblies had developed so far that, when the struggle with England came, all the colonies, whether northern, middle, or southern, and whether chartered, proprietary or direct, made common cause against the old country. The colonies had developed national feeling, and attempted repression led to independence.

In the first, or chartered type of government, charters were given by the King to the colonies. They were given to **Charters** companies, such as the Virginia Company and the Massachusetts Company. The three New England companies—Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island—each possessed a charter. The duration of the charter depended largely on how the company pleased the English authorities. The Virginia Company lost its charter soon after it was granted, while the Massachusetts charter lasted from 1629 to 1692. The Connecticut and Rhode Island Charters lasted throughout their existence as colonies, and ultimately became their state constitutions.

Proprietary governments arose from charters granted to the colonies by private proprietors to whom the colonies had been granted by the Crown. Thus Maryland **Proprietary Government** belonged to the Calvert family (Lord Baltimore), Pennsylvania and Delaware to William Penn, and New York to the Duke of York (afterwards James II.). The proprietors appointed the governors and councils, but as a rule granted a considerable measure of power to the people in their charter of government. Penn's charter to Pennsylvania, in particular, was a notable expression of the liberal ideas of the day in respect to colonial government.

Direct government by the English Crown meant that the governors and council were appointed by the Crown. These officials were responsible to the Crown, but in course of time the Crown had to grant a large measure of self-government to the colonies, especially as the colonists had the power of the purse. The royal governors, though in theory responsible to the Crown, in practice became responsible to the colonists.

The process of national fusion in America was slow. The colonists were mainly of the same race; they spoke the same language; their political and economic interests were similar. Yet they kept their governments strictly separate. Each government stood in practically the same relation to the English crown as its neighbour, but they each had separate governors, legislatures, officials and courts. Strange as it may seem, the one institutional bond of union in America was the English Crown. Some of the colonies, it is true, had united in a rough way to protect themselves against the American Indians, but it was not till 1765 that any definite movement for union took place, and even then only nine of the thirteen colonies took part. The occasion of this was a protest against taxation by the English Parliament, which later became the ostensible cause of the War of Independence. In 1774 began a number of inter-colonial "congresses." These congresses consisted of delegates from the states, each state having an equal voice. The official name of this government was "The United States in Congress assembled"—a title which has given the name to the country (United States of America) and to the legislature (Congress). In 1777, the year after the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation were drawn up by the congress of that year, but they did not become law till 1781. These articles made the congress into a legal form of government. But the confederation had no real power. It was only an advisory body. It could not command the states, and such small executive power as it did have could be exercised only with the consent of the states. As an effective government it was impotent. The states had not yet shaken themselves free from the idea of local autonomy. The War of Independence had caused them to sink local jealousies for the general

cause, but once the war was over, the old jealousies reappeared. To bring about union the present constitution was drawn up in 1787.

The constitution was drawn up largely on English models, modified by American experience and the theory of the separation of powers. It set up a definite federal government, the executive, legislative and judicial powers being entrusted to separate authorities. The legislative power was vested in a Congress of two houses, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The principle was accepted that the Senate should represent the states, and the House of Representatives the people proportionally. The executive power was vested in the President, whose position was much the same as that of the existing state governors. The judiciary was made independent of both the executive and the legislature. The individual state constitutions accepted the same arrangements. The powers given to the new government were definitely enumerated in eighteen items: the residue was left to the states.

At first the American constitution was looked on more as an instrument of convenience than as a national bond of unity. The states continued their old course, and did not wish either to have their independence encroached upon or to contribute much to the maintenance of this new form of government. Threats of secession were not infrequent, but the federal government, now based on a secure legal foundation, gradually commanded the respect and allegiance of both states and people. Public opinion gradually turned round from indifference to respect, from mistrust to faith, and from local to national patriotism. Circumstances other than political helped the union—particularly the rapid development of America westwards by means of railways. Community of economic interest was helped by the community of political interest which resulted from another struggle with England, and still another with Mexico. (1846–48).

To complete national fusion, however, there was one great barrier—the existence of slavery. The planters of the south depended mainly for manual labour on imported negro slaves. The northern labourers were free. When the southerner spoke of his nation he excluded the large

population of slaves. As to the Athenians of old, his nation was a nation of freemen but not a nation for the total population. The northerners' nation was a nation for the whole population. This difference in their point of view—a difference which was political, social and economic—led to a desire on the part of the southern or slave states to have a separate government. The result was the War of Secession or American Civil War. The southern states were beaten, and in 1865 an amendment was made to the constitution abolishing slavery. The federal government had proved itself, and soon it became the organ of a homogeneous American nation.

One or two salient features of American political life may be mentioned. In the first place, it is to be noted that the basis of American political life was English. The process of development of constitutional liberty was not the same as in England. The chief contrast is that America developed towards federalism, whereas England developed towards unitary government. But in the state organization, as distinct from the federal organization, the development was similar. In both, the unit was a small community—such as the township and hundred. From the seunits the organization rose step by step to the central government. Were the British Empire now to be organized on a federal basis, the parallel between it and the United States would be complete.

In the second place, the constitution of America is rigid; the constitution of the United Kingdom is flexible. This difference arose from the conditions of development in the respective countries. In America development was conscious, deliberate, definite, and, compared with England, quick. In England it was unconscious, accidental, and slow. The early Americans, not unnaturally, made legal safeguards for their liberties, for many of them had gone to America for the reason that no such safeguards existed in England.

In the third place, the spirit of American institutions and law as well as the actual institutions themselves are English, and they have preserved their English character to the present day. In the constitutions English law and precedent were followed. In many cases English charters became state constitutions. Private law was mainly English. The chief differences lay in the abolition of class distinctions and

titles, and in the freedom of the church. In public law the new constitutions reproduced the principles governing the relations of the English King and Parliament. The executive powers of the President were like the powers of the Crown. The constitution of the courts was similar to that of the English, while the procedure was practically the same as in England. The chief differences lay in the federal form of government, and in the separation of powers.

In the fourth place, the United States is now one nation, with a federal form of government. The individual states are constituent elements in the American nation. They have their own powers and privileges guaranteed by their own and the American constitutions, but they are part of the machinery of an organic union. The central government is supreme over all: the constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the United States as a whole and of its parts, just as the British Parliament is the legal sovereign of all the parts of the British Empire.

2. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The general organization of the federal government is laid down in the constitution, which says that the government of the United States shall be entrusted to three separate authorities, the executive, the legislative and the judicial. The constitution does not lay down details as to how these branches of government are to be organized or how they are to work. Details are fixed by ordinary legislation.

The capital of the United States is Washington, which stands in the District of Columbia. The constitution makers recognized that it would be necessary for the federal government to have a seat of its own, outside the jurisdiction of any one state. This seat was provided by the states of Maryland and Virginia in 1791 and was named the District of Columbia. This district is about sixty square miles in extent, and is really co-extensive with the city of Washington. It is governed directly by the federal government; three commissioners appointed by the President are responsible for the government. There is no municipal council, and the citizens have no right to vote either in national or in municipal matters.

The constitution is the fundamental law of the United States, and, as such, it was placed outside the reach of ordinary legislation. Special procedure was laid down as to its amendment. By the fifth article of the constitution it is enacted that amendments may be proposed either (a) when two-thirds of each house of the legislature (Senate and House of Representatives) shall think it necessary; or (b) when the legislatures of two-thirds of all the states ask Congress to call a general convention to consider amendments, in which case the convention may propose amendments. For the adoption of an amendment Congress may choose one of two methods, either (a) submit the proposed amendment to the legislatures of the states, or (b) every proposed amendment may be submitted to state conventions specially called for the purpose. If three-fourths of the states agree to the amendment, the amendment is incorporated in the constitution.

The process of amendment is the most difficult in the world. In Great Britain, the constitution, being flexible, can be altered by the process of ordinary legislation. In the old German Empire the amendment was subject to the ordinary process of law-making, but it was subject to defeat if fourteen votes were cast against it in the Bundesrath. In France a constitutional amendment passes through the ordinary channels of legislation, but must be adopted by the National Assembly, or the two houses sitting together at Versailles.

The scope of the powers of the federal government is laid down in the constitution. Generally speaking the federal government has authority in general taxation, foreign relations, the army, navy, and partly, the militia, foreign and interstate commerce, the postal service, coinage, weights and measures, and crimes affecting it.

The legislative power of the United States is vested by the constitution in a Congress, which consists of two houses, a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Senate, or Upper House, represents the states, the House of Representatives the people. The Senate represents the federal principle of government; the House of Representatives, the nation.

The Senate consists of two members from each state. These members used to be elected by the legislatures of the state, but, as the result of an amendment to the constitution in 1913, they are now elected by popular vote. Unlike the members of the Bundesrath in the old German Empire, the members of the Senate are free to vote as they please. They are in no wise representatives of the state governments, nor were they so before 1913 when they were elected by the state legislatures. Each senator is elected for six years. He must be not less than thirty years of age, and must have been a citizen of the United States for nine years ; he must also reside in the state for which he is elected.

The Senate is the second chamber of the American legislature, but besides its legislative functions, it has the power to ratify or reject all treaties made by the President. A two-thirds majority of senators is necessary for the ratification of treaties. The Senate also has power to confirm or reject appointments made by the President. Its members also constitute a high court of impeachment, its judgment being limited to removal from office or disqualification for office. The sole power of impeachment lies with the House of Representatives.

The president of the Senate is the Vice-President of the United States. The Vice-President is not a member of the Senate ; he only presides over it, having a vote only in the case of a tie. This is the chief function of the Vice-President, except in the event of the death of the President, when he succeeds to the President's post. In that case the Senate elects a chairman from among its own members. The Senate makes its own rules of procedure, and these may vary from time to time. The most prominent feature of the organization of the Senate is the committee system. The Senate is subdivided into standing committees, each of which is appointed for a special purpose. When a measure comes up before the Senate, it is first examined by the appropriate committee. The committees in this way have come to have much power. Each committee is looked on as a specialist in its subject, and as such it usually is able to guide the course of legislation on that subject. These committees

examine subjects referred to them, and make definite recommendations to the Senate. Whereas in England ministers control the course of legislation, in the American Senate the standing committees are the guides. As the committees are elected from the Senate, it may be said that the Senate leads itself in legislation, as distinct from being led by ministers. The only drawback to the committee system—and sometimes it is a serious one—is that with the rigid separation of the legislative and executive branches of government in America, the committees are sometimes not able to secure from the executive departments the information or views they desire. They have the right to ask, but they do not always get full information. In the English system the minister not only controls the legislation in his subject but he is head of his own executive department, and as such can command all its resources.

The House of Representatives is composed of members elected every two years by the people of the United States.

The House of Representatives. Its Composition The elections are by states, and no electoral district crosses state boundaries. Congress decides how many representatives there shall be, with the limitation laid down by the constitution that there shall not be more than one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. The number of representatives is determined by the decennial census. On the basis of the 1910 census one representative was allowed for every 210,415 inhabitants. Representatives must not be less than twenty-five years of age, and must have been citizens of the United States for seven years. They must also reside in the state for which they are elected. Besides the normal representatives from states, each organized Territory (that is, a district managed by the federal government till such time as it reaches full state-hood) may send one delegate, who has a right to speak on any subject and make motions, but not to vote. These delegates are elected in the same way as ordinary representatives.

The constitution provides that those who are qualified to vote for members of the larger of the two houses in the state legislatures may also vote for members of the House of Representatives. Generally speaking, this means all male citizens over twenty-one years of age. Neither race nor colour as a rule affects the right of citizens to vote. The

details of the franchise laws, however, vary from state to state. Some states require a minimum period of residence; others require from aliens only a declared intention of becoming American citizens. Payment of taxes is necessary in some states; registration, in others. In some states negroes, though theoretically qualified for the franchise by the constitution, are debarred from voting by state law. By the nineteenth amendment to the constitution, carried in 1920, women are eligible for the franchise in the case of both federal and state legislatures on the same terms as men. In several states a test of literacy exists. American Indians who do not pay taxes are excluded from the franchise; as also are convicts, fraudulent voters, and others who are not desirable citizens.

By the constitution, each of the two houses of Congress is the judge of the "election, returns, and qualifications" of its own members. Each house, with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, may expel a member.

The House of Representatives, like the Senate, makes its own rules. Unlike the Senate, the president of which is fixed by the constitution, it elects its own president, who is called the Speaker. The Speaker of the House of Representatives used to wield enormous power. Most of the business of the House is conducted by committees, and these committees used to be nominated by the Speaker. Now they are elected by the House itself after the names have been selected by party committees, composed of party leaders. Being a large body, the House has not the same facilities for debate as the Senate has. Committees therefore do the work; the House perforce has to follow their guidance, and the committees thus are able to control much of the course of legislation. There are numerous standing committees of the House, the most important of which are the Committee on Appropriations, which deals with expenditure, and has special powers for controlling procedure, and the Committee on Ways and Means, which deals with questions of taxation. Another important committee is the Committee on Rules, which fixes the way in which the time of the House is to be used. The

Speaker used to preside over this Committee, but now he is no longer even a member of the committee, though, of course, he still interprets the rules.

The course through which a bill goes to become an act is similar to the English practice. A bill may originate in either house, but it must pass through both houses, and receive the signature of the President. If one house passes a bill and the other house amends it, the amended bill must be adopted by the house which first passes it before it proceeds to the President for signature. Bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose amendments to them. A majority of members must be present in either house to form a quorum.

The President has certain powers in relation to legislation. He may withhold his signature from a bill. If he does so, the measure may go back to Congress, and if it receives the votes of two-thirds of the members of each house, it automatically becomes law. The President is allowed ten days for the consideration of a measure. If he signs it, it becomes law; or if he takes no action within the time, it becomes law. If he returns the bill to Congress, with the message that he refuses to sign, then the two-thirds majority is essential before it can become law without the President's signature.

The salary of members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives and of delegates is 7,500 dollars a year, with allowances, based on mileage, for traveling expenses. No senator or member of the House of Representatives can be appointed to any post under the United States, or to any civil salaried post the salary of which is increased during his period as a member. No person holding any office under the United States can be a member of either house so long as he holds office. There is no religious test for any office, under either the federal or the state governments.

By the constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. His term of office is four years. The method of election is prescribed by the consti-

tution thus: "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector." In every state the practice is that the electors are chosen by the direct vote of the citizens on a general ticket (*scrutin de liste*). According to the constitution "the Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States" The election is held every fourth year. The presidential term commences on the fourth of March in the year following leap years.

The Vice-President of the United States is appointed in exactly the same manner and for the same term. His chief duties are (a) to take the place of the President in the event of the President's death, and (b) to preside over the Senate.

According to the constitution "no person except a natural-born citizen or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible for the office of President: neither shall any person be eligible for that office who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States."

Though there is no constitutional limitation to the number of times the same person may hold office, it has become an unwritten law that two periods of tenure is the maximum for which the same individual can serve as President.

The election of the President depends actually on party votes. As we have already seen, the party elections are really the result of the stringency of the separation of powers in the American constitutions. The party which returns the majority to Congress has the best chance of electing the President, so that in practice there is not likely to be friction between the legislative and executive branches

of government. In practice what happens is that during the summer preceding the presidential election the parties hold national conventions composed of delegates from all parts of the United States. These conventions nominate their candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. The state electors of the President are chosen by state party conventions, and the party which secures most votes in state elections is able to put its candidates into office at the final election. Thus the party conventions really are the most vital part of the election. The parties are unknown to the constitution.

The Party System in the Presidential Elections

As the chief executive officer in the United States, the first duty of the President is to see that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed. He is commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia in the service of the federal government. He regulates the foreign affairs of the United States. He receives foreign ministers, and, with the assent of two-thirds of the Senate, can make treaties with other powers. He appoints and commissions all officers of the federal government. He can also grant pardons and reprieves.

Duties and Powers of the President

By the constitution all appointments made by the President are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. This proviso is really useless, as any act which

The Powers of the Senate in Appointments

limits the President's power can only be advisory. Not only so, but the constitution empowers Congress to remove from the superintendence of the Senate the appointments to all inferior positions, and allows it to place such appointments if it pleases solely in the hands of the President, or in the courts of law, or with the heads of departments. The confirmation of the Senate is necessary to the President's nomination for the appointment of ambassadors and of other public ministers, of consuls, of judges of the federal courts, of the chief departmental officials, of the principal military and naval officials, and of the principal post office and customs officers.

The method of appointment to executive offices in the United States has for many years been a very vexed question. The courts of the United States ruled that the right

of appointment involved the right of dismissal, and this decision, combined with a law of 1820 which set a four-year term for many federal officials, led to the "spoils" system, by which Presidents were able to reward their party supporters with offices. This system dates from President Jackson's time, in 1829. The posts of the civil service became rewards for help at elections. The abuses of this system led to a Civil Service Act in 1883, which introduced the competitive system for the lower grades of office ; but the filling of the more important offices was still left in the hands of the President.

According to the constitution, the President "shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." This "message" of the President to Congress has become one of the most important features of American political life. It is the chief constitutional means whereby the executive and legislature of the United States meet.

The constitution also gives to the President power on extraordinary occasions to convene extra sessions of both houses or of either house ; and, if, in respect to the time of adjournment, he disagrees with them, he may adjourn them to such time as he may think fit.

In his work the President is helped by his various ministers and departments of government. The main executive work falls on these ministers and departments ; the President exercises only general oversight. The various executive departments are not provided for in the constitution : they are the creations of statute law.

At present the executive work is carried on by ten departments, the heads of which are collectively called the Cabinet. They are, however, quite unlike the English Cabinet. They are not members of the legislature, nor are they in any way responsible to the legislature. They are responsible only to the President. The only connection they have with the legislature is the

**The
"Spoils"
System**

**President
and
Congress ;
The President-
ial
"Message"**

**Other
Powers of the
President
in relation to
Congress**

**The
Ministers
and
Departments**

**The
"Cabinet"**

flimsy consent of the Senate that is necessary to the President's nomination.

The departments are :—

Enumeration of the Departments 1. The Department of State, the head of which is the Secretary of State. It is the equivalent of the British Foreign Office.

2. The Department of the Treasury, the head of which is the Secretary of the Treasury. This department, as its name indicates, deals with revenue, coinage, banking, the auditing of public accounts, etc.

3. The Department of War, the head of which is the Secretary of War. This department deals with the army, defence, military education, etc.

4. The Department of Justice, the head of which is the Attorney-General. This department deals with federal litigation, gives advice to the federal government, and is the head of all the United States marshals and district attorneys.

5. The Post Office Department, the head of which is the Postmaster-General. It deals with all postal business.

6. The Department of the Navy, the head of which is the Secretary of the Navy. It deals with the naval forces, naval defence, education, etc.

7. The Department of the Interior, the head of which is the Secretary of the Interior. This department, the equivalent of the Home Office in England, has many sub-departments among which are the census office ; the land office (for management of public lands) ; the Indian bureau (to regulate the government's dealings with Indians) ; the pensions office ; the patent office ; the office of public documents ; the office of the commissioner of railroads, which audits the accounts of certain railways which have government subsidies ; the office of education, which collects statistics and information about education, with a view to its systematization throughout the United States ; and the management of certain institutions.

8. The Department of Agriculture, the head of which is the Secretary of Agriculture. This department collects statistics in matters concerning agriculture, prosecutes scientific research in diseases of trees, etc., supervises the weather bureau, and it has also a forestry sub-department.

9. The Department of Commerce, the head of which is

the Secretary of Commerce. It regulates inter-state commerce, collects statistics, etc.

10. The Department of Labour, the head of which is the Secretary of Labour. This department deals with all questions affecting labour, and the relations of labour and capital.

There are other departments, such as the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission of Fisheries, that have no representation in the Cabinet.

These offices are arranged in the order of precedence for succession to the office of President in case of the death, resignation, removal or disability of the President. The holders of office must satisfy the other presidential qualifications, of age, citizenship, etc., before they can succeed to the office.

Many of these offices, it is to be noted, exist for the collection of information, statistics, and for the circulation of memoranda for the co-ordination of the various state systems concerned. They have no power to compel the state executives to act in a certain way. The state executives are the real executives which affect the people in their everyday life.

The judiciary of the United States, according to the constitution, "shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The actual organization of the courts is thus mainly a matter of statute law. The powers of the federal courts are given in more detail in the constitution. These powers are of two types—(a) those relating to the special questions over which the federal government has legislative and executive control, e.g., maritime and admiralty cases, and cases arising out of the constitutional law of the United States, and (b) those in which the parties to the suit more properly belong to the federal than to the state courts, e.g., in cases affecting foreign relations, or foreign ministers, or in cases where the state courts have incomplete jurisdiction. It is for Congress to determine how the courts are to be organized to carry out the general law of the constitution.

The Judiciary Act of 1789, with its amending acts, is the basis of the present judicial organization. The Supreme

Court consists of a Chief Justice, and eight associate judges. The Supreme Court deals with appeals from inferior courts, and has original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls, and foreign ministers, and in cases in which a state is a party. It must hold annual sessions in Washington, and six of the judges form a quorum. Next to the Supreme Court are the circuit courts, which are of two kinds—circuit courts and circuit courts of appeal. The circuit courts are held in different divisions or circuits of the country by the judges of the Supreme Court sitting separately. The country is divided into nine circuits and each justice must hold a court in his circuit at least once in two years. The business of the Supreme Court is so heavy that the judges are not able to attend circuit courts regularly. In addition to the judges of the Supreme Court, circuit judges are appointed who hold court separately. The circuits are divided into sixty-eight districts. Each of these districts has a district court. Sometimes a whole state counts for judicial purposes as one district. The districts are arranged according to the number of population and amount of work to be done, but no district crosses state boundaries. The district courts are the lowest of the federal courts.

The courts of appeal in the circuits were established to relieve the Supreme Court of certain appellate work. The circuit courts of appeal consists of one judge of the Supreme Court and two circuit judges, or one circuit judge and one district judge. One judgeship in each circuit exists for this work. The circuit court of appeal is final in certain matters, but in other matters, such as constitutional questions, conviction for capital crimes, and matters affecting treaties, an appeal lies from the circuit court of appeal to the Supreme Court.

There are other federal courts for special work. The court of claims exists to determine the validity of claims against the United States in cases where no provision exists for their settlement. It sits at Washington, and is composed of a chief justice and four judges. The court of private land claims, which consists of one chief justice and four judges, deals with claims to certain lands which are affected by the late Spanish ownership of the country in the south-west of the

**Circuit
Courts of
Appeal**

**Other
Courts**

United States. The courts of the District of Columbia and the courts of the territories exist for the administration of justice in their respective spheres. Properly speaking, these two courts are not federal courts. They really combine the qualities of federal and state courts. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal from both.

The judges of the United States are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They are appointed for life, or to serve during good behaviour.

The district attorney and the marshal are both appointed by the President. The district attorney prosecutes all offenders against the federal criminal law, conducts civil suits on behalf of the federal government, and performs such other legal duties as his appointment as federal judicial officer may entail. The marshal is the executive officer of the federal, circuit and district courts. He issues and executes orders of the court, and effects arrests. His state equivalent is the sheriff.

The procedure of the federal courts as a rule is regulated according to the state in which the court is sitting. State procedure is followed, and state law is enforced where no federal law applies.

3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATES

Just as the citizen of Bengal is more concerned with the Government of Bengal than with the Government of India in his everyday life, so, for the control of the normal affairs of their lives, the citizens of the individual states in America are more interested in the state governments than in the federal government. The federal government deals with the greater matters of national life—with war and peace, foreign relations, etc.—and only in national crises or at the periodic elections is the ordinary citizen brought into personal contact with it. Certain broad facts must be kept in mind in this respect.

1. There are two types of constitutional law in the United States. First, there is the constitution of the United States. This is the supreme law of the land. Second, there are the constitutions of the individual states. Each of

these is part of the sum-total of the constitutional law of the United States, but as the whole is greater than the part, so the constitution of the United States is greater than the constitution of any single state or any number of states. But the constitution of the United States is an integral part of the constitutional law of any one state just as the constitutions of the individual states are respected by the federal government where those laws do not clash. In the case of conflict the greater supersedes the less.

2. From this arises the fact that, though the states have definitely guaranteed powers, their legislatures are non-sovereign law-making bodies. They have complete authority only within the limits granted by their own and the federal constitutions. There is only one sovereign body in the state—the United States.

3. The states were the original units of government in America. When the constitution was drawn up each state jealously safeguarded its own rights. To the states at the beginning of federal government the federal government was unreal and distant. They therefore kept to themselves all the powers they possibly could, consistent with the creation of a central government. To the central government was given only a strictly limited number of functions—those functions which must belong to all central governments, e g., the conduct of foreign relations, matters of war and peace, coinage, customs, the post office, and the power to raise revenue to support itself. To the states were given the residue, with such limitations (e.g., the raising of troops) as were necessarily imposed by the grant of powers to the federal government. Thus the states were left with all affairs which affect one's normal, everyday life. They decide the qualifications for the right of the vote, they control all elections, including those for the President and Vice-President. They enact and execute criminal law, with some exceptions; they administer the prisons. The civil law, including all matters relating to the possession of, and transfer of property, and succession, marriage and divorce, and all other civil relations, the regulation of trading corporations, subject to the right of Congress to regulate inter-state commerce, the regulation of

labour, education, charities, licensing, game laws—all are matters for the states. In addition to this, the states may act in those matters in which the central government may be empowered to act by the constitution and in which it does not actually take action. In some matters, e.g., regarding naturalization and bankruptcy, the central government has only partial control.

4. Each state constitution must be republican in form, but it derives its authority not from Congress but from the people of the state. States may be added to the Union in two ways—(a) by means of an enabling act, which provides for the drafting and ratification of a state constitution by the people. (In this case a territory previously administered by the central government may become a state as soon as the conditions are fulfilled); and (b) by accepting a constitution already framed, in which case, admission to the Union is granted at once.

5. In many of the newer state constitutions, much more has been included in the constitution than should really be included in purely constitutional law. Properly speaking, the constitution should merely give the fundamental principles and organization of government. But in many constitutions details are given regarding the management of public property, the regulation of public debt and such like. These things belong properly to the sphere of ordinary legislation, but distrust of ordinary laws and law-makers led the people to safeguard their theories by the constitution. This means a confusion between the realms of constitutional and statute law.

6. Owing to the difficulty of amending the constitution of the United States, many constitutional provisions now regarded as mistakes cannot easily be remedied. Experience has shown that in matters other than those granted by the constitution to the central government, central would be better than local control. From this have arisen some of the chief abuses of American political and social life. Particularly is this the case in marriage and divorce. While some states preserve the old stringency of the marriage law, others have relaxed it so far as to make both marriage and divorce almost

**Admission
of New
States**

**Results of
Formation
of New
Constitutions**

**General
Results**

farcical. The diversity of law from state to state enables parties to obtain divorce with the greatest ease ; one party sometimes obtains a formal divorce without the other party knowing anything about it. A similar lack of uniformity exists in criminal law, and in laws concerning debt. In taxation, too, much harm is wrought by lack of co-ordination. Industry and trade are frequently hampered by ill-considered state laws. Investment of capital is discouraged, and in some states taxes bear much more harshly on certain types of employment than in others.

The remedy for these evils is more co-ordination or control by the central government, but such control cannot be secured because of the difficulty of amending the constitution. The many abuses which have resulted from the lack of co-ordination in these important matters have led many thinkers to prefer the Canadian type of federal constitution, by which the states are given definitely enumerated functions, and the residue is left to the federal government.

Each state has a definite constitution, like the federal constitution. It would be more correct to say that the federal constitution is like the state constitutions, for the former was drawn up on the model of the constitutions or charters of the thirteen original states which formed the United States.

The constitutions of the states can be amended only after a lengthy and difficult process, which varies from one state to another. In the case of a general revision, the legislature may call a popular convention, but the question of the calling of the convention must first be decided by the people.

If the people agree, the convention is elected in the ordinary way. It considers the amendment, and if it agrees to the amendment, the amendment finally is submitted to the people for acceptance or rejection. Particular amendments may be proposed by the legislature, but in most cases the vote of the people is necessary for final adoption. Sometimes amendments must be accepted by two successive legislatures as well as by the people before they can be incorporated into the constitutional law of the state. In most cases more than a simple majority of the legislature is necessary.

Among much diversity of organization in the state governments one feature is common—the separation of legislative, executive and judicial. This separation is more stringent in the states than in the central government, and in some respects more harmful, e.g., in the election of judges by the people in order to avoid any possible subservience of the judiciary to the executive.

**Separation
of Powers
in the
States**

Each state has a bicameral legislature. Both the houses are elected on the suffrage basis already noted in connection with the federal government. The upper house is called the Senate, the lower the House of Representatives. Both together are usually known as the "General Assembly," but the lower house has different names, e.g., the House of Delegates in Virginia, and The Assembly in New York. The senates have fewer members than the lower houses, the electoral areas for senators being wider than those for representatives. Representatives are usually elected for two years, senators for four; one-half of the senate is renewed every two years. Both senators and representatives are paid the same; both must be citizens, though the minimum period of citizenship varies. Usually an age limit is set (senators from twenty-one to thirty, representatives from twenty-one to twenty-five). Other qualifications—such as residence in the state, or electoral district—are as a rule necessary.

The legislatures of the states theoretically are competent to deal with all matters not reserved specifically for the federal government. But the state constitutions themselves have self-imposed restrictions, so that in certain states neither the federal legislature nor the state legislature can deal with some subjects. The state constitutions, further, frequently impose limits on the length of sessions, and contain rules for the conduct of legislation, even to great detail. All these limitations are meant to secure the interests of the people against any possible legislative tyranny. In most constitutions the arrangement of procedure and of other details is left to the houses themselves.

The organization of the houses in the majority of cases is like that of the federal legislature. The lower houses

**Power of
Legislatures**

usually elect a speaker as president. In the upper houses the equivalent of the vice-president in the federal Senate is the lieutenant-governor. Bills are passed as in Congress, though there are local varieties in the amount or type of majority required. The standing committee organization prevails in the state legislatures, just as in Congress, for the same reasons and with the same results. The two state houses have similar duties, though in some states money bills must originate in the House of Representatives. The senates act as courts in cases of impeachment by the houses of representatives. The senates, too, have in some cases the power to confirm or reject appointments made by the governors.

The chief executive official in the states is the governor. He is chosen by the direct vote of the people over the whole state. The term of office varies from two to four years, but two states (Massachusetts and Rhode Island) elect their governors for one year only. The governor as a rule must be a citizen of some years' standing (the period varies from two to twenty years). Many states have lieutenant-governors. All have secretaries of state, whose duties are the keeping of state records, the registration of the official acts of the governor, keeping and affixing the state seal, keeping records of titles to property, and other duties such as belong to a public record office. Other officials are the state treasurer and the attorney-general, whose duties are denoted by their names. The comptroller, or public accountant, under whose warrant the state treasurer pays out public monies, the auditor, and the superintendent of education are other officials who exist in some states and not in others. In a few states councils are associated with the governors.

Like the governors, the state officials are elected by the people. In this respect there is a marked difference between the federal and the state practice. The President of the United States himself nominates his Cabinet or chief officials. In the states, the officials are elected by the people, and largely independent of the governor. The governor therefore is not the "executive" in the same sense as the President: he is only a part of the

**Organiz-
ation of
State
Houses**

**The State
Executives**

**Method of
Choice,
Functions,
etc. of
State
Executive**

executive, with little or no control over the other parts of it. In the states all the officers theoretically serve the people. Their responsibility from the governor downwards is to the people, and to the law of the state. The only method of removal from office is impeachment before the upper house of the legislature by the lower house.

In the American states the central offices of government do not control administration in the same way as in other

Peculiar Character of Executive Work in the States countries. They are supervisors only. The real work of administration is done by the officials of local bodies. Even in education, which usually is looked on as requiring much central co-ordination and control, the state superintendent of education as often as not is merely a supervisor.

The real powers in education are the local authorities.

Thus the governor has very little real power. He is the nominal more than the real administrative chief. His duty

Powers and Duties of the Governor is to see to the faithful administration of the laws, as far as his powers allow. He is the commander of the state militia. He has to inform the legislature regarding affairs in the state and he may recommend measures. He cannot present

bills to the legislature, though, in some states, he presents estimates. On the requisition of a certain number of members, he may call extra sessions of the legislatures. In all but two states the governor has a veto on legislation, but his veto may be over-ridden by the two houses, usually by a special (two-thirds or three-fifths) majority. He has certain powers of clemency, of granting pardons, remitting fines, etc. His power of appointment, as we have seen, is small.

The judicial system of the states is quite distinct from the federal judicial system. Each state has its own

The State Judiciary judicial system, with a complete organization and its own procedure. The only effect federal government has on these courts is the limitation of subjects which may be dealt with by the state courts.

The organization of the state courts is so varied that only a general outline can be given here. (1) The lowest courts are those of the Justices of the Peace, or, in cities, the police judges. They have jurisdiction over petty cases, both civil and criminal; they conduct enquiries in graver offences and commit prisoners for trial in higher courts. (2) The next

grade is the country or municipal courts. They hear appeals from the lower courts, and have wider jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. (3) Circuit courts, which hear appeals from both the lower grades and have a still wider jurisdiction than the county or municipal courts. Sometimes they have permanent judges : sometimes they are held by the judges of the supreme court on circuit. (4) The highest court is the supreme court, or court of final appeal, in which there is a chief justice and associate judges. This court is appellate only.

There are many varieties of this general scheme. In some states there are courts for special purposes, especially probate courts, for the administration of estates, the proof of wills, etc.

One of the most distinctive features in the state judicial organization is the method of appointment. As a rule judges are elected by the people. In some cases they are elected by the legislature ; in other cases, they are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. The term of appointment varies from two years to tenure during good behaviour. In regard to qualifications, only a few states insist on members of the legal profession being chosen. As a matter of fact, members of the legal profession as a rule are chosen. Age limits (from twenty-five to thirty-five years), residence, citizenship and other such qualifications usually exist.

The ministerial officers of the courts are also elected, e.g., the sheriff. Even the court clerks are elected in some states. The elections take place by the areas served by the courts. The judges of the supreme courts are elected by the whole state.

4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

It is impossible to give here more than the general features of American local government. The local varieties of organization are very numerous, but American local government lacks the complexity of organization that exists in England. This is largely due to the fact that the evolution of American local government was a conscious process. Areas were established for definite ends and purposes, and, though the original plan was borrowed from England, the

makers were free from the historical conditions which make the English system so complex.

Certain salient features of American local government may be noted.

1. In the United States both the scope and the freedom of action given to local authorities are very great. While the law is centralized and co-ordinated, the **Wide Scope** administration of the law is left very largely to local authorities. Local government is thus the most important branch of American government in the everyday affairs of life. The duties of the local authorities are very wide. Police, jails, sanitation, education, libraries, poor-relief, communications (roads and bridges), the assessment and collection of taxes, the licensing of trades, the lower grades of the administration of justice, are all administered by local authorities under the general guidance set down in the laws of the state.

2. Owing to the legal centralization, local legislative bodies are not common. The local authorities **Mainly Executive** are in the main executive.

3. Where there are local legislative bodies, **Limited Powers of Legislative Bodies** they are strictly circumscribed by their charters, just as the state legislatures are limited by their constitutions.

4. In America there is no equivalent of the old English Local Government Board (now the Ministry of Health). The central governments enforce the **No Central Controlling Body** state-law by means of the courts.

Three main types of organization of local government may be enumerated :

Organization of Local Government 1. The township type, which we have seen to be characteristic of the New England states.

2. The county type, characteristic of the southern colonies.

3. The compound type, which is characteristic of the middle colonies.

With the expansion of America westwards, the type of local government followed the predominant type of settler. Where the settlers were mainly from the New England states, the township was predominant : where they came mainly from the southern colonies, the county was the prevailing unit. But in most cases the compound type was

adopted, especially in the middle and north-western states. In these states immigrants from the eastern states combined what they regarded as the best qualities of their own systems. In the western states the same mixed type prevails. The later states of course had the advantage of the experience gained by the earlier ones, and were able to establish the type experience proved best.

In the township, the chief authority is the town-meeting, which is composed of all the citizens of the area who have a vote. The town meeting assembles once a year, or oftener, if occasion demands. The town meeting elects all the local officers—the “select men” (three to nine in number, according to the size of the town), who are the general executive authority, the town clerk, treasurer, assessors, school committee, library trustees, constables—every official, in fact, necessary to transact the business of the area. These officials are responsible to the town-meeting, which examines their accounts and votes their supplies. The town meeting is presided over by a “moderator.”

This is the type of New England township, where the township preceded the county. The county in New England was formed out of townships, and is confined to its own functions, which are partly judicial and partly administrative. The sphere of work of the county is quite separate from that of the township. But in other states the township is more integrally connected with the county. The county in these was often the original unit: the township was introduced for administrative convenience. In the north-west the township was established for school purposes. The government surveyors mapped out the land in blocks of thirty-six square miles, reserving as a rule one square mile for school endowment. This block was called a township, and the endowment section came to be administered on the township basis.

The organization of the township outside New England differs according to the development and vitality of the township. Sometimes there is a town meeting: sometimes the town meeting is replaced by popular election to the administrative posts. The system of select men of New England does not as a rule exist in other states. Their equivalents are supervisors, and boards of supervisors. The

number of officials varies with the size of the township and the work to be done. In some of the southern states (as in Virginia) the township system was tried and abolished, while in others it exists in only a very minor way.

The county (the idea was borrowed from the English shire) is the most suitable unit of local government for a widespread farming population, and it was naturally adopted in the southern states. It originally was a judicial area, but later it was made the area for all local administration. It has its own officials, the heads of which are the county commissioners. The ordinary officials—treasurer, auditor, superintendents of roads, of education, etc., who are elected usually by popular vote, act under the county commissioners. It has also a judicial organization (sheriff, coroner, attorney, etc.). The functions of the county are the supervision of education, roads, bridges, jails, and other such matters as fall within its area.

Where township and county exist side by side, there is much variety in organization. In some areas the county authority is composed of the heads of the township; in others, the townships choose the county authorities. The division of functions varies also from place to place. Where the two organizations co-exist, the predominant type (township in New England, county in the south) has more power and importance.

In both the county and township systems, there are subdivisions into school areas, where district directors or trustees are appointed to look after school interests. These trustees or directors are the most powerful agents in the whole state in the administration of education. Such localism has proved harmful to education, as it has prevented proper co-ordination of method, and the enforcement of any standard of qualifications for teachers.

The local units are circumscribed, either by constitutional or by statute law, in the amount of taxes they can raise. As a rule they can tax only up to a given percentage of the value of property. The county has to raise the taxes voted by the state legislature, for state purposes, as well as the county taxes. Where the township exists, it has

similar powers and duties. The assessment varies from county to county and from township to township, and boards of equalization have been created in some cases to secure equality of treatment between the areas.

Where villages and towns have grown up, county and township are superseded by municipal organization. In smaller urban districts, villages, boroughs or towns (the names vary from state to state) may be incorporated through application to the courts of law, if the electors can prove that the necessary conditions can be fulfilled. Such urban authorities take over the old township functions, though in some states they continue to be part of the county, and pay county dues. In some larger towns the urban area has swallowed up the county area altogether (as in Philadelphia and New York). In Virginia the urban areas are definitely separated from the counties.

In the case of larger cities, a special act is necessary for incorporation. Hence arises the variety of American municipal government. In England there is one act (the Municipal Corporations Act) under which urban areas may be incorporated as municipalities. American cities have wider powers than the smaller areas of local government, and, of course, a much bigger organization. They also often have a separate judicial organization. The name of the officials (mayor, aldermen, etc.), are the same as in England. In most great cities there are two chambers—a board of aldermen, and a board of common councilmen. In New York State, most of the cities have only one house—either a board of aldermen, or a common council.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

1. HISTORICAL

With the abdication of the German Emperor, in 1918, the old German Empire came to an end. The government was taken over by the Council of People's Commissaries, which, in January 1919, summoned a National Assembly to draw up a constitution. The imperial system was abolished and a republican form of government set up in its place. The old name "Empire" (*Reich*) was continued, but fundamental changes were made in the legislative and executive organs of both the federal union and the states. The major part of the present chapter is taken up with a description of the old Empire, which deserves careful study not only because many of its institutions have been carried on in the German Republic, but also because it is one of the most instructive studies in federalism and non-responsible government in the history of the modern world. The new constitution continues many of the old imperial institutions and names, although their constitutional position has been altered, but it has not been sufficiently long in operation to demand detailed treatment at the present stage.

The constitution of the old German Empire can be understood only by an analysis of its historical antecedents. Germany developed from her frontier inwards. Most states develop from their frontier outwards. In the early years of the seventeenth century, the Electors of Brandenburg acquired the Duchy of Prussia on the Baltic and the Duchy of Cleves on the Rhine. These two duchies are the boundaries of what later was Prussia. Within these boundaries there was a large number of smaller states, so many, in fact, that, as one

**The End of
the German
Empire**

**Develop-
ment of
Germany:
The
Growth of
Independent
States**

writer says, in the 18th century "the whole map of Germany was a mass of patches of different colour mingled together in a bewildering confusion." Many of these states were small, and some were composed of parts which were not contiguous. This system was the result of feudalism. The heads of the states had acquired lands at various times and in various ways. The lands thus acquired had been divided and subdivided among the families of the owners, hence the extraordinary subdivision. The Church too added to this subdivision. The Church owned lands in the same way as private individuals and its position increased the confusion.

Under the old Frankish monarchy the king used to appoint local officers called *grafs*, who were really agents of the king and as such wielded enormous power. **The Grafs** Great as their powers were, they could not interfere with the great landowners of the territories over which they ruled. These landowners were practically independent, and the *grafs* had to exercise their authority round them, but not over them. In this way a two-fold authority developed, viz., *grafs* and proprietors. In the course of time these two officers coalesced. *Grafship* became hereditary and the *grafs* usually were the landed proprietors, or, if the *graf* was not originally the landed proprietor, he received a grant of land for his services. *Grafs* thus became territorial magnates and territorial magnates became *grafs*. This led to the conjunction in one person of the old territorial independence and the delegated authority of the king. By the thirteenth century Germany was owned by the king, princes, *grafs* and barons (the old landed proprietors). The bishops and abbots were also extensive landowners.

Still another office helped the growth of local independence in Germany, the office of the *mark-grafs*. The *mark-graf* was the defender of the frontiers or boundaries. As a rule he was a military commander with an army. Not only did he defend but he also extended the frontiers by conquest. The *mark-graf* was essentially an official of the king, commanding the king's army. In the course of time the *mark-grafs* became so powerful that they virtually became kings in themselves. Thus Brandenburg and Austria became independent.

Austria was the East Mark, the boundary against the Huns.

After Charles the Great, whose authority kept his possessions together, these small princes of Germany became practically independent. The name Empire persisted through several houses, the last and strongest of all being the Austrian Hapsburg, which came to an inglorious end in 1918. The successors of Charles the Great were unable to keep the vast possession of Charles's empire together, and, in the course of three reigns, the basis had been laid for the growth literally of hundreds of independent principalities.

In the meantime the growth of trade had caused great cities to spring up, such as Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck.

The Cities These cities were troublesome to the Emperor and he solved the problem of their government in one of two ways. Either he placed them directly under his own government or he delegated his powers to an over-lord, who conducted the government in his name. The cities preferred the first of these methods, because the king was unable to take a close personal interest in them, whereas the over-lord, who was on the spot, guided and directed them according to his own ideas or to the orders of the Emperor. In the thirteenth century they were strong enough to become free cities. They owed allegiance to the Empire, but they received extensive powers of self-government. The over-lord was withdrawn and the cities sent their representatives to the Imperial Diet.

Among the many states in Germany, one stands out prominent, viz., Brandenburg or Prussia. The growth of Brandenburg as a unified state is really due to an enactment made in the middle of the fifteenth century, which forbade the splitting up of the kingdom amongst the various electors. Whilst the neighbouring states were continually subdivided, Brandenburg was held together under one monarchical house. Gradually it became the leader both in size and in power. In the fifteenth century the mark-grafship of Brandenburg fell into the hands of the Hohenzollerns. Henceforth it was known by the name of Prussia. After the Thirty-Years' War, in the middle of the seventeenth century Frederick William, the Great Elector, extended his dominions considerably, making

Prussia bigger than any other state of the Empire save the Hapsburg Austria. The Great Elector's grandson, Frederick the Great, added other territories, actually doubling the population of the kingdom. Then came the Napoleonic Wars, which checked its growth. Napoleon suppressed a large number of the smaller states, including the ecclesiastical ones. He combined them into the Confederation of the Rhine. He split Prussia into two, hoping to break her power. The Confederation neither served Napoleon's purposes nor did it last any time.

Napoleon both directly and indirectly was the cause of the growth of the German Empire. In the first place, his campaigns created a sense of common interest and unity amongst the German principalities or states. In the second place, he actually created in Germany the organizations which later developed into the Empire. In the third place, after the final defeat of Napoleon, Germany was reorganized by the peace treaty, the Treaty of Vienna.

After Napoleon's downfall, the states, thirty-nine in number, were organized in a loose confederation. This confederation in no sense created a German state. Each state remained independent except for matters affecting its internal and external safety. The central organ of the Confederation was the Diet, which met at Frankfort. It was composed of delegates or ambassadors from the individual states, who voted according to the instructions received from their own governments. The nominal powers of the Diet were fairly wide. It was empowered to declare war and make peace, to organize a federal army, to enact laws, to carry out the constitution of the confederation and to decide disputes between the states. But it had no executive power except through the states. If a state refused to obey the order of the Diet, the only procedure the Diet could adopt was to ask the other states to use force. The likelihood that the other states would obey the Diet's request was extremely problematical, for the confederation was not organized on a basis of equal rights. Two states, viz., Austria and Prussia, controlled the whole business of the union. Austria was permanent president, and Prussia permanent vice-president.

**The Results
of the
Napoleonic
Wars**

**The Con-
federation
of the
Rhine**

The chief difficulty in the way of federal union in Germany was the number of states, and more particularly the dominating power of Prussia and Austria. In spite of the new sense of nationality created by the Napoleonic wars the process of union in Germany was slow and difficult. In the years 1848 and 1849 the national spirit in Germany was strong enough to cause the summoning of a national parliament, elected by universal suffrage. It met at Frankfort and formulated a constitution. The imperial crown was offered to Prussia, but the parliament wasted so much time in carrying out its ideas that Austria had resumed leadership.

The whole of the subsequent development of Germany, until it was definitely organized as the German Empire, centred round one man, Bismarck. Bismarck recognized that if Germany were to be united either Prussia or Austria must renounce its leadership. As a Prussian, he naturally decided that Austria must be put outside the union. Bismarck first persuaded Austria to join Prussia in seizing Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark in 1864. He then quarrelled with Austria over the division of these new territories. War was declared and Austria was completely defeated in the short war of 1866.

Now that Austria was definitely out of leadership, Bismarck set himself to organize a unified Germany under Prussia. His first intention was to include all states except Austria, but France compelled him to stick to the territories north of the river Maine. Compelled to do this, Bismarck decided to enlarge his boundaries by including the recently seized territories of Schleswig and Holstein. By incorporating them along with the other states of Prussia he created the North German Confederation, of which the King of Prussia was president. There were to be two legislative chambers, one, the Reichstag, to be elected by universal suffrage, the other, the federal council or Bundesrath. This federal council was practically a reproduction of the old Diet. It was composed of ambassadors from the different states, but it had more extensive powers.

The North German Confederation left several powerful independent states, south of the Maine, viz., Bavaria,

Wurtemberg, Baden and Hesse. These might have remained independent, or if they liked, they could have formed a union by themselves. Austria, of course, was left out altogether. But the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 raised the feeling of all communities in Germany to such a pitch that the local prejudices of southern states were swept away; all were eager to join to form a unified Germany. To compensate for their loss of prestige, each received special inducements and privileges to join the Union. Thus in 1870 the Confederation became the German Empire. The president of the Confederation became the German Emperor, and in 1871 the constitution of the German Empire was drawn up.

**The
Franco-
Prussian
War**

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

The German Empire was a federal union. Its special characteristic was the possession of wide legislative and restricted executive powers. It differed in many respects from the type of federalism in the United States. In the United States the executive power is divided between the central government and the governments of the states. The central government has its own executive authority for the execution of the federal laws; for example, if Congress enacts a tariff law, federal officials collect the duties. The federal courts also decide legal cases that arise under the federal laws. In Germany the federal government had much wider power in legislation. The power included what in America belongs to the central government and also much that belongs to the state governments. Beyond dealing with such matters of national importance as the army and navy, foreign affairs and customs, the central legislature of the German Empire dealt with such domestic matters as canals and roads, as well as the whole domain of ordinary civil and criminal procedure. On the other hand, the administrative or executive power of the Empire was very limited. The Empire thus was mainly a legislative and supervising authority, except in matters relating to the army, navy and foreign affairs. In tariff matters the imperial legislature made laws and appointed inspectors, but the detail was carried out by state officials. In the case of a state refusing to carry out the federal law,

**The
German
and
American
Federal
Systems**

or directly opposing it, the Federal Council or Bundesrath was the deciding authority. If a state persisted after the decision of the Bundesrath in opposing imperial law, then the Emperor had to take action against the state.

In the German Empire there was a most pronounced inequality in the size of the states. In a normal federal union the states, if possible, should be equal in size and power. In the United States no state is so much bigger or more powerful than the others as to be able to dominate them. In the German Empire, Prussia was so powerful that it was able to plan the federal constitution in its own favour and subsequently to control the whole government of Germany. Prussia, as it has been said, ruled Germany with the help of the other states. The component parts of the German Empire were so unequal in area, population and power that equality of treatment could not be expected. The larger states would never have joined in a federal union with the smaller states, had they been given equal treatment. Prussia, for example, had about three-fifths of the total population of the Empire as well as the strongest army: to it, therefore, fell proportionate privileges in the Empire.

These privileges were great. (1) The King of Prussia had the perpetual right to be German Emperor. (2) Prussia was able to prevent any change in the constitution. Fourteen negative votes in the Bundesrath defeated any motion for a change of the constitution and Prussia alone was able to command seventeen votes. (3) Prussia was able to vote all proposals for making changes in the army and navy, and the fiscal system. The constitution laid down that in this question the vote of Prussia, if cast in the Bundesrath in favour of maintaining the existing system, should be decisive. (4) Prussia possessed a casting vote in the case of a tie in the Bundesrath; and (5) Prussia carried the chairmanship of the standing committees in the Bundesrath.

Prussia possessed other constitutional privileges as the result of private agreements with smaller states. The smaller states were free to make agreements or treaties with each other in regard to affairs under their own control. Thus when the North German Confederation was formed, the military system

**The
Position of
Prussia**

**Privileges
of Prussia**

**Other
Privileges**

prevalent in Prussia was introduced into the other states. When the constitution of the Empire was made, it was provided that the military laws should be made by the imperial government. The Emperor was to be the commander-in-chief. He was to select the generals in command of the state armies and to approve all the appointments of other generals. To the States was left the appointment of inferior military officers. But in many cases the smaller states gave up the right of such appointments to Prussia. As a return for such concessions, the Emperor conceded the right of the state troops to remain in their own areas except in case of a national crisis. Another type of agreement between Prussia and the smaller states was that made with Waldeck. The ruler of Waldeck was heavily in debt and in return for a sum of money he gave up his rights to Prussia and retired to Italy.

Some other units of the Empire possessed special privileges. The two great ports of Hamburg and Bremen were first allowed to continue as free ports, outside the scope of the imperial tariff law. They later gave up these privileges. Privileges of various kinds were enjoyed by the southern states which had been compensated by Bismarck for joining the union. Thus Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden were exempted from certain imperial excises, and had the right to levy excise on their own authority. In Bavaria and Wurtemberg the postal and telegraph services were subject only to general imperial laws. Bavaria had also special military privileges. Her army remained practically under her own control. The emperor had only the right to inspect it in times of peace. Wurtemberg too had special military privileges. Bavaria was exempt from imperial control in matters concerning railroads, residence and settlement. The right to seats on special committees of the Bundesrath (the committees on foreign affairs, army and fortresses) belonged to Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Saxony. Bavaria had the right to preside in the Bundesrath in the absence of Prussia.

The German Empire was thus not the usual type of federal union. The reason was that, when the Empire was made, Bismarck had to take many historical conditions into account. He had to force some states, persuade and entice

others hence the many privileges of individual states. The proportionate power of Prussia secured for her most power in the Empire. The German Empire was a federal union of privileged states—the privileges in essence representing a proportionate equality. For Bismarck to have attempted to join the various independent states or principalities of Germany, each with its own royal house, its own government and its own pride, on the basis of equality would have ended in complete failure.

The chief organ in the German Empire was the Bundesrath or Federal Council. The Bundesrath was the old Diet continued under a new name. The Bundesrath was

The Bundesrath: the central organ of the German Empire: it was the federal house, and was composed of a number of ambassadors who represented the rulers or governments of states. These ambassadors or delegates were appointed by the rulers of the states, or, in the case of the free cities, by the senates. The number of seats allocated in the Bundesrath was practically in the same proportion as in the old Diet in the Confederation, with the exception of Bavaria—six seats instead of four were given to Bavaria as a special inducement to join the Empire. Prussia, in addition to her own votes, obtained the votes of other states which she absorbed in 1866, e.g., Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Frankfort. Prussia in all had seventeen seats in the Bundesrath as compared with the six of Bavaria, four of Saxony and Wurtemberg, and three each of Baden and Hesse. The other states had two members or one member each. Prussia really controlled three more votes by her contract with Waldeck and by her control of the two Brunswick votes, which she obtained by setting a Prussian prince on the Brunswick throne. Thus, in all, Prussia controlled practically twenty votes. By securing other ten votes she could secure an absolute majority in the Bundesrath in all matters. Only in very small matters were the other states able to defeat Prussia.

The Bundesrath has been called by President Lowell of Harvard University "that extraordinary mixture of legislative chamber, executive council, court of appeal and permanent assembly of diplomats." The members of the Bundesrath were appointed,

Proportionate Equality

The Bundesrath: its Composition

Instructed Voting

and could be removed only by their own states. The votes cast by them were state votes ; they could not vote as free individuals. All the delegates of a state, therefore, had to vote in the same way according to their orders, so that it was not necessary for the full delegation of any particular state to be present to record the state vote. All state votes were counted whether all the state members were present in the Bundesrath or not. One Prussian member of the Bundesrath could cast the whole of the seventeen Prussian votes. According to the constitution, votes which were not instructed, i.e., votes which were cast irrespective of the instructions given by the governments of the individual members, were not counted. Formal instruction by the state was not always necessary, because the member or members nominated by the states were the chief officials of the states and were liable to be held to account for their actions in the Bundesrath by their own state governments.

Some of the smaller states found it a heavy tax on their resources to maintain the full delegation in the Bundesrath, and the custom of group representation grew up. **Group Representation** A single delegate nominated by groups of states recorded the votes of these states. The Bundesrath also had two sessions, one for important and the other for unimportant work. At the important session the individual delegates had to be present and at the unimportant session group representation was allowed.

The Bundesrath was the federal organ of the Empire. Its form and functions are both explained by its descent from the German Diet. To a certain extent it was an assembly of diplomats ; but it also had definite constitutional powers both as a law-making and as an executive body. **The Federal Organ** The members were not free to act like members of a normal legislative body. They had to vote according to order. Their tenure also depended on the will of their own governments. The Bundesrath was the representative body of the individual governments in the federal union, just as, before 1913, the members of the American Senate were elected by the legislatures of the state governments. The American senators, however, were not compelled to vote in any particular way by their own governments.

The president of the Bundesrath was the Imperial

Chancellor. He was nominated by the Emperor. As the Emperor was the king of Prussia, the Chancellor normally was one of the Prussian delegation. **Organi- zation of the Bundesrath** During the Great War this rule was departed from, but only the stress of circumstances caused by the war compelled the Emperor to go outside Prussia for his Chancellor.

The internal organization of the Bundesrath was governed by the constitution. There were eight standing committees. The members of the committees on the army and fortresses were appointed by the Emperor: Bavaria, Saxony and Wurtemberg had places on these. The committee on maritime affairs was also appointed by the Emperor. The committees on taxes, customs, trade, justice, railways, posts and telegraphs, and accounts were elected by the Bundesrath every year. The only constitutional limitation on these committees was that five states had to be represented, of which Prussia was one, and the Prussian member was always chairman. In practice the states appointed their own representatives on these committees. One other committee, the committee on Foreign Affairs, was subject to special procedure and rules. This committee was composed of representatives of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg and two other states nominated by the Bundesrath. The members of the committee gave the views of their own governments on matters referred to them by the Chancellor, who was a member of the committee. The Bavarian representative presided. The committee was really a consultative body on foreign affairs. There used to be three standing committees not provided for in the constitution—(1) the Committee on Alsace-Lorraine, (2) the Committee on the Constitution, (3) the Committee on Rules. All standing committees could meet although the Bundesrath itself was not in session.

The powers of the Bundesrath were extensive. It controlled practically the whole field of the German government.

Powers of the Bundesrath All laws and treaties that fell within the domain of legislation required its assent. Theoretically the lower house or Reichstag had the right to initiate legislation, but the Bundesrath prepared and discussed the great majority of bills, as well as the budget. Once these were discussed in the Bundesrath, they were submitted to the Reichstag, and, if passed, were

re-submitted to the Bundesrath to be passed finally before receiving the Emperor's signature.

The Bundesrath had also wide executive and judicial powers. As an executive authority it drew up regulations for the conduct of the administration and issued ordinances for the execution of the laws except in so far as that power had been given to other authorities. In finance its power was extensive. It elected the members of the Board of Accounts, which supervised the accounts of the nation. It had also considerable powers of appointment. It appointed the judges of the Imperial Court and the directors of the Imperial Bank. Other appointments, such as those of consuls and collectors of taxes, had to be approved by the committee of the Bundesrath concerned. Except in the case of invasion, when the Emperor could act alone, its consent was necessary to a declaration of war. Its consent was necessary also for the dissolution of the Reichstag and for federal executive action against a state which broke federal law. Members of the Bundesrath were also appointed to support laws approved by the Bundesrath in the Reichstag. These delegates could express the views of their own governments whether these views agreed with the views of the Bundesrath or not, so that their function had little semblance to the responsibility of cabinet members in other governments.

As a judicial body the Bundesrath had power to decide all disputes between the imperial and state governments regarding the interpretation of imperial statutes. It also decided controversies between individual states, provided these were matters of public law. The Bundesrath only adjudicated if one or other of the parties appealed to it. If a dispute arose in a state regarding its constitution and that state had no recognized authority to decide the dispute, the Bundesrath decided. It was also a court of appeal in the case of denial of justice by state courts, i.e., it compelled the state to give the complainant redress by passing a law suitable to the case.

The Reichstag was elected for five years by direct universal suffrage and secret ballot. Voters had to be twenty-five years old, not in active military service, not paupers, lunatics, felons or otherwise disqualified. Members were chosen in single electoral districts fixed by imperial law.

The electoral district was originally fixed on the basis of one member to 100,000 of population, but before the end of the Empire the population had shifted so much that

The Reichstag : the old basis of distribution was extremely unequal. As in America, no electoral district could be composed of parts of two or more states.

Its Composition Each state, however small, was thus able to have one representative. Being the largest and most populous state, Prussia had three-fifths of the whole membership; Bavaria, Saxony and Wurtemberg came next. An absolute majority was required for election in the first ballot and in the absence of an absolute majority a second vote was held. Elections were held on working days, not on Sundays, as in France, which placed the working class at a disadvantage. Members were unpaid.

The Reichstag controlled its own organization. It elected its president, two vice-presidents and secretaries. It framed its rules and decided election disputes. At the beginning of every session the Reichstag was divided into committees, which were temporary not standing committees, and were seven in number. At the beginning of each session the Reichstag was divided by lot into seven sections and each section elected one or more members to the various committees. The choice of the sections was really determined beforehand on party grounds.

The powers of the Reichstag seem to have been great : actually they were much less extensive than those of the upper chamber, or Bundesrath. Theoretically all laws, as well as the budget, loans and treaties falling within the domain of legislation, required the consent of the Reichstag. It had the right to initiate legislation, to express its opinion on the conduct of affairs and to ask government for reports. Its actual powers were circumscribed by the Bundesrath. The constitution, for example, provided that the budget should be annual, whereas the chief revenue laws were permanent and could not be changed without the consent of the Bundesrath. The appropriation for the army was fixed by the law determining the number of troops, which was voted for a number of years at a time. The chief actual function of the Reichstag was to consider bills prepared by the Chancellor

and Bundesrath. The members could criticize or amend the bills, but as a rule the Bundesrath had the final word.

The Reichstag was summoned by the Emperor. He had to convene it once a year, or oftener if he so chose. It had to be summoned at the same time as the meeting of the Bundesrath, and its sessions had to be public. The members could meet privately, if they wished to, but such a meeting had no status or authority. The Reichstag could be dismissed at any time by the Emperor with the consent of the Bundesrath. Although the Reichstag was a popular House, its dissolution did not depend upon popular opinion. It depended purely upon the will of the Emperor and Bundesrath.

In the Reichstag interpellations were allowed. The Imperial Chancellor being the only minister in Germany, interpellations or questions did not affect a body of ministers, such as a cabinet. The Imperial Chancellor had the right to sit in the Reichstag not because of his office as Chancellor, but as a delegate of the Bundesrath; in fact, all members of the Bundesrath had a right to be present in the Reichstag, and they had also a right to speak whenever they wished. The members of the Reichstag could address questions to the members of the Bundesrath individually, but as a matter of practice all questions were handed to the Chancellor, who gave the answers. If demanded by fifty members, a debate might follow, but the Chancellor did not resign if the vote went against him; nor indeed was he under any obligation to conform in any way to the wishes of the Reichstag.

The Bundesrath had far more power than the Reichstag. Besides those powers we have already seen it to possess, the Bundesrath had powers arising from special privileges. The Bundesrath could be called together at any time if a third of its members demanded. On the other hand, the Reichstag could not sit alone. The Bundesrath had to be in session at the same time. Again, the Bundesrath could carry its meetings over to a new session, whereas the Reichstag had to conclude its meeting at the end of each session. The Bundesrath was thus able, and the Reichstag unable, to make its business continuous. Another very

important privilege of the Bundesrath was its right to sit in private, whereas the Reichstag could not as a Reichstag meet privately.

The constitution laid down that the presidency of the union belonged to the King of Prussia, who carried the title of German Emperor. The Emperor occupied not a hereditary throne but a hereditary office. The imperial throne was hereditary, because occupied by the King of Prussia.

The chief powers of the Emperor lay in military and foreign affairs. He was commander-in-chief of the army and the navy, and was also in charge of foreign affairs. He represented the German Empire in its relations with foreign states, and, subject to the limitations we have seen, could make treaties for the German Empire. Except in the case of invasion, when he could act alone, he could declare war with the consent of the Bundesrath. With the consent of the Bundesrath he could also order federal action against a state which disobeyed federal law. He summoned and closed the Bundesrath, and with its consent he could dissolve the Reichstag. He promulgated the laws and was the chief executive authority for their execution. He appointed the Chancellor and other high officials whom the Bundesrath had not the right to appoint. Such were his powers as Emperor. His real powers, however, came to him not as Emperor, but as King of Prussia. As the King of Prussia he controlled Prussia, and as Prussia controlled the Empire, he, therefore, controlled the Empire. His chief power lay in the appointment of the Imperial Chancellor. As Emperor he had neither initiative in, nor veto over, legislation. As King of Prussia he nominated the Prussian delegation as well as the Imperial Chancellor and in this way had complete control over legislation. The negative vote of Prussia could prevent all changes in the constitution or in the laws dealing with the army and navy and taxes. Thus the Emperor was all-powerful.

The Imperial Chancellor, who was nominated by the Emperor, was the one minister of the German Emperor. While in office, he was practically supreme head of the executive, responsible only to the Emperor. The Chancellor was really a sort of second Emperor. He was not in any way responsible to the legislature. He was head of all the federal

delegates and as such presided in the Bundesrath ; he acted as intermediary between the Emperor and the Reichstag ; he explained the policy of the government in the Reichstag, and, though liable to criticism, he was not responsible in any way to the vote of the Reichstag ; he submitted the imperial budget to the Reichstag and gave an account of the general administration, but the Reichstag could not compel him to act in any particular way. The Chancellor controlled the various administrative departments of the government, and also supervised the administration of the imperial law in the individual states.

Before the Great War the Imperial Chancellor always was a Prussian. He used to be head of the Prussian state government. He was both a Prussian and an imperial official and had vast powers arising from his double position. As Chancellor he presided in the Bundesrath but he voted in it as a Prussian delegate, and as the head of the Prussian delegation. In the Reichstag he could appear either as a commissioner of the Bundesrath or as a Prussian member of the Bundesrath. In practice he interpreted Prussian will to the federal government and enforced the Prussian will on Germany. Thus it was that Prussia ruled Germany.

Up to 1878 the Chancellor could appoint a substitute to preside in the Bundesrath, but he remained responsible for the actions of his substitute. After 1878 a responsible Vice-Chancellor could be appointed. The Chancellor himself judged when such an appointment was necessary and the appointment was made on his own motion. Although the Vice-Chancellor was nominally responsible, the Chancellor remained ultimately responsible in every case. The Vice-Chancellorship was a convenient institution in the case of pressure of public business.

The administration of justice of the old German Empire was a mixture of state and imperial organization. At the head of the judicial system was the Reichsgericht, or Imperial Court of Appeal, which sat at Leipzig. The Reichsgericht had original jurisdiction in cases of treason against the Empire, but its main functions were appellate. The general administration

of justice was under the superintendence of the Empire. The state governments appointed their own judges and determined the limits of judicial districts, but imperial law determined the qualifications of state judges and the organization of the courts. Imperial codes of civil and criminal procedure as well as codes of civil and criminal law governed the state courts. The state courts were the interpreters of the imperial law although their decisions were given under their own rulers and in their own states.

The organization of the Prussian courts may be taken as an example of the actual administration of justice. At the head of the system, immediately below the Imperial Court, was, in each province, a superior district court, and below it a district court. There was also a court in each magisterial district (magisterial districts were formed from groups of rural communes). This (known as the *Amtsgerecht*) was normally a court of original jurisdiction in smaller civil suits. Its composition was determined by the work to be done. The higher courts each year subdivided work among themselves and the number of judges depended on the amount to be done. Cases were divided among "chambers", usually three in number, civil, criminal and commercial. Each chamber had its own organization, with a president at its head. In the magisterial districts there were also sheriffs' courts, for minor criminal cases; major cases went to the criminal chamber of the district court. Special jury courts, composed of three judges of the district court, tried grave crimes. Appeal lay from the sheriff's court to the district court, and, in points of law, from the district court to the superior district court and the Imperial Court. Judges were appointed by the king for life.

For administrative justice there was a series of courts, the organization of which corresponded mainly with local administrative areas. The circle committee, in circles, the city committee, in cities, the district committee, in the districts, acted as administrative courts, their composition being specially regulated for this purpose. The chief administrative court, corresponding to the Imperial Court as a final tribunal, was the superior administrative court in Berlin. It was composed partly of judicial and partly of administrative officials.

**The
Prussian
Judicial
Organization**

**Adminis-
trative
Courts**

There was also a court of conflicts to decide whether cases belonged to ordinary or administrative jurisdiction.

3. THE GOVERNMENT OF PRUSSIA

A short analysis of the Government of Prussia is necessary here, first, because of the importance of Prussia in the German Empire, second, because many Prussian institutions or agencies were used for imperial purposes; and third, because Prussia is an example of the state governments of the old Empire.

At the head of the Prussian government was the king, who held a hereditary crown, under the Salic law. All statutes required his signature, subject to the consent of his ministers. He appointed the chief officers of government, controlled the civil list, and conferred titles (a power he did not possess as German Emperor).

The ministers were the servants of the king, and were responsible to him, not to the legislature. Ministers could appear in either house of the legislature, but were not obliged to resign if the vote of the house went against them. They were the heads of the various departments of government. The ministries were co-ordinated in the College of Ministers or Ministry of State, which met regularly to discuss policy, proposed laws, departmental conflicts, and executive work generally.

The Chamber of Accounts was the supreme financial body in Prussia. Its members were appointed for life, similarly to judges. This chamber was responsible directly to the Crown. Its members were nominated partly by the Ministry of State and partly by the king. The president of the Chamber was appointed by the king on the nomination of the ministry.

The Economic Council was a consultative body to advise in matters concerning trade and commerce, agriculture and public works. Its voice decided how the votes of the Prussian delegation on the Bundesrath were to be cast. The German Economic Council, established under the new German constitution, was modelled on the Prussian Council. The Economic Council advises the new German Government on economic

matters. Its proposals are submitted to the Reichstag which accepts or rejects them as it pleases.

The Prussian legislature consisted of two houses—a House of Lords and a House of Representatives. The House of Lords consisted of hereditary nobles, life members who represented particular interests, representative high officials, princes nominated by the king, representatives of ruling families which had lost their kingdoms or duchies, university representatives and other outstanding men summoned by the king. The House of Representatives was composed of representatives chosen by all Prussians over twenty-five years of age not specially disqualified.

The electoral system requires special mention not only because of its distinctive nature, but because of the part it played in encouraging anti-privilege feeling in Prussia. The whole country was divided up into districts, and the voters in each were divided into three classes. Each class represented one-third of the taxable property of the district. Each class elected a third of the number of electors to which the district was entitled, and these electors ultimately elected the members of the House of Representatives. One elector was appointed for every two hundred and fifty inhabitants. Voting was public, and an absolute majority was necessary. Members had to be over thirty years of age, and Prussians. Tenure was for five years.

The two houses sat apart, except for the election of a regent, when they met together. They were summoned and adjourned at the same time. The legislative power was vested in the houses and the king. Each house could initiate legislation, but financial legislation had to originate in the lower house. The budget had to be passed or rejected as a whole. Actually most power was in the hands of the ministers, who were not responsible to the houses.

The system of local government was the result partly of historical conditions and partly of definite creation for administrative convenience. There were four units of local government : (1) The province ; the old provinces of Prussia—twelve in number—were continued for the purposes of local administration ;

(2) the district, a purely administrative creation; (3) the circle; (4) township and town.

In the province there existed two types of governing agency—one representing the central government, the other the province itself. The central government was represented by a superior president appointed by the king, with whom was associated a provincial council, which had statutory authority in respect of local matters. The superior president exercised most of the real power. The organs of the province itself were the *landtag*, or provincial assembly, which was composed of representatives elected by the diets of the circle. The *landtag* had definite functions in relation to the apportionment of taxes among the circles, election of officials, and examining the local budget. It also elected the provincial committee and the *landeshauptmann*, who together were the chief executive authority in the province. These executive authorities exercised their functions strictly within the limits allowed to the *landtag*. The superior president was responsible for the general administration.

The lowest grade was the townships or villages, and towns. In the rural communes there was a chief executive officer (mayor, president or village judge), and, if the villages were large enough, a council. In very small communes there was a mass meeting. In the towns the organization varied according to their size. Sometimes there was merely an executive officer (burgomaster); sometimes there were boards or councils. In financial, police and military matters, the central government kept the power and direction mainly in its own hands. In the large towns the organization varied, but generally speaking there was a mayor, who was a trained official. He was the president of the executive, associated with him was a council of aldermen, composed partly of members elected from the citizens of the town and partly of trained officials. The mayor and aldermen were the executive authority. The aldermen conducted their work in committees, in which members of the town council and citizens not members of the Council co-operated. The town council exercised control over the municipal budget. The three-class system of voting was the rule in the Prussian municipalities.

Magisterial districts were formed out of groups of rural communes. The head of the magisterial district was the justice (*Amtsman*), who was nominated by the circle diet for final appointment by the king. He was in charge of the police of the district and also was responsible for poor relief and local sanitation.

The district was not a unit of local self-government at all. It existed purely for local administration by the central government. All the officials were appointed by the central government. As a whole the officials were known as the administration, and the chief official was the administration-president. The officials worked through boards; the head of each board was known as the superior administrative councillor. In certain matters the administration-president had power to over-ride the decisions of the boards, and even the administration itself. There was also a district committee, composed partly of trained officials, and partly of members nominated by the provincial committee. This board confirmed certain orders of the administration-president, and also acted as an administrative court.

The diet was the chief organ of the circle (*Kreis*). It represented interests—towns (under 25,000 inhabitants), and country districts were apportioned places on it. The circle The country districts were further divided up between rural communes and landowners. The chief local official was the *landrat*, who acted for both the central government and the local diet. Associated with him was the circle committee, composed of himself and six members chosen by the diet. The *landrat* was a civil servant, appointed by the superior president of the province. The circle committee acted also as an administrative court for the circle.

At the close of the Great War, Prussia, in common with the rest of the German states, became a republic. A new constitution was adopted in 1920. Many of the institutions of the Kingdom of Prussia were continued, especially in judicial organization and local government, but the legislature and the executive were fundamentally altered. The legislature consists of two houses as before, a Diet (*Landtag*) and a State Council

(Staatsrath). The function of the State Council is to advise and control the Diet ; it may reject legislation passed by it. The Diet is elected by direct universal suffrage of persons over 20 years of age. The executive is responsible to the Diet, which elects the prime minister. The present ministry consists of the prime minister and seven ministers.

4. GERMANY AFTER THE WAR

At the conclusion of the War in November, 1918, a revolution broke out in Germany. The old system of government was completely upset. The Emperor abdicated and a provisional government under the Council of Peoples' Commissioners was established. The existing Parliament was dissolved and a National Assembly was summoned to draw up a constitution. The National Assembly elected the first President of the Republic. The reigning houses in the various states, principalities, and duchies of Germany all abdicated or were driven out, and each of the states is now organized on a republican basis. The Peace Treaty drawn up by the Allies was signed by Germany on June 28th, 1919.

The constitution drawn up and adopted by the National Assembly is, as might be expected from the circumstances under which it was drafted, a unique document. It was framed by a body which was predominantly socialist, and which had to work under the eyes of the victorious allied governments. The new constitution covers the whole domain of government, and it also outlines a programme of social reconstruction. It is not a normal constitution : it is more a social or political document, calculated to inspire the German people with new ideas of government functions and with hopes of a complete social reconstruction based on general ideas of justice. Many of the articles in the constitution contain matter not really constitutional at all : they are political, social, and even propagandist. Nevertheless, it has continued now for over ten years, and gives promise of being as interesting a constitution as that which it superseded. Several weaknesses in the new system have become apparent, especially in the relationship of the " States " to the Reich, or federal government, the position of the

administrative courts, and the complexity of local government. Serious attempts are being made to remedy them, and, when these have been successful, Germany will have probably one of the best democratic constitutions in the modern world.

Among the fundamental ideas of constitutional practice laid down are the usual freedom of person, of speech, and of meeting, but in addition to these we find other constitution maxims, such as the right of association for public officials, prohibition against sex discrimination for public office, the right to emigrate, the secrecy of communications by letter, telegraph or telephone. The constitution abolishes privileges of birth or class, and titles.

Its social, or more correctly, socialistic programme is also novel. It declares that marriage, as the foundation of the family, is under the special protection of the state. Illegitimate children must have equal rights with legitimate children. Education, too, is dealt with in considerable detail. Private preliminary schools are abolished. The conditions of compulsory school attendance are given, eight years at a public school, and a continuation school till the eighteenth year of age. The rights and conditions of labour are also set down. The most important item in relation to labour and industry is the creation of an Imperial Economic Council, to advise the government upon all economic measures.

The main principles governing the reorganization of the government may be set down shortly thus :—

1. The constitution abolished the old dynastical system. It made the German Empire a Republic. It also made the republican form compulsory for the states or territories.

2. The constitution altered the old federal system. It allows territorial arrangement by a simple act of legislation. It is significant that it uses the word "territory" in place of the old "state" for the old federal units.

3. It definitely recognized the twelve provinces of Prussia, and seems to foreshadow the dismemberment of that state. The total membership of Prussia or the new Imperial Council is two-fifths, and one-half of the Prussian members are nominated by the provinces.

4. The old Bundesrath was replaced by a new Imperial Council, or Reichsrath. Its composition is based on the proportion of one member to one million of population. Each "territory" has at least one member, and the Prussian membership is limited. The members, as in the old Bundesrath, are elected by their own governments. Its executive duties are largely the same as those of the Bundesrath. Its work is done mainly by Committees, in which each territory has only one vote.

5. The Reichsrath is much less powerful than the Bundesrath. It may initiate legislation, but actually the initiation is in the hands of the "government," which consists of the Chancellor and ministers, who are constitutionally responsible to the Reichstag. The Reichsrath has no longer an absolute veto on legislation, although the method of securing the reversal of the veto is complicated, implicating the use of the referendum.

6. The Reichstag was continued, and responsible government was introduced. The Chancellor and ministers, the constitution says, must have the confidence of the Reichstag. The Chancellor recommends the appointment or removal of ministers to the President; he determines the policy of the government. Each minister is responsible for his department, but no act of a minister is valid without the counter-signature of the Chancellor. The present German government consists of the Chancellor and eleven ministers.

7. The President is outside politics, like the French President. He is elected by the direct vote of all citizens, male and female, over 20 years of age, and holds office for seven years. He, and also the Chancellor and ministers, may be impeached by the Reichstag. The President is also subject to recall, on the initiative of the Reichstag. The President's duties are laid down in the constitution—commander-in-chief, representative of the Republic in foreign relations, etc.

8. The rules governing the convening, dissolution and organization of the Reichstag are laid down. The Diet has Standing Committees to guard the rights of the people against the government. These committees are meant to be permanent, even in spite of a dissolution. They are more like permanent commissions.

9. The main constitutional provisions regarding the

electorate and elections are universal suffrage, proportional representation, sex equality, the reduction of the age limit from twenty-five to twenty, and the secrecy of the vote.

10. The initiative and the referendum are introduced, with rules governing their use. The referendum is to be used in the case of disagreement between the Reichsrath and Reichstag. If the former does not agree with the latter, the President may order a referendum. If the Reichstag by a two-third vote insists on its view, the President must order it. He must also order it if the houses disagree on a constitutional amendment. The people may order a referendum on any measure save the budget, revenue or salary laws, if ten per cent of the voters wish it. Ten per cent of the voters are also required for the use of the initiative.

11. The division of powers between the national and territorial governments is much the same as under the Empire. The rights of the old states in several matters are much curtailed. They may determine their own form of government within the republican limits laid down, but beyond such determination they are circumscribed by national law.

12. The judicial organization of the Empire is also continued, with a large amount of constitutional safeguards and detail about the courts.

CHAPTER XXVII .

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

1. HISTORICAL

The royal house of Japan claims descent from the first Emperor, Jimmu, the date of whose accession to the throne is usually given as 660 B.C. The modern history of Japan dates from the revolution of 1867-68 when, after many centuries, the royal house was reinstated to the ruling power, which hitherto had been held by *de facto* rulers, or shoguns. With the revolution of 1868 the modern, or Meiji era commenced, and with it modern Japan may be said to have started.

The revolution can be understood only by a study of the conditions prevailing in the previous (Tokugawa) era or shogunate. The first of the Tokugawa shoguns, Iyeyasu, established his position by defeating his enemies at the battles of Sekigabara in 1600, and Osaka, in 1615. These battles put an end to internecine strife, which had continued steadily from the middle of the fifteenth century. The battle of Sekigabara is really the turning point in Japanese history, for with it the Tokugawa shoguns became masters over the many local feudal barons, and civil war gave place to two and a half centuries of peace, prosperity and orderly development.

Once he had established his position by military force, Iyeyasu proceeded to organize the country so as to ensure peace. One of his most important acts was the consolidation of the social, governmental and legal systems of Japan in a document known as the Testament of Iyeyasu. In the feudal era, Japanese society had developed a form and rigidity not unlike the Hindu caste system. At the head of the social

and political hierarchy was the Emperor (or Mikado), who was regarded as divine both in origin and in person. No one, save a few of the highest ministers and his consorts, was allowed to see him. His person was so sacred that, if he spoke to anyone outside this small circle, a curtain was drawn between the speaker and the Emperor. Living apart from the ordinary life of his subjects, he could know, and do only what the shoguns told him.

The social strata of Japanese society were three—the nobles (*kuge*), the military class (*samurai* or *buke*), and the common people (*heimin*). The *kuge* were, the court nobility, each family of which claimed descent from some previous Mikado. They occupied the chief administrative posts by hereditary right, but did not enjoy large emoluments. They were not territorial magnates, so that their position was one of high honour and comparative poverty.

Next to the *kuge* came the *samurai*, or military class. Like the *kuge*, they occupied administrative posts, which sometimes were hereditary. Many owned estates granted as a reward for military merit. Most of them received stipends from their feudal chiefs, or *daimyos*. The *daimyos* were a permanent landed nobility so organized by Iyeyasu that they could not defy either the central government or make war on each other. The *samurai* as a class did not seek wealth. Their one duty was military service, and their chief object in life was not to disgrace the code of honour of their class. Stoical indifference to pain, relentless vengeance for insult, strict truthfulness, filial piety, unselfishness and disregard for death were their chief characteristics as a class.

The *heimin* composed the third, and most numerous class of the people. They had no social status. They could not, like the *samurai*, carry swords, and their daily bread had to be earned by manual labour. The *heimin* were divided into three classes—farmers, artisans and traders. The farmers were the most important: indeed some of them enjoyed the privilege of carrying one sword (the *samurai* had the privilege of carrying two). The artisans, who included sculptors, artists, ceramists and lacquerers, came next. The traders were the lowest in the recognized social scales.

Outside the recognized social classes were the *eta* and *hinin*. The duties of the *eta*, who were the descendants of enslaved prisoners of war, were to dispose of dead bodies, kill animals and tan hides. The *hinin* were mendicants, whose duties included the removal and burial of bodies of executed criminals. These pariah classes lived apart from the *heimin*, and could neither intermarry nor eat with them.

The peace and order established by the earlier Tokugawa shoguns proved the undoing of shogunate. In the first place, the social classes changed under the new conditions of peace. The *samurai* or hereditary soldiers, in particular, lost their old virtues. Their old conditions of life had departed, and their incomes were not sufficient for the expenses of the more luxurious times of peace. The *heimin* flourished, for peace favoured money-making by trade. Luxurious living became common, and wealth came to be looked on as more important than birth. In the second place the shoguns, who had preserved ascendancy in war, deteriorated in times of peace. Their power passed from them to their ministers or to their feudatories, so that in Japan there were three grades in the government—the Mikado, whose divinity made him largely an abstraction; the hereditary shoguns, who wielded nominal powers but who preferred pleasure to work; and the feudatories, into whose hands the actual power of government passed. In the third place, the work of scholars brought to light the historical and legal fact of the sovereignty of the Emperor, from which the conclusion followed that the power of the shoguns was both illogical and unconstitutional. Scholars also brought to light the virtues of Shintoism, the old national religion of Japan, the revival of which had much influence in the development of the new Japan. In the fourth place, during the Tokugawa era Japan had come into intercourse with foreign nations. The shoguns proved unable to preserve the policy of isolation which the people regarded as essential for the best interests of their country. In the earlier years of the Tokugawa era foreign intercourse had been encouraged, but from 1637, after a rebellion of Christians, the country was closed to foreigners, save the Chinese and the Dutch, till the second half of last century.

The fifth, and immediate, cause of the fall of the shogunate was the attitude of the Satsuma and Choshu clans and their adherents, on the question of opening Japan to foreigners. These two southern clans had been granted semi-independence in the days of Iyeyasu, but they remained hostile to the shoguns. Their hostility was accentuated by the demands of foreign nations for entry to Japan, and the bombardment of their towns by foreign warships. Acting in conjunction with many of the court nobles they demanded the abolition of the shogunate and the union of Japan under the Emperor.

The shogunate was thus called on to settle two questions—the disaffection of the Satsuma and Choshu clans, and of the court nobility, and the admission of foreigners. The last shogun, Keiki or Yoshinobu settled the question by voluntarily resigning his authority to the Emperor. This surrender was followed by a considerable amount of bloodshed, but ultimately the power of the Emperor was firmly established. From this date (1868), begins the Meiji Era, the era of modern Japan.

The revolution in Japan was led by quite a few men, the most of whom, at the outset, were not democratic.

**Results
of the
Revolution**

Once the revolution was completed, they had no clear ideas as to how the country was to be ruled. The leaders of the Satsuma clan had aimed at securing the shogunate for themselves, but, as they had to act in conjunction with the Choshu clansmen, they exacted a pledge that, when the Emperor resumed his power, he should summon an assembly which would decide on future policy and appoint the best men of the country to the chief administrative posts. This promise was secured not as a matter of constitutional principle but as a result of the mutual distrust of the Satsuma and Choshu clans.

One leading object of the revolution was clear, viz., the unification of the Japanese nation. Up to 1868, as we have

**The
Unification
of Japan**

seen, Japan was divided amongst a large number of feudal chiefs who ruled their own territories in semi-royal style. Each had his own system of administration and law, and one of the first problems that faced the reformers, who themselves had no social position or prestige similar to that of the feudal chiefs,

was to establish a uniform system of law and administration over the whole of Japan. Thus, at the beginning of the revolution, while theory dictated one course, administration necessitated another. The reformers had no machinery to carry out their theories other than that of the feudal chiefs. But their difficulty was solved in an unlooked-for way. Several of the most powerful feudal chiefs surrendered their powers to the Emperor of their own free will. Among those were the chiefs of the Satsuma and Choshu clans, and their example was followed by close on two hundred and fifty other chiefs. The feudal system in Japan was thus abolished by the feudatories themselves in order to secure a united Japanese nation. Few countries can show a similar example of self-sacrifice for the common good on the part of their leading nobles. Although the *samurai* of Japan in many cases may have been actuated by ulterior personal motives, the fact remains that Japan owes its first important step towards unification to the action of a class for whom self-sacrifice was an essential part of their code of honour.

**Steps in
Centralization**

After the surrender of their feudal rights by the feudal chiefs, the first steps towards centralization of the government were the appointment of the feudal chiefs themselves as governors of their own districts and the confirmation of the *samurai* in their stipends and administrative positions. The pay of the governors and the *samurai* was fixed, and the balance of the revenues of the districts over which the governors presided went to the Imperial treasury. A cabinet, composed of the leaders of the revolution, was formed in Kyoto to conduct the administration of the country. This system was practically a continuation of the previous system with a change of name. Something further was necessary to make Japanese government really a national government. The real powers of administration still remained in the hands of the old feudatories, who were now called governors. The army also was at the command not of the Emperor but of the feudatories. To make the government national, it was necessary that the administrative districts should come under the central government, and that the local *samurai* should be under the command of the Emperor. The first steps towards centralization were

accomplished in a way similar to the previous methods. Some of the local governors voluntarily agreed to hand over the administration of their district to the central government ; a large number of the *samurai* offered to lay down their swords ; several of the clans sent contingents of troops to the Emperor's army ; and, finally, in the formation of the central government, or cabinet, the principle of clan representation was adopted.

In 1871 a Decree of the Emperor definitely abolished the system of local autonomy by districts. The old feudal nobles were relieved from their posts as governors. The taxes of these districts were now to come to the central government and the officials were to be appointed by it. The chiefs were guaranteed a fixed percentage of the income of their old territories, but they were henceforth compelled to live in the Imperial capital, which was now Tokio. The *samurai* also were confirmed in the enjoyment of their revenues, but in many cases the hereditary principle was abolished. It has been reckoned that some 400,000 *samurai* received such pensions, the annual sum amounting to something like £2,000,000. The new government had to find some method of relieving the funds of the country of this heavy charge. But the problem was solved largely by the *samurai* themselves. Although they had been a privileged class from time immemorial and as such had enjoyed hereditary revenues and distinctions, they recognized that their place in the modern scheme of things was incongruous. In 1873, the Government of Japan commuted the revenues of the *samurai* at the rate of six years' purchase for hereditary pensions and four years' purchase for life pensions. Such an arrangement was not a fair business proposition, but the *samurai* accepted the arrangement not as a measure of financial justice but as a recognition that their utility had departed. Not only did they sacrifice their revenues but they also gave up their hereditary distinctions, the chief of which was the privilege of wearing two swords. Previous to this, many of them had given up this privilege and had voluntarily stepped down the social ladder to act as traders or as peasants. The Imperial Decree of 1783 was not compulsory, but the *samurai* accepted it according to the spirit of the times.

With the accomplishment of their first objects, the reformers were not able to preserve unity amongst themselves,

So long as their purpose was not achieved, the reformers acted as one. With the necessary reconstruction which followed, however, dissension began to enter. The radical measures of the first few years after the restoration of the Emperor had been carried through more successfully perhaps than even the most sanguine reformers could have expected, but soon the inevitable split took place between the old and the new, or the conservatives and the liberals or reformers. The conservatives did not look with favour on the wholesale abolition of the old social distinctions and privileges. The *samurai*, in particular, were disturbed by a proposed measure of conscription. They had resigned many of their hereditary privileges, but one thing which the majority of them could not regard with favour was the surrender of their privileges as the military class of Japan. In spite of their surrendered revenues and outward distinctions, they still hoped to continue to occupy the chief posts in the army and navy. According to the conscription law the *heimin* could become soldiers as well as the *samurai*. The discontent of the *samurai* was brought to a head by two measures which were adopted by the government in 1876. The first was the complete veto on the wearing of swords; the second the compulsory commutation of their pensions. The Satsuma clan was the centre of the *samurai* movement and in 1877 a bitter struggle broke out between them and the government, in which, though the struggle was short, there was enormous loss of life. The Satsuma were overcome, and the viceroy of the government finally dispelled all doubts as to the fighting qualities of the Japanese nation as a whole.

The new government proceeded to make itself as efficient as possible. The old anti-foreign policy was replaced by an intense desire to model Japan on the systems of the West. Englishmen, Americans, Frenchmen, Germans and Italians were imported to organize the administration and industries of the country. Japanese students travelled to American and European universities to study the western systems for themselves. Development was very rapid, so rapid indeed that many of the Japanese themselves thought that reform was proceeding too quickly. The sudden change of manners, customs and organizations, however, did not produce any armed upheaval. Such troubles as did arise were

**The
Course of
Develop-
ment**

due to attempts to force or to retard the growth of representative government.

After the defeat of the Satsuma insurgents in 1877, another clan, the Tosa, who, though they had not joined the Satsuma insurrection, sympathized with the Satsuma *samurai*, presented a petition to the government asking for a representative assembly. This memorial was not the mark of an advanced democratic movement: it was an attempt to secure the highest administrative posts for a wider circle than the oligarchy of the four chief clans. The memorial asked that the common people should be educated to take a share in government, but it really aimed at securing a voice in government for the *samurai* as a whole, as distinct from the leading members of a few clans. Before this time, the government had organized a kind of assembly. In 1874 an arrangement was made for periodical meetings of the provincial governors, who were to act as the representatives of their areas. These governors, of course, were official nominees, and their main duty was more to persuade the people of their provinces to accept the measures of the central government than to represent the views of their people to the central government. Moreover, these meetings were advisory or consultative; they had no legislative power.

In 1875 a body of "elder statesmen" (*genro-in*) was constituted, partly as a legislative assembly, partly as a temporary expedient to enrol on the side of government leading men whose antagonism might be fatal. The body was composed of official nominees, and its main functions were to consider and revise all laws before they were finally promulgated.

In 1878, Okubo, the leading Japanese minister, was assassinated at the instigation of the Satsuma party, which ostensibly demanded remedies for the abuses of power on the parts of the government, and representative institutions. The first step in representative government was the creation of representative bodies in local government. These bodies did not have legislative powers, nor were they representative of the people as a whole. The suffrage was restricted to persons with a high property qualification, and the members elected had to have double the property qualification of the

**Growth of
Represent-
ative
Government**

**The Elder
Statesmen**

**Local Repre-
sentative
Bodies**

voters. The chief functions of these bodies were to levy and spend the taxes of their areas, under the supervision of the minister in charge of home affairs, and to present petitions to government. Frequently governors disagreed with assemblies, but on the whole they were good training grounds for wider representative government.

Meantime political parties began to develop. One, the Liberals, was organized in 1878 by Count Itagaki, who had played a leading part in the previous agitation for parliamentary government. The "platform" of this party theoretically was free of constitutional government. Actually their object was to oppose the government. Another, the Progressive Party, was organized by Count Okuma in 1881, with the same theoretical party principles as the Liberals. Instead, however, of acting together, these two parties opposed each other, for the party movement was more personal than political.

The immediate result of the formation of these parties seemed to justify their existence and methods. In 1881 an Imperial edict was issued promising that a national assembly would be convened in 1891. The parties and the government were bitterly hostile to each other, even violent measures being resorted to: but the guiding hand of the Marquis Ito (afterwards Prince Ito), the chief adviser of the Emperor, prevented internal strife, and ultimately the government and the parties came to a working understanding. Despite opposition the much maligned government had done an enormous amount of work in organizing the legal, political, industrial and commercial life of Japan. Railways, telegraphs and harbours were established; the organization of the post office; the codification of the civil and the criminal laws; the introduction of the competitive system for public appointments, the creation of a national bank; the re-organization of local government had been completed. The national finances were put on a stable basis. Education was encouraged. A mercantile marine was established, and the defence systems organized. In spite of the obloquy cast at it by the dissatisfied parties, many of the leaders of which were dissatisfied because either they had once been in office or could not get office, the old clan bureaucracy made modern Japan.

2. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The constitution was promulgated on February 11th, 1889, and the first session of the Diet was opened on November 29th, 1890. The constitution was the work chiefly of Prince Ito, who had guided the government in the stormy years preceding the constitution. After the Imperial rescript of 1881 promising the constitution, a commission was appointed to examine the constitutions of the leading European states and the United States. The leading and directing figure on the commission was Prince Ito. The constitution is a half-way measure between the old feudal system and modern free government.

The constitution originally was a gift of the Emperor to the people, and the power of initiating amendments rests with him. A proposed amendment must be submitted to the Diet. Two-thirds of the members of either house must be present before a proposed amendment can be discussed, and a two-thirds majority of the members present is necessary for the adoption of an amendment.

In constitutional theory the Emperor exercises legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet. The Diet is composed of two houses, the House of Peers, and the House of Representatives, and in practice it controls the whole course of legislation. The Emperor convokes, opens and prorogues the Diet, and he has power to dissolve it. He may also summon extraordinary sessions. The Diet meets every year, and each session lasts three months. Discussion is public, but the government may ask for a secret sitting of the houses and the houses themselves may decide to have secret sittings. The members of the Diet enjoy privileges and immunities similar to those enjoyed by members of parliament in Great Britain.

In each house of the legislature there is a president and vice-president, all of whom are paid. In the upper house these are nominated by the Emperor from among the members. The tenure is for seven years. In the lower house they are nominated by the Emperor from among three candidates selected for each office by the house itself. Each house is divided into sections by lot, and the sections elect an equal number of

members for the standing committees. Special committees are also appointed for particular purposes when necessary. Bills may be initiated by each of the houses or by the government, and all measures must go through both houses and be signed by the Emperor. The budget must be initiated in the House of Representatives, but the House of Peers may reinsert items which have been rejected by the lower house.

The House of Peers is composed of (a) princes of the blood royal, who have attained their majority; (b) princes or marquises who have attained the age of twenty-five; (c) counts, viscounts and barons, who have attained the age of twenty-five and who are elected by their own orders, the number elected never to exceed one-fifth of each order; (d) men of thirty years of age or above who have rendered distinguished service, and men of erudition, nominated by the Emperor; (e) representatives of the highest tax-payers, elected by themselves, one from each prefecture. The number of non-titled members must not exceed the aggregate numbers of the titled members. The elected titled members and the elected representatives of the highest tax-payers sit for seven years, the others sit for life.

The House of Peers is thus constituted on a basis of social aristocracy, distinguished service and property. As may be expected from its composition, it is a conservative body, and as a second chamber it wields much more power than second chambers in western democracies. It has equal power in legislation with the House of Representatives, and often blocks the measures of the lower house. As noted above, it has also definite powers in financial legislation.

According to the new Election Law passed in the 1925 Diet, the House of Representatives is composed of members of not less than thirty years of age elected by male Japanese subjects of not less than twenty-five years of age. The proportion of the total number of members to the population of Japan is approximately 1 to 128,000. Only one member is elected for each constituency, and only persons who have lived continuously for not less than a year within the same city, town or village may be registered as electors.

Certain classes are excluded from voting or being elected. Heads of families of peers and men serving in the army or navy can neither vote nor stand for election. Holders of certain specified government posts are also ineligible for electing or being elected, but government officers of the political class may be members of the House while holding office. A general election must be held once every four years, or oftener if the House is dissolved. Election is by secret ballot, and, as each elector must write the name of the candidate, the electors must, to some extent, be literate.

At the head of the executive is the Emperor. His person is sacred and inviolable. His powers are very extensive.

The Executive : In him is vested the right of convoking, closing or proroguing the Diet, and of dissolving the House of Representatives. He may issue ordinances in cases of urgency, when the Diet is not sitting, for the approval of the Diet when it meets. He may also issue ordinances for the execution of the laws and for the preservation of peace and order. He is commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and determines their organization. He can declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, and proclaim a state of siege. He determines the organization of, and makes appointments in, the administration. He confers all titles of nobility, and grants pardons, amnesties or commutation of punishments. All these powers are exercised subject to the counter-signature of the minister concerned, who is responsible for the acts of the Emperor.

The Privy Council is composed of a president, vice-president, a chief secretary, five secretaries, and twenty-five councillors. The ministers are *ex-officio* members of the council: they also form the cabinet. The Privy Council advises the Emperor on all the matters which come within his executive authority, on all constitutional difficulties, on composition of the cabinet, and on proposed measures. It is the constitutional advisory body to the Emperor.

The Elder Statesmen (*genro*) or 1868 used to be the Emperor's advisory body, but it is now practically defunct, as most of the members are dead.

The cabinet is an extra-constitutional body composed of the ministers of state, whose position as ministers is

constitutional. These ministers are twelve in number, although the premiership may be held with one of the ministries, thus making eleven holders of office. The ministers are the minister president of state, or prime minister, and the ministers of home affairs, foreign affairs, finance, war, marine, justice, education, agriculture and forestry, commerce and industry, communications, and railways. The members of the cabinet may be chosen from either house, and they may speak in either house, whether members of it or not. Originally the cabinet was responsible to the Emperor alone, but with the growth of political parties the cabinet is more and more developing the character of normal cabinet government, viz., responsibility to the lower house.

The Cabinet

The party system in Japan has neither the organization nor the stability of the party systems of Britain or the United States. The early history of modern Japanese parties has already been noted, but since the adoption of the constitution, party lines have changed and many other parties have grown up. Hitherto there have been no definite lines of cleavage in Japanese parties. They have been formed largely on personal grounds. They all avow progressive principles: in fact there is no real conservative party in Japan. In the present House of Representatives there are five parties, with a number of Independents, who practically form a sixth party. There is a tendency for modern parties to split up on principles or policy more than on the personality of leaders.

Political Parties

The Emperor is the source of justice, which is administered by the courts in his name. The courts are arranged in four grades:—(1) local courts; (2) district courts, (3) courts of appeal; and (4) the supreme court. The local courts are held by single judges; the district courts and courts of appeal are collegiate, with several divisions, each of three judges. The supreme court is also collegiate, and is divided into divisions with five judges each. The scope of the jurisdiction of all the courts is defined by law. Each court has both civil and criminal jurisdiction. There is a court of administrative litigation for trying suits arising from the alleged misuse of executive authority. The courts have no

The Judiciary

power over the constitution: the right of interpreting the constitution belongs to the Emperor.

The local government of Japan is based on the Prussian system. The whole country is divided into prefectures (*Fu*, municipal, and *Ken*, rural), which are subdivided into municipalities (*Shi*) and counties (*Gun*). The counties are subdivided into towns (*Cho*) and villages (*Son*). In the prefectures there is a governor, prefectural assembly and prefectural council, and this organization is repeated in the other larger units (in the county, with the sheriff, county assembly and county council: in the municipality with the mayor, municipal assembly and municipal council). In the towns and villages there is a chief magistrate and a town or village assembly. These assemblies decide on financial matters or on subjects delegated to them by the superior units. The franchise in local government is based on residence.

Hokkaido, Formosa or Taiwan, Sakhalin and Korea have special organizations of their own. Formosa and Korea are still under a semi-military government.

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